中國學派創造過程:背景，概觀與案例分析 - 政大學術集成

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(1)International Master’s Program in International Studies National Chengchi University 國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Theoretical Construction 政治大 and the 立 Fledgling 'Chinese School' of IR in China: Background, Overview and Case Study Analysis 中國學派創造過程:背景，概觀與案例分析 n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Kristopher William Pickett (黃軻) Advisor: Alex Chienwu Hsueh (薛健吾). June 2019. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(2) Acknowledgements This work was made possible through the hard work, professionalism and dedication of the professors and faculty at NCCU and the IMPIS program. I am especially indebted to my advisor, Prof. Alex Hsueh (薛健吾) who encouraged and assisted me throughout the entire process of writing, along with providing moral support. I am also grateful for the opportunity to have the distinguished scholars professor Yeh-chung Lu (盧業中) of NCCU and professor Simon Chang (張登及) of NTU on my committee. NCCU offered me, through the IMPIS program, an intellectually stimulating environment with unique opportunities for personal intellectual growth and advancement. I’m thankful for the invaluable relationships that I’ve made during my tenure there. Most importantly, I would like to thank my mother and father for their unceasing love, support and encouragement. Without them, none of this would be feasible.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(3) Abstract In certain areas of Chinese academics, most notably in the field of IR, there has been an ardent push for constructing a Chinese school of international relations. This work is an attempt to extract the major underlying theoretical components of Chinese International Relations Theory by examining and testing both Qin Yaqing and Yan Xuetong’s theoreties. In addition, this work also highlights, but does not test, they works and theories of Zhao Tingyang. It is also and attempt to understand what, if any, significance this has for the wider IR debate. This work first analyzes the historical trend for theoretical construction within China and the evolution of the field of IR more broadly. Next, an overview of Western, or traditional, theories of IR is outlined. Followed by this is a comprehensive analysis of Qin Yaqing and Yan Xuetong’s major theoretical elements. The final two sections test the validity of these theories both through historical and contemporary cases of China’s use of force. The historical cases tested are: The Korean War 1950-1953, China-Taiwan Offshore Island War 1954, China-Taiwan Strait War 1958, Sino-Indian War 1962, Sino-Vietnamese War 1979 and The Johnson South Reef Skirmish 1988. The contemporaneous case study investigates the South China Sea disputes by surveying the U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane incident, the USNS Impeccable incident and Chinese island building project in the area of the Spratly feature group. In all cases tested, it is demonstrated that CIRT fails to explain China’s use of force, finding that realism is a better indicator of interpreting China’s use of force both historically and contemporaneously.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. y. Nat. sit. n. al. er. io. 在中國學術界的某些領域，尤其是在國際關係領域，人們熱切希望建立一所中國的國際關係學院。本文試圖通過對秦亞青和閻學通的理論進行考察和檢驗來提取中國國際關係理論的主要理論成分。此外，這項工作也突出了，但沒有考驗，他們的作品和趙廷陽的理論。它也試圖了解這對更廣泛的國際關係辯論有何意義（如果有的話）。本文首先分析了中國理論建構的歷史趨勢和更廣泛的 IR 領域的演變。接下來，概述了西方或傳統的 IR 理論。其次是對秦亞青和嚴學通的主要理論要素的綜合分析。最後兩部分通過中國使用武力的歷史和當代案例來檢驗這些理論的有效性。歷史案例包括：朝鮮戰爭 1950-1953，中國台灣海上戰爭 1954 年，中國台灣海峽戰爭 1958 年，中印戰爭 1962 年，中越戰爭 1979 年和約翰遜南礁戰爭 1988 年。同期案件該研究通過調查美國海軍 EP-3 偵察機事件，USNS Impeccable 事件以及南沙群島特徵組中的中國島嶼建設項目來調查南海爭端。在所有測試的案例中，證明 CIRT 無法解釋中國使用武力，發現現實主義是解釋中國在歷史上和同時使用武力的更好指標。. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(4) Table of Contents Acknowledgements List of Abbreviations List of Tables and Figures Chapter I: Introduction 1.1: Introduction - pg. 1 1.2: Research Question and Significance – pg. 2 1.3: Summary of Main Argument, Hypotheses and Findings – pg. 5 1.4: Theoretical Analysis and Methodological Framework – pg. 6 1.5: Scope and Limitation – pg. 7 Chapter II: Competing Theories 2.1: Western IRT and China’s Rise – pg. 9 2.2: Liberalism – pg. 12 2.3: Realism – pg. 17 2.4: Power Transition Theory – pg. 23 2.5: Conclusion – pg. 27 Chapter III: Chinese International Relations Theory 3.1: Introduction to Chinese IRT – pg. 30 3.2: Introduction to Major Chinese Concepts Used in CIRT Construction – pg. 38 3.3: Literature Review of Chinese IRT Debate – pg. 43 3.4: Major Chinese IRT Thinker: Qin Yaqing – pg. 48 3.5: Major Chinese IRT Thinker: Yan Xuetong – pg.55 3.6: Chinese IRT Thinkers: Zhao Tingyang – pg. 64 3.7: Conclusive Survey of Major Chinese IR Theorists – pg. 66 Chapter IV: Case Study One: The PRC’s Historical Use of Force 4.1 Introduction to China’s Twentieth Century Conflicts – pg.72 4.2 Korean War 1950-1953 – pg. 75 4.3 China-Taiwan Offshore Island War 1954 – pg. 80 4.4 China-Taiwan Strait War 1958 – pg.84 4.5 Sino-Indian War 1962 – pg. 88 4.6 Sino-Vietnamese War 1979 – pg. 93 4.7 The Johnson South Reef Skirmish 1988 – pg. 98 4.8 Conclusion – pg. 101 Chapter V: Case Study Two: The South China Sea Disputes 5.1: Introduction – pg. 107 5.2: Background of the SCS Dispute and China’s Maritime Expansion – pg. 110 5.3: The South China Sea and CIRT – pg. 116 5.4: Conclusion – pg. 122 Chapter VI: Conclusion – pg. 125 Bibliography – pg. 129. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(5) List of Tables and Figures Figure 3.1: Qin’s Intimacy/Importance Graph Table 3.1: Qin Yaqing’s Relational Theory Chart Figure 3.2: Yan’s Conception of Xunzi’s Hierarchy Table 3.2: Summary of Yan Xuetong’s Use of Xunzi’s Political Philosophy Table 4.1: Outline of PRC’s War’s and Conflicts Table 4.8: Summary of Chapter Four’s Findings. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(6) List of Abbreviations AIIB – Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank BRI – Belt and Road Initiative (or One Belt One Road) CIRT – Chinese International Relations Theory COW – Correlates of War (Project) DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone IRT – International Relations Theory NDL – Nine-Dash-Line PLA – People’s Liberation Army PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy PLAAN – People’s Liberation Army Air Force PRC – The People’s Republic of China ROC – Republic of China ROK – Republic of Korea SAM – Surface-to-Air Missile SCS – South China Sea SLOC – Sea Lines of Communication UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea WIRT – Western International Relations Theory. 學. Nat. n. al. er. io. sit. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 立. 政治大. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(7) Chapter I: Introduction Section 1.1: Introduction to Chinese IRT In the field of International Relations Theory (IRT), China’s rise is without a doubt one of the most important and perplexing phenomena. This is the case not only in East Asia, but also globally due to its prodigious scope economically, politically and militarily. Naturally, this has led to a variety of interpretations seeking to explain and understand. 政治大 and perhaps misunderstandings,. this contemporary global shift. The dizzying array of explanations and interpretations. 立. demonstrates the complexities,. surrounding the. ‧ 國. 學. scholarship on China. Some academics have challenged transatlantic IRT’s (or Western International Relations Theories; WIRT) effectiveness in explaining China’s international. ‧. relations, rise and whether or not it poses a challenge to the US position in East Asia.. y. Nat. io. sit. Many academics have employed a variety of methods based on long-established IR. n. al. er. theories. However, there are important queries challenging WIRT in Chinese IR.. Ch. i n U. v. Questions such as: are the traditional theoretical models assessing China’s role in the. engchi. international arena wholly unfounded? Is there a need to understand China in novel and uniquely Chinese ways? Is Chinese exceptionalism grounded in reality or is it merely a fiction that gives a misleading explanation of Chinese intentions? If China is indeed an ‘exceptional’ state, what are the theoretical criteria for how it should behave internationally? Chinese International Relations Theory (CIRT) is an attempt by certain scholars in the field of IR to answer these questions in a way that assumes China’s unique and 1. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(8) exceptional status. It is a relative newcomer to the field of IRT in general and has only recently been expanded and translated by some of the foremost IR theorists both inside and outside China. This work is an attempt to clarify, examine and test the theories of two of the most prominent IR thinkers in China: Qin Yaqing (秦亞青), Yan Xuetong (閻學通). In addition, it will also survey the work of Zhao Tingyang (趙汀陽) to demonstrate, but not test, the growing popularity of the methods employed by IR constructionist in. 政治大 This chapter lays out the groundwork of this work’s research question, argument, 立. China.. ‧ 國. 