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model more closely resembles foreign policy suggestions or ideals rather than IRT, making it ineffectual for the purposes of this work. The application of “Chinese characteristics” in describing things political, economic or theoretical perpetuates the belief that China is somehow exceptional. This also sets the trend for how CIRT theorists posit their arguments for the creation of a unique Chinese School vis-à-vis mainstream IR theory. However, his position within Chinese academics in addition to the ardent call for a theoretical model with “Chinese characteristics” makes his work indispensible in understanding the origins and trends of the debate and a solid starting point toward tracking the evolution of IRT construction in China.
Whatever the specific motivations individual scholars possess, there are numerous academics working across a wide spectrum of theoretical models within the field of IRT generally and the building of CIRT specifically. As discussed above, the major Western theoretical lens advocated in China is realism. However, for the purposes of this paper two major CIRT thinkers (Qin Yaqing and Yan Xuetong) will be discussed along with one other no less influential thinkers (Zhao Tingyang) to analyze the ongoing debate within China about what CIRT is, how it is being constructed, and if it is indeed applicable on a regional or global scale in relation to Chinese strategy, foreign policy and economic development.
Section 3.4: Major Chinese IRT Thinkers: Qin Yaqing
Qin Yaqing is a professor at the China Foreign Affairs University and executive vice
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president of China National Association of International Studies and one of the leading Chinese IRT thinkers advocating the construction of a Chinese School of IRT. As a Western-trained scholar, Qin’s “theoretical orientation is largely impacted by his involvement with policy and politics” and his dissatisfaction with Western-oriented theories that fail to explain the Chinese reality.81 Qin also views theoretical models not as universal, as the major Western IRTs claim to be, but as culturally bound and determined by the cultural background from which they emerge. In Qin’s view, the Chinese experience is unique to China and China’s rise can only be interpreted through a Chinese context. Qin Yaqing challenges the notion that China’s rise necessitates confrontation with the U.S. He argues that a dualistic or Hegelian dialectic falls outside of the Chinese mindset and that background knowledge, defined by “histories, experiences, practices, and habits” shared by a cultural community are better at determining what China’s intentions are and how China would respond to changes in the international system.82
Qin proposes what he calls a “relational theory” of IR. Relational theory presupposes that “an actor tends to make decisions according to the degrees of intimacy and/or importance of her relationships to specific others, with the totality of her relational circles as the background.”83 There are three underlying assumptions to his theory. First is the
81 Thuy T. Do, “China’s rise and the ‘Chinese dream’ in international relations theory,” Global Change, Peace &
Security Vol. 27, No. 1 (2015): 33-34.
82 Qin Yaqing, “Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s International Strategy,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2014): 287.
83 Qin Yaqing, “A Relational Theory of World Politics,” International Studies Review 0 (2016), 5.
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interrelatedness on the metaphysical level of a world comprising relations that are continually evolving and changing, not individual actors (i.e. states) as in other IRT.
Second is what Qin calls “actors-in-relation.” Actors possess no independent identity, as they are continually defined and redefined by their relations to others. And finally is the concept of process, whereby actors-in-relation are continually becoming and not static, predefined entities.84 These components constitute the ontological argument for Qin’s relational theory.
On a epistemological level, according to Qin, the most important concept in understanding China’s approach to IR should be the Confucian notion of zhongyong (中 庸). As mentioned above, zhongyong refers to a middle way or middle path and Qin sees this as “one of the core components constituting background knowledge that is commonly shared in the Chinese cultural community.”85 In other words, in order to properly understand China and Chinese strategy one needs the background knowledge of Chinese culture, primarily the zhongyong ethic that guides Chinese thinking and actions.
