國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
64
6.1.4 In Pingdong City
In the city of Pingdong, the financial incentive provided by the market was too low for the contracted collector to continue. The city, too, could not fund it itself. This led to the involvement of the Tzu Chi Foundation, of whom the involvement was carefully
considered internally; specifically, the judgment of Cheng Yen in this case was key. She pointed out, according to the TCQ, that the initiative both led to improved involvement of community members in recycling, as well as improved sorting, with volunteers leading the collection points to instruct community members on sorting.
Table 11 - Model for Tzu Chi in Pingdong City. Source: own.
Incentives Ideological: Protect environment
Ideological: Involve as many people as possible in environmental protection
Financial: Income from selling recyclables Interests Maintaining income to fund Daai TV
Improving participation in recycling
Increasing the ‘quality of recycling’: how well recyclables can be re-used
Improving participation in recycling
Actions Cooperate with city government to collect recyclables and inform community members.
Effect on recycling success
(Local) increase in collection and sorting of recyclables from regular waste.
Incentive interaction
Master Cheng Yen was asked to confirm fit with organization’s ideals
6.2 Incentive dynamics & further effects
In the above analyses, it became clear that for the Tzu Chi Foundation, first and foremost the ideological incentive is important in both making decisions as well as motivating
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
65
volunteers. For volunteers and members, the financial incentive received by the organization is one that they only benefit from in terms of continued existence of the recycling activities and promotion of its ideology, which means that it effectively only is a further non-material incentive for members and volunteers. At the same time however, volunteers have a relatedness incentive that is unique to them as a group in the
organization, as recycling allows them to socialize with other members.
Over the whole picture of the above tables, the financial incentive strengthens the
ideological incentives for the organization’s pattern of decisions and actions, following a pattern that Frey and Jegen (2002) would describe as crowding-in. This became
especially visible in their interests after 2006, when sorting, collection and even
processing of recyclables became more common practice nationwide. As a result, the Tzu Chi Foundation focused less on actual quantity collected.
Subsequently, the Foundation started Da.ai Technology to develop new recycling technologies, improved its sorting, and focused on education. Instead of using its
expanding volunteer base to compete for recyclables, their nominal throughput fell back to that of the period before 2006, and the growing trend that was present before stabilized for plastics and even became a declining trend for paper and the total of recycling. At the same time, it is clear that with the conception of Da.ai Technology they stretched
themselves out up the value chain identified by Wilson et al. (2006) and thus most likely increased their income. Important to note here is that the framework above does not capture the full effect on recycling success. Da.ai’s development of textiles and other materials made from recyclables provided another incentive to other actors, to improve their recycling. This falls outside the defined framework however.
With major decisions identified in this thesis, meaning the start of recycling operations, implementation of the cooperation between the Foundation and the city government in Pingdong and the initial efforts towards Da.ai Technology, spiritual leader Master Cheng Yen was consulted as the head of the organization. While financial gains towards other organizational goals seem to have played a role as well, the main motivator was the ideology.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
66
The aforementioned decisions indicate that the two main sorts of incentives, ideological and financial, follow a hierarchical exclusion pattern for the organization, in which the ideological incentive requires to be satisfied first before any action is undertaken.
Following assertions by Wilson (1973) that the ideological incentive often is a very strong one, this sounds logical. Of course, since arguably the organization’s main reason for existence is its ideology, this pattern should be hardly surprising.
Over time, this interaction of financial and ideological incentives to improve recycling and increase participation and awareness seem to have led to a consistent contribution at the forefront of recycling developments. It led them to be early in their pursuit of
recycling when compared to the national government in 1990. Then, after 2006, national efforts by all actors improved significantly, as sorting for community became mandatory and recyclable collection by the government increased further. As a result, it became less important for the Tzu Chi Foundation to focus on quantity, since they were mainly motivated by ideological incentives to increase participation in recycling, something that now undeniably occurred without its interference. Instead, the Foundation initiated efforts to improve the use of recyclables by turning them into textiles, something that undeniably had an impact, but outside of the conceptual relations identified above.
In their endeavors, the Tzu Chi Foundation had advantages over the other parties in the recycling sector in terms of resources; both volunteers and donations are what the recycling branch mostly thrives on. They are particularly strong in inspiring using their charisma, as determined by Huang (2009), thus harnessing non-material incentives for these others to support them in recycling. In this, the ideology is also key: their aim to involve anyone, to ‘practice Buddhism’, is a key ideological aspect to spread and motivate grassroots movements and volunteers.
For volunteers, several important incentives to recycle can be distinguished. Firstly, there is of course the purposive, ideological incentive of saving the environment with as many people as possible. Secondly, there is a second incentive which relates to socializing and being part of the group that is formed at a recycling station; this can be regarded as a relatedness incentive. Thirdly, volunteering is something that is necessary to acquire the
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
67
role of commissioner; this is a status incentive. All these generally seem to synergize, although they are not the main topic of analysis following the framework.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
68
7 Conclusions
This thesis has observed first the background of the Taiwanese recycling sector, and then collected and analyzed different sorts of data regarding the Tzu Chi Foundation’s
recycling. Later, this was combined and the model, outlined in chapter 3, was applied to the information collected, to come to an understanding of incentives and incentive dynamics, how these impacted the interests of the Tzu Chi Foundation and its different parts, and subsequently how this impacted its efforts towards recycling success
What remains in this chapter, is to distill from the analyses an answer to the main research question, and to sum up its consequences for practice and research, to recollect how the study has contributed, and to set out directions for further research. Finally, also limitations of the thesis will be discussed.