學. methodology and shortcomings. The next section explains the research question and research significance of this work. Following this, a brief description of the argument and. ‧. findings summarizes the conclusions made by this work. The subsequent section briefly. y. Nat. n. al. Ch. engchi. er. io. with an explanation of this research’s limitation.. sit. discusses the methodological framework used in the research. The chapter will conclude. i n U. v. Section 1.2: Research Question and Significance. Understanding why some academics in China are zealously pursuing the creation of a China-centric IR theory is important for two reasons. First, an examination of motivation gives scholars a broad sense of trends in Chinese academia, especially those that challenge deeply entrenched theoretical models. In this case, transatlantic IRT and its capacity/incapacity to understand China’s international relations. Second, inferences can be made more generally about where that debate may lead in terms of picking apart 2. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(9) academic arguments and how that may guide the debate in the future. Knowing who is involved in CIRT construction is instructive for deciphering the scope of construction and legitimacy depending on the reputation and status of the academics involved. And, of course, understanding which methods, concepts, terms and theoretical arguments are used is essential for a foundational decipherment of what CIRT looks like generally. Primarily, this paper seeks to understand how or if the incipient attempts at building a. 政治大 grand strategy (if, indeed, a “grand strategy” truly exists) from what has been produced 立 predictive CIRT can explain a Chinese use of force. It also strives to understand PRC’s. ‧ 國. 學. thus far in the selected anthology of major Chinese IRT thinkers. In other words, what, if anything, can “Chinese School” proponents hang their hats on when considering China’s. ‧. rise and the ancillary international actions it has taken and responsibilities that. y. Nat. io. sit. accompany it? Both the growing trend of Chinese IR theorists advocating a “Chinese. n. al. er. School” of IRT and the academic energy exerted in both China and the West toward. Ch. i n U. v. understanding the thoughts and ideas of CIRT make this a topic of growing importance.. engchi. The success or applicability of any theoretical model is how it holds against the scrutiny of testing. As is the case with International Relations Theory in general, the applicability of CIRT will be tested against historical events in order to find if the nascent theories of CIRT thinkers are tenable. In this case, the use of force will be the means by which Chinese International Relations Theory is tested.1 The aim of this research is to 1. There are six historical examples of the PRC’s use of force analyzed in this work (The Korean War 1950-53, China-Taiwan Offshore Island War 1954, China-Taiwan Strait Island War 1958, Sino-Indian War 1962, Sino-Vietnamese War 1979, and the Johnson South Reef Skirmish 1987) and one contemporary case (South. 3. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(10) answer the following questions: 1) Using the information, philosophies, and ideas, particularly those of Qin and Yan, when will China use force to achieve its desired ends? Can CIRT adequately explain historic uses of force? 2). Do CIRT and CIRT proponents in general have any measurable effect or influence on Chinese policy making?. 政治大 supplementary questions related to CIRT. They are as follows: 立. In addition to the primary research questions, this paper also seeks to understand two. ‧ 國. 學. 1) What are the major motivations for IR theorists in China in promoting the construction of a uniquely “Chinese School” of IRT?. ‧. 2). What are the broader implications of the development of CIRT in the field of. y. Nat. io. sit. IRT in general and within China specifically?. n. al. er. These questions were chosen for a number of reasons. First, testing any theoretical. Ch. i n U. v. model is an indispensible way theories are validated or disproved. Many of the major. engchi. works in IRT employ a state or country’s use of force as an independent variable to appraise it. Next, the ambit of CIRT now possesses a global extent and has caught the attention of many leading IR specialists. Finally, can CIRT provide any answers to the big questions regarding Chinese policy making? If so, how useful are the works of academics like Qin and Yan?. China Sea disputes). See Chapters 4 & 5.. 4. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(11) Section 1.3: Summary of Main Argument, Hypotheses and Findings To understand China and its concomitant rise, it is the view of the author that a balanced approach necessitates a serious consideration of how thinkers in China understand and explain China itself. The understanding of Chinese foreign policy and strategy often stems, in large part, from conjecture and the incomplete analysis of ruling party mouthpieces that very carefully disclose information. Of equal importance is the. 政治大 requires increased consideration of major IR thinkers within China, especially those with 立 growing sense of exceptionalism emanating from China. Expanding this understanding. ‧ 國. 學. experience within China’s foreign policy bureaucracy. That being said, the hypotheses of this paper are summarized here:. ‧. According to the Chinese International Relations Theories examined in this paper,. io. sit. y. Nat. China should:. n. al. er. 1) Only use force for defensive purposes and should not pursue an offensive grand strategy, and;. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2) Chinese soft power aims should be purely political in the sense that attracting other states comes from leading by example and not purely economic investments or coercion. From an offensive realist perspective of International Relations China should: 1) Due to the anarchic structure of the international system, China will use force offensively when it suits its grand strategic ambitions, especially when those ambitions involve Chinese core interests, and its military capabilities increase. It 5. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(12) would also calculate risks based on relative power assessments; From a defensive realist perspective of International Relations China should: 2) Use force when it feels threatened or insecure, or when a security dilemma arises; From a neoclassical realist perspective of International Relations China should: 3) China will use force when a strategic rival’s perceived threat reaches an. 政治大 account and when domestic constraints are minimal. 立. intolerable threshold, its relative material power considerations are taken into. ‧ 國. 學. These hypotheses are a synopsis of the theories used in this work. They are hypotheses summarized broadly for CIRT and were made on the basis the works of Qin. ‧. Yaqing and Yan Xuetong. There exist significant difference in their bodies of work. y. Nat. io. sit. respectively and are analyzed closely in chapter four. It is important to point out that. n. al. er. other contending IR theories such as liberalism or constructivism were intentionally left. Ch. i n U. v. out because this work is primarily concerned with use of force. The findings in chapters. engchi. four and five all postulate that realism, particularly defensive and offensive realism depending on the case study, is a better indicator for comprehending the PRC’s decisions to use force historically.. Section 1.4: Theoretical Analysis and Methodological Framework The method of this research is a combination of empirical, qualitative, and historical research. The empirical aspect will focus on two case studies: the historical testing of 6. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(13) CIRT and Chinese actions in the South China Sea. These cases are chosen for a number reasons. The importance of understanding the international system and how and when states choose to use force is a paramount question in the study of IR. CIRT concerns itself with this quandary, but only to a limited extent. Nonetheless, where CIRT is concerned with force and how force should be used will be analyzed against both historical and contemporary backdrops.. 政治大 as a growing trend within certain circles of Chinese academia and analyze its philosophy 立 The qualitative portion of this research will critically examine IRT building in China. ‧ 國. 學. and application of concepts, many of which are derived from ancient origins. In order to do this, a comprehensive review of the major CIRT thinkers and concepts, philosophies,. ‧. and theories is necessary to provide a selected background to understand the major trends. y. Nat. io. sit. in CIRT and how they will be applied. This also includes the historical analysis of ancient. n. al. er. Chinese thinkers and their ideas concerning international relations.. Ch. Section 1.5: Scope and Limitations. engchi. i n U. v. The intent of this work is to shine light on the small, but growing body of work in Chinese academia dealing with theoretical construction. It makes use of an extensive array of research from English language books and journals. However, for the scope of this work, many Chinese language databases were not utilized. This poses some limitations due to the absence of a wide-range of research. It is hope that as this work continues to develop more resource can be drawn upon to ameliorate this. Another 7. