台灣政治重建的論爭: 1992-1997年憲政改革的研究 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asian-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 憲政改革的研究. 學. 台灣政治重建的論爭: 1992-1997 年. ‧. The Push and Pull of Reform on Taiwan:. Nat. er. io. sit. y. A Study on Constitutional Amendments from 1992-1997. al. n. v i n STUDENT:CNicholas h e n g c hSerasis i U 倪晨睿. ADVISOR: PROFESSOR I Yuan 袁易教授. 中華民國. 年 2017 月 06. June 2017.

(2) 台灣政治重建的論爭: 1992-1997 年憲政改革的研究 The Push and Pull of Reform on Taiwan: A Study on Constitutional Amendments from 1992-1997. 研究生: 倪晨睿. Student: Nicholas Serasis. 指導教授 : 袁易教授. Advisor: I Yuan. 立. 政治大. 國立政治大學. ‧ 國. 學. 政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧. sit. y. Nat. A Thesis Submitted to the International Master’s Program of Asian-Pacific Studies. er. io. National Chengchi University. n. v In partiala fulfillment of the Requirement l ni Ch. U i e h n c g For the degree of Master in Asian-Pacific Studies. 中華民國年 2017 月 06 June 2017.

(3) Acknowledgement I would like to thank my family, especially my mother, father, and sister for helping me realize my potential. To my advisor Professor Yuan my committee members, professor Vivianne Yen-ching Weng and professor Hsieh for your guidance was invaluable. Lastly to Bannai for never letting me give up on my endeavors.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. I. i n U. v.

(4) Chinese Abstract 台灣人民一直以來都嚮往民主，而在經濟蓬勃發展下，人民則進而渴望得到更多的自由。海峽另一岸的中華人民共和國距離台灣不過咫尺之距，位於北京的人民政府更虎視眈眈地等待每一個可以應其主張，一統台灣非法政權的機會。台灣的菁英份子對於這個迫切的時局卻相當覺醒，因而促進了和國民黨的「一中政策」持相反意見，支持「台灣獨立」的民主進步黨的成立。雖然兩方對於民主的走向和未來發展有所對立，但面對中華人民共和國的崛起，他們對於 — 強而有力的政府才能有效捍衛台灣當前得來不易的自主，這項觀政治大點的認知卻不謀而合。西元 1992 年至 1997 年間的改革正是. 立. ‧ 國. 學. 基於這項認知下，國民黨與民進黨，兩方相互做出的妥協才得以促成。民進黨藉由凍省，得以將台灣朝完全獨立推近一. ‧. 步，而國民黨則能夠保有執政權力，並在海峽兩岸的協商中進行主導。1. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. 1. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The translation of my abstract would not have been possible without help from 蘇上婷.. II.

(5) Abstract The need for a powerful presdient to match the growing power of China led reformers on Taiwan down a unique path. Factors outside the control of the ruling Kuomintang party created a precarious situation, one which its leaders had to navigate in a delicate fashion. Many on Taiwan longed for democracy. As the country’s economy flourished, the people desired greater freedoms. The solution to this desire was not so cut and dry. The People’s Republic of China lay only a few miles away across the Taiwan. 政治大 claimed to be a part of the 立mainland run by an illegitimate government.. Strait. Beijing was eagerly awaiting the opportunity to reunify with what it 2. ‧ 國. 學. The stark reality was not lost to the party elites and people on Taiwan. The newly founded Democratic Progressive Party, stood on the side of. ‧. Taiwanese independence, a clear break with the KMT’s “One China” policy. Although both sides disagreed about the direction of. y. Nat. sit. democratization and what it would mean for the future of Taiwan, they. er. io. both realized a powerful government was still necessary in maintaining the. n. a l in the presence of thei vPeople’s Republic of nation’s hard fought autonomy n U China. The reforms made in the period were based on e n gofc 1996-1997 hi. Ch. compromise. Both the KMT and the DPP surrendered parts of their platform to reach an agreement with the other side. The DPP was able to inch Taiwan closer towards independence with the abolition of the Provincial government, while the KMT was able to hold its power within the executive effectively giving the party complete control over cross-strait negotiations.. 2. Copper, John F, Taiwan: Nation State or Province? Fifth Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), xi-xii.. III.

(6) TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgement…………………………………………………………………….I Chinese Abstract……………………………………………….………………….….II English Abstract………………………………………………………………………III Acronyms……………………………………………………………………………..V List of Figures………………………………………………………………………...VI Chapter 1……………………………………………………………………………....1 1.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………….…1. 政治大 1.3 Research Question…………………………………………………………….…..5 立 1.2 Research Background and Purpose…………………………………………….…4. ‧ 國. 學. 1.4 Research Method…………………………………………………………….……5 1.3 Chapters Structure………………………………………………………………...19. ‧. Chapter 2 Literature Review………………………………………………………….21 Chapter 3 Opposition and Coalition Building…………………………………….…..35. y. Nat. sit. Chapter 4 Analysis of Constitutional Reform…………………………….…………..56. n. al. er. io. Chapter 5 Conclusion……………………………………………………….………...64. i n U. v. References…………………………………………………………………………….72. Ch. engchi. IV.

(7) Acronyms AA- Additional Articles CPC- Communist Party of China DPP- Democratic Progressive Party EY- Executive Yuan KMT- Kuomintang LY- Legislative Yuan. 政治大. PRC- Peoples Republic of China. 立. ROC- Republic of China. ‧ 國. 學. TASLG- Taiwan Affairs Small Leading Group UN- United Nations. ‧. USA- United States of America. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. WTO- World Trade Organization. Ch. engchi. V. i n U. v.

(8) List of Figures 1.1 Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………....9 1.2 Methodology…………………………………………………………………...18 3.1 PRC Policy and Posturing Timeline…………………………………. ….........41 3.2 Straits Crisis Timeline…………………………………………………………50 3.3 Policy Stances Among Taiwan’s Factions…………………………………….53. 政治大 4.1 Timeline and Breakdown of Constitutional Reforms…………………………56 立. ‧ 國. 學. 4.2 Flow Chart for Additional Articles……………………………………………61 4.3 Flow Chart For Additional Articles…………………………………………...63. ‧. 4.3 Vote of No Confidence Flow Chart…………………………………………...66. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. VI. i n U. v.

