CHAPTER 1: Introduction
1.2 Literature review
This section reviews concepts and theories in the literature. After establishing a conception of tolerance and its components and borders, we will then dive into the process of how religious groups move across the borders of tolerance and start and end conflicts. We will thereby find some useful approaches for determining the level and methods of toleration in the case studies in Taiwan.
The concept of tolerance
It is within the Christian tradition, which has been highly intolerant of any perceived unbelievers and perhaps was the most in need of an argument to act otherwise, that the principle of “tolerance” was developed.1 Political philosopher John Locke presents an early, classical defense of religious tolerance in A Letter Concerning Tolerance. His main reasons for tolerance are twofold: the theological argument of the limited human knowledge of God, and a pragmatic prevention of battles between the plurality of religions and opinions. Locke thus proposes the separation of religion and politics, since civil interests demand laws and penalties, while the salvation of the soul only works through personal deliberation (2010 [1689]). Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh (2013) demonstrate that his arguments are still widely influential.
In their analysis of contemporary guiding motifs for religious freedom in Western societies, half of these notions are based upon Lockean arguments.2
Locke’s “natural right” to religious freedom seems liberal. However, Richard Ashcraft shows how deeply Locke’s rights of tolerance are grounded into his religious beliefs, not only as a justification but also as “a necessary condition for the existential exercise of such rights” (2011 [1996]: 43). Thus, people who deny God are not to be tolerated, for promises and oaths (in God’s name) have no meaning for them (Locke, 2010 [1689]: 32). Moreover, as Ashcraft indicates, this separation of religion and politics was formulated in a strong anti-Catholic political climate in which the Anglican clergy claimed political control and would not tolerate many Protestant churches (2011 [1996]: 51-52). This is visible in two other limits of Locke’s toleration: first, churches loyal to foreign monarchs, such as the Catholics are to the Pope (2010 [1689]: 31-32); and second, churches claiming temporal dominion, as the Anglicans did at the time (14-15, 31).
1 For example, see Beck (2010: 110-115) or Ahdar and Leigh (2013: 24-34), the latter on the historical changes of the ideas of religious liberty and (mostly lack of) religious tolerance throughout the development of Christianity.
2 These are the principle of voluntariness, persecution injunction, fallibility, and eschatological or providential confidence. In addition, Ahdar and Leigh recognize four more leading motifs, namely the dual authority principle, Christological injunction, universal principle, and unrestricted conscience (34-50).
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The final limit to Lockean toleration is doctrines that go against civil society and moral order (30-31).
With Locke’s conception of religion being that of an inward faith (17), Ulrich Beck criticizes this last limit for demanding a society with a Protestant and secularized conception of God at the core. He argues that this is actually intolerant against any religions that “seek to maintain their religious claims even in the seemingly ‘insignificant externals’ of religious faith” (2010: 115-117). Here, Beck raises the examples of orthodox Sabbath rest and specific food requirements; another example is the processions around the district as required by local gods in Taiwanese folk religion. Locke not only took important steps toward religious tolerance but simultaneously also showed that this tolerance has clear limitations.
Going one step further than these specific conceptions of tolerance and their limitations, political scientist Preston King analyzes the components of toleration, forming the basis of philosopher Rainer Forst’s analysis of the general concept of toleration and its boundaries.
King focuses on the interplay of objection and acceptance components that creates tolerance. He looks at morally charged “items,” that is, actions, beliefs, or practices (the use of any of these terms, hereafter, refers to this category) one is not indifferent toward, and assumes that a genuinely held objection is acted upon through a counter-action with relevant effects, such as removing the objectionable item (1976: 25-29). When evaluating the other’s practice, you could (1) primarily find reasons to like or approve of it (“acceptance”), which generally leads to agreement; or (2) primarily find reasons to dislike or disapprove of it (“objection”), which tends to leads to rejection; or (3) initially find reasons to object, but then also find reasons to accept; or (4) initially find reasons to accept, but then also find reasons to object. The latter two cases could result in tolerance because they involve both acceptance and objection components. Therefore, when reaching tolerance, the objection component is in no way diminished, but merely seen as a relative concern. In other words, the disapproval of the tolerated object is less important than one’s disapproval of some other object (44-54). The acceptance component can then be very minimal, such as in the example raised by King: one “may oppose a different group less than he opposes the idea of demeaning or destroying that group – it being taken perhaps as an equally legitimate part of God’s creation” (27).
