Professor, Faculty of Law, St. Andrew’s University in Osaka
【Abstract】
In April 2016, Australia decided to acquire a conventional variant of the French nuclear-powered Barracuda class as the Royal Australian Navy’s next-generation submarine, rather than the Japanese Soryu class. Choosing the latter would probably have led to a metamorphosis of the Australia-Japan military relationship from mere cooperation in military policy and administrative issues via the respective bilateral alliances with the U.S., to cooperation and coordination in military operations through the trade of a major weapon system. This study will first discuss “quasi-alliance”
conceptually and theoretically, comparing and contrasting it with “alliance”, and focusing on conditions under which a “quasi-alliance” functions well.
Second, based on this discussion, the analysis will center on a series of the recent related bilateral agreements and other diplomatic documents to comprehend major features of the widening and deepening of the bilateral cooperative security and defense relationship. This will help in understanding the major factors that limit the evolutionary changes in the bilateral relationship. Third, this study will investigate a series of policy essays published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy, a major Australian think in the field, aiming to grasp the strategic rationale for why Australia has rejected the formation of a quasi-alliance with Japan. Last, the work will suggest a rule-of-thumb for prospective bilateral security and military relations in the near future.
Keywords: Soryu-class submarine, US-Japan Alliance, US-Australia Alliance, Japan-Australia Quasi-Alliance, Japan-Australia
‘Special Partnership’
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