In doing so, Qin often evokes the yin (陰) and yang (陽) imagery to elucidate his usage of zhongyong. Whereas Hegelian dialects embody dualisms and dichotomies such as thesis and antithesis, hegemons and rising powers, East and West, zhongyong defines phenomenon in a non-dichotomous way, seeing things not in black-and-white terms but correlated and interrelated.86
84 Qin Yaqing, “A Relational Theory of World Politics,” 3-5.
85 Ibid.
86 Qin, “Continuity through Change,” 290-292.
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Integral to Qin’s theory of world politics is the idea of “relationality” or relational totality. Qin maintains that all three of the major Western IR schools of thought “try to develop paradigmatic theories at the systematic level, focusing on how factors of the international system influence state behavior and/or shape state identity” in what he terms
“individualistic rationality.”87 Qin maintains that within the field of International Relations, relations have surprisingly received very little attention. Relations are the crux of Qin’s argument and basis for his understanding of the international system as a whole.
The level of intimacy and importance defines relationships. For example the Sino-U.S.
relationship is arguably one of the most important in the world, however the degree of intimacy between the two is relatively low compared to China’s “all-weather” friend Pakistan. Countries base their decision making on the depth of either intimacy or importance. In this case, a high degree of intimacy and importance should theoretically lead to more harmonious relations, whereas cases of un-intimacy, whether or not the relationship is important, could lead to conflict.
Figure 3.1: Qin’s Intimacy/Importance Graph. Source: Qin Yaqing, A Relational Theory of World Politics, (Cambridge:
87 Qin Yaqing, “Relationality and Processual Construction: Brining Chinese Ideas into International Relations Theory,” Social Sciences in China Vol. 30, No. 4 (2009), 9-10.
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Qin’s use and understanding of Relational Theory is summarized below:
Table 3.1: Summary of Qin Yaqing’s Relational Theory Underlying Component/
Assumption of Relational Theory
Description Features Examples
Logic of Relationality Three important assumptions:
1) Interrelatedness 2) Actors are becoming
through relations 3) Process
1) Actors are related to each other and their respective relational circles 2) Identities are shaped by their relations
3) An actor’s identity may (re)produce and (re)define each piece is defined by its relation to others
3) Globalization: initiated by certain states, but once set in motion began to shape itself and the actors involved in the process of globalization
Zhongyong Dialectics The epistemological portion of Qin’s relational theory
Three important elements view of the state of nature
ASEAN is a modern example. Inclusive regionalism, one of the aims of ASEAN, is cited as two or more cultures that are mutually inclusive in their interactions.
Relational Power Ability to make others conform to one’s will during the process of social interaction – this is done by constant manipulating and managing one’s relational circles: More power = larger relational circles
China’s aid to Africa in the 1960s. Despite being poor its UN membership in the 1970s.
Use of Force Conflict is not the normal method of interaction
Relationality tends to push states toward cooperation.
Qin is intentionally vague on the use of force within
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Relational Governance Three limitations of rules-based governance:
1) Individualistic
2) Rationalistic inclination:
Rules work only if actors are rational
3) Contain a non-trust presumption: Trust rules, but not each other
- Based on three pillars:
relation, morality and trust general are a good place to test this hypothesis Yaqing, A Relational Theory of World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
Finally, Qin’s “processual contructivism” as a potential theoretical hard core for CIRT can be understood in three ways: First, both process and actors associate in an interdependent fashion as both are “actively involving the practice of socialization”;
second, interactions are given meaning through their inter-subjectivity; and third, process differs from the dualistic understanding of the West and embodies a zhongyong background that makes it non-linear.88 The Chinese worldview, according to Qin, looks at the interrelatedness of things where actors “are and can only be actors-in-relations.”89 This also fits into his conception of a zhongyong ethic that perceives things not as separate and dichotomous, but as correlated. These actors acting in relation to one another are also in a continual process that is both shaped by them and simultaneously
