東南亞「一帶一路」新聞中的政經框架分析研究―以菲律賓、馬來西亞與新加坡為例 - 政大學術集成

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(1)A Political Economy Framing Analysis of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Southeastern Asia Press – A Comparative Study on the Republic of Philippines, Malaysia and the Republic of Singapore. 東南亞「一帶一路」新聞中的政經框架分析研究─以菲律賓、馬來西亞與新加坡為例. 治政 Advisor: Dr. Yi-Ning (Katherine) Chen 大陳憶寧立. Nat. y. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. Student: Shin-Han (Gary) Kwan 關信恆. n. er. io. al. sit. 國立政治大學傳播碩士學位學程. Ch. e 碩士論文 ngchi. i n U. v. A Thesis Submitted to Master’s Program of Communication National Chengchi University For the degree of Master of Arts in Communication. January 2019. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(2) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(3) Abstract. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), first proposed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping in 2013, is a cross-national investment plan claiming to work towards a win-win scenario by raising infrastructure standards and seeking political and economic cooperation with neighboring countries. The author chooses the Republic of Philippines, Malaysia and the Republic of Singapore, which are all on the Maritime Silk Road and have China as. 政治大 development is sought while having different levels of sovereignty issues with China 立 their top trading partner, to see how their media respond to the project when economic. in the South China Sea. Nine hundred and forty-nine articles are collected from 7 media. ‧ 國. 學. outlets of the three countries after systematic sampling to find the quality, topic,. ‧. tendency, news origin, news source and frames of BRI media content. The research. y. Nat. finds that economic incentive remains the most used frame for all three countries.. er. io. sit. However, in Malaysia, standpoint and ownership of media have a huge influence on the reporting of BRI. Whether BRI can benefit locals becomes the center of debate for. al. n. v i n politicians. In the Philippines, C BRI is regarded as a U h e n g c h i great opportunity to develop its. country, however, China’s activities in SCS are seen as a political threat that harms national interests. This leads to higher economic concern, political threat and political stability frame. The Straits Times, owned by Singapore government, has the most BRI articles and more often uses non-prominent frame to show the multiple aspects of BRI. It not only keeps track of how other countries respond to the BRI but also serves as a platform for officials and scholars to find niche and identify problems of the BRI.. Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, China, Framing Analysis, Malaysia, Singapore, South China Sea, the Philippines i. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(4) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. ii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(5) 摘要. 2013 年由中國國家領導人習近平提出的一帶一路計畫對外聲稱共創雙贏，尋求國際政治與經濟合作，也提升周邊國家基礎建設水平。作者選擇海上絲綢之路上的菲律賓、馬來西亞與新加坡為分析對象。經濟面上三國最大的貿易夥伴皆為中國，在南海爭議上則有與中國不同程度的主權爭議。研究關注東南亞國家在. 政治大針對三國共七家媒體的九百四十九篇的一帶一路新聞，藉內容與框架分析法找出立. 追求經濟發展的同時，與中國在南海上的主權爭議將如何影響媒體報導。研究者. 一帶一路報導與評論的時間分布、主題、出處、消息來源與框架分布，也進一步. ‧ 國. 學. 探討這類變數與經濟、政治和媒體所有權因素與報導框架的關係。研究發現經濟. ‧. 誘因在三國皆為主要框架，然而在馬來西亞，媒體立場與所有權充分影響一帶一. y. Nat. 路報導，政治人物也針對一帶一路是否益於當地相互攻擊。菲律賓尋求一帶一路. er. io. sit. 帶來的經濟效益，但中國在南海的活動被視為威脅其主權。如此也反映其較高的經濟擔憂、政治威脅、政治穩定框架比例。新加坡政府持有的海峽時報具的一帶. al. n. v i n Ch 一路報導數量居冠，並常使用正反並陳框架表現一帶一路的優缺。在關注他國的 engchi U. 反應同時，其官員與學者也積極尋找新加坡在一帶一路的利基和可能面臨的問題。. 關鍵詞：一帶一路、中國、南海、框架分析、馬來西亞、菲律賓、新加坡. iii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(6) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. iv. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(7) TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................. i ABSTRACT IN CHINESE ..................................................................................... iii LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................... xi LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................xiv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................... xv CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................1. 政治大. 1.1 BACKGROUND STUDY AND RESEARCH MOTIVATION....................................1. 立. 1.2 CASE SELECTION: PHILIPPINE, MALAYSIAN AND SINGAPOREAN PRESSES ...4. ‧ 國. 學. 1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT ...................................................................................8. ‧. CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................... 11. y. Nat. 2.1 ECONOMY BACKGROUND OF THE THREE COUNTRIES AND THEIR ROLES IN. io. sit. BRI................................................................................................................ 11. er. 2.1.1 The Republic of Philippines ....................................................................... 13. al. n. v i n Ch 2.1.2 Malaysia ................................................................................................ 14 engchi U 2.1.3 The Republic of Singapore ......................................................................... 15 2.2 FORMER BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE MEDIA STUDIES ............................... 15 2.3 FRAMING THEORY ....................................................................................... 21 2.3.1 Overview................................................................................................. 21 2.3.2 Economy related frame .............................................................................. 23 2.3.3 Politics related frame ................................................................................ 23 2.4 SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUE ............................................................................. 24. v. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(8) 2.4.1 The Republic of Philippines’ Claim .............................................................. 25 2.4.2 Malaysia’s Claim...................................................................................... 27 2.4.3 The Republic of Singapore’s Claim .............................................................. 28 2.5 MEDIA OWNERSHIP AND THEIR STANDPOINTS ............................................ 29 2.5.1 The Republic of Philippines ........................................................................ 29 2.5.2 Malaysia ................................................................................................. 31 2.5.3 The Republic of Singapore .......................................................................... 33 2.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ................................................................................ 36. 政治大. CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODS ............................................................... 39. 立. 3.1 OVERVIEW ................................................................................................... 