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International Master’s Program in International Studies
National Chengchi University
國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程
Weaving Discord in South African and
Nigeria: Managing Imports of Chinese
Textile
織出矛盾: 南非與奈及利亞如何處理進
口中國紡織品的糾紛
Quirijn Sander de Jong
Advisor: Philip Hsiao-Pong Liu
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Abstract
This work looks into the factors of state, civil society, and the relation between the two to explain the discrepancy of the responses of African countries to China’s growing presence on the
continent from the perspective of the African countries themselves. The research focusses on Nigeria and South Africa, China’s largest import partners in Africa, in the context of the textile dispute that affected most African nations. The textile dispute pressed the same incentives on all African countries that were affected, yet still they were divided in their reactions. The cases of Nigeria and South Africa show that answer to this riddle lies in the degree to which civil society groups, particularly labour unions, can make the issue salient for politics. Moreover, another key aspect is the degree to which the relation between civil society and the state allows the former to gain the compliance of the latter by invoking incentives that derive from the cooperative aspect of the relation, rather than only the confrontational aspect of it. The implication for the wider China in Africa debate is that instead of viewing China-Africa relations in the context of the continent as a whole, more attention should be paid to the details of the bilateral relations between China and specific African countries and the role that the arrangement of domestic interest groups in said African countries plays in formulating African responses to China.
摘要
此篇論文以非洲諸國之自身角度出發，探討中國於當地之政府及民間日益擴張的影響力， 並闡述當地公私部門間的相互影響，從而歸結出政府及民間不同的回應方式。筆者力引中 國於非洲最大的兩大夥伴—南非及奈及利亞作為例證，並探討兩國深具影響力的紡織業糾 紛。在此糾紛中深受影響的諸國，原先有著相同的動機，卻產生了不同的反應。南非及奈 及利的例子，說明了民間組織扮演的角色，有著決定性的因素，甚至將影響政治層面，其 中尤以勞工團體為甚。此外，政府及民間的互動，兩者間的合作抑或競逐程度，也是關鍵 所在。與其將非洲大陸視為一個整體，不如逐一探討特定國家及中國的雙邊關係，及各國 境內民間利益團體的角色，如此一來，將有助於了解更多中國於非洲拓展影響力的細節， 並歸結出關於此議題更廣泛的論述。‧
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Table of Contents
1: Introduction……….3 1.1: Research Background………...3 1.2: China in Africa……….41.3: The Textile Dispute………..6
1.4: State and Civil Society in Policymaking………..8
1.5: Research Question………..14
1.6: Methodology………15
2: South Africa, Nigeria and Chinese Textile………18
2.1:China’s Relation with South Africa and Nigeria……….18
2.2: The Chinese Textile Disputes in Nigeria and South Africa………22
3: Civil Society……….26
3.1: Civil Society in Nigeria and South Africa……….26
3.2: Labour Unions and the Media in Nigeria and South Africa………31
3.3: Labour Union Activity in South Africa’s Textile Dispute………..36
3.4: Embedding the Textile Issue………..37
3.5: The Jobs and Poverty Campaign and Media Responses……….38
3.6: Other Actors………44
3.7: Labour Union Activity in Nigeria’s Textile Dispute………..45
3.8: Beleaguered Unions………...46
3.9: The Media’s Role………..47
4: The State………...51
4.1: The COSATU-ANC Alliance Relation………...51
4.2: The Nigerian State-Civil Society Rivalry………..55
5: Conclusion………59
6: References………63
Tables
Table 1: Civil society, media, and labour unions compared in Nigeria and South Africa……36‧
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1: Research background
It is unsurprising that as China’s economic, military, and political clout grows, so does the interest in theories about how it might act upon its growing presence on the international stage. Hence, scholars and practitioners alike have cultivated a myriad of theories and scenarios concerning how the country might assert itself towards other nations. However intriguing this side of the matter might be, the other side of the issue – how other countries receive China’s growing impact on their affairs – is highly relevant as well. After all, in politics it takes two to form a relation. As such, the country that is on the receiving side of China’s influence also plays a role in determining the type of relation the two will have. In this research the topic of Africa’s reception of China’s impact on the continent was chosen as the test case for analysing how the internal dynamics of recipient countries shape their reaction to China. This is because the continent appeared best suited for this type of research given its diversity in levels of
development and cultures. This makes it a good measuring point regarding what factors may influence a country’s reception of China.
The variety between the characteristics of the African countries also poses a challenge, however. There is much more to African responses to Chinese influence than one would expect at face value. As will be discussed a little further down, the responses of African countries in
general can be summarized as disparate, incoherent, and uncoordinated (with the exception of South Africa). This raises an intervening question about what might account for this wide variety in responses, even in cases where the incentives facing the countries are the same.
In order to address the question of what makes for this diversity in African responses to China, this work will take up one concrete issue which affected most of the African countries in a similar way. This issue is the textile dispute with China, which will be elaborated upon further
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below. To give the analysis of this subject sufficient concreteness and detail, the focus will be placed on China’s two largest importers in Africa (Nigeria and South Africa), and how their respective reactions to the textile dispute were shaped by their domestic politics (Broadman, 2008). This is because the fact that these two countries import the most from China and therefore the impact of textile imports should be most visible in their respective societies. Beyond their extensive trade ties, these countries are also selected for their size and possession of natural
resources, which ought to grant them greater leverage vis-á-vis China, compared to other, smaller, not as well-endowed African nations. For example, South Africa has shown to be able to
maintain continued Chinese interest, despite having a more mature, regulated market, as well as stricter employment requirements (such as Black Economic Empowerment program) that have deterred some investors (Alden and Wu, 2014). This indicates that these two countries should be able to make some demands towards China. Before going any further into the textile issue, it is necessary to gain a wider understanding of China’s role in Africa.
1.2: China in Africa
In the last few decades China’s engagement with the continent has expanded drastically. The type of involvement today is different from the past as well. Today, China deals with all kinds of parties, ruling or not. Additionally, beyond party politics, economic cooperation and cultural exchange are now also part of the relation’s content. The economic cooperation changed too, as it shifted from purely state led to a two-part approach including state-owned and private companies. The size of trade is different as well, given the large increase in volume (Li, 2008).