88 Qin, “Relationality and Processual Construction,” 9-10.
89 Qin, “A Relational Theory of World Politics,” 34.
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shaping them. An example used by Qin is the process of globalization that, once initiated, began to take a life of its own. Certainly actors had played a role in its creation, but it has continued as a process through the relations among actors to define and redefine, produce and reproduce new processes. It is important to note that Qin does not elaborate further on his brief mention of globalization or provide supporting evidence. The logic of relatedness within international relations stems from, in Qin’s interpretation, the Confucian notion of how to understand relationships. Relationships and relational circles within which an actor is embedded ultimately determine an actor’s behavior. Equally important is the actors-in-relations use of relational circles in seeking gains.90
Taken holistically the ideas of Qin Yaqing, the most vociferous proponent of
“Chinese School” construction, shed important light on the direction of the debate for CIRT. Qin contends that contrary to popular belief, China’s overall strategy has been and will remain focused on domestic development and territorial integrity through a non-alliance approach to international relations and economic diplomacy.91 We can glean from his writings a non-comprehensive yet useful initiation into CIRT. From Qin Yaqing’s philosophy on IR, the following assumptions about CIRT will be made:
1) Using the zhongyong ethic as background knowledge for understanding Chinese grand strategy, China will maintain a foreign policy strategy that emphasizes domestic economic development, political stability, and territorial integrity.
90 Qin, “A Relational Theory of World Politics,” 36-37.
91 Qin, “Continuity through Change,” 308.
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2) ‘Processual constructivism’ as a potential theoretical hard core for CIRT where power is relational and relations define identity among actors:
a) Relational power places more emphasis on nonmaterial capabilities i.e.
social capital
3) “Chinese dialectics allows room for a ‘process approach’, which relates things in an ongoing process, moving toward harmony by combining opposites and thwarting conflict”92
Section 3.5: Major Chinese IRT Thinkers: Yan Xuetong
Yan Xuetong (閻學通) is the director of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing and is considered one of the more hardline political theorists in China. He is often categorized as a realist and is an advocate for a more assertive foreign policy, the establishment of military alliances (his stance also includes increasing military aid while decreasing economic aid), and a general bolstering of China’s military presence.93 Yan’s seminal essay compilation Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, published in 2011, was generally well received by curious readers outside of China who were interested in a dynamic and increasingly powerful China. However its reception was not without very serious critiques. Commentators charged the volume as being “utopian” and “too ambitious and entangles too many
92 Qin Yaqing, “Culture and global thought,” 82.
93 Yufan Huang, “Q. and A.: Yan Xuetong Urges China to Adopt a More Assertive Foreign Policy,” New York Times February 9, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/world/asia/china-foreign-policy-yan-xuetong.html?_r=0
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issues.”94 In the introduction to Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, Daniel Bell gives a more moderate account of Yan’s political philosophy than others have. Bell argues that far from being extreme, Yan himself is neither a communist nor a militarist.95
To begin with, it is necessary to understand Yan’s relation to and view of CIRT.
From Yan’s perspective, the absence of a veritable CIRT stems not from a lack of effort but from an inadequacy in Chinese academia. He cites three major reasons why there exists no CIRT: First, there is a shortage of properly trained scholars; second, more emphasis is needed in IR circles regarding ancient Chinese political thought, and; third, there are not enough theoretical debates among Chinese scholars that can critically improve their theories.96 Unlike Qin Yaqing, Yan Xuetong views the creation of a
“Chinese School” of IRT as neither prudent nor feasible, calling it “a waste of effort and a fruitless task.” This has not prevented him from attempting to coalesce a Chinese/Western fusion of IR ideas, resembling IRT creation. He views the pre-Qin interstate political philosophy as a basis to augment and cultivate a better understanding of modern IR.97 His writings suggest not so much an opposition to the establishment of a unique IRT, but to the use of the demonym ‘China’ as an appellation because of the vast connotations that ‘China’ entails. He very much agrees with China’s exceptional status,
94 Jayshree Borah, “Book Review: Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power,” China Report Vol. 51, No. 1 (2015), 85-86.
95 Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 2.
96 Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 265.
97 Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 201.
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hence his attempt to revive ancient concepts and apply them to the modern world. It has been observed that this trend of drawing on classical traditions, particularly by Yan, “has been foundational for the aspirations of a Chinese School.”98 The reason for Yan’s application of pre-Qin political relations and philosophies as a model for understanding contemporary interstate relations is twofold: first, the pre-Qin period contains one of the most fecund foundational arrays of political thinkers and; second, pre-Qin states, especially during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, contain two basic features of the modern state: sovereignty and territory.99
Yan endorses a foundational approach to IRT that is centered on what he calls
“moral realism.” He elaborates by stating,
“Moral realism involves leading by example, which means China needs to practice the moral principles it advocates to the world both at home and abroad. The core principles suggested by moral realism are fairness, justice and civility. Equality, democracy and freedom are also important principles advocated by moral realism.”100
Of the many pre-Qin philosophers, Yan pays particular attention to the 3rd century BCE philosopher Xunzi (荀子) and the ideas he expounded concerning relations among states.