39. ‧ 國. 學. 3.2 ANALYSIS OBJECT AND TIME FRAME.......................................................... 39. ‧. 3.3 SAMPLING ................................................................................................... 41. sit. y. Nat. 3.4 CONSTRUCTION OF CATEGORY ................................................................... 41. n. al. er. io. 3.4.1 Topic ...................................................................................................... 41. v. 3.4.2 Tendency ................................................................................................. 42. Ch. engchi. i n U. 3.4.3 News origin ............................................................................................. 43 3.4.4 News source............................................................................................. 43 3.4.5 Measurement of frame ............................................................................... 44 3.5 RELIABILITY TEST ....................................................................................... 45. CHAPTER 4. RESULTS ........................................................................................ 47 4.1 QUANTITY AND TREND ............................................................................... 47 4.1.1. Malaysia ........................................................................................... 47. 4.1.2. Republic of Philippines ........................................................................ 49. vi. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(9) 4.1.3. Republic of Singapore .......................................................................... 50. 4.2 NEWS ORIGINS ............................................................................................ 50 4.2.1. Malaysia ........................................................................................... 50. 4.2.2. Republic of Philippines ........................................................................ 52. 4.2.3. Republic of Singapore .......................................................................... 53. 4.3 TOPICS ......................................................................................................... 54 4.3.1. Malaysia ........................................................................................... 54. 4.3.2. Republic of Philippines ........................................................................ 58. 4.3.3. Republic of Singapore .......................................................................... 61. 立. 政治大. 4.4 TENDENCY .................................................................................................. 64. ‧ 國. Republic of Philippines ........................................................................ 66 Republic of Singapore .......................................................................... 68. sit. y. Nat. 4.4.3. Malaysia ........................................................................................... 64. ‧. 4.4.2. 學. 4.4.1. n. al. er. io. 4.5 FRAMES ....................................................................................................... 68. v. 4.5.1 Economic Incentive Frame ........................................................................ 69. Ch. engchi. i n U. 4.5.2 Economic Concern Frame ......................................................................... 76 4.5.3 Political Threat Frame.............................................................................. 89 4.5.4 Political Stability Frame ........................................................................... 99 4.5.5 Distribution of Total Frames and the Most Prominent Frame ......................... 105 4.6 NEWS SOURCES ......................................................................................... 112 4.6.1. Malaysia ......................................................................................... 112. 4.6.2. Republic of Philippines ...................................................................... 114. 4.6.3. Republic of Singapore ........................................................................ 116. vii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(10) 4.7 HOW BRI FRAMES CHANGE WITH TIME .................................................... 118 4.7.1. Malaysia ......................................................................................... 118. 4.7.2. Republic of Philippines ...................................................................... 120. 4.7.3. Republic of Singapore ........................................................................ 122. 4.8 HOW BRI FRAMES CHANGE WITH DIFFERENT NEWS ORIGINS .................... 123 4.8.1. Malaysia ......................................................................................... 123. 4.8.2. Republic of Philippines ...................................................................... 124. 4.8.3. Republic of Singapore ........................................................................ 124. 政治大. 4.9 HOW BRI FRAMES CHANGE WITH DIFFERENT SOURCES ............................... 125. Republic of Philippines ...................................................................... 125 Republic of Singapore ........................................................................ 126. ‧. 4.9.3. 學. 4.9.2. 立. Malaysia ......................................................................................... 125. ‧ 國. 4.9.1. sit. y. Nat. 4.10 HOW BRI FRAMES CHANGE WITH DIFFERENT MEDIA ................................. 126. n. al. er. io. 4.10.1 Malaysia ......................................................................................... 126. v. 4.10.2 Republic of Philippines ...................................................................... 127. Ch. engchi. i n U. 4.10.3 Republic of Singapore ........................................................................ 128. CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION & INTERPRETATION ........................................ 129 5.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS ................................................................... 129 5.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF BRI REPORTS IN EACH COUNTRY .............................. 137 5.2.1. Malaysia: Chinese investments in the center of debate between political parties. More support from more commercialized media............................................. 137. 5.2.2. The Philippines: As Duterte administration welcomes Chinese investments, sovereignty concerns never cease in media .................................................... 139. 5.2.3. Singapore: Active, informative press help Singapore find niche and reposition itself amid political and economic concerns remain ....................................... 140. viii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(11) 5.2.4. BRI Media Content in Asean ......................................................................... 142. CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 143 REFERENCES....................................................................................................... 145 APPENDIX ............................................................................................................ 179 A. BRI CODING INSTRUCTION ........................................................................ 179 B. BRI CODING SHEET - Origin ........................................................................ 184 C. BRI CODING SHEET – Topic and tendency ...................................................... 185 D. BRI CODING SHEET – Frame ........................................................................ 186. 政治大. E. BRI CODING SHEET – Source ....................................................................... 187. 立. F. Table 4-32 Cross analysis of BRI news frames and news origins for Malaysia . ......... 188. ‧ 國. 學. G. Table 4-33 Cross analysis of BRI news frames and news origins for the Philippines ... 189. ‧. H. Table 4-34 Cross analysis of BRI news frames and news origins for Singapore ......... 190. Nat. y. Table 4-35 Cross analysis of BRI news frames and source figures by types in Malaysian. sit. I.. io. al. v i n press ........................................................................................................... 192 Ch engchi U Table 4-36 Cross analysis of BRI news frames and source figures by types in Philippine. n. J.. er. press ........................................................................................................... 191. K. Table 4-37 Cross analysis of BRI news frames and source figures by types in Singaporean. press ........................................................................................................... 193 L. Table 4-38 Distribution of the most prominent meta-frame among Malaysian media .. 194 M. Table 4-39 Competition of frames in Malaysian media. 1: Economic incentive; 2: Economic concern; 3: Political stability; 4: Political threat .................................... 195 N. Table 4-40 Distribution of the most prominent meta-frame in Philippine media ......... 196 O. Table 4-41 Competition of frames in Philippine media. 1: Economic incentive; 2: Economic concern; 3: Political stability; 4: Political threat. ................................... 197. ix. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(12) P. Table 4-42 Distribution of the most prominent meta-frame in The Straits Times of Singapore ..................................................................................................... 198 Q. Table 4-43 Competition of frames in The Straits Times of Singapore. 1: Economic incentive; 2: Economic concern; 3: Political stability; 4: Political threat ................... 199. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. x. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(13) LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Related factors for the selection of analysis objects. ......................................4 Table 2-1 Basic information for Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore ................. 12 Table 2-2 Introduction and framing analysis result of former BRI research ............... 16 Table 2-3 Major English news agencies from the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore ................................................................................................................. 34 Table 2-4 Frames and meta-frames of BRI in media. ................................................ 37 Table 3-1 The degree of reliability between variables in BRI media content ............. 46. 政治大. Table 4-1 Number and percentage of BRI articles collected from Malaysian press. . ..49. 立. ‧ 國. 學. Table 4-2 Number and percentage of BRI related articles collected from Philippine press…………………………………………………………………………………..50 Table 4-3 Distribution of news origin of Malaysia press…………………….............51. ‧. Table 4-4 Distribution of news agency of different origins among Malaysian press…51. sit. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. Table 4-5 Number and percentage of news origin for Philippine press……………......52. i n U. v. Table 4-6 Number and percentage of news origin for the Philippines……………….53 Table 4-7 Distribution Singapore………….53. of. Ch. engchi. news. origins. of. The. Straits. Times. from. Table 4-8 Number and percentage of topics for Malaysia…………………………...55 Table 4-9 Distribution of political, economic in general and mixed topics of BRI news among Malaysian media…...…………………………………………………………57 Table 4-10 Number and percentage of topics of BRI news from Philippine press…..59 Table 4-11 Distribution of political, economic in general and mixed topics of BRI news among Philippine press……………………………………………………...…60 xi. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(14) Table 4-12 Number and percentage of topics covered by The Straits Times of Singapore……………………………………………………………………………..62 Table 4-13 Number and percentage of politics, economy or both topics covered by The Straits Times of Singapore. …………….………………………………………….....64 Table 4-14 Distribution of tendency of BRI articles among Malaysian press……….65 Table 4-15 Distribution of tendency of BRI articles among Philippine press………..67 Table 4-16 Distribution of tendency of BRI articles from The Straits Times of Singapore. ………………………………………………………………....................68. 治政大press…………………...107 Table 4-17 Distribution of total frames among Malaysian 立 ‧ 國. 學. Table 4-18 Distribution of the most prominent frame among Malaysian press…….107 Table 4-19 Distribution of total frames among Philippine press……………………109. ‧. Table 4-20 Distribution of the most prominent frame among Philippine press. ..….109. sit. y. Nat. io. n. al. er. Table 4-21 Distribution of total frames of Singaporean press. ……………………..111. v. Table 4-22 Distribution of the most prominent frame of Singaporean press..….…..111. Ch. engchi. i n U. Table 4-23 Distribution of total figures of Malaysian press…………………….…..113 Table 4-24 Distribution of the user of most prominent frame among Malaysian press…………………………………………………………………………………113 Table 4-25 Five most featured figures in BRI articles among Malaysian press….....114 Table 4-26 Distribution of total figures of Philippine press. …………………..…….115 Table 4-27 Distribution of the user of most prominent frame in Philippine press. …..115 Table 4-28 Five most featured figures in BRI articles among the Philippine press...116 xii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(15) Table 4-29 Distribution Singapore. …….…117. of. total. figures. from. The. Straits. Times. of. Table 4-30 Distribution of the user of most prominent frame from The Straits Times of Singapore. ………………………………………………………………………..…117 Table 4-31 Five most featured figures in BRI articles of Singapore. ……………..…118. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. xiii. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(16) LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. An overview of the influential factors, agents and framing process in BRI news flow ...................................................................................................................8 Figure 2. Claimants of Exclusive Economic Zones by China, the Philippines and Malaysia in the South China Sea .............................................................................. 23 Figure 4-1 Total articles by month ............................................................................ 48 Figure 4-2 Distribution of economic incentive and concern frames through time in Malaysian press ....................................................................... ……………………119 Figure 4-3 Distribution of political stability and threat frames through time in Malaysian press ...................................................................................................... 119. 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. Figure 4-4 Distribution of economic incentive and concern frames through time in Philippine press……………………………………………………………………..120. ‧. Figure 4-5 Distribution of political stability and threat frames through time in Philippine press………………………………………………………………..……121. sit. y. Nat. Figure 4-6 Distribution of economic incentive and concern frames through time in. er. io. The Straits Times………………………………………………………………..…..…...122. al. n. v i n C hstability and threatUframes through time in The Figure 4-7 Distribution of political engchi Straits Times……………………………………………………………………..….123 Figure 5-1 The argument of economic incentive frame. Created by the author…….132 Figure 5-2 The argument of economic concern frame. Created by the author……...133 Figure 5-3 The argument of political threat frame. Created by the author………….133 Figure 5-4 The argument of political stability frame. Created by the author……….134. xiv. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(17) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS BRI. Belt and Road Initiative. CPC JP NYT SCS. Communist Party of China The Jakarta Post New York Times South China Sea. ST TOI WP. The Strait Times Times of India Washington Post. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. xv. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(18) CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background study and research motivation The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), first proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in September 2013 (CCTV, 2013, September 7), comprises the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road (National Development and Reform Commission, 2015). These two trade routes aim to connect cities or ports with inland railways, roads and maritime courses. As of August 2017, People’s Republic of China (PRC, it will be called China afterwards) has signed cooperation agreements in infrastructure, trade,. 政治大 May 16; Global Times, 2017 August 18). Every ASEAN member, including Malaysia 立. finance and government policy with 69 countries and organizations (China Daily, 2017. and the Philippines signed trade agreements with China. In order to gain support. ‧ 國. 學. domestically and internationally, Chinese officials have been asking their media to. ‧. ‘cooperate and consolidate public opinion while offering intellectual support for the. y. Nat. BRI’ (Xinhua, 2017, September 21). Chinese media also have been describing the. ‘common destiny’ (Zhao, 2018, January 19).. al. er. io. sit. Initiative as ‘win-win’ (2017, June 23), ‘inclusiveness’ (2017, May 5), and leading to a. n. v i n Some foreign officials andCelites support the BRI h e n g c h i U by focusing on the economic. benefits and claim that cooperating with China will improve local economy and infrastructure level. For instance, former Philippine officials wrote that:. The people-to-people bonds in the Belt-and-Road Initiative are the first and principal keys to achieving good relations among nations, trade facilitation, jointventures, networking, and policy coordination, as we endeavour to connect highways, railways, electricity grids, rivers, and lakes to the great arteries of the world. (De Venecia Jr., 2017, May 27) 1. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(19) ‘This is why it is important for the Philippines to have actively participated in this (Belt and Road) forum, especially given the economic agenda of President Duterte anchored on a massive and aggressive infrastructure strategy that is designed to achieve the country’s “Golden Age in Infrastructure.”’ (Villar, 2017, May 30). However, not all foreign presses agree with officials’ discourse. In some cases, they question China’s real intention behind its investment in foreign countries, for example,. 立. 政治大. … It (BRI) is not some benevolent project to benefit most of Asia and parts of. ‧ 國. 學. Europe, but a plan using Chinese financial muscle and prowess in infrastructure. er. io. sit. y. Nat. dependent on China. (Malaysiakini, 2017, May 23). ‧. development and manufacturing to make nations ... economically and financially. … Duterte's plan to obtain huge loans from China to fund his ambitious. al. n. v i n C hturn the PhilippinesUinto a “debt slave” of the Asian infrastructure program could engchi economic power. (Rappler, 2017, May 21). …it is clear that the Chinese are designing the megaproject to bypass Singapore... Such marginalisation of Singapore would mean a huge blow to its economic fortunes in the longer term (Polin via The Straits Times, 2017, May 30).. The significance of studying the international news flow is that media coverage can help manufacture consent such as cultural identity, and further affect ritual behavior 2. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(20) and political movement by supporting government policy (Carey, 1989; Dayan and Katz, 1992, Perlmutter, 1998, Robinson, 1999, Clausen, 2003). How each country perceives BRI and cross-national trade cooperation, development plan affect the way media report draws the author’s attention. The extent of globalization nature and geopolitical context of the Chinese project make it different from other international and policy news studies. On one hand, China has been expanding its news department by hiring correspondents abroad and building up networks in order to let ‘China’s voice to be heard internationally’ (Gagliardone & Pál, 2017), on the other hand, many western. 政治大 (Sambrook, 2010, p. 31). How presses 立. news organizations faced reduced revenues and has been cutting the budget of foreign correspondents. perceive and represent. international events can reflect their journalistic value or national interest. With the. ‧ 國. 學. incorporation of the BRI into China’s Constitution (Xinhua, 2017, October 24), and the. ‧. lifting of the term limits of its national leader (BBC, 2018, March 11), China is. y. Nat. determined to make sure the project succeeds. In the context of globalization and. er. io. sit. changing media environment, how China factors influence the content of foreign media and how and why foreign presses respond to the Chinese project are the objectives of. n. al. this research.