The 1970’s saw a significant chain of events which lead to future policy shifts from Beijing. United Nations Resolution 2758 on October 25, 1971 officially declared the People’s Republic of China as the sole representative of the Chinese people. The resolution infuriated then ROC leader Chiang Kai-shek, prompting him to abandon the UN. The move struck a severe blow to the ROC’s international standing.30 A few years later Chiang would pass in 1975 only to be followed by his rival from across the strait, Mao Zedong in 1976. The passing of these two figures marked an important event in cross-strait history, one that would affect policy over the next two decades. Before their death, both leaders enjoyed almost unrivaled authority. They were staunchly committed to unifying China, under their own interpretation of what China would look like.
The death of Mao had a greater effect on Chinese policy than the death of Chiang on Taiwan. Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-Kuo assumed power on the island, largely following in his father’s footsteps.31 Following Mao was another larger than life revolutionary figure, Deng Xiaoping. Deng differed from Mao. The Cold War was beginning to thaw just as he took power, and new dynamics on both the international and cross-strait stage were beginning to form. As China increased its international space and opened its economy to the world, Deng saw an opportunity to initiate his newfound
“peaceful unification” plan.32 Beijing’s new Taiwan policy set itself apart from the past. Official’s took a less aggressive and ideological stance. The fight between both sides of the strait was no longer about “liberation” or “class struggle.” Instead, Deng and other key members of the Communist Party sought to reconcile differences and bridge gaps through rhetoric first, policy second.33 The policies Beijing attempted could only have gone into effect with the okay from Taipei, and this is precisely why they made the first move. By reaching out the hand of cooperation, China would again appear to be the pragmatic actor in an ever-changing situation.
30 Herschensohn, Bruce. Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy (Los Angeles, World Ahead Publishing, 2006), 16-18
31 Jacobs, Bruce J., and I-hao Ben Liu. "Lee Teng-Hui and the Idea of Taiwan." The China Quarterly 190 (2007): 378. JSTOR. Web. 25 May 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192775>.
32 Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. "The Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Twenty Years of Development and Frustration." China Review (2000): 107. JSTOR. Web. 5 Apr. 2017.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23453363>.
33 Wei-Chin Lee, T.Y. Wang, Sayonara To The Lee Teng-Hui Era Politics in Taiwan, 1988 to 2000(Laham:
2003) 283-284.
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The shifting atmosphere was certainly in the back of Beijing’s minds when the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress released, “A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” on New Year’s Day, 1979. The tone of the message was important. Far from the ideological rhetoric of the Mao era, the speech showed
Beijing’s new approach to Taiwan. Within its text, the speech covers a number of issues on the minds of both sides of the strait. Economics development, end to military
hostilities, and person to person exchanges were all important subjects to the people of Taiwan and China.34 Interestingly, the speech also briefly mentions China’s
international rise, certainly a strategic placement in order to get the audience thinking about Taiwan’s own international standing. Beijing’s message ends by stating
reunification as the ultimate goal for both sides of the strait, “The bright future of our great motherland belongs to us and to you. The reunification of the motherland is the sacred mission history has handed to our generation. Times are moving ahead and the situation is developing. The earlier we fulfil this mission, the sooner we can jointly write an unprecedented, brilliant page in the history for our country.” Although Beijing’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” was purely political rhetoric it served the party’s initial purpose. It provided context for Beijing’s future moves, set the tone, and allowed Taiwan to make the next move.
Following the message to Taiwan, a few more official policy proposals were put forth by the Communist Party during the mid-1980’s in an effort to be more specific on the nature of cross-strait negotiations, conditions, and eventual unification. A few years later Chairmen of the National People’s Congress, Ye Jianying delivered a public statement entitled, “Policy on Return of Taiwan to the Motherland and Peaceful Reunification, the speech which was administered through Xinhua News agency later came to be known as Ye’s Nine Point Proposal. Chairmen Ye proposed (1) more,
“exhaustive exchanges” between both the Communist Party of China and the
Kuomintang. (2) Both sides of the strait longed for cooperation in an effort of people to reconcile and reconnect with relatives, loved ones, and acquaintance. (3) The people of Taiwan would enjoy a high level of autonomy, including administrative and armed forces. (4) Taiwan’s socio-economic system would be left intact, property rights and foreign investment would be respected. (5) People on Taiwan will be allowed to
34 Lee, Peter Nan-shong. "Jiang Zemin versus Lee Teng-hui: Strained Mainland-Taiwan Relationship."
China Review (1997): 110. JSTOR. Web. 23 Apr. 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23453119>.