Figure 1. The assesment of normative actions, beliefs, or practices (as proposed by King, 1976) [when assessing an action, belief, or practice]
acceptance ←― subscription ←――┘ └――→ objection ―→ rejection
└――――――→ (reasons to object) (reasons to accept) ←┘
└→ tolerance ←┘
King here speaks of the inclination of “dislike” and more rational “disapproval,” not as equal, but as both belonging to the category of “objections” (42). Originally, “approval” and “like” were bracketed together as “subscriptions,” which could ultimately lead to “acceptance” (42). However, since King’s use of the word “acceptance” in this second scenario seems inconsistent with his more minimal use of
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“acceptance” in the third and fourth scenarios of tolerance, I propose to stick to the use of “acceptance”
in the minimal form (thereby also replacing “subscription”), in the sense of “I accept your opinion, even though I do not agree with it.” Consequently, I propose to replace the stronger “acceptance” with
“agreement,” which then also becomes more consistent with Forst’s analysis, as we will see shortly. The differences are mapped out in Figure 1 and the upper part of Figure 2.
Figure 2. The assesment of normative actions, beliefs, or practices divided by the boundaries of tolerance (largely based on Forst, 2012; and King, 1976)
[when assessing an action, belief, or practice]
agreement ← acceptance ←――┘ └――→ objection → rejection
└→ (reasons to object) (reasons to accept) ←┘
Related to these components, Forst identifies three realms of practices that are morally charged (2012).
Of interest here are the two borders that separate these spheres and so determine toleration (Figure 2).
The first boundary lies between the realms of nominal acceptance and of tolerance and distinguishes what needs to be tolerated from what is a non-issue (Forst, 2012). An interesting way to explore this in the context of religious organizations in Taiwan would be by examining the potential for interreligious cooperation. Which aspects of the other religion are accepted, in such a way that it can lead to a partnership? The first border becomes visible when this cooperation expires; what is the extent of this mutual validation, and what reasons are given for ending the partnership? This seems a more positive way to find the limits of interreligious tolerance in Taiwan by examining how the reach of agreements between religious organizations. It also demonstrates the role of the objection component in cases of opposing values or actions. The latter situation requires tolerance of some sort to keep the peace.
Because of practical constraints to the scope of this study, this topic will be left for future research.
The second boundary lies between the realms of the intolerable and the tolerable. It separates practices and beliefs that are wrong but still can be tolerated from those that are strictly rejected and should be acted against (ibid.). This can be illustrated by situations that lead to conflicts between religious groups or, when there is government entanglement with religious business, between a religious group and the government. For each dispute it is important to not only consider the intensity of the conflict, in order to understand which practices and beliefs cross the line and are strictly rejected, but also to recognize what it took to solve the problem and reach a point where the situation was tolerable for both sides. Therefore, this focus on conflicts may seem negative, but also shows
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possibilities for peacebuilding. Still ongoing cases demonstrate the actual level of (in)tolerance amongst religious organizations in contemporary Taiwan.
Sociologists Mark Juergensmeyer and Sharon Erickson Nepstad analyze cases that cross this second border. While Juergensmeyer (2003) focuses on the sanctification of violence, Nepstad (2004) recognizes these same traits in radical peaceful religious movements. However, Nepstad also found what sets peaceful religious movements apart in their mentality toward conflict resolution, distinguishing three practices for pursuing interreligious peace. The first is a belief in an individual capacity for both good and evil (versus group divisions of unchangeable good and evil), which urges peacemakers to “intentionally traverse group boundaries to have dialogue and develop relationships with their opponents” (299). The second is the vision of a shared quest to a higher truth (versus claiming to possess the only one truth), which also requires a nonattachment to the religion’s own ideas so as to stay open to persuasion by others toward a higher truth. Lastly, religion is viewed as a means to an end (versus as an end in itself), which opens up the possibility to use different religions as equal means to guide individuals and society toward spiritual fulfillment (298-301).