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. To show the uniqueness of communication phenomena of the BRI, two aims are established in this study: 1) Provide an overview of the BRI news and commentary flow, 2) explain how economic, political factors and media ownership influence the distribution of various frames in BRI articles and commentaries. The expected results of this research not only include the characteristics and explanation of media coverage, but also offer a study of framing, which can be applied to other countries participating in the BRI, or other international events.. 3. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(21) 1.2 Case selection: Philippine, Malaysian and Singaporean Presses Since this study explores how economic and political factors influence media content, the controversial South China Sea (SCS) issue, which concerns various countries’ national interests, becomes a meaningful factor for analysis. China advocates Southeastern Asian countries to join BRI and achieve mutual economic growth. However, territorial issues can become obstacles and hinder international cooperation. Another reason for selecting countries along the Maritime Silk Road is that they are. 政治大 in the New South Bound Policy, which seeks to decrease dependence on China and 立 closer to where the author locates. The Republic of China (Taiwan) has been engaged. enhance ties with other Southeast, South Asian and South Pacific countries, under. ‧ 國. 學. president Tsai Ing-wen since 2016 (Tai & Low, 2016 September 5; Lu & Chung, 2016,. ‧. November 1).. y. Nat. To further single out the analysis object, BRI fund raised by countries, China’s. er. io. sit. global investment by countries, countries having territorial confrontation with China in SCS, official language, and former BRI media studies are all considered.. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Table 1. Related factors for the selection of analysis objects. Issue. Related Country. BRI fund raised by Southeast Asian countries from 2013 to 2017*. Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam (order by ranking). 2017 China’s investment ranking in Southeast Asia**. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam (order by ranking). Southeast Asian countries having territorial issues with China in SCS. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia. English as official language. Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore. Southeast Asian Countries former BRI media studies have covered as of April 2018. Vietnam (Vietnam News Agency), Indonesia (The Jakarta Post), Singapore (The Strait Times) 4. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(22) *Deloitte Singapore (2018). **The Economist Intelligence Unit (2017). Based on the ranking of contributors of BRI fund (Deloitte Singapore, 2018) and Chinese foreign investment (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017), Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam can be regarded as countries most influenced by the BRI and Chinese investment in Southeast Asia. In consideration of the tension in SCS, Thailand is less concerned while the other five countries have an urgent and serious territorial problem with China. Vietnam went to war with China concerning sea territorial dispute in 1988 (Hernandez et al., 2016), and in 2014 conflicts between both sides still appear (Ito, 2014 May 27). Another. 政治大. ASEAN member, the Philippines, appealed to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). 立. in Hague over its territorial disputes with China and won the case in July 2016 (PCA,. ‧ 國. 學. 2016). China has declined to accept the ruling and the Duterte administration of the Philippines has chosen not to bring up the territorial issue. Malaysia and Indonesia’s. ‧. sea borders both overlap with China’s nine-dash line (Asia Maritime Transparency. y. Nat. sit. Initiative, 2017), but rather downplay the tension with China. In general, the Vietnam. n. al. er. io. and the Philippines have more serious confrontations of sovereignty with China in. i n U. v. terms of frequency and intensity level than Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.. Ch. engchi. Although Singapore’s territory does not overlap with China, its location at the mouth of Malacca strait is deemed to have strategic and economic value (Tai, 2016, December 13). In addition to the above economic and political factors, the researcher can only read English and Chinese content. This limits this research to only the study of English media content. English is widely spoken and used by the Malaysian, Philippine and Singaporean governments due to colonial history. In addition, these three countries have news agencies releasing English news on a daily basis. Malaysia has the Star, New Straits Times, Malaysiakini; the Philippines has the Inquirer, Manila Bulletin, and 5. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(23) Rappler; Singapore has the Strait Times. Vietnam and Indonesia both have English news agencies but their news products are mostly translated from their native language, and their English news service offer less news products compared to news agencies in native language observed by the author. Chinese press in the Philippines is nonmainstream and much smaller than English press, so this study only collects BRI media content in English. As of April 2018, former BRI media studies have paid attention to Vietnam News Agencies of Vietnam (Nie, 2017), the Jakarta Post of Indonesia (Han, 2017; Liu, 2017),. 政治大 (2018) only cover from 2013 to September 2016, and did not cover the Belt and Road 立. the Strait Times of Singapore (Han, 2017; Shi, 2018). However, Han (2017) and Shi. Forum in May 2017. The Belt and Road Forum was a key event where officials meet. ‧ 國. 學. and sign cooperation deals, it is also an indispensable news material in the reporting of. ‧. BRI. There is a lack of studies on BRI in Malaysia and the Philippines. Both countries. y. Nat. are situated along the Maritime Silk Road, and have signed economic and trade. er. io. al. v i n C hreasons, SingaporeU(economic, language, academic In consideration of the above engchi n. 8a).. sit. cooperation agreements with China (China Daily, 2017 May 16; Cheong, 2018, April. reasons), Malaysia and the Philippines (economic, political, language, academic reasons) are selected. Singaporean, Malaysian and Philippine government have joined the BRI and signed cooperation agreements with China (China Daily, 2017, May 16; Cheong, 2018, April 8a), and they are also members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Yet, the roles of these three countries in BRI are different. Singapore, the highest contributor to the BRI fund among Southeastern Asian countries (Deloitte Singapore, 2018), can promote free-trade between ASEAN and China (Tong & Kong, 2018), raise infrastructure level and cut down financial risks by providing 6. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(24) banking and legal support in the region (Pan, 2018, May 22; Fernandez, 2018, Jan 25). Malaysia and the Philippines, on the other hand, still require better infrastructure system to solve the problem of unevenness of development and offer business opportunities for local economy. The demographics between the three countries are also different. Singapore has the highest proportion of ethnic Chinese. In 2017, 76.1 percent of the total population are ethnic Chinese. In 2016, Malaysia, with a population of around 31.2 million in 2016 (United Nations, 2017), is estimated to have 68.6 percent of Bumiputera, which are. 政治大 million people, and 7 percent of ethnic Indians (Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 立. Malay and indigenous peoples, 23.4 percent of ethnic Chinese, which is around 7.3. 2016, July 22). The Philippines, on the other hand, has a smaller population of ethnic. ‧ 國. 學. Chinese. According to official statement, in 2013, there are around 1.35 million of. ‧. ethnic Chinese, which is around 1.4 percent of the then population (103.3 million). y. Nat. (United Nations, 2017), and up to 22.8 million who have Chinese descendants. er. io. sit. (Macrohon, 2013, January 21). The variance in demographics are also reflected in the political field. Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), composed of Chinese members,. al. n. v i n C hChinese, and fightUfor their rights (MCA, 2015, claims to represent the Malaysian engchi. September 2). MCA has been one of the members of the Barisan Nasional, which had been the ruling party from 1957 to 2018. Chinese political figures also can be seen in other Malaysian parties such as the Democratic Action Party. There is no political party especially for Chinese Filipinos, but political figures have claimed to have Chinese ancestry, such as current President Rodrigo Duterte (Campbell, 2016, October 19), and former President Benigno Aquino III (Esmaquel II, 2015, June 8).. 7. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(25) 1.3 Problem statement Figure 1 (see p.9) shows an overview of the influential factors and agents in BRI news flow. It is shown to help us understand their roles and relationships among them. Political figures, scholars, business people and media of local (Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines), foreign and Chinese origins shape the media content of BRI. Under specific political, economic or cultural contexts, these agents frame BRI by selecting and reconstruction of information. Frames used by various agents might be different. However, it is possible to understand each agent’s viewpoint and the influence of. 政治大 proposed to help build up research questions in the later section: 立. factors through BRI media content on the platform of press. The following statement is. 1. What kind of features do BRI reports have?. ‧ 國. 學. 2. Who are the sources in BRI reports, and what are their standpoints?. er. io. sit. y. Nat. their choices of reporting on BRI?. ‧. 3. What are the differences among these countries, press, and how do we explain. To explain the reasons behind BRI reports, literature review of the political,. al. n. v i n economic, media background ofC each country is conducted. h e n g c h i U Reviewing BRI studies and. framing theory can help building the possible BRI frames. Research questions will be proposed after the literature review.. 8. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(26) Political, economic, cultural context. Political. Business. figures. people. Framing. 立. Scholars. 政治大 Framing. Framing. ‧ 國. 學. Influcing factors: media ownership, media culture and standpoint. Framing. Nat. sit. y. ‧. Local, foreign, Chinese and other Asian origins. er. io. BRI media content on the websites of local press. al. n. v i n Cinfluential Figure 1. An overview of the U and framing process in h e n gfactors, i agents h c BRI news flow.. 9. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(27) 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 10. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(28) CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW This section will first give a review of the background of economies of the three countries to understand their possible roles in BRI. Former BRI media studies are then reviewed to find what can be improved on and advanced on in BRI media content. Then framing theory in economic, political news content is studied to help establish frames for this research. Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines claims and recent events in SCS are reviewed to understand their attitudes towards China and possible conflicts. Media ownership in these countries are also studied to find possible factors that might. 政治大. influence about the reporting and comment on BRI.. 立. 2.1 Economy Background of the Three Countries and Their Roles in BRI. ‧ 國. 學. Table 2.1 gives an overview of Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore’s. ‧. economic and development background. Similarities among these three countries. y. Nat. include that China is their biggest trade partner (Workman, 2018), and Chinese. er. io. sit. investments in these countries have been growing since 2013 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017). Both Malaysia and the Philippines have trade deficits with. al. n. v i n C h are different U China. Although these three countries in land area, Malaysia and the engchi. Philippines both face the problem of the uneven development (Ngah, 2011; Lewis, 2013 September 6), and this leads to the need of better infrastructure in transportation. Integrated circuits remain the most exported and imported products to and from China for these countries (OEC, 2018a; 2018b; 2018c). Differences among these three countries are covered by population and economic indicators such as GDP, poverty ratio, CO2 emission and internet usage ratio. Singapore can be regarded as the most developed among them. It is also the only country who has a trade 11. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(29) Table 2.1 Basic information for Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. Malaysia. The Philippines. Singapore. 2017 Population (thousand) *. 31,624.264. 104,918.090. 5,708.844. Land area (sq. km) **. 328,550.0. 298,170.0. 709.0. 2017 Gross domestic product per. 9,659.878. 3,022.448. 53,880.128. 2017 GDP annual growth (%) **. 5.902. 6.685. 3.619. 2017 Top three trade partners****. China, Singapore,. China, Japan, the. China,. US. US. Malaysia,. capita (in US$) ***. Indonesia 2017 Trade balance with China (in. -8.9 billion. 政 4(18)治大28(39). US$) **** 2017 China Going Global. -10.8 billion. 立. 24.4 billion 1(2). Investment Index ranking by world. ‧ 國. 學. country (2013 statistics)***** Integrated circuits,. Integrated circuits,. Integrated. from China******. refined petroleum,. cars, refined. circuits,. semiconductor. petroleum. n. al. Integrated circuits,. er. io. sit. y. Nat. devices. 2016 Top three exported products to China******. ‧. 