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Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1: Research background
It is unsurprising that as China’s economic, military, and political clout grows, so does the interest in theories about how it might act upon its growing presence on the international stage.
Hence, scholars and practitioners alike have cultivated a myriad of theories and scenarios concerning how the country might assert itself towards other nations. However intriguing this side of the matter might be, the other side of the issue – how other countries receive China’s growing impact on their affairs – is highly relevant as well. After all, in politics it takes two to form a relation. As such, the country that is on the receiving side of China’s influence also plays a role in determining the type of relation the two will have. In this research the topic of Africa’s reception of China’s impact on the continent was chosen as the test case for analysing how the internal dynamics of recipient countries shape their reaction to China. This is because the continent appeared best suited for this type of research given its diversity in levels of
development and cultures. This makes it a good measuring point regarding what factors may influence a country’s reception of China.
The variety between the characteristics of the African countries also poses a challenge, however. There is much more to African responses to Chinese influence than one would expect at face value. As will be discussed a little further down, the responses of African countries in
general can be summarized as disparate, incoherent, and uncoordinated (with the exception of South Africa). This raises an intervening question about what might account for this wide variety in responses, even in cases where the incentives facing the countries are the same.
In order to address the question of what makes for this diversity in African responses to China, this work will take up one concrete issue which affected most of the African countries in a similar way. This issue is the textile dispute with China, which will be elaborated upon further
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below. To give the analysis of this subject sufficient concreteness and detail, the focus will be placed on China’s two largest importers in Africa (Nigeria and South Africa), and how their respective reactions to the textile dispute were shaped by their domestic politics (Broadman, 2008). This is because the fact that these two countries import the most from China and therefore the impact of textile imports should be most visible in their respective societies. Beyond their extensive trade ties, these countries are also selected for their size and possession of natural
resources, which ought to grant them greater leverage vis-á-vis China, compared to other, smaller, not as well-endowed African nations. For example, South Africa has shown to be able to
maintain continued Chinese interest, despite having a more mature, regulated market, as well as stricter employment requirements (such as Black Economic Empowerment program) that have deterred some investors (Alden and Wu, 2014). This indicates that these two countries should be able to make some demands towards China. Before going any further into the textile issue, it is necessary to gain a wider understanding of China’s role in Africa.
1.2: China in Africa
In the last few decades China’s engagement with the continent has expanded drastically. The type of involvement today is different from the past as well. Today, China deals with all kinds of parties, ruling or not. Additionally, beyond party politics, economic cooperation and cultural exchange are now also part of the relation’s content. The economic cooperation changed too, as it shifted from purely state led to a two-part approach including state-owned and private companies.
The size of trade is different as well, given the large increase in volume (Li, 2008).
For example, between 1999 and 2004 the figure grew substantially, with 48 percent per year. By 2008 China accounted for 40 percent of Africa’s exports to Asia. China is also
significant on the import side as it accounted for more than a third of imports from Asia to Africa.
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In 2004 China’s largest import from Africa was oil and natural gas (62% of total merchandise exports to China), its largest export was textiles (36% of total merchandise imports from China) (Broadman, 2008). By 2015 textile had been pushed to second place by machinery and
electronics however (Pigato and Tang, 2015). As a result, most of China’s activity has been in oil producing states, although South Africa has received much attention as well. By percentage, the most prominent exporters to China were Angola and South Africa. The most important importers by percentage were, as mentioned earlier, Nigeria and South Africa (Broadman, 2008).
As for what brings China to Africa, scholars note that there are a variety of explanations.
Wenran Jiang (2008) explains that, although there is no single explanation, there are a number of factors that have an influence. These include: China’s high economic growth rate, which fosters demand; China’s membership of the WTO and its resulting trade practices; the degree of its energy demand; positive views of China in Africa; decreasing Western influence; and domestic developmental dynamics, which entail an externalization of China’s internal business behaviour to Africa. Alden (2007), adds that the competition between Taiwan and China for recognition and Beijing’s goal to obtain African votes in multilateral institutions also played a role in China’s engagement.
Whether this growing relation is positive or not is a contested issue among scholars.
Whereas authors like Deborah Brautigam (2009) argue that the developments have a largely positive impact on the African continent, others highlight a number of problems that China’s engagement brings with it. Jiang (2008), for example, mentions the case of Zambia, which
entailed accusations towards Chinese businessmen and their alleged exploitation of local workers.
The resent even reached politics as the opposition ran an anti-China election platform. During his visit, President Hu responded to the criticisms and offered the country special loans and debt cancellation. In South Africa too, a debate is going on about whether China’s economic role is
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complementary or competitive to the country. This is since South Africa’s manufacturing seemed to have faced job losses because of the Chinese competition. Especially, the small and medium sized firms are claimed to have a direct impact on the lives of Africans. Alden (2007) notes that although African companies might benefit from the presence of these firms because of the flying geese effect, they also suffer under the competition. This is said to be the result of the networks and supply chains to which the Chinese firms have access, which allow these firms to offer lower prices.