For example, between 1999 and 2004 the figure grew substantially, with 48 percent per year. By 2008 China accounted for 40 percent of Africa’s exports to Asia. China is also
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In 2004 China’s largest import from Africa was oil and natural gas (62% of total merchandise exports to China), its largest export was textiles (36% of total merchandise imports from China) (Broadman, 2008). By 2015 textile had been pushed to second place by machinery and
electronics however (Pigato and Tang, 2015). As a result, most of China’s activity has been in oil producing states, although South Africa has received much attention as well. By percentage, the most prominent exporters to China were Angola and South Africa. The most important importers by percentage were, as mentioned earlier, Nigeria and South Africa (Broadman, 2008).
As for what brings China to Africa, scholars note that there are a variety of explanations. Wenran Jiang (2008) explains that, although there is no single explanation, there are a number of factors that have an influence. These include: China’s high economic growth rate, which fosters demand; China’s membership of the WTO and its resulting trade practices; the degree of its energy demand; positive views of China in Africa; decreasing Western influence; and domestic developmental dynamics, which entail an externalization of China’s internal business behaviour to Africa. Alden (2007), adds that the competition between Taiwan and China for recognition and Beijing’s goal to obtain African votes in multilateral institutions also played a role in China’s engagement.
Whether this growing relation is positive or not is a contested issue among scholars. Whereas authors like Deborah Brautigam (2009) argue that the developments have a largely positive impact on the African continent, others highlight a number of problems that China’s engagement brings with it. Jiang (2008), for example, mentions the case of Zambia, which
entailed accusations towards Chinese businessmen and their alleged exploitation of local workers. The resent even reached politics as the opposition ran an anti-China election platform. During his visit, President Hu responded to the criticisms and offered the country special loans and debt cancellation. In South Africa too, a debate is going on about whether China’s economic role is
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complementary or competitive to the country. This is since South Africa’s manufacturing seemed to have faced job losses because of the Chinese competition. Especially, the small and medium sized firms are claimed to have a direct impact on the lives of Africans. Alden (2007) notes that although African companies might benefit from the presence of these firms because of the flying geese effect, they also suffer under the competition. This is said to be the result of the networks and supply chains to which the Chinese firms have access, which allow these firms to offer lower prices.
What is not contested is the urgency of a united African stance with regard to China’s involvement. Many scholars have stressed this is necessary to give Africa the leverage it needs to balance the relationship with China (Rocha, 2007). Nonetheless, at this point, most African countries on themselves lack a coherent or coordinated response to China’s engagement of the continent (Again, South Africa is an exception to this). Indeed, Chidaushe (2007) explains that the African approach to China’s role on the continent is marked by individual engagements instead of multilateralism. Without a structured approach, the author claims, the allegedly equal relation is skewed in China’s favour. However, suggestions have been made that this might come about in due time as more meetings of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) pass (Alden, 2007). As to why this disunity is the case, some theories point to the fact that the African countries are highly dissimilar in terms of their level of development, which translates into vastly different priorities for each country (Ikome, 2010).
1.3: The Textile Dispute
Thus, in general, the African countries are disunited because they all face a somewhat different situation with regard to China. In other words, their dissimilar interests lead them to have dissimilar responses. However, as mentioned before, the matter of the textile industry is an
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exception to this as interests seems to align around this issue: the African textile sectors were hard hit in 2005 with the withdrawal of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). The repeals caused a sizable increase in Chinese textile imports which persuaded Europe and the US to reinstall a restriction by 2008. During the interim period, many textile manufacturing companies were put out of business or had to lay off large sections of their personnel. The export-oriented textile industry in Africa suffered but survived (Brautigam, 2009).
As such, the Chinese impact on local textile industries has been wholly negative. Deborah Brautigam (2009), singled out the textile industry as the only sector which fared predominantly badly under Chinese competition. Nevertheless, the author mentions that in Lesotho, Mauritius, and Kenya the sector showed signs of recovery until the 2008 global crisis. Hence, we see that the matter of the textile dispute is different from China’s general involvement in Africa in that here the interests of the African countries converge rather than differ. Following this reversed logic, one would expect that the similar interests of most African nations would result in a
comparable response to the problem among these nations. Yet beyond the Istanbul Declaration, in which the WTO was requested to continue its quota on Chinese textile exports after 2005, no coherent responses have been made (Alden, 2007). More so, the Istanbul Declaration only
included South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Mauritius, and Kenya. On top of this, it was a Turkish and American led initiative, not an African one (Naumann, 2006). In some cases, African traders even contributed to the problem, as was the case for some Togolese traders who travelled to China to teach Chinese manufactures traditional designs, after which they imported the imitations back to Togo (Sylvanus, 2013).
This makes the textile dispute both an interesting and potentially indicative case
concerning the question of why the African nations, even when facing similar incentives, choose different courses of action. In the next section two dimensions that might explain the different
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reactions in our case studies, Nigeria and South Africa, will be defined. After, their functioning and the relation they have to each other will be clarified.
1.4: State and Civil Society in Policymaking
Since the initial focus of this paper was on the reception of Chinese influence in Africa in general, the dimensions in which the textile dispute is to be analysed ought to cover both the state of the respective countries in the form of their governments, and their societies in the shape of their civil societies. This does not mean that they should be seen as separate explanatory variables, but rather as two that interact with each other in either a competitive or cooperative policy process. This interaction, if it concerns dissimilar interests between the two, is characterized by civil society’s access to the negotiation table and methods to influence the government, and the state’s ability to sail its own course by resisting influence through centralization of power. Alex
Thomson (2010), in his introductory work on African politics adds that ‘external interests’, or third parties, are also highly relevant to determining African decision-making. However, in this paper this dimension will be largely omitted as it focusses on the reception of an ‘external interest’, namely China’s. Thus, as mentioned earlier China will only play a passive role in the research and the country’s response will be assessed through the dynamics of domestic interests.