(9) Chapter 1. 1.1 Introduction It has been said that the people on Taiwan have always been use to a powerful executive. The tiny island was once a colony of Japan. During that time period, the people enjoyed limited political rights. During the Chinese Civil War, Chiang Kaishek’s Kuomintang Party was locked in an intense struggle against Mao Zedong’s communists. Unable to withstand the communist’s advances, Chiang retreated to Taiwan effectively moving the Republic of China government from Nanjing to Taipei.. 政治大 extraordinary circumstances立 called for drastic measures. Despite the democratic nature Chiang ruled Taiwan with an iron first. He claimed the war had yet to be won,. of the ROC constitution, basic civil liberties and political rights were suspended under. ‧ 國. 學. temporary provisions.3 Some may view this as unjust, especially in light of the democratic ideals set forth within the ROC constitution, yet others argued the necessity. ‧. of a powerful executive. The purpose of this study is not to examine on moral grounds. y. Nat. the necessity of a strong executive in a democratic government, but to understand why. sit. those who enacted, supported, and took part in such administrations did so in the face of. er. io. China and a growing domestic opposition movements. While examining the past is. al. n. v i n C hmassive changes since 1992 Taiwan had already undergone e n g c h i U the KMT first established a foothold on the island and declared nationwide martial law. important, the focus of this study lies in the heart of the early reforms on Taiwan. By. Former Taiwanese President Lee’s initiative to push for reform, first in the legislature and then in the executive were a direct response to the actions of Beijing. In the literature review I will briefly introduce the evolution of Beijing’s approach to Taiwan. Starting from the post Mao era of Deng Xiaoping’s “Open door” policy, leaders of the PRC took a more calculated shift than before. Communist Party leaders at that time, most of which had little experience in fighting the Civil War abandoned 3. Officially referred to as, The Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization For the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, were provisions of the Republic of China Constitution effective from 1948-1991. The provisions curtailed certain political and civil liberties granted under the ROC constitution. Copper, John, F. “Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Progress Toward a Democratic System.” Asian Survey 21, 10 (1981) : 1031.JSTOR. Web. 22 June 2017.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643972>.. 1.

(10) ideology for a more practical approach. The move helped Beijing internationally and created a complicated situation for Taiwan.4 While Beijing initiated its “peaceful unification” plan in the early 1980’s, Taiwan was undergoing political, economic, and societal shifts. By that time the Taiwanese had enjoyed years of strong economic growth. Taiwan, one of Asia’s Tigers was shifting economically from a labor intensive to knowledge intensive country. This shift was important, as people on both sides of the strait looked to capitalize on the increasingly globalized world. Chinese business began to grow, while Taiwan’s internal political struggles started to unfold. In the following literature review I will begin with policy initiatives from. 治政 Teng-hui on Taiwan. This will provide a backdrop to the大 motives behind reformers on 立the two interpretations of circumstances by officials in Taiwan and paint a picture as. Beijing starting in the post Mao era of the early 1980’s up until the 1997 election of Lee. ‧ 國. 學. Beijing. The literature will continue with a brief yet necessary background of opposition politics on Taiwan and their influence on reform. Lastly, I will focus on the second era. ‧. of constitutional reforms on Taiwan from 1995-1997. Downsizing or abolition of the provincial government directly relates to the DPP’s push towards independence, while. Nat. er. io. al. 1.2 Purpose. sit. y. the creation of a duel-executive system strengthened the powers of the president.. n. v i n The purpose of this studyC is to uncover the nature h e n g c h i Uof Taiwan’s reforms from. 1992 to 1997. During that time, politicians on Taiwan undertook the task of reforming and reshaping presidential powers and the Provincial government. Taiwan is not unique in the sense that it must also consider other countries when shaping domestic policy. From Chiang Kai-shek to Lee Teng-hui, each leader of Taiwan has had to face the reality of a hostile PRC government across the strait. Creating a narrative around this situation will better paint a picture as to why reformers on Taiwan choose to give. 4. Deng Xiaoping became paramount leader of the PRC once Mao Zedong had passed away. Deng’s “open door” policy was an economic initiative to liberalize the Chinese economy, slowing opening certain sectors to the rest of the world in an effort to bring China into the future. Naughton, Barry. “Deng Xiaoping: The Economist.” The China Quarterly 135 (September 1993): 491-514. JSTOR. Web. 20 June.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/654099. 2.

(11) greater power to the executive branch while simultaneously compromising with a small yet growing opposition party at home.5 Cross-strait policy as executed by the PRC government still plays an important role in the policy decisions of Taiwan’s current politicians. Thus, understanding the nature of the PRC influence during a time of historic reform is of great importance to this study. PRC policy and posturing certainly played a role in shaping presidential powers on Taiwan. Scholarship on Taiwan’s constitutional reform during this period tend to focus on the internal struggles between Taiwanese political actors. Interparty struggles along with a population eager for change, the purpose of this study is not to ignore those factors but to examine them under a different scope. By creating another narrative around this specific time period, I aim to uncover the principles which lie. 政治大 President Lee Teng-hui’s inner 立circle and the opposition Democratic Progressive Party. behind the intentions of Taiwanese reformers, most notably those within former. With every action there is a reaction, political systems are not fixed structures but. ‧ 國. 學. responses to ongoing circumstances.. ‧. The early to mid-1990’s were a pivotal time for Taiwan’s democratization. For the first time in decades both sides of the Taiwan Strait were openly searching for means to. Nat. sit. y. create legal, institutionalized exchanges. On Taiwan, a growing opposition movement. io. er. finally had space to work out in the open, the debate for independence had never been livelier. Some looked on at this development with new found hope, while others. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. remained skeptical. The purpose of this study is to understand what the intentions of the. engchi. PRC were during this time period and how that in turn influenced reformers on Taiwan. A narrative must be created on both perception and practice by Beijing. This study will be divided into various sections, each attempting to explain and expand in greater detail the variables which helped create the political system used on Taiwan post 1992 reforms. The importance of this study rests on the notation that political systems are in many ways reactionary. Yet those involved in shaping the politics of a particular country attempt as best they can to mold the system to their advantage. Political structures do not simply exist or function because of some universal norm which dictates them to do so. Instead, players within certain political systems must make. 5. Lin, Jih-wen, Taiwan’s Semi-Presidential System Was Easy to Establish but is Difficult to Fix: A Comparison Between the Constitutional Reform Efforts (Taipei: Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol 12 No. 2, 2016), 46. 3.

(12) calculated moves in order to achieve their stated goals. Much analysis has been done on intentions of the KMT and Lee Teng-hui during the initial phases of democratization, further analysis remains to be done about the influence of the Communist Party of China and DPP on reform in Taiwan. Post-authoritarian theory will be used to understand how countries transition from single-party states to democracy. As a country in transition I feel it will be vital to frame the reforms around this type of theoretical framework. Furthermore, it has been argued that Taiwan is a semi-presidential system. This study will examine the reforms to presidential powers within the context of semipresidential systems. By using these methods and theories the studies hopes to shed new light on democratization in Taiwan. The islands transition has been studied and written on to a. 政治大 democratization lead to a multi-party 立 state free from the shackles off authoritarianism. great extent, but much of the focus, especially of western scholarship tends to be how. Furthermore, many scholars have focused on what has come to be known as the Taiwan. ‧ 國. 學. miracle.6 No doubt Taiwan’s rapid economic growth has played a huge part to the nations success but for this study that aspect of the nation’s development will only be. ‧. mentioned briefly. For this study mentioning the increasing economic integration will. sit. y. Nat. also be helpful, but the primary focus is political and not economic.. io. er. I aim to focus on the history leading up to the reforms to demonstrate why politicians choose certain systems. Political actors react to their circumstances and plan. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. accordingly. Certainly, history has shown that the American Revolution and subsequent. engchi. ratification of the Constitution was a response to monarchy. Similarly, Taiwan’s reforms were a response to both domestic and external events. By conducting this research I aim to show how certain reforms and powers entrusted to politicians are influenced by their historical context.. 6. The Taiwan Miracle as it has come to be known in academia refers to the economic boom Taiwan experienced from the 1960’s to early 1980’s. Standard of living increased and through a mix of private and state sponsored economic initiatives. To read more on this subject refer to, Tasi Pang-long. “Taiwan’s Economic Miracle: Are the Revisionists Right?” A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform 6, 1 (1999) : 69-82. JSTOR. Web 20 June.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43199017>.. 4.