2016 Top three imported products. Integrated circuits,. v wood i refined petroleum, computers, n C h palm oil e n g c h i U carpentry. 2015 Poverty headcount ratio at. refined petroleum, broadcasting equipment Integrated circuits, gold, refined petroleum. 0.4. 21.6. No data. 8.033 in 2014. 1.055 in 2014. 10.306. 78.8. 55.5. 84.5. Malay, English. Filipino, English,. English,. Spanish, Arabic. Chinese,. national poverty lines (% of population)** 2014 CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)** 2016 Individuals using the internet (% of population)** Most used languages. Malay National leader from 2013. Najib Razak,. Benigno Aquino. Lee Hsien. 12. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(30) September to 2018 August Major development policy as of. Mahathir. III, Rodrigo. Mohamad. Duterte. New Economic. Build, Build,. Singapore. Model. Build. 2030. April 2018. Loong. * United Nations (2018). ** World Bank (2018). *** International Money Fund (2017, October). **** Workman (2018). ***** The Economist Intelligence Unit (2017). ******OEC (2018a) & OEC (2018b) & OEC (2018c).. 政治大. surplus with China. In 2017, Singapore’s GDP per capita was the highest among. 立. ASEAN countries; Malaysia’s is the third; the Philippines is the sixth (International. ‧ 國. 學. Money Fund, 2017, October). The problem of poverty continues to be more serious in. ‧. the Philippines (see poverty headcount ratio in Table 2.1), which might encourage the Philippine government to promote national development plan, ask for foreign. y. Nat. io. sit. investment into commercial activities, and finally raise the average income of citizens.. n. al. er. Compared to the Philippines, Malaysia has also been richer in terms of energy resources.. i n U. v. According to CIA (2017), Malaysia has a stock of 3.6 billion barrels of crude oils, while. Ch. engchi. the Philippines only has 138.5 million. It is also the world’s second largest palm oil origin (OEC, 2018b). Refined oil and palm oil Malaysia are the second and third most products exported to China (OEC, 2018b). The Philippines, on the other hand, exports primary industry products such as wood carpentry, and imports refined petroleum, steel bars from China (OEC, 2018a). The following section will introduce each country’s attitude towards BRI through time.. 2.1.1 The Republic of Philippines Benigno Aquino III, President of the Philippines from June 2010 to June 2016, 13. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(31) joins AIIB in late December of 2015 (Reuters, 2015 December 30). Since Rodrigo Duterte’s inauguration in June 2016, he has sealed approximately $25-billion USD in “economic cooperation” investment and loan pledges from China, mainly about infrastructure projects such as railroads, bridges and ports as of July 2017 (Velasco, 2017 July 13; Banal, 2017, June 1). The president also attended the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017 to sign agreements with China (Ranada, 2017 May 15). The Duterte administration proposed the ‘build, build, build’ plan, and sets to embark on 75 projects with a budget of $180 billion USD for infrastructure spending. These projects include. 政治大 Finance of the Philippines, January 23; 2018; Heydarian, 2018 February 28). 立. airports, railways, bus rapid transits, roads and bridges, and seaports (Department of. ‧ 國. 學. 2.1.2 Malaysia. ‧. Najib Razak, the Prime Minister of Malaysia from April 2009 to May 2018, had. y. Nat. openly supported China’s BRI and described it as a ‘game changer’ (Bernama, 2017. er. io. sit. May 13), and has acknowledged the win-win and shared prosperity situation (Bernama, 2017 May 16). Forbes (2017, November 29) reported that Najib's government has. al. n. v i n C several signed agreements with China for megaprojects, such as the East U h e ninfrastructure i h gc. Coast Rail Link (ECRL), which will penetrate the Malaysian Peninsula and connect the Strait of Malacca with the Gulf of Thailand. Moreover, Malaysia and China also came to agreement with building and managing deep-sea port and Maritime Industrial Park near Melaka city (Forbes, 2017, November 29). Najib had been the President of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the largest political party in the current ruling Barisan Nasional coalition, from March 2009 to May 2018. Besides UMNO, Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysia India Congress (MIC) are also members of the coalition. After the general 14. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(32) election in 2013, the multi-racial Democratic Action Party became the country’s largest opposition party. The ECRL project was temporarily put on hold by Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia’s leader as of September 2018, for further studies on the project (Bernama, 2018 August 25).. 2.1.3 The Republic of Singapore Singapore has been a member of AIIB since December 2015 (AIIB, 2018). Its national leader Lee Hsien Loong did not attend the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017,. 政治大 agreements with China (Okutsu, 2018 April 9). The two countries will focus on 立 and it was not until April 2018 did the country officially join BRI and sign cooperation. ‘infrastructure connectivity, financial connectivity, joint collaboration to help other BRI. ‧ 國. 學. countries, and offer services to resolve cross-border commercial disputes’ according to. ‧. Lee Hsien Loong (Cheong, 2018 April 8b). Scholars suggested that Singapore can. y. Nat. promote free-trade between ASEAN and China (Tong & Kong, 2018). Officials also. er. io. sit. said it can raise infrastructure level and cut down financial risks by providing banking and legal support in the region (Pan, 2018, May 22; Fernandez, 2018, Jan 25).. n. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 2.2 Former Belt and Road Initiative Media Studies Fields of English papers about the BRI range from international politics and diplomacy (Hofman, 2016; Nie, 2016, Wang, 2016), regionalism (Clarke, 2016; Episcopo, 2016), China study (Yu, 2016), economy and investment (Yin et al., 2017; Lai & Guo, 2017), and environmental effects (Fu et al., 2015; Tracy et al., 2017). Studies on the BRI in media are mainly in Chinese, and the majority of researchers are from China (see Table 2.1). There have been no Belt and Road media studies by Taiwanese authors as of September 2018. The following categorization are done in 15. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(33) April 2018. If classified by country, BRI related news have been studied in China (Wang, Table 2.2 Introduction and framing analysis result of former BRI research. Researcher and year. Press name. Number of Samples. Sun & Sun. NYT,. 12. (2017). Washington Post (WP), Los Angeles Times 7 Russian. (2017). media and 4. 12 - 18. 立. criticisms after positive discourse, and stigmatize BRI with negative adjectives. Western media compare BRI to Marshall plan. China Threat Theory is. mentioned. 治 82 政2017 May Neutral (73.2%) and positive 大 7 - 22 reports are the main tendency. Russian media mainly report on. 