Paying attention to the role of the state in determining the response to the textile dispute is by no means a controversial research decision as the state is the most significant actor in terms of enacting and enforcing policy, and therefore has priority in determining a country’s political development (Thomson, 2010). The focus on civil society, on the other hand, is in need of further justification. This is not to say that there is no precedent for taking up this dimension in the analysis, as other scholars such as Thomson (2010), Michael Bratton (1989), and John Makumbe (1998) have underlined the importance of civil society in African politics. Rather it is necessary
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to provide a number of concrete examples of civil society’s influence in the past, its definition, and an explanation of how civil society might influence policy, in order to create sufficient clarity to facilitate the analysis.
Indeed, Thomson (2010) and Bratton (1989) explain that civil society can be of great explanatory value in Africa as much of the continent’s political exchanges take place in society rather than parliament, in part because of the relatively weakness of state institutions in Africa. In the 1990s the significance of civil society in Africa became particularly visible as it played a major role in the wave of democratization attempts that swept the continent. Makumbe (1998) refers as such to the end of apartheid in South Africa, the national strike by Swazi workers in 1997, the creation of Zambia’s Movement of Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in 1990, followed by its subsequent coming to power a year later, and Laurent Kabila’s victory over Mobutu in Zaire, which had obvious support from civic groups. He also mentions a number of strikes led by trade union congresses in a succession of countries, like Congo and Niger in 1990, and Gabon, Guinea, Cameroon as well as Mauritania in 1991.
Before further clarification can be given concerning civil society’s methods to influence policy, an effort should be made to define the concept of civil society. Therefore, we will first cross various pieces of literature on what civil society is and what it is not. From these a working definition for this thesis will be shaped. After, a number of concrete examples of civil society organizations will be given to create a sharp image of the concept. At the last, examples drawn from literature on Nigerian and South African state-civil society relations will be put forward to indicate the methods through which civil society may exert influence over the state.
The various definitions given in the reviewed literature will be discussed starting from the broadest definition followed by increasingly narrow definitions. Thus, the first and widest
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definition is given by Habid (2005), who defined civil society as the organized expression of varying interests and ideals which work in the sphere between family, the state, and the market.
Usman (2009), in his book on state and civil society in Nigeria, adds some more detail to this definition. He states that it is the participatory space between the formal apparatus of the state and the informal settings of families and atomized individuals. In this space, groups are formed in order to create associations, express interests and take part in public affairs. Usman notes that the term is too large and insufficiently concrete on its own and should therefore be expressed
embedded in a specific context as it would yield concrete instances of civil society groups. Arguably this would help to clarify the definition, hence we will discuss concrete examples of civil society organizations further below.
Cohen and Arato (1997), in their writings on civil society in political theory, give a
definition that overlaps with Usman’s. They describe civil society as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed of the intimate sphere (especially family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public
communication. In this context, modern civil society comes from types of self-constitution and self-mobilization.
Rainey, Wakunuma, and Stahl (2017) give the greatest amount of detail. This is since they compiled the working definitions of civil society organizations of multiple fields, including academia, policy views, project views, and the EC/EU view. They list that the EC/EU views civil society organizations as being non-state actors that work on a non-profit basis. Moreover, these actors should be non-partisan and non-violent, while aiming to promote the public good. They consist of platforms through which people organize to achieve common goals and ideals. These relate to political, cultural, social, or economic issues. Academia, according to Rainey,
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non-profit. They are self-constituting voluntary organizations. Policy shares this view, with the only difference being that they conceive of them as common cause NGOs, rather than self-constituting voluntary organizations. Those working on projects tend to perceive civil society organizations as being non-government, non-profit or without commercial interest, faith based or carrying an alternative legal status, and having a primary concern in public interest or public wellbeing.
The above-mentioned authors give quite a few characteristics with which we can define what civil society is. However, for the sake of nuance and clarity, it is also necessary to look into what civil society is not. Cohen and Arato (1997), for example, note that civil society is a
separate entity from economic and political society. The latter consists of all cooperatives, firms, partnerships, and other organizations of production and distribution. These societies, although rooted in civil society, are not equal to it because their imperatives do not allow them to subordinate their goals (state power or economic gains) to the normative integration and open-ended communication that civil society displays.
Habid (2005) expresses his agreement with this view in his own work. Likewise, Hicks, Janoski and Schwarz (2005) assert that political parties are distinguished as controversial, as some claim that they cannot be seen as part of civil society given their governing function.
With all the above we can define civil society as the following: a public space beyond
economic and state entities, in which interests can be expressed and voluntary groups can be formed to pursue said interest.
This definition needs some further justification: as can be seen, the feature of non-profit and no commercial interest is left out of the definition. This is because including it would bar journalists and labour unions from civil society. After all, the workers who form a labour union have a commercial interest in mind in the shape of any wage demands they might make.
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Journalists too can work on a for profit basis. Nevertheless, these two groups are considered by many scholars to be part of civil society, as will be shown below. The difference with economic actors which are excluded from civil society is that labour unions and journalists can subordinate their economic interests for other normative goals, which would make them suitable by Cohen and Arato’s (1997) definition. Furthermore, as will be explained in the chapters on Nigeria and South Africa’s background, Labour unions and the media are central elements in the countries’ civil societies when it comes to textile dispute.
In line with Habid’s (2005) suggestion, some more concrete examples will be given of groups that can be considered part of civil society. Usman (2009) gives four examples of civil society groups: firstly, pro-democracy groups, which are associational entities that claim to represent the public interest or challenge the government on issues related to democracy; second, civic associations, referring to associations that rely on donors to represent interests such as women’s rights, media rights, transparency, etc.; thirdly, labour movements, entailing wage labour associations aimed at safeguarding the interests of workers against employers; lastly, professional associations, which Usman sees as associations that defend the interests of skilled and formally educated workers or professionals.
Michael Bratton (1989), while delving into civil society in Africa, lists some more examples such as Christian churches in Kenya, Islamic brotherhoods in Sudan, Lawyers’ and Journalists’ associations in Ghana and Nigeria, and mineworkers’ unions in Zambia and South Africa.