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actively participate in the National government. (6) China would aid Taiwan in times of financial difficulty. (7) The people of Taiwan are welcome to relocate to the mainland.
(8) Business interests will be respected under the law and investment will be encouraged. (9) The reunification of China and Taiwan is the responsibility of all Chinese people. It was this proposal that Deng Xiaoping used to state his “one country, two systems” theory in January of 1982.35
The “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” and Ye’s “9 Points” were the initial foundation, the bedrock, to the Communist Parties new policy toward Taiwan. During the mid-1980’s the Communist Party was undergoing an important change. As many revolutionary leaders began to pass away or simply step down from official posts due to failing health, a new group of party cadres took the helm. Although Beijing’s Taiwan policy remained under a centralized hierarchy, the new faces within the policy making structure of the Communist Party provided fresh eyes to a decades old problem.
Lacking revolutionary experience, the new class of policy shapers were groomed through the bureaucratic process, from across the strait it seemed as though Beijing had become less Hawkish in its approach.36 During the era of Mao and even Deng, many policy decisions came from one single man. Once the paramount leaders were gone, the rhetoric became increasingly inviting and cooperative in nature. It was during this era of transition that the Communist party began taking advice from outside the party. The CCP began consulting various academic institutes, which were often closely linked to the party.
Before making official statements related to policy initiatives the Communist Party established the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group in 1978. The TALSG’s role changed over time. Initially it was created by CCP central committee to conduct
research on Taiwan. As time went on it would become the cornerstone of Taiwan policy. Deng retained paramount power over the group during the 1980’s but by 1993, as his health declined, Jiang Zemin became the head of TALSG. Although Jiang sat at the top of the TALSG he did not enjoy absolute power and needed to consult various
35 Jianying, Ye. Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, China News,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7943.htm (accessed December 16, 2016).
36 Tasi Kevin G, Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations Since 1979 Policy Adjustments and Institutional Change Across the straits. Waterloo. University of Waterloo. 2011. 220-221.
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senior leaders from both the political and military sections of the CCP. This would later effect policy, as Jiang became more Hawkish during the presidency of Lee Teng-hui.37
As China’s “Open Door” policy began to show signs of success, Taiwan was undergoing major political reforms. In 1987 under Chiang Ching-kuo martial law was lifted, effectively giving citizens the personal and intellectual freedoms they lacked over the past few decades. Instead of panic, China reacted with calm. Despite their lifting of martial law, the international world still shunned Taiwan and stifled any attempts to gain more space. The KMT controlled government attempted to enact laws limiting personal and economic contacts for security reason, but this had limited effect. Business and people simply found round about ways, such as flights through Hong Kong as means to an end. China bided its time, if it were not going to use force then patience was the only option.38
In January of 1995 Jiang made his famous “8 Point” proposal to the people of Taiwan. The context was more complex than ever before. The Taiwanese had
successfully completed the first round of political reform by giving its people the right to vote for their legislature. President Lee lifted the, Temporary Provisions for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, which was met with optimism from across the straits. The outcome of initial legislative elections also gave the Communist party hope for future reunification as the KMT won a majority of seats, leaving the opposition Democratic Progressive Party to rethink its strategy.
Jiang’s speech entitled, “Continuing to Strive Toward the Reunification of China” or “Eight Points” also came at the cusp of Taiwan’s second reform, one which would see the Taiwanese people choose their president through popular election less than a year later. The success of Taiwan’s first phase of democratization was fresh in Jiang’s mind and many within the Communist Party believed the second round would be successful. Beijing still had a hand to play. Despite such historical gains, Taiwan was losing international space, most notably the loss of recognition by South Korea in 1992.
