CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
4.5 FRAMES
4.5.3 Political Threat Frame
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According to the Wall Street Journal, which quoted an unnamed former Malaysian official, Najib met Jho Low at the sidelines of the Belt and Road forum in Beijing in May 2017. The official, whom WSJ claimed was attached with the Prime Minister's Office, also claimed that Najib would travel to China on a regular basis to meet Low. Among others, the DOJ claimed that Low had used funds meant for 1MDB to purchase jewellery for his associates and to buy a superyacht (Malaysiakini, 2018, August 1).
4.5.3 Political Threat Frame
The political threat frame is constructed on the basis of China Threat Theory, or Chinese Century, which sees China as a hegemony using its growing economic, military power to achieve world dominance.
a. China uses BRI to achieve global dominance
For BRI countries who have conflicts with China in SCS, China is sending both win-win and hostile messages.
China’s proactive commercial diplomacy has gone hand in hand with territorial assertiveness and rapid military modernization, raising concerns over the motivations of Beijing’s global economic initiatives…It has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between soft and hard power and stick to the long-held (naive) narrative that China is simply interested in a “win-win” economic interaction with the rest of the world (Heydarian, 2015, October 27)
The intention behind China’s BRI is a debatable and ‘a Sino-centric order’ often
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"… Belt and Road is intended to create greater economic interdependence between China and its neighbors, which Beijing hopes will translate into increased political influence…Xi Jinping wants China to become the dominant regional power in an essentially Sino-centric order," Glaser told Agence France-Presse. (Rappler &
AFP, 2017, May 14)
From the “one belt, one road” scheme to the Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, major Chinese initiatives are gradually but steadily advancing China’s strategic objective of fashioning a Sinocentric Asia.’ (Chellaney, 2016, January 28)
China continues to seek guidance from a past characterized by Confucian notions of hierarchical political order and a ‘moral geography’ that places China at the center of the civilized world. ‘One Belt, One Road is an initiative driven by the impulse to centralize power through commercial and civilizational influence.
While sounding futuristic, it is in fact anachronistic, a throwback to Cold War rhetoric and a bipolar world (Maggay, 2017, June 15)
One of China’s goal is said to drive other powerful nation, such as the U.S., out of the region.
China’s plans to dominate the First Island China in the medium-term, paving the way for dominating East Asia by pushing out the United States out of the Second Island Chain in the Western Pacific (Heydarian, 2015, October 27).
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The infrastructure projects BRI invests in are regarded as tools for China to expand its global influences.
Xi’s “One Belt One Road” initiative is set to create a multitude of opportunities for economic development spanning much of the world, but building physical links over land and sea will also give China the wherewithal to expand its influence into every connected nation. (The Nation via the Inquirer, 2017, October 19)
Buying foreign companies to own technology and supply chains is one of China’s intention.
“If you are a big emerging nation that’s very heavily reliant on raw materials from other countries ... you’d want to have as much control over the transporting of those fundamental raw materials as you possibly can… I think it is quite a smart move by them and it plays into the One Belt, One Road project because it means they are not just recreating the Silk Route but also owning the Silk Route,” said a Sydney-based M&A lawyer who advises on investments by Chinese companies into Australia (Reuters via New Straits Times, 2016, March 1)
b. Cooperation with China means the concession of sovereignty rights
Similar discourse is also used in Malaysia by the then opposition party leader, Dr.
Mahathir during his election campaign.
Pundits have been parsing Dr. Mahathir’s public comments for a clearer view of his China policy after a heated election campaign in which he assailed Najib for
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“selling off” the country to China in exchange for help in settling debts linked to the multi-billion-dollar 1MDB -scandal (The Star, 2018, June 21).
Mahathir had also repeatedly spoken out against the Forest City development project, claiming that it would lead to foreign ownership of Malaysian land and an influx of property buyers from mainland China (Malaysiakini, 2018, May 11).
As of December 2018, the most important case of foreign assets being handed to China is the Hambantota port of Sri Lanka, which was leased to China for 99 years in July 2017 (Reuters, 2017, December 11).