Then, lastly, some examples of civil society methods to influence the state are in order, as this could give direction for the research as to where we can look for points of comparison between the civil societies of Nigeria and South Africa. First off, Habid (2005) mentions in the example of South Africa that civil society comes in two forms: formal NGOs that leverage the
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increased freedom after apartheid, and informal survivalist communities created by marginalized groups to fight the implementation of neoliberalism. The former can influence the state (and be influenced by it) through being subcontracted, engaging in partnerships, court action, lobbying, and resistance. The informal marginalized communities share no relation with the state and simply seek to assist people in surviving their poverty.
Usman’s (2009) work also gives example of how civil society, particularly labour movements, can influence policy. He mentions that the Nigerian National Labour Congress (NLC), has resorted to negotiation, mass protest or strikes, mobilizations, as well as attempted direct participation in politics to secure its goals. He elaborates on the power of the threat of a mass strike, as he mentions that in 1993 the threat of mass action by the NLC over politically motivated arrests led to the resignation of the head of the military, general Bagangida.
Agbaje’s (1993) work on the role of the Nigerian press under military rules shows that civil society, especially the press, can influence public policy in two ways: it can call out
malpractices of those in power; and it can positively or negatively cover government policy thus shaping public opinion.
Thus, we have formulated a definition of civil society and explained how it might work to influence policy. Now, we will look to the other side of the dyad where we find the state. Not all states tolerate civil society’s attempts to influence policy. In fact, some theories have pointed out that local government councils do not manage to cooperate with civil society organizations. The two tend to work against, rather than with each other (Olowu, 2005). Tordoff (1984) gave three reasons why the state at times seeks to limit the role of interest groups, like labour unions: Firstly, the state, being the main employer of the country, has a vested interest against wage demands; secondly, these wage demands can have an inflationary effect on the economy if they are met;
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they may also widen the urban-rural gap; lastly, strong labour unions can pose a political challenge to the state.
The latter incentive is particularly strong in centralized states. In these states political power has withdrawn from civil society and ‘peripheral’ state institutions and usually coalesces in the executive, like the presidential or prime ministerial office. These kinds of states often aim to maintain this status quo by curbing source of power that might rival their own. Civil society is not exempt from this tendency as labour unions, professional organizations and other such
organizations tend to be either co-opted or kept in check by the state. Thus, centralized states tend not to listen to civil society and create a rift between the former and latter (Thomson, 2010).
1.5: Research Question
Thus, we have addressed: the wider question of why there are such inexplicably mixed responses in Africa concerning China’s influence, the exceptional role that the textile industry can play in explaining this matter, as well as the theories concerning state and civil society that can help to approach our question. All the above culminates in the proposed research question of the thesis, which is the following: How does the difference in the state and civil society between Nigeria and
South Africa relate to the difference in responses to the textile dispute with China in Nigeria and South Africa? To clarify, the word ‘state’ in this question refers to the nature of the state and its
relation to civil society as explained in the previous section.
Hopefully, answering this question will not only yield new within-case findings, but also findings that are generalizable to the wider issue of what makes for the difference in African responses to China. If these findings are indeed generalizable, then it could also shed light on the wider subject of African decision-making. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the textile dispute is an odd case because it entails a difference in response despite similar economic incentives. By
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showing what the mechanics behind the issue are, knowledge may be gained on what truly makes African countries tick. Such a finding could indicate that the incentive structure of African
countries is markedly different from most developed states. Lastly, the findings could help to emphasize the point that Africa cannot be taken as a whole when discussing the politics of the region, given the wide range of differences between the African states. This would be the intended contribution of the proposed research to the academic debate.
1.6: Methodology
Then, the methodology that will be used to approach the questions mentioned earlier will consist of document analysis in the framework of a comparative case study. The reason for this selection is twofold: firstly, document analysis can provide a convincing account without necessarily demanding a physical presence in the countries under investigation; secondly, comparative research requires that data collection methods and data categories between the cases are comparable, a requirement which document analysis can easily fulfil.
In more detail, what does document analysis entail? Document analysis entails a
systematic procedure for evaluating documents of both physical and electronic nature. In doing so, almost any source can be used in the analysis, provided that they meet the criteria for our purpose. As for what these criteria consist of, Bowen mentions that the overall range of documents should come from different sources to prevent selection bias. Other dimensions in which the value of the document can be assessed are: the general relevance to the topic at hand; the document’s credibility; its authenticity; accuracy; and its representativeness. These
dimensions can be assessed by looking at the source’s focus (on the topic in general or a specific aspect of it), its target audience, intended purpose, and its author. For certain documents
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For our purpose these criteria limit the documents that are eligible for this research to the following categories: scholarly literature on the subject, research reports that rely on documented sources or interviews with relevant individuals, documents or press statements by relevant labour unions in the two countries, official and press statements by the respective governments of Nigeria and South Africa, and news articles by papers that publish in either Nigeria or South Africa. Regarding the newspapers it should be noted that local publications are a minimal
requirement for the reason that this can be said to be a form of exerting influence as it may shape public opinion on the issue. Furthermore, in order to avoid biases that might be inherent to certain papers, it would be best to cover a wide enough variety of papers to filter out such biases that may distort the image of the events.
What we hope to gain from the documents is data, context and historical insights, which will help us to gain perspectives and facts on our topic. This in turn may help to narrow down the potential factors until we arrive at a satisfactory explanation. Furthermore, Bowen points out that documents can also be complementary to each other as they may prove or disprove the findings of other documents, thus providing a more accurate image. There is, however, a limitation to this method: Research based upon document analysis must find ways to deal with low retrievability. This problem might occur when it comes to government documents, given that these may be confidential or not available outside the country of origin. One way around this problem is to rely on secondary sources that mention these documents (Bowen, 2009).