What is not contested is the urgency of a united African stance with regard to China’s involvement. Many scholars have stressed this is necessary to give Africa the leverage it needs to balance the relationship with China (Rocha, 2007). Nonetheless, at this point, most African countries on themselves lack a coherent or coordinated response to China’s engagement of the continent (Again, South Africa is an exception to this). Indeed, Chidaushe (2007) explains that the African approach to China’s role on the continent is marked by individual engagements instead of multilateralism. Without a structured approach, the author claims, the allegedly equal relation is skewed in China’s favour. However, suggestions have been made that this might come about in due time as more meetings of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) pass (Alden, 2007). As to why this disunity is the case, some theories point to the fact that the African countries are highly dissimilar in terms of their level of development, which translates into vastly different priorities for each country (Ikome, 2010).
1.3: The Textile Dispute
Thus, in general, the African countries are disunited because they all face a somewhat different situation with regard to China. In other words, their dissimilar interests lead them to have dissimilar responses. However, as mentioned before, the matter of the textile industry is an
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exception to this as interests seems to align around this issue: the African textile sectors were hard hit in 2005 with the withdrawal of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). The repeals caused a sizable increase in Chinese textile imports which persuaded Europe and the US to reinstall a restriction by 2008. During the interim period, many textile manufacturing companies were put out of business or had to lay off large sections of their personnel. The export-oriented textile industry in Africa suffered but survived (Brautigam, 2009).
As such, the Chinese impact on local textile industries has been wholly negative. Deborah Brautigam (2009), singled out the textile industry as the only sector which fared predominantly badly under Chinese competition. Nevertheless, the author mentions that in Lesotho, Mauritius, and Kenya the sector showed signs of recovery until the 2008 global crisis. Hence, we see that the matter of the textile dispute is different from China’s general involvement in Africa in that here the interests of the African countries converge rather than differ. Following this reversed logic, one would expect that the similar interests of most African nations would result in a
comparable response to the problem among these nations. Yet beyond the Istanbul Declaration, in which the WTO was requested to continue its quota on Chinese textile exports after 2005, no coherent responses have been made (Alden, 2007). More so, the Istanbul Declaration only
included South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Mauritius, and Kenya. On top of this, it was a Turkish and American led initiative, not an African one (Naumann, 2006). In some cases, African traders even contributed to the problem, as was the case for some Togolese traders who travelled to China to teach Chinese manufactures traditional designs, after which they imported the imitations back to Togo (Sylvanus, 2013).
This makes the textile dispute both an interesting and potentially indicative case
concerning the question of why the African nations, even when facing similar incentives, choose different courses of action. In the next section two dimensions that might explain the different
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reactions in our case studies, Nigeria and South Africa, will be defined. After, their functioning and the relation they have to each other will be clarified.
1.4: State and Civil Society in Policymaking
Since the initial focus of this paper was on the reception of Chinese influence in Africa in general, the dimensions in which the textile dispute is to be analysed ought to cover both the state of the respective countries in the form of their governments, and their societies in the shape of their civil societies. This does not mean that they should be seen as separate explanatory variables, but rather as two that interact with each other in either a competitive or cooperative policy process.
This interaction, if it concerns dissimilar interests between the two, is characterized by civil society’s access to the negotiation table and methods to influence the government, and the state’s ability to sail its own course by resisting influence through centralization of power. Alex
Thomson (2010), in his introductory work on African politics adds that ‘external interests’, or third parties, are also highly relevant to determining African decision-making. However, in this paper this dimension will be largely omitted as it focusses on the reception of an ‘external interest’, namely China’s. Thus, as mentioned earlier China will only play a passive role in the research and the country’s response will be assessed through the dynamics of domestic interests.
Paying attention to the role of the state in determining the response to the textile dispute is by no means a controversial research decision as the state is the most significant actor in terms of enacting and enforcing policy, and therefore has priority in determining a country’s political development (Thomson, 2010). The focus on civil society, on the other hand, is in need of further justification. This is not to say that there is no precedent for taking up this dimension in the analysis, as other scholars such as Thomson (2010), Michael Bratton (1989), and John Makumbe (1998) have underlined the importance of civil society in African politics. Rather it is necessary
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to provide a number of concrete examples of civil society’s influence in the past, its definition, and an explanation of how civil society might influence policy, in order to create sufficient clarity to facilitate the analysis.