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(14) potential drawback is that this work only analyzes scholars from the PRC. While this is intentional, it also leaves out a number of scholars outside the PRC working on IRT construction. This paper will proceed as follows. Chapter two will give an introduction of Western IRT’s explanations, specifically the various liberalisms and realisms, of China’s rise and how and when China should use force. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a counter. 政治大 behavior. Chapter three provides an introduction to some of the primary concepts used in 立 analysis to CIRT and give background on how the most prevalent IRTs explain China’s. ‧ 國. 學. CIRT, followed by an outline of major CIRT thinkers and their philosophies in order to supply an analysis of CIRT. Chapter four evaluates CIRT by examining five historical. ‧. examples of the PRC’s wars, to test the validity of CIRT theories. Chapter five looks at. y. Nat. io. sit. Chinese actions in the South China Sea and attempts to qualify/disqualify the use of force. n. al. er. under CIRT. Finally a conclusion will summarize the findings and argue the case for further study.. Ch. engchi. 8. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(15) Chapter II: Competing Theories Section 2.1: Western IRT and China’s Rise Many have theorized what challenges and changes China’s rise may hold for the future. Most have studied China’s behavior within the framework of mainstream IRTs. Even within this configuration, the spectrum of interpretations is highly contrasted, and on the polar opposites one sees arguments that range from perceiving China’s rise as. 政治大 assessment of China’s rise. The reality of China’s rise and its international behavior, 立. threatening to the international order to a more accommodating and indeed positive. ‧ 國. 學. however, seem to continually confound and challenge traditional models and theories used in understanding International Relations. Western IRT or transatlantic IRT,. ‧. particularly liberalism and realism, has dominated the field of IR since its inception as a. y. Nat. io. sit. discipline. This fact has not gone unnoticed by IR thinkers and, as postulated above, may. n. al. er. be one of the variables pushing certain academics within China to seek alternatives to. Ch. i n U. v. mainstream IR. Dissatisfaction with mainstream IR as a means of understanding China. engchi. presents itself in many Chinese IR related works. This chapter, therefore, will offer a background on liberalism and realism for the purposes of more deeply understanding how the field of IR is responding to the changes brought about by a rising China. It will also serve as a backdrop to pinpoint what, according to the CIRT thinkers, are the foremost points of contention with traditional IRT. An abundance of writers have framed their work in a way that positions China as the antithesis to the West. The rhetoric within much of the scholarship on China since the 9. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(16) “China threat theory’s” formation has continually emphasized a growing confrontational tone that places China at ends with the West and Western established IR models and the international system. Although many in the West have been quick to denounce China’s growing assertiveness, some have seen not change, but a continuity of tone and policy. One study by Alastair Iain Johnston quantitatively measured the frequency within U.S. news articles, academic journals and books, as well as blogs that refer to China as. 政治大 around 2010, suggesting a potential “narrowing of public discourse” and perhaps a 立. “assertive.” The findings reveal a radical increase in the use of the word “assertive” at or. ‧ 國. 學. growing celerity of “discursive bandwagoning” that creates imprecise and erroneous impressions of China’s international intentions. 2 This analysis empirically examines. ‧. Chinese diplomacy before and after 2010 and the findings suggest three analytical flaws. y. Nat. while. discounting. n. al. ignoring. Ch. examples);. er. evidence. io. confirming. sit. within the assertive China discourse: 1) selection on the dependent variable (emphasizing. i n U. v. 2). ahistoricism. (predetermined conclusions that transitions or changes breaking with the past have been. engchi. made), and; 3) problematic causal arguments. Johnston concludes that although some instances of escalating assertiveness can be witnessed in new “core interest” areas such as the South China Sea, overall China’s diplomacy has not fundamentally changed; more likely the West’s reactions to Chinese diplomacy have become more polarized.3 An additional reason many writers, especially in the West, have adopted a tone that 2. Alastair Iain Johnston, “How Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?,” International Security Vol. 37, No. 4 (Spring 2013), 8. 3 Johnston, “How Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?” 32-45.. 10. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(17) equates China’s rise with growing assertiveness and bellicosity is the 2012 ascension of Xi Jinping as paramount leader. Much of the debate surrounding the assertive China discourse is focused on a shift from the Deng Xiaoping-era strategy of “keeping a low profile” (韜光養晦) to “striving for achievements” (奮發有為) and many see this as a change in overall Chinese policy.4 The termination of presidential term limits in China, in addition to the inclusion of ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ into the Chinese constitution since. 政治大 a different view in light of the growing increase of assertive rhetoric about China. Much 立 the 19th Party Congress have done little to quell these concerns. This has led some to take. ‧ 國. 學. of this has fueled a reemergence of realism and has led many to view U.S. – China relations through the lens of a power transition theoretical model.. ‧. To better understand CIRT it is necessary to compare and contrast it with traditional. y. Nat. io. sit. IRT paradigms. In doing so, both a structural and state level analysis review will be. n. al. er. necessary to pinpoint transatlantic IRT’s usefulness in comprehending China’s behavior.. Ch. i n U. v. This chapter will proceed as follows: In Section 2.2, liberalism’s understanding of. engchi. China’s rise and behavior will be examined before Section 2.3 delves into realism’s explanation of how China’s rise should be understood. In addition, a survey of power transition theory’s understanding of China’s rise will be analyzed in Section 2.4. All three sections will hypothesize when China would use force to advance its goals. The divergence between transatlantic IRT and where they may run counter or parallel to 4. Qin Yaqing, “Continuity through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s International Strategy,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics (2014), 286.. 11. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(18) CIRT will be used as a benchmark to test the validity of CIRT.. Section 2.2: Liberalism Contemporary liberalism embodies the three pillars of what are commonly referred to as “liberal peace:” republican representation (constitutional); values associated with the human rights norm (international), and; commercial interdependence (cosmopolitan).5. 政治大 a way to “promote beneficial effects on human security, human welfare and human 立. International liberalism of today also places heavy emphasis on the role of institutions as. ‧ 國. 學. liberty….” 6 However, as the American-led international liberal order adapts to the realities of the 21st century, it is important to understand how China fits into an. ‧. international liberalist way of perceiving the world. Certainly in the case of commercial. y. Nat. io. sit. interdependence China has expanded both trade with other countries (especially the U.S.). n. al. er. and has entered into an increasing amount of international and regional institutions where. Ch. it often plays a major decision making role.. engchi. i n U. v. Democratization and respect for human rights present the biggest hurdle for liberal optimists. In the U.S., IR theorists and China scholars have, since the normalization of relations, traditionally adhered to the tired argument (often through rose-tinted lenses) that China will one day democratize. After Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972 and the formalization of Sino-U.S. relations, many thought China was on the path toward a more 5 6. Michael W. Doyle, “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace,” American Political Science Review (2005): 463. Robert O. Keohane, “Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism,” International Relations (2012): 126.. 12. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(19) open society. The growing prosperity and reliance on the U.S. in the 1980’s led many to believe that China was on its way toward democratization, a belief that was rescinded after 1989. During the Clinton years when relations began to warm after the Tiananmen Square Massacre, China’s now booming economy meant that China may finally begin to open both politically and economically. In the early 2000’s China’s ascent into the WTO and the cooperation between U.S. and China in regards to international terrorism again. 