(13) 1.3 Research Question How did the historical development of Taiwan’s democratization lead additional articles in the constitution? In what way did those additional articles mirror the ideas of reformers and how did they solidify certain powers in the president?. 1.4 Method and Theory This study focuses on two important actors, China and Taiwan. I attempt to uncover the nature of Taiwan’s response to Beijing policy toward the island. More specifically, my study focuses on constitutional reform related to presidential powers and the downsizing of the Provincial Government. Viewing the question through the. 政治大 understanding how different actors influence one another. Realism rests on the notion 立 that the international system is anarchic. The state is the ultimate actor within this lenses of a realist perspective will be helpful in creating a theoretical framework for. ‧ 國. 學. system. Finally, the primary goal of a state is its ultimate survival.7 Within Taiwan’s political system, both the KMT and DPP were acting in a way that would secure their. ‧. eventual political triumph via future elections. Although the study will focus on additional articles and the history leading to those reforms, it is important to highlight. y. Nat. sit. the process in which the DPP and KMT collaborated with each other. This will be. al. er. io. reserved for one chapter about the coalition building between Lee camp and Hsu. n. moderates. Through evidence this will show how both sides, although opposed on. Ch. i n U. v. certain issues, could find common ground especially when reforming presidential powers.. engchi. With this brief introduction, the actions of each actor which pertains to this study will become more evident. Although the PRC and the ROC view themselves as the representative of China, for the purposes of this study I will consider each to be a sovereign state. In order to consider a state sovereign, it must have clear national boarders within which it has the sole authority to govern. Furthermore, a state is usually considered sovereign if it has recognition from other sovereign states. This second part proves problematic for Taiwan, as its international space is quite small in comparison to China. The ROC has many overseas unofficial offices, yet it lacks formal ties with most. 7. Donnelly, Jack, The Ethics of Realism, The Oxford Handbook on International Relations( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 150. 5.

(14) nations. The nations which have or had official relations with the ROC since Chiang Kai-shek decided to leave the UN are considerably small nations, most of which have little international clout Yet the first principles of sovereignty apply to Taiwan. Since the KMT’s retreat to the island, the PRC has never held administrative or judicial power over the Taiwanese people. The same can be said for the PRC, despite decade long claims by the KMT government to be the sole representative of China, reality has been quite different.8 Direct presidential and legislative elections on Taiwan have proven this to be true. As this study will show, although the PRC attempted to influence Taiwanese politics via policy and a show of force the effects were contrary to their goals. In this way, Taiwan as represented by the ROC constitution was and is a sovereign political state.9. 政治大 interaction between both sides 立of the strait, from the post Mao era up until 1997. The. Both Taiwan and China are rational actors. This study focuses on a narrow era of. time period of 1980-1992 serves as the historical backdrop to the constitutional reform. ‧ 國. 學. era of 1992-1997. The purpose of this study is to first uncover the reasoning behind the policy initiatives from Beijing in order to form a complete understanding of what. ‧. constitutes their self-interest. Second, the study will examine the effect of internal. y. Nat. pressures on the Taiwanese reforms to confront the question of independence. As states. sit. seek survival in an anarchic world, actors take what they deem to be necessary actions. er. io. in order to gain the upper hand from their rival. Certainly, the relationship between the. al. n. v i n stability to the region, but as thisC study both sides of the strait remained far h ewill n show gchi U. PRC and Taiwan was not always antagonistic and with increased dialogue brought more. more skeptical of each other than optimistic. Uncovering the behavior and mindset of both states leaders is important to determine why certain policies were implemented in a particular fashion. For the purposes of this study, Chinese and Taiwanese policy act as independent variables and constitutional reform the dependent variable. Policy makers in Beijing shifted post Mao. The shift did not come as a direct response to the situation on Taiwan, but was more an initiative already embedded in the new administrations ethos. This 8. Blanchard, Marc F, Hickey Dennis V, New Thinking About the Taiwan Issue: Theoretical insights into its origins, dynamics, and prospects (Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 190-192. 9 Baogang, He. “The Question of Sovereignty in the Taiwan Strait: Re-examining Peking’s policy of opposition to Taiwan’s bid for UN membership.” China Perspectives 34 (March-April 2001): 7-8. JSTOR. Web. 20 June.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/24050860. 6.

(15) push toward a less hostile and ideological relationship in dealing with Taiwan became even greater once Deng stepped down from power in 1993. The conditions external to China were favorable, and the Communist Party capitalized on the world’s new-found optimism for the country. The PRC took the initial steps in initiating dialogue and relations with the ROC, this was an important step because it gave Beijing the chance to set the tone for the nature of future exchanges. Taiwan is also an independent variable as political reformers crafted the environment necessary for change. The politicians on Taiwan were certainly influenced by factors outside of their control, such as policy coming from Beijing. However, the rapid change starting in the 1980’s to Taiwan’s political environment took on a life of its own. Even in the face of external threats and not far removed from remnants of an. 政治大 the 1980’s came to an end it立 was apparent that the flow of capital, the exchange between authoritarian states, the political climate on Taiwan was lively and full of debate.10 As. people, and unofficial relations between both sides of the strait were increasing. Lee. ‧ 國. 學. attempted a few policies, such as his southbound and go slow be patient policy. Both of which failed. What Lee and the ruling Kuomintang could control was the process and. ‧. outcome of constitutional reform on Taiwan. The purpose of this study is to show how. sit. y. Nat. presidential powers were increased through reform.. io. er. Constitutional reform acts as the dependent variable. By the 1990’s martial law was lifted but much work had to be done if Taiwan was to become a democracy.. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Taiwanese politicians wondered and debated about which type of democracy the. engchi. country should be. Certainly not all democratic countries are the same in both structure and practice. The very nature of reforms on Taiwan is a reflection of the political actors who ratified and promulgated the new additional articles. Reforms happened because these actors were able to come together. Once the political system became more competitive, following legislative elections the KMT did not control a super majority in the legislature and thus had to work with the DPP. Within this theoretical framework, I assume that both the KMT and the DPP act competitively while trying to find common ground. Within Taiwan’s democratic system, both parties are fighting for their right to govern and implement their platform.. 10. Harrison, Selig, S. “Taiwan after Chiang Ching-Kuo.” Foreign Affairs 66, 4 (Spring, 1988): 796. JSTOR. Web. 20 June 2017.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20043483>.. 7.