All three of these practices for seeking genuinely peaceful resolutions require an active stance toward other religions. Especially the idea of nonattachment to ideas seems to demand a high level of adjustment to the religious Other. Just as with the concept of tolerance, this goes further than mere indifference, such as conflict resolution through the separation of the groups and asking each to stay in their own territory. If these practices are rigorously followed, would that still involve tolerance, or cross over in to agreement? However, we have seen that toleration requires acceptance of the other’s beliefs and practices to a certain extent, to balance the objection. This thesis does not aim to prescribe these practices to religious organizations in Taiwan, but to evaluate if and how much of this rhetoric is used in creating and solving religious conflicts. In this way, the typically peaceful situation among religions in Taiwan provides an excellent opportunity to examine all the facets of the concept of religious tolerance.
A final key point is that tolerance should be practiced voluntarily; that is, it should be a choice as to whether to tolerate the objectionable practice (Forst, 2012). Otherwise, it would simply be a situation of endurance, wherein your actions would be ineffective. “Tolerance […] requires some form of self-restraint by the tolerator” (King, 1976: 22). In a different way than the practices identified by Nepstad, it does involve an active stance toward the religious other—different, because toleration asks for an action of non-interference.
For King, the level of power is crucial for tolerance to happen. A person only can tolerate when holding the power to interfere; they must be in a position that enables them to view an act or belief and either accept or perform a counter-action with relevant effects (1976: 21-25). Forst uses conceptions of majority and minority to understand these differences in power (2012). However, in the Taiwanese context of religious plurality, this power to interfere is less clearly defined. I, therefore, propose to look at the place of each religious organization and tradition in Taiwan. Their amount of power is
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demonstrated, first by the sheer scale of religions in Taiwan, which indicates to what extent they are a majority or minority group. The second aspect is tradition, such as the historical dimension of when and how each religion was established in Taiwan, as well as how it was developed vis-à-vis Taiwanese culture;
enabling an understanding of how much the religious tradition is considered to be part of the normative culture. The last aspect is the relationship of religions with the government. We will see next that, especially for conflict situations before 2000, this is important for determining the amount of influence the government has over these organizations and the influence of religious organizations on politicians.
Moreover, as philosopher Bernard Williams argues, toleration is a matter of attitude towards those who are objected to. “A group or a creed can rightly be said to be ‘intolerant’ if it would like to suppress or drive out others even if, as a matter of fact, it has no power to do so” (1996, 19). In other words, when you are in a minority position, promoting tolerance is necessary to ensure that those in power tolerate you, but that does not necessarily mean that you would keep this attitude when obtaining power yourself. However, it is also possible to maintain tolerant attitudes regardless of your degree of power. In the case of religious groups, I suggest that this is more concretely put forward in their theologies on the existence of religions with other practices than their own. Different theologies will decide for a religious organization whether they can accept other religious traditions with distinct practices and truth claims. Moreover, it offers a sacred basis for the attitude that is held toward other religions. Besides the idea that your own god and religion is the most suitable for you, the reality of Taiwanese religious plurality is that a manifold of gods are claimed to exist and are worshipped.
One way to identify this attitude is by differentiating the theisms that religions are based upon. At one end of the spectrum is polytheism, acknowledging the existence of multiple deities, each with (part of) a truth and thus worthy of being worshipped. Monolatrism and henotheism worship one deity, with the former believing in and the latter not denying the existence of other deities who could be equally valuable. At the opposite end is monotheism, which recognizes only one god and denounces the existence of other deities. The only theism that makes a claim about “truth” and “false” religions is monotheism—the other theisms accept to a greater or lesser extent the presence of religions with different truth claims that are not necessarily less true than those of one’s own religious teachings.3 Based on the premise of a personal god, this approach is limited when considering some of the main religious traditions in Taiwan. For example, Buddhist doctrine entails many gods, but since none can bring personal enlightenment, it ultimately is nontheistic. Yiguandao presents itself to be polytheist by incorporating all gods of major religions. However, with putting the Venerable Mother as the highest deity, it seems to be more monolatrist in its practice. Another limitation is that this method looks at religions in general, without regard to the reality that different groups within the same tradition possess different rhetoric and strategies.