政治大 instances have shown the ineluctable reality that authoritarianism within China is resilient 立 led many to consider democratic changes within China were on the horizon. All of these. ‧ 國. 學. and likely not to falter given current course of the PRC. The CCP’s grip on power has only ossified as the party’s recent rescinding of presidential term limits has demonstrated.. ‧. Of significant importance in understanding why democracy is an essential. y. Nat. io. sit. component of liberalism’s theoretical hardcore is the strong empirical relationship. n. al. er. between democracy and peace. Known as the democratic peace theory, it postulates that. Ch. i n U. v. democracies rarely, if ever, engage in interstate conflict with each other. This is attributed. engchi. to a combination of the structural account that democratic governments must ultimately gain approval from their electorate and the normative account that democratic values deter democracies from engaging in conflict with states that share the same values and norms. 7 While arguments over what defines a democracy and what counts as war continue to reshape the debate, there exists statistically significant correlation that 7. John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security Vol. 19, No. 2 (Autumn 1994), 90.. 13. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(20) democracies rarely engage in conflict with one another.8 Understanding the evolution of liberalism is also vital to grasping what major changes have occurred and how that in turn affects state relations to the international order and also how liberalism as an IRT has matured. International liberalism, according to G. John Ikenberry, has gone through two major paradigmatic shifts and is now entering a third. What Ikenberry refers to as “liberalism 1.0” is simply the post-WWI Wilsonian. 政治大 influence, military rivalry and alliances into a unified liberal international order based on 立 world and the transforming of “the old global system of balance of power, spheres of. ‧ 國. 學. nations states and rule of law.” 9 While Europe was reformatting itself after the devastating conflagration of WWI, the inequitable Treaty of Versailles set the stage for. ‧. China’s participation in the liberal international order albeit one that was defined by. y. Nat. io. sit. inequality, imperialistic ambitions, and violence. Liberalism 2.0, again defined by. n. al. er. Ikenberry, is the period after the close of WWII where a significant reshuffling of. Ch. i n U. v. international liberal order occurs. It is an order dominated by the West (U.S.), one where. engchi. compromises are made to state sovereignty, enforcement of international rules through institutions, and the extending of things like economic regulations and human rights.10 The prominence of liberalism in the IR debate took off after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of U.S.-led institutions. Liberalism 2.0 is in a period of crisis, 8. Piki Ish-Shalom, “Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic-Peace Thesis and the Politics of Democratization,” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 12 (2006), 575. 9 G. John Ikenberry, “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order,” Perspectives on Politics Vol. 7 No. 1 (2009), 75. 10 Ikenberry, “International Liberalism 3.0,” 74.. 14. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(21) according to Ikenberry. This is primarily due the end of the Cold War and the change of bargaining incentives due to unipolarity and a globalization of the world’s economy coupled with the rise of developing states.11 The erosion of liberalism’s efficacy may be what deters China from playing by the rules. China has benefited immensely from global trade and its participation in organizations such as the WTO. That has not prevented it from challenging aspects of the. 政治大 projects related to the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank the Belt and Road Initiative. 立. status quo. Questions emerge with the prominence China has placed on its own grand. ‧ 國. 學. On the one hand, these are international institutions that indeed create interdependence and cooperation. Other the other hand, many of the states at the receiving end of Belt and. ‧. Road Initiative funding are finding themselves unable to pay back their debts and falling. y. Nat. io. sit. prey to predatory responses from the PRC (see Section 2.4).. n. al. er. According to a liberalist understanding of China’s rise, a deepening of economic and. Ch. i n U. v. institutional ties globally, and the growing bilateral ties between the U.S. and China (the. engchi. first and second largest economies respectively) should witness a China that is a more accommodating and responsible stakeholder in the international system. However, that only embodies one-third of liberalism’s major tenets. China has done little to curb its human rights abuses and, since the rise of Xi Jinping as president for life, the situation seems more ominous. Criticism of the communist regime is met with harsh suppression. For example, a 2015 incident now infamously known as “709”, 205 lawyers were 11. Ikenberry, “International Liberalism 3.0,” 80.. 15. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(22) detained for their work in human rights cases. Many were forced to give admissions of guilt and sentenced to serve jail time. One of the lawyers, Wang Quanzhang (王全璋), was working on cases deemed particularly sensitive by the party has not been heard from since.12 Even seemingly benign acts have been regarded as subversive and therefore met with ruthlessness. A budding grassroots feminist movement has been growing in many areas of China and its activities largely target social issues that were thought to be outside. 政治大 sexual harassment on public transportation, domestic violence and the disparity of toilet 立 the political sphere. Much of their work was aimed at raising awareness for things like. ‧ 國. 學. access between men and women. These seemingly innocuous issues have made feminists targets of the regime. The most notorious human rights abuse was the jailing of the. ‧. “Feminist Five” on International Women’s Day in 2015. Feminists and feminist activities. y. Nat. io. sit. continue to be the recipient of police intimidation, detention and threats. 13 These. n. al. er. incidences along with countless others make it unlikely that China has any intention of. Ch. democratizing or improving its human rights record.. engchi. i n U. v. What this indicates, according to liberalism, is that China is likely to continue its participation in international organizations, especially those from which it gains the most benefit economically and diplomatically. It would be unlikely that China, as a rational actor, would seek to weaken or impinge its economic position by disregarding . 12. “Third Anniversary of the Lawyers Crackdown in China: Where are the Human Rights Lawyers?,” Amnesty International, July 9, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2018/07/china-human-rights-lawyers-crackdown-third-anniv ersary/. 13 Leta Hong Fincher, Betraying Big Brother: The Feminist Awakening in China (London, Verso, 2018), Kindle edition, Chapter 2.. 16. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(23) international norms. Even so, while China is a stakeholder in many international institutions, it has either evaded or simply ignored the decisions made by international bodies of which China is a participant. This holds especially true in incidences that China deems “core interest areas”. In the case of democracy, the CPC’s survival rests on a closed and undemocratic society that is carefully managed through state controlled media outlets and ever more technologically advanced systems of surveillance.. 政治大 view each other with growing suspicion. This mutual suspicion may be amplified by the 立. The Sino-U.S. relationship has been under immense strain. Both sides continue to. ‧ 國. 學. unpredictability of the US economic policy toward China. With current tariffs and a burgeoning trade war developing, the situation may indeed precipitate into something. ‧. more dangerous. Under a liberalist model, China may be inclined to use force when key. y. Nat. io. sit. strategic areas are endangered. Economically, this may be further provoked by the trade. n. al. er. war between the U.S. and China. In addition to strict state control, a key component of. Ch. i n U. v. the CCP’s persistence is its ability to sustain economic growth. If the U.S. were to. engchi. threaten any of China’s core interest areas or deal a significant economic blow to the Chinese economy, despite China’s invested interest in international organizations, some form of force may be employed.. Section 2.3: Realism Realism has dominated IRT for at least the past 50 years and has, in part, shaped the perceptions of China’s actions and its rise. While realism is not a single unified theory 17. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(24) but a set of theories it does share some common overall characteristics. All realist theories stress the following key components: sovereign states are the central actors in the international system; states are rational and act in accordance to advance their security, power and wealth; the international background is structurally anarchic meaning it lacks an overarching authority to govern states. Of equal importance to realists is the uneven distribution of power within a system or a dyad that creates the conditions for conflict.14. 政治大 realist thinking. International anarchy drives power considerations and the desire to 立. Positing that the international background is anarchic has profound consequences in. ‧ 國. 學. consolidate power by leaving states uncertain about the intentions of other states.15 There are three major threads of realist thought in IR: Classical realism, neorealism. ‧. and hegemonic stability theory. In brief, classical realism, as put famously put forth in. y. Nat. io. sit. Hans Morgenthau’s book Politics Among Nations, posits that war is unlikely when the. n. al. er. great powers are relatively equal in wealth and power. Balance of power politics makes. Ch. i n U. v. the cost of war high and the chances of success questionable. Classical realists see. engchi. multipolarity as the key to maintaining peace, where any potential aggressor may be thwarted by alliances. 16 Neorealism, on the other hand, focuses it attention on the anarchic background structure and asserts that bipolar structures are less likely to engage in warlike behavior. This, according to neorealist, occurs for three reasons: first, great . 14. Jack S. Levy and William R. Thompson, Causes of War (West Sussex, United Kingdom: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 28-29. 15 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 33. 16 Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 11.. 18. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(25) powers are less like to be entangled in complex alliance systems that draw them unwillingly into war, second; polarity make peripheral comprising undesirable so the major powers increase deterrence and, third; great powers prioritize military spending that minimizes other great powers from emerging.17 Finally, hegemonic stability theory views a system with a unitary great power as a key to stability.18 Realists tend to have a less cheerful view of international relations. In his article,. 政治大 realists into two camps: realist pessimists and optimists. For realist pessimists, a rising 立. “The Future of U.S.–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable,” Aaron L. Friedberg divides. ‧ 國. 學. power is likely to disturb the status quo and upset either the balance of power or the pre-established hegemony, in this case the U.S. This occurs through the tendency of. ‧. rising states to expand, placing both sides in a security dilemma where even if states are. y. Nat. sit. actively avoiding conflict, the measures each side takes to secure its position may lead to. n. al. er. io. an unintended clash or enhance mutual suspicion.19 Looking at the track record of rising. Ch. i n U. v. states throughout history and the bellicosity of rising powers or the reaction of hegemons,. engchi. from a realist pessimist perspective, “it is unlikely to behave differently than have others of its type throughout history.”20 On the other end of the realist spectrum, realist optimists see a wide range of opportunities emerging from international anarchy that may in fact foster greater . 17. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 12. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, 13. 19 Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable,” International Security Vol. 30, No. 2 (Autumn, 2005): 17-22. 20 Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.–China Relations,” 20. 18. 19. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(26) cooperation. Charles L. Glaser proposes an alternative to structural realism, which he designates as “contingent realism,” that is developed from three different arguments. First, it disposes of the bias toward competition that is fundamental to structural realism by its understanding of “risk” associated with cooperation and the fact that self-help contains little that indicates preference toward competition or cooperation. 21 Second, in a structural realists sense “states evaluate their ability to achieve security in terms of power”. 政治大 as rational actors use military policy to communicate their intentions, particularly benign 立. whereas contingent realism bases it assumption on military capabilities.22 Finally, states. ‧ 國. 學. intentions through “arms control, unilateral defense, and unilateral restraint.”23 One of the major conditions of the anarchic structure of the international system. ‧. under both defensive and offensive realism is the security dilemma. Assuming that states. y. Nat. io. sit. are status quo security-seekers but uncertain of each other’s motives, true capabilities,. n. al. er. strategic aims etc. respond to the misinterpretation of the actions of other states leading to. Ch. i n U. v. a reaction that exasperates military competition. To better assess the catalysts of. engchi. competitive security dynamics between states, Liff and Ikenberry identify two types of strategic settings. The first type is characterized by a traditional security dilemma based on “mutual suspicions” even though both states are more interested in preserving the status quo than increasing defense spending. The second type differs from the first in the outcome variable: one or both states are not seeking to preserve the status quo even 21. Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994-95): 58-59. 22 Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 60-61. 23 Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists,” 68.. 20. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(27) though they are not seeking military conflict.24 How do states understand one another’s intentions? There is little consensus in regards to intentions and IR scholars have a widely varying definition of states’ intentions, however for the purposes of this paper, a slightly modified version of Rosato’s is used to understand intentions.25 In regards to arms controls, it is unlikely that states will make major reductions in their arsenal or capabilities and even less likely they will unilaterally. 政治大 these gestures are likely to be seen as strategic trickery. States have little motivation to 立 adopt policies of restraint. States may extend gestures signaling reductions, however 26. ‧ 國. 學. reduce either their defense spending or their procurement and expansion of arms. A realist interpretation of China’s rise views it as an inevitable contestation for. ‧. hegemony. John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism offers a bleak picture of China’s rise. y. Nat. io. sit. and the future for balance of power relations with the United States. In a realist. n. al. er. explanation, states not only vie for absolute power, but also for relative power. Under this. Ch. i n U. v. interpretation, China will likely develop regional hegemonic ambitions within Asia that. engchi. would create friction with its neighbors, some of which would subsequently look toward the U.S. for help. The rise of China is predicated on “intense security competition with considerable potential for war. In short, China’s rise is unlikely to be tranquil” and will. 24. Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,” International Security Vol. 39, No. 2 (Fall 2014): 63-64. 25 Sebastian Rosato, “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” International Security Vol. 39, No. 3 (Winter 2014/15): 52-53; Rosato defines “intention” in four ways: first “intentions entail actions” in which they will behave in a certain way. Second, intentions are considered only from the state level. Third, intentions can be and are often modified. Finally, intentions are usually circumstantially conditioned. 26 Rosato, “The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers,” 74-75.. 21. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(28) reasonably lead to balance of power relations on a grand scale.27 Growing mistrust and a lack of transparency on multiple sides would suggest that China’s neighbors would enhance their own capabilities in confronting and trying to thwart China’s rise. Even considering Charles L. Glaser’s assessment of “contingent realism” we can hardly rule out the pessimistic stance of realism given the conditions of China’s current trajectory. Liff and Ikenberry emphasize China’s littoral states (including. 政治大 uncertainty surrounding China. Japanese reaction to growing Chinese influence in the 立. the U.S., Singapore, and Australia) growing military expenditures in the face of growing. ‧ 國. 學. region in addition to territorial disputes between Japan and China in the East China Sea that has led to “significant upgrades to its military capabilities.”28 Japan has also sought. ‧. out strategic alliances in a balancing effort directed toward Beijing. There is also debate. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. militarily.29. sit. within Japan about amending Article 9 of their constitution aimed at strengthening Japan. Ch. i n U. v. Under a realist model, it seems unlikely that China will seek increased cooperation. engchi. with the US and even less likely it will not perceive US actions in the Asia-Pacific as threatening and as a means to contain China. There is no doubt about China’s military ambitions. Defense spending is one of the major indicators of a country’s military capabilities. In 2017, China spent an estimated 228 billion USD (approximately 1.9% of . 