(16) As the nation democratized the political climate became more competitive. With more options Taiwanese shifted their identification.11 In a competitive environment actors are farsighted. They see how current policies will set them up for future action under a similar or shifting political landscape. This study will also focus on the intent of the DPP and the KMT. Both parties placed value on different policies which they believed were of the upmost importance to their country future success. When coming to a compromise politicians often link certain policies or reforms together. Through this method, a much broader coalition can be formed. Despite the linking of different policies and reforms not every politician gets exactly what they want. As this study will show both parties often had varying stances on similar issues. The issue of Taiwan’s Provincial Government was one such instance. The push for a. 政治大 power in the executive came立 to a head during the 1996 reform debates. Politicians will declaration of sovereignty by the opposition camp, and the KMT’s need to shore up. often times willingly give up or compromise on their own issues in order to see reform. ‧ 國. 學. to the end. Each side accomplishes something, but it is not what either wanted in totality. Politicians package certain issues together in an effort to avoid gridlock.. ‧. History is important when understanding why each party brought their issue to the table.. y. Nat. Below is the theoretical framework, in the table I break down the independent and. n. al. er. io. sit. dependent variables to show how these factors lead to constitutional reforms.. Ch. engchi. 11. i n U. v. Fell, Dafydd. “Inter-Party Competition in Taiwan since the 1990s: Despite the Change in the Ruling Party in 2000, most of the salient issues of the 1990s remain on the political agenda.” China Perspectives, 56 (November-December 2004): 4. JSTOR. Web. 20 June.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/24051936>.. 8.

(17) Figure 1.1 Theoretical Framework. Independent Variables Taiwanese Politcal Climate post Chiang KaiShek. Chinese Policy/Posturing/Rehetoric. Dependent Variables Opposition: democratization as a way to aceive symbolic and legal soverginty. stregethening of Presdiential power. 政治大 Establishment of Semi-Presdiential System Down Sizing of the Provincinal Government 立 Constituional Reform. ‧ 國. 學. Source: Myers, Ramon H. "A New Chinese Civilization: The Evolution of the Republic of China on Taiwan." The China Quarterly 148 (1996): 1072-090. JSTOR. Web. 5 May 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/655517>. ‧ y. Nat. sit. The process of transitioning from a single party state to a democracy is often. er. io. long and arduous. Post authoritarian regimes often have a high probability of. al. v i n C hand the TemporaryUProvisions laid a groundwork this essay, the lifting of martial law engchi for democratic transition. A key piece of reform which Taiwanese argued for during n. backsliding on their democratic promises.12 As mentioned in the previous sections of 13. the National Development Council was the direct election of the president. This was to be the true test of Taiwan’s democratization. The constitution had called for the direct election of the president, but during the martial law period the Chiang family enjoyed unrivaled control of the country’s top position. President Lee Teng-hui proved to be reformed minded. Some political observers believed he argued for direct elections because it strengthened his position, while Lee himself argued it was the major move necessary to bring Taiwan closer towards its democratic future.. 12. Opello Jr, Walter, C. “The Transition to Democracy and the Constituional Settlement as Causes of Political Instability in Post Authoritarian Portugal.” Luso-Brazilian Review 27, 2 (Winter, 1990): 78-79. JSTOR. Web. 20 2017.<http://www.jstor.org/stable3513355>. 13 Jacobs, Liu 382.. 9.

(18) Lee Teng-hui’s break from the conservative faction was an important moment in Taiwan’s political transition as it marked a point in which observers recognize the change from authoritarianism to democracy. There are a number of important factors when discussing post authoritarian regimes. The historical development of politics and civil society are considered while also addressing the likelihood a transitional regime might face a crisis, both internal and external. A certain set of criteria exists in determining whether or not a country has transitioned to democracy. The essential change must first come from a constitution. The constitution must either be created or reformed upon.14 In case of Taiwan, the ruling party had the advantage of pushing for reform within the ROC constitution. Although the DPP expressed its will to create an entirely new constitution, this received little support and was viewed as an impractical. 政治大 Many scholars who study 立 Taiwan are quick to note its vibrant election. way of achieving reform within the limited timeframe at hand.. environment. Small trucks blaring campaign slogans, people out and about handing. ‧ 國. 學. leaflets are just a few pictures that come to mind. A major factor for transitional regimes is the creation of fair and free elections. Taiwan certainly has a unique history when it. ‧. comes to elections. Even under colonial rule the people on Taiwan were granted some,. y. Nat. if not very limited voting rights. This has certainly played an important part in Taiwan’s. sit. politics but is not of importance to this study. Post authoritarian studies have often. er. io. focused on the ability of transitional regimes to create a competitive space in which. al. n. v i n issue during Taiwan’s transition C to democracy KMT’s continued uneven h e n g cwashthe i U. opposition parties can actually have a legitimate chance of securing votes. One major influence over the election process. By the 1990’s the KMT had amassed a fortune and created far reaching relationships both of which served the party quite beneficially come election day. Here analysis focuses on not only the creation of institutions but its function. In the case of Taiwan, the historically entangled development of the party and politics could not so easily be washed away in the first wave of democratic changes on Taiwan. Still the reforms brought about direct elections for both the legislative and executive branches of government, they served the short term, but further analysis is required on long term effects of such reforms.. 14. Davis, Michael C. “East Asian after the Crisis: Human Rights, Constitutionalism, and State Reform.” Human Rights Quarterly 26, 1 (Feb, 2006): 126-129. JSTOR. Web. 20 June 2017.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/20069719>.. 10.

(19) Authoritarian regimes are characterized by their leaders.15 Often strong and unforgiving, political observers often remember powerful men such as Joseph Stalin or Mao Zedong. While the role of the chief executive remains important to a democracy, it is the creation of a truly representative legislature that lies at the heart of reform. A key component of a functioning democracy is proper checks and balances. The concept dates back to enlightenment thinker Montesquieu, who believed power vested in the hands of one branch would cause corruption. Creating a truly representative legislature was difficult on Taiwan. Those within the KMT who held onto the eventual goal of unification wondered how representation for the mainland should work. The DPP pushed for legislative elections, it was in there benefit to gain experience at the legislative level if the party was ever going to secure the presidency.. 政治大 popular mandate, one which立 influenced his decision to move ahead with strengthening. The legislative elections of 1992 and public support for president Lee gave him a. the office of the president. Lee and his supporters realized the constitution would allow. ‧ 國. 學. for either a parliamentary or presidential system. Yet there appeared to be a third way, one which could mirror that of the French 5th Republic.. ‧. French political scientist Maurice Duverger coined the phrase semi-presidential. Nat. sit. y. system when defining the new constitution of the French 5th republic.16 In order to meet. io. er. the criteria for a semi presidential system a country must follow three rules. First the president must be elected via a popular vote. This was the first hurdle Lee would have. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. to overcome in the initial reforms of 1994. Lee was confident that he would win any. engchi. future election and new the DPP would support his push for a popular vote. This position was challenged by the non-mainstream faction of the KMT. They supported an indirect vote through the National Assembly.17 It was their belief that a popular vote would inch Taiwan closer to an opposition victory and vote of independence. Lee was successful in passing additional Article number 2. Which allowed for a presidential vote 15. Huntington, Samuel P, Betts, Richard k. “Dead Dictators ad the Rioting Mobs: Does The Demise of Authoritarian Rulers Lead to Political Instability?” International Security 10, 3 (Winter, 1985-1986): 112. JSTOR. Web. 20 June 2017.<http://www.jstor.org/stable2538944>. 16 Roper, Steven D. "Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes." Comparative Politics 34.3 (2002): 255. JSTOR. Web. 5 May 2017.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4146953>. 17 The National Assembly was a legislative body brought over from China by the KMT. In the 1990’s many of its powers were transferred to the Legislative Yuan. In 2005 the National Assembly was disbanded. Long, Simon. “Taiwan’s National Assembly Elections.” The China Quarterly, 129 (March 1992):216-228.JSTOR.Web. 19 June 2017.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/654605>.. 11.