In follow up, it is necessary to determine how document analysis will apply to our comparative research framework. First, we must have a clear definition of what a comparative study is. This definition we find in Alan Bryman’s book. He quotes a previous work by Hantrais (1995), which states that comparative research is conducted: “when individuals or teams set out to examine particular issues or phenomena in two or more countries with the express intention of
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comparing their manifestations in different socio-cultural settings (institutions, customs, traditions, value systems, life styles, language, thought patterns), using the same research instruments either to carry out secondary analysis of national data or to conduct new empirical work. The aim may be to seek explanations for similarities and differences or to gain a greater awareness and a deeper understanding of social realities in different national contexts.”
In the context of our topic this would consist of a comparison between Nigeria and South Africa in terms of the media and labour unions ability to influence policy against the state’s ability to act unilaterally through centralization of power and using document analysis in both cases. For example, the research will look into the actions undertaken by labour unions and how the government responded to these actions. Also, attention will be payed to the media coverage of dispute, in terms of whether it was pro-textile, against the local textile industry, its workers and advocates, divided, or neutral. On the other hand, the statuses of these parts of civil society vis-á-vis their governments are to be compared as well. This will show whether the governments are open to negotiation with the former or seek to hold them off. Naturally, the degree of
centralization of each government is also given due consideration. The combination of these should give a complete picture concerning the role of civil society and the state in determining Nigeria and South Africa’s reaction to the textile dispute. As such, the comparative framework should not create any complex problems for the intended research. Nevertheless, we should still account for the comparability of the two cases. In the case of document analysis this means that the documents compared should be of similar organizations in the two countries (Nigerian government documents compared to South African government documents, for example). Naturally, they should also concern the same topic (textile industry to textile industry, civil society to civil society, etc.) (Bryman, 2012).
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Chapter 2: South Africa, Nigeria and Chinese Textile
2.1: China’s Relation with South Africa and Nigeria
Now that the background of the general issue has been set, it is possible to go in deeper and engage the context of our case study countries Nigeria and South Africa. In the following chapter the general relation between Nigeria and China, as well as South Africa and China will be
discussed. Moreover, the onset of and government reaction to the textile disputes in the two countries will be looked into. As such this chapter will not only give information for initial
comparison but also sets the stage for the in-depth analysis of how the two countries came to their current positions. We shall start with the South Africa-China dyad’s background.
The formal ties between Beijing and Pretoria were initiated after the end of apartheid and opened in 1998. The early relation was one of cooperation that culminated in the signing of the Pretoria Declaration on partnership relations in 2000 followed by the creation of a strategic partnership in 2004. The relation continued to improve, especially in the light of Beijing’s performance under the 2008 global crisis (Alden and Wu, 2014; Bradley, 2016). On top of this, South Africa was able to enter the BRICS group on China’s invitation. As such, Herman
Wasserman (2012) claims that in South Africa’s eyes the relation between itself and China is part of a geopolitical shift towards the global South, particularly the BRICS. He also explains that for China South Africa’s status as the largest trade partner on the continent and its sizable mineral deposits help to reinforce the relation. For example, between the years of 2006 and 2011, mineral products accounted for over 60% of China’s imports from South Africa (Bradley, 2016).
Much of the closeness and stability in the relation between the two countries comes from the strength of their trade relationship. This notion was cemented at the South African side in 2009 when trade from other countries dropped and China became its most important trading partner, as a cause of the global crisis and in line with the ANC’s international strategy for
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economic engagement and investment. To give a concrete image of this growth in trade: from 1996 to 2011, the share of the trade between the two nations of South Africa’s total trade figure increased from 1,3% to over 13% (Alden and Wu, 2014; Bradley, 2016).
In 2010 the strategic partnership was expanded by President Zuma and President Hu into a comprehensive strategic partnership, which entailed that the two countries were to initiate cooperation in various fields, such as: culture, education, media, health, and tourism. Furthermore, documents were signed concerning cooperation in solar power, iron ore, finance, and
telecommunication. Alison Bradley (2016) notes that during this event Zuma brought a
delegation that was larger than any delegation South Africa had brought before, consisting of 13 ministers and over 350 business executives and entrepreneurs. This too is indicative of the importance that South Africa attaches to the relationship.
There is, however, a counter side to the positive aspects of the relation. For example, China can adversely affect South Africa’s economic growth and employment in two ways: directly, by means of imports which overtake domestic production; and indirectly, by competing over markets with South African exports (Rangasamy and Swanepoel, 2011). Indeed, the Chinese investments have been criticized for harming domestic production. For one, South African
business asserts that the country is exporting too much mineral resources and imports too much manufactured products from China. As a result, the trade relation had no positive impact on the country’s unemployment level. In fact, labour-intensive sectors have taken losses because of the relation.
Also abroad, in its own neighbourhood, South Africa experiences pressure from Chinese competition. Jenkins and Edwards (2015), for example, note that South Africa is at risk of displacement as it is a middle-income country, which means that it is likely to have a manufacturing base which is developed but not specialized enough to compete. Indeed, the
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authors’ findings show that South Africa’s market share in 2001 to 2010 in various Sub Saharan countries would have been higher if it had not been for Chinese competition. Additionally, they found that low-tech products were affected most. Fortunately, the impact on South Africa’s overall exports would be relatively small, considering the low percentage that these goods make up. Lastly, the imbalance in the relation has resulted in some negative attitudes: only 45% of South Africans think positively of China and Mbeki called Chinese practices “neo-colonial, while Zuma called them unsustainable. These criticisms were limited, however, because of South Africa’s reliance on Chinese investment (Bradley, 2016).
In Nigeria’s case, the relation can be traced back to an earlier point in time as formal bilateral relations between Nigeria and China started in 1971. Hereafter, the relations between the two countries grew to the point that Nigeria was China’s fourth largest trade partner in Africa, in 2008. Additionally, already in 2002 Nigeria’s prominence was noticeable as the country was only second to South Africa in terms of Chinese investment in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ikhuoria, 2010). This shift was noteworthy because past precedent showed that Nigeria tended to become more Western oriented after each democratization wave. After the most recent one, however, it focused on China (Obiorah, Kew, and Tanko, 2008; Seteolu and Oshodi, 2017).