27. John J. Mearsheimer, “Can China Rise Peacefully?” The National Interest October 25, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204 28 Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy?” 73. 29 Feliz Solomon, “Sinzo Abe Moves Closer to Changing Japan’s Pacifist Constitution,” Time May 4, 2017 http://time.com/4766409/shinzo-abe-japan-constitution-military/. 22. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(29) its GDP) on its military expenditure, up a staggering 356 percent since 2001 when the estimated military budget was around 50 billion.30 While some scholars maintain that a traditional security dilemma is not occurring between China and the US,31 China’s growing military capabilities and the reaction of not only the US but also littoral states in the Asia-Pacific region suggest a dangerous and potent recipe for a security dilemma. Under a realist model China would be on the path toward challenging the unipolarity of. 政治大 securing territorial integrity, rising states seek to assert themselves beyond their borders 立 the US by means of both economic and military expansion and strengthening. Apart from. ‧ 國. 學. in many ways. Not only seeking to ensure access to different economic markets, resources and influence in strategic areas, growing powers also seek to promote their. ‧. values to the outside world.32 It is likely that China would use force in preserving what it. y. Nat. io. sit. considers core areas of interest that emphatically includes territorial integrity – and. n. al. er. especially strong stance on the One China debate and Taiwan – but unlikely to use force. Ch. i n U. v. in a contest it deems unwinnable. This is because as a rational actor, China would not. engchi. seek to engage in behavior that may reduce or weaken its relative power.. Section 2.4: Power Transition Theory One of the most important questions concerning the rise of China vis-à-vis the United States is whether or not China is to be seen, desires to or is on the path to replace the U.S. 30. “What Does China Really Spend on Its Military?” CSIS: China Power, Accessed October 16, 2018, https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/ 31 Adam P. Liff and G. John Ikenberry, “Racing Toward Tragedy?” 88. 32 Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.–China Relations,” 19.. 23. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(30) as the a regional or global hegemon. This exposition has taken root even at the highest levels of dialogue. In September 2018, foreign minister of the PRC Wang Yi (王毅) gave a speech where he declared, “China will not become, will not challenge, will not take the place of the United States.” 33 Despite this, an abundance of literature exists that maintains China will challenge the U.S.-led order. As a thread of realism, the power transition theory sees power as the underlying factor that dominates state behavior. In this. 政治大 their competitors. Power transition theory is an alternative to the balance of power theory. 立. regard, throughout history, great powers have had to worry about their power relative to. ‧ 國. 學. In international systems that are dominated by a single hegemonic power, those states will set up economic systems and norms of behavior that both benefit themselves and. ‧. create security for the system as a whole. Those who work with the hegemonic states. y. Nat. io. sit. receive benefits and those states that disapprove are too weak to contest. According to the. n. al. er. power transition theory, a rising power will contest this structure when the rising state is. Ch. i n U. v. dissatisfied with the status quo, power begins to shift and there is approximate equality of 34. power.. engchi. Graham Allison’s book Destine for War examines the eponymous phenomenon of the “Thucydides Trap” (TT), whereby a rising power challenges the supremacy of a seated hegemon leading to conflict or war. Allison analyzes 16 case studies of rising 33. Owen Churchill, “US Is Making ‘Serious Strategic Misjudgment’ In Its Accusations against China, Beijing’s Top Diplomat Says,” South China Morning Post, September 29, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/2166275/beijings-top-diplomat-says-us-making-serio us-strategic. 34 Levy and Thompson, Causes of War, 44.. 24. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(31) power/ruling power dynamic from the past 500 years. His results find that 12 of the case studies examined resulted in war.35 The book is not all doom and gloom – Allison points out that war is not inevitable – but it does demonstrate the difficulty of managing the Sino-U.S. relationship. There exists four potential ways in which Sino-U.S. relations can fall through the “trap door”. The first is through strategic miscalculation. That is, there is no guarantee that leaders on either side will evaluate the relationship through clear and. 政治大 decades as the military gap between the U.S. and China begins to shrink. Third, concerns 立. informed decision-making processes. The second is how China will behave in the coming. ‧ 國. 學. China’s calculation of America’s relative decline and how it will act. Fourth and finally, is the potential for both sides to become entangled in conflict as a result of hostilities. ‧. between China and America’s allies in the region. With tensions already simmering in. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Sino-U.S. relationship.36. sit. East Asia, especially in the South China Sea, this may be the biggest challenge facing the. Ch. i n U. v. Chinese institutions like the AIIB and the Belt and Road Initiative are viewed with a. engchi. mix of skepticism and concern as a means to erode already established global institutions. The big question is whether or not these actions are part of a Chinese grand strategy whereby the PRC is desirous of weakening the US position in key strategic areas. The opening of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in January of 2016 was a monumental shift in regional and global responsibility for China. The AIIB is the only . 35. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can China and America Escape the Thucydides Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), Kindle edition, Chapter 3. 36 Lam Peng Er, “China, the United States, Alliances and War: Avoiding the Thucydides Trap?” Asian Affairs: An American Review Vol. 42 No. 2 (2016), 44.. 25. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(32) major multinational development bank outside of the U.S. backed major institutions (World Bank, IMF) and the Japanese-led and U.S. supported Asia Development Bank (ADB) that works closely with developing countries in Asia to promote infrastructural development. The 57 signatories of the AIIB included major developed economies such as Germany, South Korea, and Australia. This support demonstrates international encouragement for augmenting China’s share of regional and global responsibility.37. 政治大 AIIB represents a significant step of China taking on more responsibility as a regional 立. Apart from being a challenger to the US led unipolar global economic governance, the. ‧ 國. 學. power. In the long-term, however, the AIIB is a way for China to develop its regional soft power and as a way for mutually beneficial relationships to emerge between China and. ‧. developing nations.38. y. Nat. io. sit. In regards to foreign policy, China is beginning to play a more prominent role. China. n. al. er. is currently building its first overseas base in Djibouti and in recent years has pledged to. Ch. i n U. v. increase its share of global peacekeeping troops.39 While China maintains its intent in the. engchi. region is to thwart piracy in valuable shipping lanes near and around the Horn of Africa, it may be the first in a number of bases necessary for China’s naval ambitions. In addition to its sole military base, China has funded a number of port projects around the world as a component of the BRI. China has been charged with debt trap diplomacy, whereby . 37. The U.S. refused to join and vehemently lobbied key ally states not to as well. Xing Yuqing, “The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and China’s Role in Regional Economic Governance,” East Asia Policy 08, 25 (2016), 25-29. 39 Katrina Mason, “China Military to Set up First Overseas Base in Horn of Africa,” Financial Times, April 1, 2016, accessed November 14, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/59ad20d6-f74b-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132 38. 26. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(33) countries that are unable to pay back their debt are pressured into acquiescing to China’s demands. No case is more apparent than Sri Lanka, where China had dumped enormous loans for a project that was deemed unnecessary and was channeling money to the then president’s election campaign. Unable to payback the loan and under tremendous pressure, Sri Lanka relinquished the port to China giving China possession of an immensely strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean.40. 