(20) by the population on free area. The second criteria used to define semi-presidential systems is whether the president possess extraordinary powers. Post authoritarian regimes which face both internal and external crisis are often prone to moments of giving power to the hands of the executive to mitigate any potential danger to national security. Under the Article 36 the president is the head of national security, and acts in a similar capacity as the US president as commander and chief. Additional articles allow the president to issue decrees during times of national security. During the martial law period the president of the ROC was able to suspend basic civil liberties and forbid the formation of political parties. These specific powers are not explicitly expressed in the additional articles passed by the reform committee but it can be imagined during a time of crisis the president might want to utilize them.. 政治大 which heads the executive branch. 立 According to Duverger’s checklist Taiwan would The last aspect of a semi-presidential system is a separate office of premier,. meet the criteria for a semi presidential system.1819 Yet these classifications are not. ‧ 國. 學. enough to define Taiwan’s political system, a deeper analysis is necessary to prove Taiwan’s system is more prone to a strong man type government. Luckily the scholarly. ‧. work on post-authoritarian systems is wide ranging. With the fall of the Soviet Union. y. Nat. many scholars have written on the subject of democratic transitions. Many of the post-. sit. communist states faced similar crisis and conditions following the dissolution of the. er. io. single party state. Matthew Shugart and John Carey focused on classifying in greater. al. n. v i n institutions but how much powerC each h einstitution i U wielded in the given country’s n g c hactually detail regime type. Their classification system was based not only on the type of political environment.20. Shugart and Cary’s analysis is important to this study because it will help clarify Taiwan’s political regime post reform. If in fact the reformers on Taiwan created a semi-presidential system headed by a strong chief executive the office of the president would meet the criteria based on Shugart and Cary’s analysis. According to their study constitutions can have potential relations property’s but these must be checked on actual. 18. Kaminsky, Elijah Ben-Zion. "On the Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Governments." Presidential Studies Quarterly 27.2 (1997): 223. JSTOR. Web. 5 May 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551727>. 19 Albert, Richard. "The Fusion of Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." The American Journal of Comparative Law 57.3 (2009): 533. JSTOR. Web. 15 May 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25652657 20 Roper, 257. 12.

(21) political realities to deem whether or not they are effective enough. Dissecting and analyzing a countries regime type is important because it directly effects democratic consolidation. It has been argued that certain systems lead to instability which could adversely affect democratic consolidation and confidence in a country political institutions. Semi-presidential systems are most common in Eastern Europe, yet there are examples within western European as well, most notably France. It should be noted that comparison between France in Eastern European counties must be taken into historical context. Western democracies such as France have had time to mature compared to Eastern European countries which attempted to create democratic societies in a post-communist world wrought by economic strife. The question remains, how does Taiwan fair in Shugart and Cary’s detailed. 政治大 mentioned in Duverger’s original 立 study but expands to legislative and non-legislative. analysis of semi-presidential systems. Their analysis rests on the previous three criteria powers, regime type and cabinet stability.21 Two types of semi-presidential systems. ‧ 國. 學. exist, premier presidential and president parliamentary. Taiwan falls under the premierpresident lexicon. It is argued that this system creates more cabinet stability but lacks. ‧. the ability to create an environment of cohabitation.22 This occurs when the president. y. Nat. and the majority party within the legislature differ from each other. Certain countries. sit. can function within this environment, Taiwan did not experience this until president. n. al. er. io. Chen Shui-Bian won the 2000 presidential election. Under that administration, the. v. limits of the 90’s constitutional reforms came under majority scrutiny as the legislature faced serious gridlock.. Ch. engchi. i n U. The distinction between legislative and non-legislative power is important. In certain countries, the President may have little institutional mechanism to shape policy yet still play a major de facto role in the process. The authors cite France as an example and Taiwan would certainly fit this. Although Lee Teng-Hui lacked the necessary mechanisms to initiate policy he played an important role in supporting legislative initiatives. Once such example would be his, “be patient, go south policy.”23 Shugart. 21. Roper, 258. Richard, 555. 23 Jacobs, Liu 382. 22. 13.

(22) and Cary’s scale ranges from 0-4.If the power is given a 4 then the president wields significant power, a 0 would mean power primarily rests in the hands of the legislature. Various democratic constitutions give the president the veto power. This falls under the category of legislative powers. The United States is one example of a country in which the president has the power to veto legislation. Veto power is considered an important check on a legislatures power. If, for example the president and the majority of the legislature are from different parties then the power to veto bills allows the president to exercise the mandate given to him by the people. A 4 on this scale would mean the president has absolute power to deny a bills passing. Under the ROC constitution, the president does not have the power to veto. Under additional Article 3, section 2 the Primer does have the power to send a bill back which the office deems to. 政治大 not completely similar, the French 立 president has only suspensive veto power. This. difficult to execute, if the bill passes again it must be signed by the premier. Although. means, the president can suspend a pending bill from passing and have the legislature. ‧ 國. 學. vote again, however if the vote passes for a second time the president does not have the power to override the bill’s passage.. ‧. Without the veto power the ROC president cannot thwart legislation without the. Nat. sit. y. help of law makers. However, the president is allowed to issue special decrees which. io. er. may give him or her certain powers given the circumstances. Previously following the retreat of the KMT to Taiwan Chiang Kai-shek initiated Temporary Provisions which. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. gave the president a wide range of extraconstitutional powers. Yet Shugart and Cary. engchi. claim that there can be limits to those powers. If the president has the ability to issue emergency decrees and the passage of such decrees does not have to be confirmed by the legislature than the president’s power is at a 4 on the scale.24 According to Article 2 of the additional articles of the ROC constitution, “The president may, by resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, issue emergency decrees and take all necessary measures to avert imminent danger affecting the security of the State or of the people or to cope with any serious financial or economic crisis, the restrictions in Article 43 of the Constitution notwithstanding. However, such decrees shall, within ten days of issuance, be presented to the Legislative Yuan for ratification. Should the Legislative Yuan withhold ratification, the said emergency decrees shall forthwith cease to be valid.” The. 24. Roper, 258. 14.

