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Chapter Two: Literature Review
2.1 One Belt One Road
The Belt and Road Initiative is a relatively recent development and many of the proposed projects are either in their preliminary phases or have yet to leave the drawing board. Therefore, much of the existing scholarly literature can only speculate about the possible results of One Belt One Road.
In March 2015, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce released the official action plan for the “Belt and Road Initiative.”14 While the published plan contains more specific points than Xi’s speeches, Christopher Johnson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) describes OBOR as “more of a sweeping vision with a multitude of objectives than an operational blueprint,” and adds that foreign officials have remarked that Beijing “has been slow to table specific proposals for cooperation and nobody seems in overall control.”15 However, he also concedes that Asian demand for infrastructure “makes it likely that OBOR, though certainly running into painful obstacles now and again, will come out the other end with some modicum of success.”16
Zhao Minghao, writing more specifically about One Belt One Road’s impact on relations between China and the European Union (EU), draws similar conclusions. Similar to Johnson, Zhao identifies a number of potential challenges to One Belt One Road’s success, such as suspicion from regional powers about China’s true motivations behind One Belt One Road a lack of Chinese knowledge, experience, and capacity “in dealing with the
governmental and non-governmental actors in Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East,”
14 For clarity, it should be noted that “One Belt” refers to the overland Silk Road Economic Belt and “One Road”
refers to the proposed new Maritime Silk Road.
15 Christopher K. Johnson, "President Xi Jinping's "Belt and Road" Initiative," (Center for Strategic &
International Studies, 2016), vi.
16 Ibid., 23.
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as well as the broader problem of “synergizing China’s governmental and civilian power.”17 Given the geopolitical and geo-economic challenges facing the EU, Zhao believes that the EU will engage with One Belt One Road in order to give itself the flexibility it needs to stabilize its relations with Russia and also gain the leverage it needs to “reshape international rules regarding trade and investments.”18
Irina Pop delves deeper into the issue of regional rivalries as a potential stumbling block for widespread implementation of One Belt One Road. The major players she points to are Russia, the United States, Japan, and India. Although Russia is a major economic partner with China through its membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Pop argues that Russia may see China’s proposed projects in Central Asia as a push into an area that Russia has traditionally considered as its own backyard. Despite the fact that the two countries have established cooperative frameworks, Pop argues, “Russia is not an easy partner to work with, as its actions can be unpredictable and could undermine China’s
confidence in Russia.”19 Like Russia, India also feels that OBOR encroaches on its traditional sphere of influence; it sees the maritime component as a “string of pearls” meant to encircle it.20
For its part, Chinese leadership has done much to portray One Belt One Road as something that other nations should embrace. In his analysis of Chinese views and commentary on One Belt One Road, Michael Swaine notes that Chinese officials and observers focus heavily on the benefits that other nations stand to gain by taking part in One Belt One Road; he quotes a Chinese official who describes One Belt One Road as “an offer of a ride on China’s economic express train. [OBOR] is a public product for the good of the
17 Minghao Zhao, "China's New Silk Road Initiative," Istituto Affari Internazionali 15, no. 37 (2015).
18 Ibid., 10.
19 Irinia Pop, "Strengths and Challenges of China's "One Belt, One Road" Initiative," (London: Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies, 2016), 9.
20 Ibid., 10.
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whole world.”21 Indeed, much of the Chinese commentary that Swaine paints OBOR in an altruistic light – as a service that China is generously providing to Eurasia. In this regard, it is also frequently contrasted with the American Marshall Plan, and the Bretton Woods system that followed, “which practically ensured the absolute dominance of the U.S. currency. But China does not want that.”22
Not all commentators share this rosy view of Chinese intentions: Swaine identifies a number of non-authoritative Chinese commentators who see possible ulterior motives behind One Belt One Road, such as “shaping the perceptions of other powers so that they ‘do not make trouble for China.’”23 Nor are all commentators as quick to accept that One Belt One Road will be an obvious success: some wonder whether “the Chinese approach” to economic development will necessarily work in other countries.24 Swaine himself feels as though Chinese commentators fail to see the true breadth of obstacles that One Belt One Road faces, whether glossing over the poverty in some of the region and the “limited experience in undertaking huge infrastructure projects”, or the potential “political and cultural ‘blowback’
that could harm China’s image or increase instability and heighten geopolitical tensions.”25 With regards to One Belt One Road’s impact on energy policy, Lu Ruquan, an
employee of China’s National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), writes that “[w]hen analyzing OBOR, the oil and gas industry is a strategic industry that no one can exclude.”26 He points out that Xi Jinping’s decision to announce the One Belt One Road framework in Kazakhstan was a deliberate one, given that China has important strategic (read: oil) interests in
Kazakhstan. He explains that Chinese oil companies have in effect been laying the
21 Michael Swaine, "Chinese Views and Commentary on the "One Belt, One Road" Initiative," China Leadership Monitor 47 (2015): 10.
22 Ibid., 11.
23 Ibid., 14-15.
24 Ibid., 12.
25 Ibid., 15.
26 Ruquan Lu, ""One Belt, One Road": China and the "Oil Roads"," China Oil & Gas 3 (2016). 7.
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groundwork for One Belt One Road in Kazakhstan and Central Asia over the last decade, with more than USD 40 billion of investments in “exploration and production, transportation by pipelines, refining, marketing, engineering services, and international trade.”27 He lays an image of “oil roads”, with China and Russia as two key points, the six Central Asian
countries as footholds, and the five South Asian countries – namely Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – as upgrade points; the Middle East and Africa are relegated to “outskirts and important substitutes.”28 Lu emphasizes that Russia must be included because it has the world’s largest gas reserve and the 8th largest oil reserve, and that the Central Asian countries are important either as suppliers of oil or as vital transit countries for oil and gas pipelines.