The framework used provides understanding of some, but not all, impacts. For example, the Tzu Chi Foundation’s focus on education does not directly impact recycling success, and nor does the leading role of Da.ai Technology in the PET-textiles industry. Rather, it creates an incentive for other actors to contribute to recycling success. The model applied does not capture these effects- while they do indeed seem present. This would require inclusion of an arrow from ‘actions’ to other actors’ ‘incentives’ box; a lesson that could be applied in other studies.
7.1 Findings
The analyses above indicate that an NGO can thus, indeed, quite well contribute to a recycling sector as a result of its combined incentives. The outcome of the analysis above seems to suggest that the NGO had a unique set of incentives, centering around the ideological incentive. The strong adhesion to the ideological incentive above others caused it to start recycling before other parties decide to do so. Later, it was related to the organization diminishing its role, as other actors took over; instead, the organization started focusing more on actual re-use of recyclables through Da.ai Technology. As a whole, this makes NGO participation especially interesting for nations where MSWM is less developed. Moreover, the outcome of this analysis confirms and explains assertions
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
69
by Mohamed et al. (2012a; 2012b) who find that religious non-for profit groups provide a considerable potential for recycling.
Particular to the NGO studied here are its ideology and the charismatic way in which this is communicated. The ideology outlines an aim to incorporate as many members of society as possible, in protecting the environment as well as possible. This, and the charismatic way in which it was spread, has made the organization successful in
developing a recycling sector before the national sector was well-established, effectively bolstering grassroots movements.
Volunteers in these grassroots movements have been thus been moved by several
incentives. Firstly, the ideology itself provides an incentive, and this plays a large role for most. For others, several more personal benefits such as fitness were even named during visits to the plant. Social connection, too, provides an important incentive for many of the elderly doing the daytime sorting who would elsewise risk exclusion from social
environments. Finally, within the organization, there is a hierarchy with the Tzu Chi Commissioners above the volunteers, which creates a social status incentive. To become a Tzu Chi Commissioner, extra effort and dedication to the ideology is required. The sum of these are strong motivators following literature, which suggested that religious
association and value expression are often strong motivators to recycle (Omoto and Snyder 1993; Wymer 1997; Bussell and Forbes 2001).
As recycling developed nationally, the NGO focused more on developing actual purposes for recyclables in order to make recycling and recycled products more attractive, as such providing an incentive to industry actors- and consequently indirectly to the recyclable market. This was both financially and ideologically attractive for the organization, but the fundamental factor in its decision making has always been the ideological incentive.
Whereas this is hardly surprising for an NGO, it has led it to the forefront in recycling, together with its ‘hands-on’ approach.
Assuming Geels’ (2002) technological transition framework holds, the early role of the Tzu Chi Foundation seems to have played an exemplary role, first growing within the organization, to spread to other niches, and thus slowly impacting the landscape. The
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
70
scale of this impact is however uncertain, and would require further study following the outline of this framework of development of recycling in Taiwan by different actors.
An important factor for Tzu Chi’s recycling motivation too, is the financial incentives provided by the recycling market. The market incentive program initiated under the 4-in-1 recycling program seems, from the numbers and trends, to have strongly increased alignment towards recycling, and it further backed Tzu Chi’s motivation to recycle. More interesting even, is how the Tzu Chi Foundation has decreased its paper and total
recycling after 2006, when adequacy of waste treatment seems to have risen nationwide.
This suggests a less permanent role for an NGO, once other actors pick up.
It must be clear that not every NGO, nor every ideologically motivated NGO, nor even every religious NGO, can directly be expected to contribute to recycling in such a way.
But with Mohamed (2012a; 2012b) and the analyses of this thesis there is an increasing expectation that ideological NGOs have strong potential as early adopters in recycling in rapidly developing countries, especially those that have religious populations.
The reports from volunteers however, which mentioned that many members are not Buddhist until after joining the organization as volunteers, indicate that the religious aspect of the NGO studied in this case may not be fundamental when attempting to replicate this model, however. Whereas volunteers and the Tzu Chi Quarterly did mention personal spiritual benefits, these were not often directly linked to the religion that the organization has founded its ideals on, suggesting that an NGO that is not religious, but simply strongly constructive and ideological, would be able to grow into such an important actor. It is at the same time true that religion is obviously a strong potential provider for these ideological incentives.
What is most remarkable, and arguably key in its contributions to recycling success, are the Tzu Chi Foundation’s extremely hands-on approach. Its ideology is focused on laboriously pushing for what in their view- and most people would agree- is a better world, which motivates both outsiders and insiders through different mechanisms. This may result in difficulties when attempting to replicate the approach; it seems to be very much related to culture, too, other than just organizational- and technological capabilities.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
71
Obviously, ideological incentives have some practical downsides as well. It would be hard to affect or steer an organization that relies on ideological incentives externally.