(23) wording in Article 2 of the Additional Articles differs from the original text of article 43 which only states, “In case of a natural calamity, an epidemic, or a national financial or economic crisis that calls for emergency measures…” Inclusion of the line, “imminent danger, affecting the security of the State,” is important to this study as it realties not to some natural calamity but military threat. Furthermore, the article states that during such a period, as stipulated by law the president would be allowed to form a national security council. Lastly the study of presidential-premier regimes looks at the president’s power to initiate referendum. Up until the presidency of Chen Shuai-Bian, referendum was never initiated on Taiwan. As stipulated in the constitution under Article 136, “The exercise of the rights of initiative and referendum shall be prescribed by law.”. 政治大 denote any legislative bill that 立shall have been passed by the Legislative Yuan and. Furthermore, under Article 170, “The term “law,” as used in this Constitution, shall promulgated by the President of the Republic.” All legislative power rests in the. ‧ 國. 學. legislature, while the president is limited to simply promulgating the law. This power is non-legislative in nature, under the current criteria the president referendum power. ‧. would be a 0.. Nat. sit. y. It would appear that the ROC president lacks major legislative powers. This. io. er. however does not mean the chief executive is without actual power. According to his paper entitled, Are All Semi-Presidential Systems the Same? A Comparison of Premier-. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. Presidential Regimes, author Stephan D. Roper maps out in great detail various. engchi. European regimes presidential powers. France, thought to be most similar to Taiwan has a total score of 1 when all three categories of Veto, decree, and referendum are added. Although legislative powers are able to push policy forward, the author argues nonlegislative powers can be equally if not more powerful within the context of a countries political reality. Taiwan’s political reality is inexplicably linked to cross-strait relations. Thus the powers of the president and premier to not only guide policy but also safeguard Taiwan can be interpreted as broad and far reaching.25 Non-legislative powers have been a major focus of semi-presidential systems as they lead to coalition building. One of the paramount powers of a president is his or her ability to name cabinet members. Many 25. Kucera, 66.. 15.

(24) constitutions call for the nominating to be done by the president with consent of the legislature. Originally under the 1947 constitution as stipulated in article 55 the president has the ability to choose a premier at the consent of the legislature. This however was eventually changed with the passage of the 3rd additional articles. Appointment of a premier is crucial as this position acts as the head of the executive department, and is the liaison between the president and the legislature. It would be in the president’s best interest to have a premier who is like minded, although critics would argue that this might produce nothing more than a yes mas, incapable of objectively critiquing the president’s policies. Roper notes proponents of semi-presidential systems claim under the particular system there is an increased likelihood of cabinet stability. Yet upon further. 政治大 persist. This is because the president 立 not only has the power to choose his or her cabinet research, Roper finds that in many Eastern European countries the opposite seems to. but also retains the right to dissolve them. If approval of the government is low or the. ‧ 國. 學. president deems it necessary to sack someone who is not fulfilling their duties they have the right to do so. Scholars of semi-presidential systems argue that this creates more. ‧. government instability as cabinets are at constant risk of reshuffling.26 This leads to the. y. Nat. conclusion that semi-presidential system such as that of Taiwan are very much strong-. sit. man governments. Roper points to Russia as an example of this, and evidence can be. n. al. er. io. found of major cabinet reshuffles under their current leader Vladimir Putin. On Shugart. v. and Corey’s scale, the ROC president’s powers to appoint and dismiss are at a 4.. Ch. engchi. i n U. Theoretically Taiwan certainly falls under a semi-presidential system.27 When compared to other countries which have transitioned from single party states it is clear that a number of factors contribute to the formation of specific regime types being created in post authoritarian world. History has played a major role in determining regime type on Taiwan. Taiwan’s unique history since the end of WWII has led to a top down approach at democracy. At the forefront of reform have been the elites. Elites have come from both sides of the isle, from within the ruling party and the opposition movement.28 The following sections detail the history behind reforms starting with the 26. Shoesmith, Timor-Leste. “Divided Leadership in a Semi-Presidential System.” Asian Survey 43, 2 (March-April 2003): 232-233. JSTOR. Web. 16 June 2017.<http://www.jstor.org/stable/as.2003.43.2.231>. 27 Furst, 48. 28 Myers, 1087. 16.

(25) post Mao era up through the 1990’s. History will show that the 1980’s saw a policy shift from Beijing, while not openly hostile the threat of force still existed and this played into the hands of reformers like Lee Teng-hui. The 1990’s saw a cooling of relations leading to the most serious cross-strait event in decades known as the Third Straits Crisis. Political theory is also integral to this study, a simple explanation of the results using constitutional theory is not enough. In the mid 1990’s Taiwan was in a precarious state. Relations across the Taiwan strait were tense. Although the Chinese side was willing to allow Taiwanese certain benefits for investment, they would not allow a democratic system or opposition party to oppose their single party state. On the other side of the strait, the KMT was dealing with a much more aggressive opposition. This. 政治大 allowing the direct election 立 of the president have normative values attached, the issues situation created a situation that was not so cut and dry. Although reforms such as. were much more complex than that. The opposition represented by the DPP leaned. ‧ 國. 學. toward the side of independence. The KMT, in the early 1990’s was split by those who supported president Lee and those who did not. To better understand how the triangular. ‧. relationship between the president, premier and legislature was created the study will. y. Nat. focus on how different groups emerge from post authoritarian regimes to form. er. io. sit. coalitions and enact constitutional change.29. After the initial phase of reforms, questions still remained about how certain. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. government institutions would function and be shaped by future reforms. The earlier. engchi. passages laid the groundwork for the historical background to the reform era. In recent scholarship post-authoritarian theory has been utilized to understand constitutional change on Taiwan. The focus of this chapter is to add scholarship to previous attempts to explain this era using that methodology. The previous chapters which laid bare the background to reform are important in understanding the motives behind certain actors. In emerging democracies, such as Taiwan in the mid 1990’s it is not beneficial to examine institutions based on their stability given the fact that certain government institutions were not fully executed to their constitutional ends during the martial law period. This makes the study more complex, and gives reason as to why a historical. 29. Weh-lin, Jin, How are the Powers of the President Decided? Vote Trading in the Making of Taiwan’s Semi-Presidential System, (Taipei, Acedemia Sinica, 2016), 4-5. 17.

(26) background is necessary in which all actors motives can be clearly stated. Instead, vote trading theory suggests that certain issues unrelated to each other will be linked together in order to reach some type of consensus. The important actors within democracies are those with veto like powers, these players are called the, “pivot.” Understanding the significance of each issue can provide us with insight into how certain reforms took shape. The pivot in this situation is the president. In an effort to better understand the motives behind the 1996-1997 reform period an understanding of Taiwan’s political history from the 1980’s onward is essential. Historical institutionalism is a vital method for our understanding of the reform period. Institutions take shape over time, the litmus test for a constitution is whether or not it can produce a stable society which follows uniformity of laws and procedures. Yet upon. 政治大 which share a somewhat similar 立 semi-presidential system. To better tackle the motives closer examination, the Republic of China constitution is quite unique from others. of each actor involved in reform, this study aims at creating a historical narrative.. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 1.2 Methodology. ‧ y. Nat. n. al. Data Collection Primary and Secondary Source data. Ch. Post-Authoritarian theory. engchi. Semi-presidential theory. er. io. How have presidential powers been shaped through constitutional reforms?. sit. Thesis Question. Conclusion. i n U. v. IV- China, Taiwan DV- Constitutional reform. Historical Analysis. Presidential powers increased/ downsizing of TPG. This study is a work of history. As such the information collected in this study comes many from primary and secondary sources. It is important in the field of history to examine past interpretations of circumstances through secondary sources, but as time progresses a fresh perspective can prove to be a necessary endeavor. I have gathered a plethora of secondary sources for the library of National Cheng Chi University and the universities Online database. Perspective is important, authors form different walks of 18.