The Chinese engagement is in many respects similar to what has been observed in other
African countries; unconditional aid and oil investment are at the centre of the official
relationship. This is illustrated by the 2006 investment by China’s largest off-shore oil producer, worth 2.3billion US dollar. Moreover, during the same period, China followed up the oil
investment with a planned 4-billion-dollar investment in various infrastructure projects related to the oil sector. Beyond the oil sector China also made a deal worth 8.3 billion to rebuild the Lagos-Kano railway. Additionally, Chinese firms set forth 200 million US dollar worth of preferential buyers’ credit to create Nigeria’s first communications satellite. Thus, the difference
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in projected investment in Nigeria between 2001 and 2006 was less than 2 billion in the former year versus 9.5 billion in 2006. The last figure made up 31 percent of all of China’s offshore contracted projects (Gbadamosi and Oniku, 2009). Additionally, the Nigerian and Chinese government engaged in a strategic partnership in 2005. Moreover, Setelu and Oshodi (2017) also state that according to polls conducted by the international polling firm GlobalScan in 2005, 68% of the Nigerians interviewed held a positive view of China. Other polls mentioned by the authors suggested even higher numbers, yet it should be noted that the demographics and geography of the polls was not available to the authors.
However, there is also a downside to Nigerian-Chinese relations, which is the impact of Chinese imports on the local market. Alden (2007) states that small and medium sized Chinese firms have a direct impact on the lives of Africans. He mentions one such case in Nigeria, when Chinese companies opened three wholesale and retail shopping centres in major cities. This resulted in protest from local Nigerian traders, which escalated to the point that police intervention was needed. The centres were temporarily closed after the event. The protest
reflected the fact that the cheap Chinese imports were devastating to consumer product industries, especially in Kano and Kaduna. In these cities, six out of seven manufacturers had to close their doors in 2006, part of which was the result of Chinese goods that entered the country through smugglers or concessionary trade deals (Obiorah, Kew, and Tanko, 2008).
In some cases, the Chinese businesspeople engaged in such smuggling practices
themselves, as noted by the complaints of Nigeria’s Customs Department in 2006, which stated that Chinese traders in the country violated the import and export rules. The customs department arrested a number of Chinese businesspeople because of their involvement in a smuggling operation that concerned thirty trailers of goods (Obiorah, Kew, and Tanko, 2008). Because smuggling has become the norm for many traders, the government loses out on much of the
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import duty revenue (Ikhouria, 2010). In addition, beyond textiles, illegal Chinese business extended to pirated CD, video, and audio production as well, as observed in 2004 (Obiorah, Kew, and Tanko, 2008). Bad labour practices by Chinese is also an issue that was brought up at
multiple moments in time, however Seteolu and Oshodi (2017) note that that much of the debate is media led, which entails that not all the criticisms are grounded. The authors confirm that there have been cases of bad labour practices but nuance this matter by adding that this pertains only to specific companies. Regardless, the Nigerian labour unions (those for furniture, wood workers, construction, and civil engineering) took up the issue and gave the government a 14-day
ultimatum to address the problem. The government, however, rejected the criticism. Hence, it can be said that this downside did not affect the relation significantly.
At face value, we see that the South Africa-China dyad and the Nigeria-China dyad have a number of aspects in common: both involve cordial relations, both have received substantial benefits from China in the form of investment and political cooperation, as well as the fact that in both cases on the African side local manufacturing in industry suffered notably from Chinese competition. The main differences seem to be that In Nigeria, despite that Chinese competition takes a more illegitimate form because of the smuggling issue, public approval seems more favourable towards China. In South Africa, however, regardless of the fact that much of the imports are legal (although legal trade occurred as well), rather than smuggled, the population is more divided in terms of its views on China.
2.2: The Chinese Textile Disputes in Nigeria and South Africa
Now, to focus on the textile dispute, the first section shall again begin with South Africa. As mentioned in the previous part, China can adversely affect South Africa’s economic growth and employment in two ways: directly, by means of imports which overtake domestic production;
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and indirectly, by competing with South African exports (Rangasamy and Swanepoel, 2011). South Africa’s textile industry faced the former problem. The roots of this problem can be found between 1999 and 2002, when the South African Rand was devaluated which prompted many manufacturers to focus on exporting to the US for a higher profit, although they were unable to meet both export and domestic demand. Furthermore, illegal imports, domestic competition which reduced prices, firms turning to export to maintain capacity, also drove manufacturers to focus on foreign markets instead of the domestic one. Around the same time, the tariffs on yarn fell by 20 percentage points, fabric tariffs by 28 percentage points, and made-up household textiles tariffs were halved in this period, thus the overall the import tariff of clothing was reduced to a flat 40 percent (Thoburn and Roberts, 2004; Morris and Einhorn, 2008). This still relatively high percentage did not help however, since the South African wages were kept comparatively high because of the strength of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (Pillay, 2006). This led to a price discrepancy with Chinese products that allowed Chinese imports to endure the tariff, while staying well below South African price levels. The combination of these factors allowed foreign manufacturers to enter the market.
Then, in 2003 the Rand strengthened again, while at the same time the Multi-Fibre Agreement was repealed. Moreover, the South African government was reluctant to subsidize its clothing exports (Morris and Einhorn, 2008). This caused South African textile producers to be pushed out of markets in the EU and US by Chinese competition as well as their home market. This initial refusal by the South Africa government to support the textile sector can traced back to its believe that its economic and political objectives required it to insist on international openness, as such a stance would help to resolve profitability and productivity shortcomings in the
manufacturing sector. Secondly, the South African government also held the conviction that it could not spare the resources to uphold uncompetitive industries by means of protectionist or
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import substitution schemes. Thirdly, the government thought that the textile industry was not sustainable altogether in its early 2000s form, and therefore had to change itself (Van Der Westerhuizen, 2006).