Wilson (1973) asserts, “(Ideological incentives) attract persons prepared to make deep and lasting commitments to the cause”, but also that “ideological (…) organizations display little flexibility about their objectives or, if the objectives are changed, the transformation exacts a heavy price in associational conflict and personal tensions.”
7.2 Contributions
7.2.1 Academic contributions
This thesis observes and provides an argument for how an ideologically motivated NGO, in this case a religiously motivated NGO, can indeed support the recycling sector, and run ahead of its peers in organizing and coordinating efforts towards collection and even further recycling. This is done by looking at both its incentives for volunteers, as well as the incentives the organization has for its actions, and subsequently looking at how these actions contribute to overall recycling success. The latter bases on the study by Tang and Tang (2014) and is explained in a new visual framework that was not yet found in other literature; suggestions for improvement are also made in this chapter. This framework may as such be used to inform further studies that base on incentive dynamics.
As for the typology of incentive dynamics introduced by Tang and Tang, (2014) this thesis observed three. Firstly, synergetic effects, mostly during Tzu Chi’s early years.
Secondly, hierarchical exclusion effects, as the Foundation tested several decisions by their fit with the organization’s ideology. Thirdly, in its impact on the community, the Tzu Chi Foundation ran into crowding out of ideological incentives, as the minimal subsistence that collecting recyclables provided for scavengers became an important argument for critics of the organization.
Whereas, when observing incentives for individuals, this type of dynamic may generally focus on more material factors, the ideology for the organization studied here as an actor is its basic reason for existence, and thus it is reasonably its basis for decision making. As
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
72
such, it adds extra body of evidence to this typology, observing incentive interaction patterns in a different setting, with different sorts of actors, and over a longer time period.
Furthermore, this study provides backing to calls by Baud et al. (2001) and Wilson et al.
(2006) to further integrate informal, non-government led MSWM practices, something that is common already in Taiwan and is extensively studied in this thesis. Secondly, it supports the idea of Mohamed (2012a; 2012b) that religiously motivated, or, more broadly, ideologically informed NGOs are potentially strong and leading contributors in an MSWM-sector. It shows how an ideological incentive can play a role in creating a high-profile early adopter, which following the Technology Transfer Model would be crucial in re-shaping the landscape.
Finally, there is no extensive English-language publication yet on the recycling activities of the Tzu Chi Foundation in Taiwan. As such, the description in this thesis may inform further studies of MSWM or the Tzu Chi Foundation by doing so. It may form input for- or more indirectly inspire studies of the Foundation’s recycling activities.
7.2.2 Practical contributions
For practitioners, too, this thesis may provide valuable input. For the Tzu Chi Foundation itself, it may further provide insights in its internal incentives. Within Taiwan, it adds to a more comprehensive understanding of the recycling environment and lead to further integration of parties into the system. Outside of Taiwan, mostly in countries where MSWM is in early development stages, it may lead to increased interest from NGOs to engage in recycling, as well as from governments to stimulate or welcome recycling. For the former, this study also provides (limited) insight in how ideology can shape effectiveness.
The fact that the ideology plays such a key role in this instance may also form a warning of sorts to policymakers and NGOs outside of Taiwan, in that Taiwanese recycling success may be difficult to replicate. As mentioned before, ideology is- especially from outside an organization- something that is difficult to change or abolish. Practitioners that thus wish to copy the success may want to consider this, and broaden their view from
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
73
only the recycling technologies that are implemented to include the social and ideological context of these technologies.
7.3 Future research
Observing the current role of the Tzu Chi Foundation as an NGO has here been done from an incentive perspective, evaluated on its contribution to recycling success. Future studies may want to focus on its economic impacts. Problematic here is however that the informal sector, which in Taiwan is of considerable size, is difficult to map and study accurately; studies have attempted this before, but a credible estimation still needs to be published.
Further studies may also attempt to find similar cases and subject them to the same tests as done here, to come to insights as to how especially non-material incentives can be harnessed by groups to further recycling, or steer towards other purposes. This would greatly improve the practical application of incentive theory. Comparative material could provide further insights as to which factors are crucial in building a well-aligned NGO or even recycling sector as a whole.
Further work needs to be done to develop the practical application of incentive theory as a policy tool, further investigating incentive dynamics in policy and institutional
environments. This thesis has provided a visual framework; however, future studies can focus on incorporating the reciprocation of actions on other actors’ incentives, to further develop this framework. Whereas observed here throughout the study, it was not
incorporated into the framework; this could for example be done if the framework is viewed as a ‘repeated game’, applying it to successive periods for a set of actors over to arrive at insights as to how these actions affect others’ incentives and incentive dynamics.
7.4 Limitations
This thesis has developed an understanding of NGO impact in an MSWM sector. It must be noted that there are some limitations to this research, too. Firstly, the nature of the research was to look into how incentive caused the organizations to contribute. This
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a
tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
74
translate to an analysis of positive effects; while no strong evidence for negative effects
translate to an analysis of positive effects; while no strong evidence for negative effects