(27) life always have varying opinions about similar topics. While gathering secondary sources, I was sure to choose from a wide variety of authors from a multitude of backgrounds. Government publications have also proved helpful as they provide official interpretations of the circumstances related to this study. In terms of party affiliation, most of my sources come from the Pan-blue camp, this could prove problematic in the long run, and poses as a potential space for improvement and balance. Primary sources are essential to any work of historical analysis. First, a reading of the ROC constitution was necessary as it was the basis of this study. Next, in order to better understand policy from Beijing I examined various speeches and policy proposal’s which were available online. The speech’s provided the direct text and language used by Communist Party leaders, which gave my research insight into the. 政治大 JSTOR have proven to be an立 immensely important tool in my research. Furthermore tone being set for future policy. The NCCU library as well as the online database. official government websites of both the PRC and ROC have provided valuable primary. ‧ 國. 學. sources. Constitutions, additional articles, official speeches all provide immense insight into this topic.. ‧. 1.3 Chapter Structure. sit. y. Nat. io. er. The following chapter contains the literature review. In it, I discuss already existing knowledge about the subject of reform on Taiwan. The literature review will. n. al. i n U. v. also briefly mention the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis in a more general fashion. Further. Ch. engchi. analysis of the crisis will be added in later chapters. Understanding in the general sense what Beijing’s intentions were post-Mao and the political climate on Taiwan up until reform is needed. The literature review will also cover a summary of Taiwan’s political environment before reform. The focus of this study will not go beyond the 1980’s but it is important especially to those who have little knowledge of Taiwan’s history to get a brief summary of the islands development. Chapter 3 will focus on the development of the opposition party and coalition building. As mentioned in previous passages the KMT and DPP worked together to achieve constitutional reform. This chapter will focus on the main pollical actors, and each party’s goals for reform. The goal of this chapter is to first show how in a postauthoritarian country various political actors emerge from the single party state to enact 19.

(28) change. There will be focus on issues and to a certain extent factionalization of each party as this played a significant role during the reform process. Chapter 4 is an analysis of the additional articles. I have included a timeline of all constitutional reform although this study only focuses on a certain number of those reforms. The Chapter will include a detailed analysis that pars the additional article next to the previous articles it replaced. The main focus of this chapter is to provide the reader with the exact wordage of the Additional Articles. In this chapter I provide analysis to the additional articles as I attempt to put them into greater context for the study. Lastly Chapter 5 will contain my conclusion.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. 20. i n U. v.

(29) Chapter 2 Literature Review The 1970’s saw a significant chain of events which lead to future policy shifts from Beijing. United Nations Resolution 2758 on October 25, 1971 officially declared the People’s Republic of China as the sole representative of the Chinese people. The resolution infuriated then ROC leader Chiang Kai-shek, prompting him to abandon the UN. The move struck a severe blow to the ROC’s international standing.30 A few years later Chiang would pass in 1975 only to be followed by his rival from across the strait, Mao Zedong in 1976. The passing of these two figures marked an important event in cross-strait history, one that would affect policy over the next two decades. Before their death, both leaders enjoyed almost unrivaled authority. They were staunchly committed. 政治大 The death of Mao had a greater effect on Chinese policy than the death of 立 Chiang on Taiwan. Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-Kuo assumed power on the island, to unifying China, under their own interpretation of what China would look like.. ‧ 國. 學. largely following in his father’s footsteps.31 Following Mao was another larger than life revolutionary figure, Deng Xiaoping. Deng differed from Mao. The Cold War was. ‧. beginning to thaw just as he took power, and new dynamics on both the international. y. Nat. and cross-strait stage were beginning to form. As China increased its international space. sit. and opened its economy to the world, Deng saw an opportunity to initiate his newfound. er. io. “peaceful unification” plan.32 Beijing’s new Taiwan policy set itself apart from the. al. v i n C h “liberation” or “class sides of the strait was no longer about struggle.” Instead, Deng engchi U n. past. Official’s took a less aggressive and ideological stance. The fight between both. and other key members of the Communist Party sought to reconcile differences and. bridge gaps through rhetoric first, policy second.33 The policies Beijing attempted could only have gone into effect with the okay from Taipei, and this is precisely why they made the first move. By reaching out the hand of cooperation, China would again appear to be the pragmatic actor in an ever-changing situation.. 30. Herschensohn, Bruce. Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy (Los Angeles, World Ahead Publishing, 2006), 16-18 31 Jacobs, Bruce J., and I-hao Ben Liu. "Lee Teng-Hui and the Idea of Taiwan." The China Quarterly 190 (2007): 378. JSTOR. Web. 25 May 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20192775>. 32 Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. "The Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Twenty Years of Development and Frustration." China Review (2000): 107. JSTOR. Web. 5 Apr. 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23453363>. 33 Wei-Chin Lee, T.Y. Wang, Sayonara To The Lee Teng-Hui Era Politics in Taiwan, 1988 to 2000(Laham: 2003) 283-284.. 21.

(30) The shifting atmosphere was certainly in the back of Beijing’s minds when the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress released, “A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” on New Year’s Day, 1979. The tone of the message was important. Far from the ideological rhetoric of the Mao era, the speech showed Beijing’s new approach to Taiwan. Within its text, the speech covers a number of issues on the minds of both sides of the strait. Economics development, end to military hostilities, and person to person exchanges were all important subjects to the people of Taiwan and China.34 Interestingly, the speech also briefly mentions China’s international rise, certainly a strategic placement in order to get the audience thinking about Taiwan’s own international standing. Beijing’s message ends by stating reunification as the ultimate goal for both sides of the strait, “The bright future of our. 治政大are moving ahead and the sacred mission history has handed to our generation. Times situation is developing. The立 earlier we fulfil this mission, the sooner we can jointly great motherland belongs to us and to you. The reunification of the motherland is the. ‧ 國. 學. write an unprecedented, brilliant page in the history for our country.” Although Beijing’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,” was purely political rhetoric it served. and allowed Taiwan to make the next move.. Nat. y. ‧. the party’s initial purpose. It provided context for Beijing’s future moves, set the tone,. sit. Following the message to Taiwan, a few more official policy proposals were put. er. io. forth by the Communist Party during the mid-1980’s in an effort to be more specific on. al. n. v i n C h Congress, Ye Jianying later Chairmen of the National People’s e n g c h i U delivered a public. the nature of cross-strait negotiations, conditions, and eventual unification. A few years statement entitled, “Policy on Return of Taiwan to the Motherland and Peaceful. Reunification, the speech which was administered through Xinhua News agency later came to be known as Ye’s Nine Point Proposal. Chairmen Ye proposed (1) more, “exhaustive exchanges” between both the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang. (2) Both sides of the strait longed for cooperation in an effort of people to reconcile and reconnect with relatives, loved ones, and acquaintance. (3) The people of Taiwan would enjoy a high level of autonomy, including administrative and armed forces. (4) Taiwan’s socio-economic system would be left intact, property rights and foreign investment would be respected. (5) People on Taiwan will be allowed to. 34. Lee, Peter Nan-shong. "Jiang Zemin versus Lee Teng-hui: Strained Mainland-Taiwan Relationship." China Review (1997): 110. JSTOR. Web. 23 Apr. 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23453119>.. 22.