Chinese submarines docked at the harbor the same day that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan was visiting Colombo, in what was seen across the region as a menacing signal from Beijing…Sri Lankan officials had little real control…Sri Lankan officials are quick to point out that the agreement explicitly rules out China's military use of the site. But others also note that Sri Lanka's government, still heavily indebted to China, could be pressured to allow it (Abi-Habib via The Straits Times, 2018, June 26).
c. China interferes domestic politics
It is reported that China interferes Malaysian politics by bailing out 1MDB, in which then Prime Minister Najib was accused of money laundering.
China has, for example, been quick to capitalise on the 1MDB imbroglio to expand its influence over the administration, push for maximum political and economic
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concessions and leapfrog other countries to become primus inter pares among Malaysia’s partners. China’s economic and diplomatic strategy has already yielded impressive dividends as Malaysia shifts significantly closer to China, upending the more cautious and nuanced approach to big power relations that has long been the hallmark of Malaysia’s foreign policy (Ignatius, 2017 May 30).
As a strong promoter of BRI, MCA was called ‘China’s agent’ in Malaysia by the then opposition party (Khiang, 2017, January 24). China’s ambassador to Malaysia’s (Bai Tian) appearance with UMNO before the general election also attracts doubts.
The analyst, who declines to be named, says that Bai’s CNY speeches in praise of the Government gave the impression that China was backing the ruling coalition…
“It is so obvious the present and past ambassadors are supporting Barisan,” says an official working in a Chinese association. According to some reports, China has to back Barisan to ensure there is no disruption to its current and potential investments worth over RM300bil in Malaysia (Foon, 2018 March 25).
Philippine President Duterte also faces questions about his policy of leaning towards China.
Does he (Duterte) really believe the PRC is doing this out of the goodness of its heart, motivated by sheer altruism? That at some point China won’t use its aid to influence policies in the Philippines that could be detrimental to its own interests?
(Francia, 2017 May 23)
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In May 2017, a Philippine official from Duterte administration said the Philippines would not accept aid from EU to maintain an independent policy (Reuters, 2017 May 18). On January 24, 2018, the Philippines officially declined EU aid, which it said to come with the condition of respecting human rights. Few days later Duterte explained that it’s because ‘socialists are contributing money for destabilization (of the country)’
(Basa, 2018, January 27). Some criticize that Duterte has a double standard towards Chinese aid and China’s possible interference of Philippine politics.
So how can Duterte reconcile his stance against aid from the EU that he describes comes with strings attached, with accepting aid from China? Does he really believe the PRC is doing this out of the goodness of its heart, motivated by sheer altruism? That at some point China won’t use its aid to influence policies in the Philippines that could be detrimental to its own interests? (Francia, 2017, May 23)
…the Philippines may yet be one of the best growth areas for Macau-based casinos, not just for our robust economic growth but also Duterte’s wholehearted pivot to China…The growing influence of China on Duterte’s policymaking is also striking.
Just how beholden is Duterte to the Chinese? How many more of his future decisions and policies will be tinged by Chinese interests? What’s in it for him?
(Punongbayan, 2018, March 22)
It is reported that for those who do not follow China’s policy, Chinese tourists are weaponized to limit the income of other countries.
…, China effectively banned tour groups to the idyllic tropical archipelago,
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branding it (Palau) an illegal destination due to its lack of diplomatic status. As China extends its influence across the Pacific, Palau is one of Taipei’s 18 remaining allies worldwide and is under pressure to switch allegiances… “There is an ongoing discussion about China weaponizing tourism,” said Jeffrey Barabe…, “Some believe that the dollars were allowed to flow in and now they are pulling it back to try and get Palau to establish ties diplomatically.”…China has previously used its tourism clout as a diplomatic tool, last year halting tours to South Korea after Seoul installed a controversial U.S. missile defense system (Reuters via Manila Bulletin, 2018, August 21).
d. Materialization on the islands of SCS
For some, China is ignoring the arbitration result from Hague, and this is against the Filipinos’ interests.