Indeed, Thomson (2010) and Bratton (1989) explain that civil society can be of great explanatory value in Africa as much of the continent’s political exchanges take place in society rather than parliament, in part because of the relatively weakness of state institutions in Africa. In the 1990s the significance of civil society in Africa became particularly visible as it played a major role in the wave of democratization attempts that swept the continent. Makumbe (1998) refers as such to the end of apartheid in South Africa, the national strike by Swazi workers in 1997, the creation of Zambia’s Movement of Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in 1990, followed by its subsequent coming to power a year later, and Laurent Kabila’s victory over Mobutu in Zaire, which had obvious support from civic groups. He also mentions a number of strikes led by trade union congresses in a succession of countries, like Congo and Niger in 1990, and Gabon, Guinea, Cameroon as well as Mauritania in 1991.
Before further clarification can be given concerning civil society’s methods to influence policy, an effort should be made to define the concept of civil society. Therefore, we will first cross various pieces of literature on what civil society is and what it is not. From these a working definition for this thesis will be shaped. After, a number of concrete examples of civil society organizations will be given to create a sharp image of the concept. At the last, examples drawn from literature on Nigerian and South African state-civil society relations will be put forward to indicate the methods through which civil society may exert influence over the state.
The various definitions given in the reviewed literature will be discussed starting from the broadest definition followed by increasingly narrow definitions. Thus, the first and widest
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definition is given by Habid (2005), who defined civil society as the organized expression of varying interests and ideals which work in the sphere between family, the state, and the market.
Usman (2009), in his book on state and civil society in Nigeria, adds some more detail to this definition. He states that it is the participatory space between the formal apparatus of the state and the informal settings of families and atomized individuals. In this space, groups are formed in order to create associations, express interests and take part in public affairs. Usman notes that the term is too large and insufficiently concrete on its own and should therefore be expressed
embedded in a specific context as it would yield concrete instances of civil society groups.
Arguably this would help to clarify the definition, hence we will discuss concrete examples of civil society organizations further below.
Cohen and Arato (1997), in their writings on civil society in political theory, give a
definition that overlaps with Usman’s. They describe civil society as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed of the intimate sphere (especially family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public
communication. In this context, modern civil society comes from types of self-constitution and self-mobilization.
Rainey, Wakunuma, and Stahl (2017) give the greatest amount of detail. This is since they compiled the working definitions of civil society organizations of multiple fields, including academia, policy views, project views, and the EC/EU view. They list that the EC/EU views civil society organizations as being non-state actors that work on a non-profit basis. Moreover, these actors should be non-partisan and non-violent, while aiming to promote the public good. They consist of platforms through which people organize to achieve common goals and ideals. These relate to political, cultural, social, or economic issues. Academia, according to Rainey,
Wakunuma, and Stahl sees civil society organizations as non-governmental entities, that work
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non-profit. They are self-constituting voluntary organizations. Policy shares this view, with the only difference being that they conceive of them as common cause NGOs, rather than self-constituting voluntary organizations. Those working on projects tend to perceive civil society organizations as being non-government, non-profit or without commercial interest, faith based or carrying an alternative legal status, and having a primary concern in public interest or public wellbeing.
The above-mentioned authors give quite a few characteristics with which we can define what civil society is. However, for the sake of nuance and clarity, it is also necessary to look into what civil society is not. Cohen and Arato (1997), for example, note that civil society is a
separate entity from economic and political society. The latter consists of all cooperatives, firms, partnerships, and other organizations of production and distribution. These societies, although rooted in civil society, are not equal to it because their imperatives do not allow them to subordinate their goals (state power or economic gains) to the normative integration and open-ended communication that civil society displays.
Habid (2005) expresses his agreement with this view in his own work. Likewise, Hicks, Janoski and Schwarz (2005) assert that political parties are distinguished as controversial, as some claim that they cannot be seen as part of civil society given their governing function.
With all the above we can define civil society as the following: a public space beyond economic and state entities, in which interests can be expressed and voluntary groups can be formed to pursue said interest.
This definition needs some further justification: as can be seen, the feature of non-profit and no commercial interest is left out of the definition. This is because including it would bar journalists and labour unions from civil society. After all, the workers who form a labour union have a commercial interest in mind in the shape of any wage demands they might make.
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Journalists too can work on a for profit basis. Nevertheless, these two groups are considered by many scholars to be part of civil society, as will be shown below. The difference with economic actors which are excluded from civil society is that labour unions and journalists can subordinate their economic interests for other normative goals, which would make them suitable by Cohen and Arato’s (1997) definition. Furthermore, as will be explained in the chapters on Nigeria and South Africa’s background, Labour unions and the media are central elements in the countries’
civil societies when it comes to textile dispute.
In line with Habid’s (2005) suggestion, some more concrete examples will be given of groups that can be considered part of civil society. Usman (2009) gives four examples of civil
In line with Habid’s (2005) suggestion, some more concrete examples will be given of groups that can be considered part of civil society. Usman (2009) gives four examples of civil