政治大 and its position globally, the power transition theory gives a lens though which to 立. While it is questionable whether or not China is actively seeking to replace the U.S.. ‧ 國. 學. potentially view China’s actions. China is a long way off from catching up to the U.S. militarily and would predictably be leery of engaging in an all out conflict with the U.S.. ‧. to secure regional or global hegemony. However, China is gradually strengthening its. y. Nat. io. sit. position and possessions as the examples above demonstrate. The BRI is entrenched. n. al. er. within Chinese foreign policy and it seems reasonable the China will continue to expand. Ch. i n U. v. its reach while eroding smaller countries’ burgeoning democratic institutions, financial. engchi. institutions and relations with the West. It may also embolden China to more military proactive means of securing its position in these key areas.. Section 2.5: Conclusion The main purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the major IRT’s in order to establish 40. Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” New York Times, June 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html . 27. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(34) a platform to see how CIRT is contradicted, complimented or reject by them. The above literature review of liberalism, realism and power transition theory also provides a backdrop from which the judgments comparing and contrasting CIRT can be made. These are the most prominently used theoretical models in assessing China’s rise and its behavior. As such, it is essential to understand their significance as well as their methodology for how they view China’s rise.. 政治大 need of serious reform. China has developed deep economic interdependence with the 立 Liberalism generally views China from a more positive angle, albeit as an actor in. ‧ 國. 學. global economic system and especially with its greatest trading partner the U.S. This economic relationship is under immense strain in the face of U.S. tariffs and an. ‧. unpredictable trade war. Democratization seems a phenomenon unlikely to happen. y. Nat. io. sit. anytime soon in China weakening liberalism’s sanguine view that China will not pose a. n. al. er. threat to either the region or the U.S. While China participates and is a stakeholder in. Ch. i n U. v. many international organizations and treaties, it has proved sometimes apprehensive or. engchi. even dismissive of actually adhering to these as the case of the 2016 Hague arbitration poignantly demonstrates. Realism holds a bleaker prospect of China’s evolving place in the world and its behavior. With its focus on anarchic background, relative power considerations and tendency for security dilemma-type situations to arise China’s actions, especially those that are diametrically opposed to the U.S., seem to fit the bill of realism’s assessments. Under a realist model, the U.S. is likely to have misgivings about China’s intentions. Its 28. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(35) increased military expenditure, its militaristic posture in the SCS and its growing assertiveness in the region (particularly vis-à-vis Taiwan) all pave the way for a security dilemma that could fracture relations and lead to conflict. As a branch of realism, the power transition theory seems the least applicable lens through which to view China’s behavior. However, as China continues to develop it military capabilities and strategic positioning, it may be a more tenable lens in the decades to come.. 政治大 the IR debate for at least the past decade and many have taken up the call to explore other 立 The absence of non-Western IRTs has been widely discussed as a weakness within. ‧ 國. 學. options that compliment or challenge mainstream IRT. While serious scholarship is being undertaken to find alternatives to the current paradigm, Western IRT as of now remains. ‧. largely unchallenged in its preeminence particularly realism. While that may be the case. y. Nat. io. sit. in the present, the IR thinkers in the next chapter view this disparity as an inherent. n. al. er. shortcoming and as one of the major motivations for their work.. Ch. engchi. 29. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(36) Chapter III: Chinese International Relations Theory Section 3.1: Introduction This chapter is an attempt at assembling the underlying assumptions of CIRT by examining the works of both two of the leading thinkers, Qin Yaqing (秦亞青), Yan Xuetong (閻學通) and Zhao Tingyang (趙汀陽). A holistic understanding of the emergent trend of IRT construction in China requires understanding the background of. 政治大 to dedicate their academic efforts to IRT construction is helpful for a number of reasons. 立. the thinkers involved and factors motivating their endeavors. Why these scholars choose. ‧ 國. 學. First, we can better understand why there is a general push in China to develop a uniquely Chinese theory of IR. Second, pinpointing their reasons will inform whether or. ‧. not CIRT can be vindicated on an objective level. In other words, how much of a role. y. Nat. io. sit. does professional advancement of individual scholars play in CIRT? Beyond these. n. al. er. considerations, this chapter also provides an outline of the theories and concepts they. Ch. propose as well as a critical analysis of those proposals.. engchi. i n U. v. As of yet, CIRT claims no unified theoretical model, nor does it possess a theoretical hard core such as that of Realism or Liberalism. It is a disparate collection of potential ways to understand China’s actions by some of the leading thinkers of IR within China’s most prestigious intellectual institutions. Despite its heterogeneous nature, CIRT boasts significant scholarship devoted to understanding its potential both inside and outside of China. It is also a developing trend within the Chinese IR framework. In addition, its scope is increasingly wide as more literature on and about CIRT is being 30. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(37) produced. This work is an attempt at understanding the potential influence of CIRT on policy makers and thinkers and how or if it possesses any practical application. Many of the proponents of CIRT construction, along with those who strive to incorporate Chinese concepts into IRT, do so in response to the dominance of Western or transatlantic IRT in the field of IR. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan wrote a seminal article in the journal International Relations of the Asia-Pacific in 2007 that inquired why. 政治大 has been overly subjugated to what they term a “Westphalian straightjacket” that has 立 there was no major or influential non-Western IRTs. According to them, the field of IR. ‧ 國. 學. disproportionately placed emphasis on the European historic experience and subsequently projected this globally through the study of IR as a discipline.41 With their focus on Asia,. ‧. Acharya and Buzan propose five hypotheses as to why the field of IR has been dominated. y. Nat. io. sit. by the West.42 Also paramount for this work are their conditions for what can be. n. al. er. considered IRT. They put forth three criteria: 1) significant acknowledgement by others. Ch. i n U. v. in IR academics; 2) self-identification as IRT by those who created it, and; 3) its. engchi. construction identifies with a systematic attempt to “abstract or generalize about the subject matter of IR.”43 While these may be loose benchmarks for theory in the social sciences, they do allow for a certain flexibility in early theoretical formulation that is important for gauging potential and usefulness. Following Acharya and Buzan, this 41. Anitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? An Introduction,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 7 (2007), 288, 293. 42 They are as follows: 1) “Western IRT has discovered the right path to understanding IR;” 2) Western IRT has developed a Gramscian hegemony; 3) There are non-Western IRTs, but they hidden; 4) Cultural conditions may predispose others from developing new theories on IR; 5) The development of IR in the West has given it a head start. Acharya and Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?” 293-301. 43 Acharya and Buzan, “Why Is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory?” 292.. 31. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(38) article will also apply the same specifications for what may be considered CIRT. In the same volume mentioned above, Qin Yaqing posed a similar question, but specifically aimed at why China had developed no substantial IRT. International Relations, as a field of study, developed much later in Chinese academia than its Western counterparts. Qin Yaqing breaks down the history of IR-related studies into three broad periods that roughly follow the tumultuous political atmosphere within China in the. 政治大 shortly after the establishment of the PRC, a building of a diplomatic core to “satisfy the 立. second half of the previous century. The first is the period from 1953-63 that witnessed,. ‧ 國. 