In his article “Xunzi’s Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications,” Yan lays out a summary of Xunzi’s philosophy and international theoretical model (drawn from Book 11, Of Kings and Lords-Protector; Book 9, On the Regulations of a King; and
98 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is There no Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years on,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 0 (2017), 19.
99 Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 147.
100 Huang, ““Q. and A.: Yan Xuetong Urges China to Adopt a More Assertive Foreign Policy.”
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Book 18 Rectifying Thesis) in order to gain insights into China’s “rising strategy.”101 Contrary to liberalism, Xunzi believed it is the state—more specifically the nature of the great powers—that shapes the international system and not the international system that determines the nature of states. Therefore, within the three different levels of analysis (international, state, and individual), Yan categorizes Xunzi’s philosophy as individualistic because the nature of imperial states are shaped in the form of an individual; in this case the ruler in the form of a king. This individualistic analysis also emanates to the ministers and officials who are also responsible for shaping the state’s character.
In his chapter “Xunzi’s Interstate Political Philosophy and Its Message for Today,”
Yan Xuetong lays out the basis for how to interpret and understand Xunzi in a modern context. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how Xunzi’s political philosophy can guide China’s rise and help to understand what kind of state China will become.
According to Yan, Xunxi’s method of analysis is the same as constructivist theory and only differs in that the independent variable is the conduct of the ruler not society as a whole.102 States can be divided into three broad categories: sage kingship (humane authority or 王), hegemony (霸) and tyranny (強).103 These categories are determined by the nature of their rule/ruler. In Xunzi’s political philosophy, according to Yan, sage kingship, hegemony and tyranny are independent variables, while peace and conflict
101 Yan Xuetong, “Xunzi’s Thoughts on International Politics and Their Implications,” Chinese Journal of International Politics Vol. 2 (2008), 159.
102 Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, 71-74.
103 Ibid.
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would be dependent variables.
While acknowledging the scientific shortcomings of Xunzi’s case study analysis by virtue of their lack of control mechanisms over variables and by the fact that many of his historical examples are based on legends, Yan nonetheless provides an outline for understanding Xunzi’s political philosophy. His understanding of the international system can be understood as a unitary actor analysis through the importance placed on the nature of rulers and their influence on the state and international system. Xunzi’s political philosophy as a tool to understand China’s rising strategy theorizes what kind of state China should become. Yan stresses that China clearly should not become another Nazi Germany nor Imperial Japan; yet it would also not want to simply model itself on the United States which may lead to either a dual hegemony and a return to a Cold War-like state of international relations, or it would simply replace the U.S. and the international order would remain the same.
Power, according to Yan’s analysis, resembles a realist calculation of power in that it is relative. That is, when state A’s power diminishes in relation to state B, state B has become relatively more powerful. Xunzi departs from realism, however, in that power stems from political power (i.e. the nature of the state or rule) and not from economic or military power as suggested above. States are also security seeking. Quoting Xunzi, Yan states, “[states] all desire security and have an aversion to danger.”104
Xunzi famously departed from Mencius (孟子) and viewed human nature as
104 Yan, “Xunzi’s Thoughts on International Politics,” 146.
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inherently evil. From birth, human beings are guided by desires and emotions. To check these basic guiding faculties, the mind must be cultivated. As an extension of this individual cultivation, the state must also be cultivated. A ruler cultivates a state by wisely selecting ministers, according to Xunzi. Both the state and relations between states are governed by a systematic hierarchy. According to Yan, Xunzi’s interpretation of the origins of war is similar to that of realist theory, that is, international war stems from social anarchy.105 Constructing a systematic hierarchy is a way to minimize interstate conflict.
Figure 3.2: Yan’s conception of Xunzi’s hierarchy. Source: Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power,
Figure 3.2: Yan’s conception of Xunzi’s hierarchy. Source: Yan, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power,