Jiang’s, “Eight Points” exemplify a more precise Chinese policy direction in the face of Taiwan’s upcoming second phase of reform. Jiang opens his statement with a brief
37 Tasi Kevin G, Cross-taiwan straits relations since 1979 policy adjustments and institutional change acriss the straits, 224.
38 Harrison, Selig S. "Taiwan After Chiang Ching-Kuo." Foreign Affairs 66.4 (1988): 795-96. JSTOR. Web. 3 May 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/200483>.
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history lesson. He attempts to refute any opposition to the idea that Taiwan is or ever was an independent country, “Taiwan's early development by the Chinese people has been recorded in many historical books and documents. The Chinese governments through the past ages set up administrative organizations to exercise its jurisdiction over Taiwan.” Beijing’s rhetoric is important for multiple reasons. By talking about Chinese history and the idea of a unified China, Beijing shares a common historical understating of the situation with the KMT. By using historical and resorting to grandiose language, Beijing was also making it clear to the international community that the issue of Taiwan was one internal to the Chinese nation.39 By pushing Taiwan further outside the realm of international relations, Beijing confines Taiwan’s democratic reforms to a matter of simple domestic consequence.
In his speech, Jiang’s tone was once again inviting and conciliatory. (1) Jiang reiterates the concept of One China. (2) Taiwan has the ability to join economic and cultural international organizations, but must refrain from doing so as an independent nation. (3) consultations on an equal footing mean that Taiwan will recognize the October 1992 talks and the conclusions reached at that time. (4) No use of force, not a liberation but a peaceful reunification of Taiwan to the motherland. (5) Further
investment between both sides of the strait will help increase competitiveness and prosperity in the coming century. (6) The 5,000 year history of China is the bedrock of unification. (7) Through unification people on both sides of the strait can search for a more prosperous future together. (8) Government officials from Taiwan are able to visit the mainland, but only in the appropriate capacity.40
Although short, there is much to be said about Jiang’s speech. The first point sets the context of the entire speech. By restating the importance of “One China” Jiang made it clear, whatever the future of reform holds for Taiwan it must be undertaken through Beijing’s framework. Points two and four backup Beijing’s concept of peaceful unification. Until that time, the world could rely on China to not provoke the situation across the straits. Even after the Tiananmen incident and initial reforms on Taiwan, China remained calm and calculated. If the Communist Party created waves it could have meant a dramatic shift for the success of their policy. The second point is
39 Herschensohn, Bruce. Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy, 50.
40 Zemin, Jiang. Continuing to Strive for the Unification of China, China News,
http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7955.htm (Date accessed, December 17 2016)
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important as it reiterates the understandings reached in talks between both government in Singapore. The meeting was a historic event which brought together Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu. Koo Chen-fu represented Taiwan through the quasi-governmental Straits Exchange Foundations. His counterpart, Wang Daohan represented the People’s Republic of China through the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits.
They came to an understanding that there was only one China, with each differing in their interpretation of China. The meeting was a landmark in cross-strait diplomacy. 41
Point 5 is significant because it reminds both sides of the strait how important each other is in terms of economic growth. As the world became more globalized, business’s in Taiwan needed to seek lower production costs if they wanted to remain competitive. Jiang’s reiteration of this and reassurance that investment would be respected with rule of law is an attempt to show the important nature of Taiwan and China economically symbiotic relationship. Lastly, points 6,7, and 8 restate the importance of person to person connection across the straits. By invoking history Beijing policy makers are painting a more glorious picture for the future prospects of Taiwan’s unification.
The speech was a brief but important synopsis of China’s Taiwan policy moving forward. Jiang began his speech by reiterating the One China principle. A declaration of Taiwanese independent would not be permitted. Furthermore, the government in
Beijing would not accept the ROC’s claim to legitimate rule over a prolonged period of time. The wording is general, but its urgent and conveys the message that the subject of cross strait relations is time sensitive. While Taiwan would not be allowed to have official diplomatic ties with other countries, Beijing reassured that it would not interfere with the nations acceptance and participation in certain international organizations.
Under the name Chinese Taipei, Taiwan would be able to remain a part of the Asian Investment Bank and continue to attend the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum.