學. immediate need for talents in the field of national security and public security”; academic and disciplinary development was not the aim of their work.44 The second stage saw the. ‧. development of three departments in China’s major universities (Peking University,. y. Nat. io. sit. Renmin University, and Fudan University) related to international communism and its. n. al. er. spread. However the most important and vital shift came after 1979 with the political and. Ch. i n U. v. market reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping. The field of IRT in China during the ’80s. engchi. and ’90s was overwhelmingly, and continues to be primarily, dominated by Realism due, in part, to the paucity of translations available in Chinese that lie outside the spectrum of Realist thinking.45 If mainstream IRT has insufficiently explained China in a contemporary context, it is important to enumerate and understand where and how it has failed according to the 44. Qin Yaqing, “Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific Vol. 7 (2007), 315. 45 Qin, “Why Is There No Chinese International Relations Theory?,” 316-17.. 32. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(39) scholars in China challenging mainstream IRT’s explanations. One of the primary arguments is cultural background and how culture and history play a role in theoretical creation. Qin Yaqing, the leading proponent of CIRT construction, maintains that culture is the paramount factor shaping social sciences. The need for the establishment of a uniquely Chinese IRT or Chinese School of IRT, according to Qin, stems from two major expressed concerns about the shortcomings existing within Western theories. The first is. 政治大 Mainstream IRT has failed on some accounts to explain some of the most 立. the “exclusivity” of Western theories that have “sometimes failed to explain the reality in our world.”46. ‧ 國. 學. important events in modern history. Here he cites the failure of Realism to predict and explain the end of the Cold War and the inadequacies of Western IR when used to. ‧. interpret East Asian regional transactions. The second is whether culture is an important. y. Nat. io. sit. factor in the construction of IRT. More will be discussed about this below, however Qin. n. al. er. and other scholars are adamant in their position that although many IRTs claim. Ch. i n U. v. universality, they are ultimately Western/American-centric and culture is a major. engchi. influencing component of theoretical construction.47 As the world continues to globalize, more and more non-Western concepts are going to play a more consequential function in explaining how non-Western nations behave in the international community. 48 For thinkers like Yan Xuetong (also discussed in Chapter 3), Western IRT is an important point of reference, but even more important factors are the divergent cultural, historical 46. Qin Yaqing, “Culture and global thought: Chinese international theory in the making,” Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals 100 (December, 2012): 68-69 47 Qin Yaqing, “Culture and global thought,” 68-69. 48 Qin Yaqing, “Culture and global thought,” 68-69.. 33. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(40) and social backgrounds that can enrich and expand mainstream IRT.49 Ultimately, the biggest challenge to IRT as a field is contemporary China’s rise as a regional power and the world’s second largest economy. Much ink has been spilt on assessing what exactly are China’s intentions internationally and what, if any, are the theoretical foundations driving its ascent and strategy. Equally, the reactions to a rising China have been multifarious. For example, the “China threat theory” has been a key. 政治大 The rhetoric within much of the scholarship on China since the inception of the “China 立. topic of debate among international relations experts in the West for over two decades.. ‧ 國. 學. threat theory” has continually emphasized a growing confrontational tone that places China at odds with the West and Western established models and international systems.50. ‧. Whether or not China threatens the established international order is a point of. y. Nat. io. sit. contention among scholars, but often overlooked are the areas where China unwaveringly. n. al. er. refuses to negotiate. While understanding strategy in Chinese foreign policy is often. Ch. i n U. v. determined indirectly, sometimes from unconventional sources, it can provide a glimpse. engchi. into how to interpret and understand China’s intentions. A number of novel ways to infer China’s strategic thinking have been used. For example, the analysis of Zeng et al. quantifiably identifies scholarly articles that mention “core interests” (核心利益) while identifying other explanatory variables included within the articles. In it they cite China’s 2011 White Paper that includes areas of “state sovereignty, national security, territorial 49. Yan Xuetong, Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power, Trans. Edmund Ryden, Ed. Daniel A. Bell and Sun Zhe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 159. 50 See: Denny Roy, “The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments,” Asian Survey Vol. 36 No. 8 (Aug. 1996), 758-771.. 34. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(41) integrity and national reunification, China’s political system established by the Constitution and overall social stability, and the basic safeguards for ensuring sustainable economic and social development.”51 They find that out of the 108 “core interest” papers analyzed, the top ten cited authors were all Western writers.52 However, of the papers studied “only 20.37% of all papers refer to the mainstream IR theories. Or, to put it another way, almost four-fifths of the papers did not refer to IR theory at all!”53 This. 政治大 to interpret not to mention strategic 立. makes pinpointing the direction of the scholarly debate within China murky and exceptionally difficult. and foreign policy. ‧ 國. 學. developments. These are also some of the factors influencing the generation of CIRT with Chinese academia, primarily: the perceived incapability of traditional IRT to. ‧. understand and explain Chinese behavior, the predominance of Western thinkers in. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. China’s behavior.. sit. Chinese IR scholarship and the perceived hostility of traditional IRT in evaluating. Ch. i n U. v. The development of CIRT, while underemphasized, has not gone unnoticed among. engchi. IRT thinkers outside of China. How do CIRT and the field of IRT in China diverge from the trends in the West? Very often comparisons between different schools of IRT are made in order to flush out misunderstandings and accentuate differences in thought and application. An important collaboration between Wang Jiangli and Barry Buzan . 51. Zeng et al., “Securing China’s Core Interests: The state of the Debate in China,” International Affairs 91:2 (2015), 246. 52 It’s interesting to note that Niccolo Machiavelli was found to be the most influential Western scholar in the “core interests” debate, while Max Weber was the most frequently quoted (49%). Zeng et al., “Securing China’s Core Interests,” 252. 53 Zeng et al., “Securing China’s Core Interests,” 256.. 35. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.

(42) compares the English and Chinese Schools of IRT in order to shed light on what lessons the formation and development of the English School can teach scholars about CIRT by using six dimensions of comparison: origins, founders and organization; naming; context; aims/intentions; theoretical sources; and historical projects.54 The development of an English School of IRT did not arise from an Anglo-centric view of the world, nor should it be interpreted as the dominant school of IRT in England. The English and Chinese. 政治大 academic literature written comparing the English School and Chinese School, especially 立 Schools are compared because of their challenge to mainstream IRT and the copious. ‧ 國. 學. within China. Wang and Buzan’s analysis concludes by casting doubt on the likely formation of a “single monolithic ‘Chinese School’ [that] will come to dominate IR. ‧. thinking [in China]” but rather the formation of various schools with diverse foundations. y. Nat. io. sit. and intentions.55 However, there are, according to the authors, some important lessons. n. al. er. from the experience of the English School’s development. The first is the English. Ch. i n U. v. School’s distinctive identity. The English School has produced foundational works that. engchi. have advanced its theoretical assumptions about international society which have been reproduced and utilized by succeeding generations. 56 Next, as the inclusion of international society may suggest, the English School has produced unique concepts that fit into what can be considered a theoretical hard core. Finally, the English School has provided an “active site for normative IR debates about world society, human rights, and 54. Wang Jiangli and Barry Buzan, “The English and Chinese Schools of International Relations: Comparisons and Lessons,” The Chinese Journal of International Politics Vol. 7, No. 1 (2014), 3. 55 Wang Jiangli and Barry Buzan, “The English and Chinese Schools of International Relations,” 3. 56 Wang Jiangli and Barry Buzan, “The English and Chinese Schools of International Relations,” 39-41.. 36. DOI:10.6814/NCCU201901209.