3 Baumgartner, Christoph. Class Ethics, Human Rights, and Religious Tolerance (February 2011).
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Responding to this last question, Knitter divides the various theological visions on other religions into four models (2004). Knitter’s analysis is focused on the different visions among Christian denominations, but it seems to fit other religious traditions as well. The models show the extent to which other religions can be accepted or objected to as the equal sources of religious truth. The replacement model holds the religion’s own prophet either as the only or as the ultimate path to the truth, thereby insisting on the uniqueness and importance of their own religious teachings and consequently denying equal values to other religions. Second, the fulfillment model argues that the truth is greater than one’s own religion and that other religious teachings could also offer some valuable lessons, although their own religion teaches the normative, best message. This reminds us that the religion or deity in question has the highest claim to truth, but simultaneously patronizes other religious teachings as being less valuable.
Next, the mutuality model discovers truth also in other religions and suggests that all religions have limitations, and therefore that religious diversity should be protected. In granting equal value to all religions while making it possible to insist on the uniqueness of a specific religion’s teachings, this model also pushes for a Western conception of religion. The acceptance model, finally, welcomes the diversity of religions and their truths and goals, because it views religions as comparable to different languages or cultures. However, it thereby overemphasizes the unbridgeable gap between languages and cultures, for which religions exactly can be a unifying factor. This method recognizes the reality of religious plurality, even within larger religious traditions, and requires that these theological bases be identified in the teachings of specific religious organizations in Taiwan. We then can use the limits of these models to see the extent of their ability to possibly object to or accept other religions and their practices or beliefs. Knitter thus offers a method to evaluate religions’ sanctification of their attitudes toward the religious Other.
Religions’ power to interfere in modern Taiwan
To appreciate the current status of relations among religious organizations and between these organizations and the government, we first need to understand the development of the modern Taiwanese religious environment. This shows in part how the traditions at large developed their “power to interfere,” as analyzed by the political and religious scientist Kuo Cheng-tian (2013). Taiwan was left relatively free of central control during the imperial dynasties, as long it did not threaten social stability or the power of the emperor. After the establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1911, the state tried to assert control over religion, such as with the 1929 and still-valid Law Regulating Temples and Shrines (LRTS; 監督寺廟條理, Jiandu Simiao Tiaoli) of traditional Chinese religions—Christians and folk religionists were the major exception of this law (2013: 10). During these early years of the ROC, the island of Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule. The rulers attempted a Japanification of the island by replacing local (Daoist) temples with Japanese Buddhist shrines and shortly before the war, temporarily,
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expelled foreign Christian missionaries. However, after the island was returned to the Republic of China in 1945, religiosity bloomed once more.
However, tensions rose again and 1949 saw the Nationalist ROC regime flee to Taiwan, together with other mainland Chinese (including many religionists, most noticeably the practitioners of Yiguandao, Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism), and subsequently the start of the martial law era. During this period, the state proved capable of controlling religion. In addition to the LRTS, only a few national umbrella religious associations were allowed to represent the clergy and believers of Buddhism, Daoism, and Catholicism, as will be expanded upon below. As Kuo puts it, “the state was able to influence the management of religious organizations and the theological debates that went on within them. It also restricted the behavior of religious believers outside religious organizations by means of various martial-law-based regulations” (19-20). The authoritarian regime viewed religion as a functional method to urge people to do good and thus expected religious groups to use their teachings for the improvement of the atmosphere in the Taiwanese society. Most religious organizations took either a submissive or a
However, tensions rose again and 1949 saw the Nationalist ROC regime flee to Taiwan, together with other mainland Chinese (including many religionists, most noticeably the practitioners of Yiguandao, Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism), and subsequently the start of the martial law era. During this period, the state proved capable of controlling religion. In addition to the LRTS, only a few national umbrella religious associations were allowed to represent the clergy and believers of Buddhism, Daoism, and Catholicism, as will be expanded upon below. As Kuo puts it, “the state was able to influence the management of religious organizations and the theological debates that went on within them. It also restricted the behavior of religious believers outside religious organizations by means of various martial-law-based regulations” (19-20). The authoritarian regime viewed religion as a functional method to urge people to do good and thus expected religious groups to use their teachings for the improvement of the atmosphere in the Taiwanese society. Most religious organizations took either a submissive or a