By 1995 it was clear that the DPP had made major inroads within Taiwanese politics.42 They not only had seats in the legislature but even more importantly their
41 Wong, Timothy Ka-ying. "Changing Taiwan's Foreign Policy: From One China to Two States." Asian Perspective 24.1 (200): 31. JSTOR. Web. 8 May 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704247>.
42 Ferhat-Dana 34.
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influence at the local level was growing stronger. Jiang proposed all parties to be present in negotiations related to unification, this was however predicated on the acceptance of the One China principle. Without this starting point, nothing could be accomplished. By claiming that Taiwan could still join international organizations Jiang was letting those weary of unification know the terms of the agreement. Beijing would let Taiwan remain autonomous in certain respects. Socialism would remain the main economic method of the mainland while Taiwan could continue to run its capitalist economy. This was mentioned not only for the common Taiwanese people but the business class. By the mid 1990’s globalization had created a much more competitive world. In an effort to shore up profits the Taiwanese business men would have to invest in China which had a larger labor pool and a much cheaper investment environment.43 If Taiwanese were reassured that their business ventures and investments would be
protected they might have been more likely to view unification in a more favorable light. China worked towards courting the top companies from Taiwan. These
companies, such as Formosan Plastics were vital to Taiwan’s economy. The Chinese focused on incentives for companies focused on infrastructure, power, and high
technology.44 If these companies jumped ship and joined the pro unification side others might follow suit.
By issuing the 8 points, Jiang created a situation in which Taiwan would have to respond. The Chinese strategy was to bide time and wait out president Lee. Jiang was testing Lee’s commitment and resolve. The Chinese wondered if Lee was fully
committed to furthering Taiwan’s international presence and democracy for the sake of his own presidency. Jiang believed he could influence the Taiwanese electorate and move the people’s sentiments more in line with Beijing. Lee promptly responded to Jiang with 6 clearly stated points. The 6 Point reply was released on April 5, 1995.45 The first point similar to Jiang provided the starting point to which Lee wanted all future negotiations to be founded upon. Lee stated that since 1947 Taiwan and mainland
43 Keng, Shu, and Gunter Schubert. "Agents of Taiwan-China Unification? The Political Roles of Taiwanese Business People in the Process of Cross-strait Integration." Asian Survey 50.2 (2010): 289.
JSTOR. Web. 20 May 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2010.50.2.87>.
44 Jacobs, Liu 388
45 Teng-Hui, Lee. "Document 4: President Lee Teng-Hui, "Six-Point Reply," 8 April 1995." Asian Affairs 26.2 (1999): 101-02. JSTOR. Web. 25 Apr. 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012774>.
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China had been governed by two spate entities both with sovereignty. Until this historical fact was recognized unification would not be possible.
Since the 1980’s China constantly reiterated the shared culture and history of both people across the Taiwan Strait. This was done in an effort to create a hegemonic sense of identity between the two peoples. Lee’s second point claims that China and Taiwan could create lasting bilateral negotiations based off of their shared culture. It could be argued that by the 1990’s Chinese culture was better preserved on Taiwan than it had been in China. The tumultuous times of the 60’s, 70’s which cumulated to the cultural revolution saw a major backlash of Chinese culture in the PRC. Under Mao’s regime students were encouraged to damage cultural sites and reject Confucius
teachings. Taiwan, under Chiang Kai-shek had promoted Chinese culture. Calligraphy, poetry, art all flourished on Taiwan. Although this was the reality, many on Taiwan saw themselves as distinctly different from China. Taiwanese accepted and celebrated the Chinese aspect of their identity while also shaping something new.46
Following Jiang’s points, President Lee stated that both sides of the strait should participate in international organizations. APEC was the only organization mentioned specifically but Lee was certainly thinking about other organizations such as the WTO and UN. The insistence on international participation was seen as crucial to gaining
Following Jiang’s points, President Lee stated that both sides of the strait should participate in international organizations. APEC was the only organization mentioned specifically but Lee was certainly thinking about other organizations such as the WTO and UN. The insistence on international participation was seen as crucial to gaining