…a giant country (China) belligerently ignoring the ruling and continuing to behave as if the former were a vassal state being allowed to fish in its waters (Maggay, 2017, June 15).
Xi’s threat was unmistakable. This was Xi’s message: “We’re friends as long as you accept the fact that the South China Sea is ours, all of it including the portion you call the West Philippine Sea. As long as you accept this, we will provide you with generous loans to fund your infrastructure projects. But if you drill for oil there, we will declare war on you.” (Rodis, 2017, June 8)
China continues to exercise administrative control over the Scarborough
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the shoal and are still barred from entering the lagoon within the shoal (Heydarian, 2017, March 14)
The responsibility falls to Duterte, who is said not to challenge but ignore China’s actions in the contested area.
Sen. Risa Hontiveros said President Duterte should stand up against Chinese President Xi Jinping’s threat of waging war against the Philippines.“The threat is an act of aggression; it is bullying. It was also barefacedly undiplomatic. The fact that the threat was personally expressed to the Philippine president makes it more repugnant,’’ she said (Mabasa, 2017 May 24).
Yet, its (China’s) military actions do not agitate Duterte. They, in fact, seem to scare him… This is a leader who equates claiming sovereignty with going to battle, saying in a speech: “So we are now negotiating…it’s better than we go to war … my soldiers will all be killed. Launch cruise missile – my soldiers will die. I will not do that. So with regards to the West Philippine Sea, I’ll just get what we can get.” (Manila Bulletin, 2018, May 21)
Philippines’ accommodation of the Chinese weakens its negotiating stance with regard to the contested waters. (Francia, 2017 May 23)
Beijing has deployed a range of military hardware including anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles and electronic jammers across the South China Sea, where it has built islets and other maritime features into hardened military facilities, (US Defense Secretary Jim) Mattis said. China has also landed heavy bombers on
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Woody Island in the Paracel Islands. (NST, 2018, June 2)
There are other topics that can be attributed to the political threat frame, such as cyber attack (Reuters via New Straits Times, 2018, August 15) and the damage of Muslim human rights in Xinjiang, China (Martina via Malaysiakini, 2018, February 17).
e. China wants a divided ASEAN
This argument points out that China is influencing ASEAN countries’ policy to match with its interests.
… the progressive Indonesian diplomat was surprised why ASEAN has no common stand on China’s One Belt, One Road policy.“Totally flabbergasted. We have a situation where China is picking us one by one. Some are invited. Others are not invited... We should engage China as a group when ASEAN centrality becomes synergic to One Belt, One Road. But if we start to go to China individually, then we will be disadvantaged,” Natalegawa said (Lopez via Manila Bulletin, 2018, May 14).
…what we see is a two-faced China. It wants to see a united Asean on issues like trade, but on strategic territorial issues, like control of the South China Sea, China would rather work bilaterally and not face a united front. It’s one way of signaling other countries to “turn a blind eye” to Chinese activities in the South China Sea.
(Decena via Inquirer, 2017, May 26)
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led to the group's failure to issue a joint statement on tensions in the South China Sea at the 2012 Asean Summit… The current political structure in South-east Asia may well dilute Asean's ability to negotiate with external powers. It would be a tragedy if a failure of coordinated leadership within Asean results in great-power competition turning this region into a strategic battleground (Busbarat via The Straits Times, 2017, August 3).
Direct confrontations between China and Singapore are less obvious and frequent than Malaysia or the Philippines, however, a commentary from The Straits Times (Goh, 2017, June 16) has pointed out that the two countries’ interests are not completely the same. From China’s perspective, Singapore supports the SCS arbitration case and invite navies of the US and other countries to use its port is something that China is not willing to see. Detention of several Singaporean armoured vehicles by Hong Kong customs in January 2017 and Singaporean leader Lee Hsien Long did not attend the BRI forum in May 2017 are other examples that the two countries have different opinions (Goh, 2017, June 16).