At this point, in 2005, clothing made in China, including Hong Kong, had claimed 78.8 percent of the total clothing imports (Morris and Einhorn, 2008). As a result, the employment in the industry, which used to be the sixth largest employer in the manufacturing sector, decreased from 70,500 to 50,500 between 2003 and 2007, according to Fanie Herman (2011). The biggest losers of these were those in the textile sub-sectors such as spinning, weaving and finishing. The employment in these sectors in 2001 was 45 percent lower compared to 1996. Moreover, large, vertically integrated firms in general took a lion share of the losses, since many of restructuring entailed upgrades that reduced the workforce (Thoburn and Roberts, 2004).
In the South African case we see a government response directed at engaging China: In 2002 the labour unions led by COSATU, the opposition party, media, and industrial lobbyists voiced accusations of unfair dumping (Herman, 2011). COSATU’s complaint against the government, regardless of the alliance it shares with said government, can be explained by the fact that the labour congress has a vested interest in the textile issue. This is since COSATU suffered from a shirking membership base resulting from the job losses in the textile sector (Pillay, 2006). In 2005 these domestic constituencies applied for quotas to be imposed on the Chinese imports (among other requirements). The South African government heeded the calls of the protesting groups; a negotiation was started. In this negotiation the president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, fulfilled the role of the Chief of Government (COG), the main negotiator vis-á-vis the Chinese (Herman, 2011).
Brautigam (2009) states that the South African government engaged China to settle a two-year voluntary export restraint. Furthermore, China also offered 31 billion US dollar worth of
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skill-building in the South African textile industry. These compromises were to no avail as the South African government did not spend the money on the textile industry, and the quotas did not boost the performance of the sector. On top of this, the continued demand for Chinese textiles in South Africa led to increased smuggling of these goods. Moreover, South African retailers also started to legally import cheap textiles from Mauritius, Lesotho, Bangladesh, and Malaysia (Lee, 2014). Thus, although the gains of the negotiation were wasted, it can be said that there was a response to the matter of the Chinese imports.
In Nigeria’s case too, wider problems related to the trade relation affected the textile industry. In Nigeria is concerns the problem of both legal and illicit Chinese competition: During the 80s and 90s the Nigerian textile industry was already failing, despite officially having little foreign competitors in the domestic market (Bankole, Babatunde, and Kilishi, 2014). This is since in this period the Nigerian textile industry was protected by a prohibition. For example, in Brooks and Simon’s (2012) article it is mentioned that in the year 1989 almost 96 percent of all textiles tariff lines faced import prohibitions in a bid to shield domestic producers. Regardless, it is estimated that 75 to 80 percent of the clothing exported to West-Africa was smuggled into Nigeria given that not all countries in the region have a textile import prohibition and the weak implementation of the ban. Additionally, the smuggling is largely a consequence of the lack of wealth of most Nigerians, which keeps cheap contraband clothing in demand. (Brooks and Simon, 2012). The problems continued into 2015. One consequence of these problems we find in the 2015 Kano protest, where the protestors marched to the local Emir’s palace to express their stance against the Chinese imports (Seteolu, and Oshodi, 2017).
Beyond smuggling, amongst the causes for the demise of the Nigerian textile industry are the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which for a brief period of time allowed for foreign competitors to enter the market; the end of the MFA; and the initiation of the WTO textile and
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clothing agreement from 1995-2005 onwards, which removed the globally imposed quota system concerning the textile industry; and the Inability of the Nigerian textile sector to live up to
modern production technology standards. This resulted in relatively high production costs, pricing, and even lacking quality, which made the sector uncompetitive. In turn, this caused Nigerian consumers to grow a preference for foreign made textiles. Hence, the local market was lost to the sector and its collapse became almost certain.
These factors caused Nigeria’s textile industry to decline as the years went by. By the early 2000s the Nigerian share of the West African market was reduced to 27 percent. Moreover, only 45 out of an estimated 70 companies were active in December 2004. Worse still, only 28 percent of the installed capacity was used on average. In consequence, the contribution of the sector to GDP became less than one percent and 150000 employees had been laid off by 2004. Bankole, Babatunde and Kilishi (2014) claim that the malaise in the sector and pressure from the sectors representatives has shaped the believe amongst some policy makers that government support is required for the survival of the industry.
In sum, we see that despite the positive factors in the relation, the effects of the competition of Chinese imports on the textile industry can be considered an incentive for the Nigerian government to intervene. This is even more so the case if one considers the discontent that the demise of the textile industry yielded. For example, beyond civil protest, regional politics has been affected by the issue as well as. Political leaders at this level have voiced criticism towards the federal government(Seteolu, and Oshodi, 2017). On top of this, there is also the loss of revenue because of the smuggling practices of some Chinese traders. Given that these practices are direct violations of the law, they would make an obvious point of complaint.
As for the government’s actual reaction to this problem: beyond the implementation of an import ban in 2004-2005, the discussion of the matter in the senate, and temporary closures, the
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government has made no efforts to address the matter or to discuss it with China. The discussion in the senate, mentioned by Alden (2007), is not mentioned in any other scholarly source.This shows that the momentum most likely stayed within the walls of the senate building. Likewise, the 2004-2005 ban includes a licensing requirement for importing an outlawed product. The allocation process of these licenses is said to be lacking in transparency (Ikhouria, 2010).The problem of continued smuggling will probably also render the ban ineffective. Concerning these smuggling practices, it can also be said that the government reaction was limited. For example, in 2003 authorities closed the Ikoyi Chinese market because of smuggling charges, but it was
opened again later for obscure reasons (Ikhouria, 2010). Thus, during the same timeframe that the South African government came to the decision to negotiate with China, the Nigerian
government’s response can be summarized as one of neglect adorned with ineffective temporary solutions to still critique. It is only under the current administration, led by president Buhari, that more substantial initiatives are being shaped, although in many regards this is still work in progress (Bello, 2017).
These histories uncover some overlap between the cases: firstly, in Nigeria and South Africa the textile industry laboured under inherent inefficiency that made them unable to compete; secondly, the government has displayed unwillingness to solve the matter in both instances; thirdly, in either case substantial resistance was mounted against the prevailing status quo, in order to bring about government intervention. The chief difference lies in the dissimilar responses between the two, as foreshadowed in the research question. In South Africa the government was moved to intervene and even achieved an initial victory, while in Nigeria the issue was put off with half-hearted attempts until much later. To elaborate on this discrepancy, in the next chapters the events in both countries will be looked at more deeply from a civil society vis-á-vis the state perspective in order to explain why one side succeeded and the other did not.