(31) actively participate in the National government. (6) China would aid Taiwan in times of financial difficulty. (7) The people of Taiwan are welcome to relocate to the mainland. (8) Business interests will be respected under the law and investment will be encouraged. (9) The reunification of China and Taiwan is the responsibility of all Chinese people. It was this proposal that Deng Xiaoping used to state his “one country, two systems” theory in January of 1982.35 The “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” and Ye’s “9 Points” were the initial foundation, the bedrock, to the Communist Parties new policy toward Taiwan. During the mid-1980’s the Communist Party was undergoing an important change. As many revolutionary leaders began to pass away or simply step down from official posts due to failing health, a new group of party cadres took the helm. Although Beijing’s Taiwan. 政治大 structure of the Communist 立 Party provided fresh eyes to a decades old problem.. policy remained under a centralized hierarchy, the new faces within the policy making. Lacking revolutionary experience, the new class of policy shapers were groomed. ‧ 國. 學. through the bureaucratic process, from across the strait it seemed as though Beijing had become less Hawkish in its approach.36 During the era of Mao and even Deng, many. ‧. policy decisions came from one single man. Once the paramount leaders were gone, the. y. Nat. rhetoric became increasingly inviting and cooperative in nature. It was during this era of. sit. transition that the Communist party began taking advice from outside the party. The. al. n. the party.. er. io. CCP began consulting various academic institutes, which were often closely linked to. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Before making official statements related to policy initiatives the Communist Party established the Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group in 1978. The TALSG’s role changed over time. Initially it was created by CCP central committee to conduct research on Taiwan. As time went on it would become the cornerstone of Taiwan policy. Deng retained paramount power over the group during the 1980’s but by 1993, as his health declined, Jiang Zemin became the head of TALSG. Although Jiang sat at the top of the TALSG he did not enjoy absolute power and needed to consult various. 35. Jianying, Ye. Message to Compatriots in Taiwan, China News, http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7943.htm (accessed December 16, 2016). 36 Tasi Kevin G, Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations Since 1979 Policy Adjustments and Institutional Change Across the straits. Waterloo. University of Waterloo. 2011. 220-221.. 23.

(32) senior leaders from both the political and military sections of the CCP. This would later effect policy, as Jiang became more Hawkish during the presidency of Lee Teng-hui.37 As China’s “Open Door” policy began to show signs of success, Taiwan was undergoing major political reforms. In 1987 under Chiang Ching-kuo martial law was lifted, effectively giving citizens the personal and intellectual freedoms they lacked over the past few decades. Instead of panic, China reacted with calm. Despite their lifting of martial law, the international world still shunned Taiwan and stifled any attempts to gain more space. The KMT controlled government attempted to enact laws limiting personal and economic contacts for security reason, but this had limited effect. Business and people simply found round about ways, such as flights through Hong Kong as means to an end. China bided its time, if it were not going to use force then patience was the only option.38. 立. 政治大. In January of 1995 Jiang made his famous “8 Point” proposal to the people of. ‧ 國. 學. Taiwan. The context was more complex than ever before. The Taiwanese had successfully completed the first round of political reform by giving its people the right. ‧. to vote for their legislature. President Lee lifted the, Temporary Provisions for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, which was met with optimism from across. Nat. sit. y. the straits. The outcome of initial legislative elections also gave the Communist party. io. Democratic Progressive Party to rethink its strategy.. al. er. hope for future reunification as the KMT won a majority of seats, leaving the opposition. n. v i n Ch Jiang’s speech entitled, “Continuing U the Reunification of e n gto cStrive h i Toward China” or “Eight Points” also came at the cusp of Taiwan’s second reform, one which would see the Taiwanese people choose their president through popular election less than a year later. The success of Taiwan’s first phase of democratization was fresh in Jiang’s mind and many within the Communist Party believed the second round would be successful. Beijing still had a hand to play. Despite such historical gains, Taiwan was losing international space, most notably the loss of recognition by South Korea in 1992. Jiang’s, “Eight Points” exemplify a more precise Chinese policy direction in the face of Taiwan’s upcoming second phase of reform. Jiang opens his statement with a brief 37. Tasi Kevin G, Cross-taiwan straits relations since 1979 policy adjustments and institutional change acriss the straits, 224. 38 Harrison, Selig S. "Taiwan After Chiang Ching-Kuo." Foreign Affairs 66.4 (1988): 795-96. JSTOR. Web. 3 May 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/200483>.. 24.

(33) history lesson. He attempts to refute any opposition to the idea that Taiwan is or ever was an independent country, “Taiwan's early development by the Chinese people has been recorded in many historical books and documents. The Chinese governments through the past ages set up administrative organizations to exercise its jurisdiction over Taiwan.” Beijing’s rhetoric is important for multiple reasons. By talking about Chinese history and the idea of a unified China, Beijing shares a common historical understating of the situation with the KMT. By using historical and resorting to grandiose language, Beijing was also making it clear to the international community that the issue of Taiwan was one internal to the Chinese nation.39 By pushing Taiwan further outside the realm of international relations, Beijing confines Taiwan’s democratic reforms to a matter of simple domestic consequence.. 政治大 reiterates the concept of One立 China. (2) Taiwan has the ability to join economic and. In his speech, Jiang’s tone was once again inviting and conciliatory. (1) Jiang. cultural international organizations, but must refrain from doing so as an independent. ‧ 國. 學. nation. (3) consultations on an equal footing mean that Taiwan will recognize the October 1992 talks and the conclusions reached at that time. (4) No use of force, not a. ‧. liberation but a peaceful reunification of Taiwan to the motherland. (5) Further. y. Nat. investment between both sides of the strait will help increase competitiveness and. sit. prosperity in the coming century. (6) The 5,000 year history of China is the bedrock of. n. al. er. io. unification. (7) Through unification people on both sides of the strait can search for a. i n U. v. more prosperous future together. (8) Government officials from Taiwan are able to visit. Ch. engchi. the mainland, but only in the appropriate capacity.40. Although short, there is much to be said about Jiang’s speech. The first point sets the context of the entire speech. By restating the importance of “One China” Jiang made it clear, whatever the future of reform holds for Taiwan it must be undertaken through Beijing’s framework. Points two and four backup Beijing’s concept of peaceful unification. Until that time, the world could rely on China to not provoke the situation across the straits. Even after the Tiananmen incident and initial reforms on Taiwan, China remained calm and calculated. If the Communist Party created waves it could have meant a dramatic shift for the success of their policy. The second point is. 39. Herschensohn, Bruce. Taiwan: The Threatened Democracy, 50. Zemin, Jiang. Continuing to Strive for the Unification of China, China News, http://www.china.org.cn/english/taiwan/7955.htm (Date accessed, December 17 2016) 40. 25.

台灣政治重建的論爭: 1992-1997年 憲政改革的研究 - 政大學術集成

台灣政治重建的論爭: 1992-1997年憲政改革的研究 - 政大學術集成