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Chapter 3: Civil Society
3.1: Civil Society in Nigeria and South Africa
Now we will look into the status of civil society in Nigeria and South Africa in more detail. With this information we can shape a general image of the differences and similarities between the Nigerian and South African government and their relations with their domestic civil societies. Hereafter the key parts of the civil societies with regard to the dispute with China will be identified to further slim down the focus of this research. After, a general description will be given of the governments’ attitude towards civil society to shape a tentative image of the differences between these key groups in the two countries. Lastly, the role of media and labour unions in determining the outcome of the dispute will be elaborated upon in more detail. First of all, we will look into Nigeria.
Ikelegbe (2013) distinguishes three major types of civil society organizations in Nigeria: Primary or Primordial organizations, which are identity-based groups; secondary or middle level associations, referring to socio-economic, professional, or labour based groups; and NGOs, which make up the largest number of organizations. Civil society organizations of each type can
combine their strength to form platforms, such as the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) or the Trade Union Congress which comprise the labour unions. These platforms are used to organize nation-wide actions such as the protests against the government’s stance on minimum wage and fuel subsidies.
He also lists a number of challenges for civil society organizations in Nigeria: many organizations are divided among regional, religious, and other partisan lines, thus making them less capable of cooperation. Secondly, many organizations suffer from internal management competition and business, wealthy and aristocratic interests that inhibit formation. Weak
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organize themselves on a national level worked to their detriment since national formation allows for resource aggregation and engagement of the state on its own level. Since the most recent democratization wave, civil society lost some influential leaders, because they went into politics or joined the government.
Although the relation between the state and civil society has improved since the advent of democracy, the relation is still rather sour and marked by mutual distrust. For example, the state may seek to co-opt leaders or penetrate the leadership to ensure either control or division with the leadership. This usually happens through a form of patronage. Worse still, the state may attempt to harass the leaders. The government is distrustful of civil society organizations in part because of their anti-government tendencies which were displayed in the latter’s fight against the military government. Beyond this, the government also mistrusts civil society organizations because they are viewed as special interest groups that do not necessarily care for the national interest.
Lastly, Ikelegbe (2013) states that the policy influence of civil society is generally low. Only national organizations such as labour unions and professional organizations hold the ability to gain some influence. On their part, civil society organizations tend to look at the government as lacking responsiveness towards urgent civilian needs, mostly as a result of corruption, abuse of power, and self-interest. Differences in ideology, mode of operation and styles also worsen relations between the two.
In South Africa we can see some similarities. Lehman (2008) mentions that, in the years after apartheid, the changes in interest groups have been related to the growth of civil society and its less than optimal relation with the South African state, as well as the initiation of neo-liberal economic policies by the latter. The author states that scholars before him have pointed out that the ANC elites make use of the power of the state to neutralize the opposition against the neo-liberal policies. This is usually done by ANC occupation of structures of economic power.
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Regardless, large well-funded NGOs can still engage the government over policies at various points in the policy process. The smaller organizations, however, suffered from declining funding since 1994. They are forced to resort mostly to informal channels. Thus, Lehman refers to the scholarly debate which says that despite tolerance for civil society organization activities, the government has attempted to co-opt the organizations in the decision-making structure under the state. Thus, after apartheid, many organizations found themselves with less funding and (similar to the Nigerian case) with less leaders, as the latter group left for government positions.
Moreover, the implementation and subsequent failure of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) program, caused a severe reduction of civil society organizations in policy circles in the early 2000s. It is unclear, however, if this was a result of the chaos or the centralist tendencies of the government. This widened the distance between state and civil society. Additionally, the government has been highly critical of civil society organizations (particularly NGOs), as they criticized them for lacking democratic accountability. This criticism was most strongly directed against foreign organizations. President Mbeki stated in 2005 that these organizations not only lacked accountability but also influenced the agendas of domestic organizations (Lehman, 2008).
Thus, we see that in both the Nigerian and South African case civil society sustained a weakening because of the co-optation of leaders by the government or decisions by the former to join the government after democratization. Another similarity is that primarily the larger
organizations are the ones that can influence policy at least to some degree. The smaller
organizations in the two countries are either forced to resort to informal engagement or to limit their actions to the local level. The last similarity is that both governments hold a degree of disdain for civil society, as they see the groups as a challenge to party interests, the national interests, and even to democratic accountability. The main difference lies in the degree to which
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the two governments act against civil society. Whereas the South African government only seeks to control the policy process and co-opt leaders, the Nigerian government has shown to be willing to not only apply these strategies but also to harass and inhibit attempts by civil society to
undertake action.
3.2: Labour Unions and the Media in Nigeria and South Africa
Then, to go into more detail, what are the key civil society groups in Nigeria and South Africa? For the Nigerian case we can look back at the work of Seteolu and Oshodi (2017), which was mentioned earlier. They stated that the debate surrounding China’s role in Nigeria is mainly led by the media. Moreover, in cases of bad labour practices or in the textile dispute at large, the workers and their unions took the lead in taking action against the issues at hand. This view seems to be shared by Remi Aiyede (2003), who states that in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria most of civil society lost its democratic drive, with the exception of the labour unions and the media. As for South Africa, in another work that this paper came across the key constituents were said to be the labour unions, the opposition party, the media, industrial lobbyists and industrial traders (Herman, 2011). For our proposes the opposition party as well as the industrial traders and their lobbyists will be mostly excluded from the comparison as they are not seen as part of civil society.
Firstly, we shall look into the relation between the Nigerian labour unions and the media with their government, starting from the Fourth Republic at the end of the 1990s. In this period, the Nigerian government initiated a number of structural reforms in favour of privatization, deregulation, and commercialization. Multiple policy points were challenged by the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) on grounds that they reduced subsidies and social welfare. Thus, in response the NLC organized several general strikes between 2000 and 2007. The author mentions