學. Mongolian media. ‧. economic content of BRI instead of culture, technology, environment or society. Mongolia: economy and diplomacy.. y. Nat. sit. Russia and Mongolia both mainly use cooperation, explanation frame. Risk frames are few and there is no confrontation frame.. n. al. er. io Zheng & Li (2016). Frame or standpoint. 2017 May Western media tend to show. ‧ 國. Li & An. Time Frame. NYT, WP. Ch 25. i n U. v. eSeptember n g c h i BRI 2013 to October 2015. is China’s diplomatic strategy (56 percent), Main theme: China’s own interest and need for development. A mixed or neutral point of view (56%), positive (27%) (16%).. Shi (2018). NYT, The Times of India (TOI), The Strait Times (ST). 196. and negative. September ST shows higher attention by 2013 to using positive, various terms to June 2016. describe BRI, and rejects negative comments from other countries. TOI shows Indian government’s cold attitude. NYT subtly presents. 16. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(34) the objection government. Wang, T. (2016). China Daily, NYT and WP. 80. November 2013 – November 2016. from the. US. All focus on the connotation and effect of BRI. Chinese newspapers show more concern about the purpose of BRI and what benefits it can bring to both China and other countries. The author concludes that American newspapers exaggerate China’s leading role in the project and take international relationship and. Vietnam News. 立. 2013 to. Agency. March 2016. AIIB. Number of coverage increases with Vietnam’s decision on participating the Chinese banking institution and welcoming BRI.. September 2013 – September 2016. JP holds a doubtful attitude and warns ASEAN states for China’s real intention. ; ST sees the project as a product of geopolitical. al. Ch. 372. y. sit. 183. n. JP. articles show a positive or active sign towards the. er. The Jakarta Post (JP) and ST. io. Liu (2017). into. ‧. Nat. Han (2017). factors. 學. ‧ 國. Nie (2017). political 治政 consideration. 大 139 October 86% of the. i n U. v. e n g c h i conflict. between China and the US, which can be destructive to the balance and cooperation between ASEAN states.. October. China is described as a country. 2013 – with strong economy which seeks September mutual development, but also 2016 with tough standpoint and enthusiastic about regional dominance. Frames are used interchangeably. The explanation frame (77.42%) is used most often. The cooperation (10.75%), 17. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(35) competition (8.87%) and risk (2.96%) frames are fewer. Economic, political issues are featured the most. Wang, C. (2016). People’s Daily, NYT, The Times. 104. September People’s Daily uses win-win 2013 – cooperation frame. NYT prefers April competition and challenge frame. 2015. The Times uses the action and influence frames.. C., 2016; Wang, T., 2016; Wang, H. Z., 2017), Vietnam (Nie, 2017), Russia (Li & Yan,. 政治大 2016) and Kyrgyzstan (Liu & Liu, 2015), Indonesia (Han, 2017; Liu, 2017), and 立 2015; Li & An, 2017), 22 Arabian countries (Chen & Xu, 2015), Turkey (Bai & Osman,. ‧ 國. 學. Singapore (Han, 2017; Shi, 2018). If categorized by news station, the News York Times (NYT) (Zheng & Li, 2016; Wang, C., 2016; Wang, T., 2016; Bao, 2017; Sun & Sun,. ‧. 2017; Shi, 2018), Washington Post (WP) (Zheng & Li, 2016; Wang, T., 2016; Sun &. sit. y. Nat. Sun, 2017), the Times (Wang, C., 2016), the Los Angeles Times (Sun & Sun, 2017), the. io. er. Strait Times (ST) (Han, 2017; Shi, 2018), the Jakarta Post (JP) (Han, 2017), the Times of India (Shi, 2018), People’s Daily (Wang, C., 2016), China Daily (Wang, T., 2016;. al. n. v i n C h mainly by Chinese Wang, H. Z., 2017) have been examined e n g c h i U researchers.. Chen & Xu (2015), Li & Yan (2015) and Nie (2017) use content analysis to find. the number and coverage of BRI news, and their distribution and attitudes toward the Initiative through time. Some use critical discourse or contrastive analysis to look at the traits, attitudes, power relations behind texts (Wang, T., 2016; Bao, 2017; Shi, 2018), and some focus on reviewing China’s communication strategy in foreign countries (Liu & Liu, 2015; Bai & Osman, 2016; Chen, 2017). Sun & Sun (2017) analyzed 55 pieces from NYT concerning the BRI Forum, and found it uses diverse frames to depict BRI. One of the features is resembling the BRI 18. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(36) as the Marshall Plan, which includes financial aid and loans provided by the US government to help rebuild war-torn European countries. Futhermore, Chinese and foreign officials, scholars are the major news sources. News sources in BRI related news, foreign sources, especially scholars, tend to provide a passive tone (Sun & Sun, 2017). Zheng & Li (2016) collected 25 pieces from NYT and WP from September 2013 to October 2015, and found that more than half of the topics (56 percent) of BRI related news center on China’s diplomatic strategy. China’s own interest and need for development are the main theme, while a few mentioned there is still space for. 政治大 of the news sources are from governmental officials, such as China, the US and India. 立. cooperation between the US and China (Zheng & Li, 2016, p.89). Around 45 percent. Fifty-six percent of the articles have a mixed or neutral point of view, while 27 percent. ‧ 國. 學. are positive and 16 percent are negative towards the BRI (Zheng & Li, 2016, p.93).. ‧. For Chinese media, Lee (2017) uses content analysis to examine 518 articles from. y. Nat. People’s Daily, and concluded that there were no negative reports about the Chinese. er. io. sit. project. Major themes include political achievement and government activities. Chinese government officials are the major sources. This is the result of the newspaper’s party-. al. n. v i n Ccreating controlled nature and the need for environment for the implementation U h e n agbetter i h c. of the BRI. Yao (2018) also found that Chinese media such as People’s Daily portrays a positive image by promoting policies and displaying economic results. Wang, C. (2016) discovered that People’s Daily builds up a win-win news frame based on the expected economic results. On the other hand, NYT establishes a more conflictive frame filled with mixed responses and focuses on competition and challenge. The Times has a less obvious standpoint. For media outside of China and the US, Nie (2017) collected 126 Vietnamese and 13 Chinese news concerning AIIB from Vietnam News Agency from October 2013 to 19. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(37) March 2016. She found that the number of coverage increases with the changing of attitudes and the decision on participating in Chinese banking institutions. Nie (2017) further analyzed the standpoints and found that around 86 percent of the articles show a positive or active sign towards the AIIB. The main topics of news reflect Vietnam’s political interest such as balancing its position among powerful nations, and economic interest such as the need for capital for infrastructure construction. Li & An (2017) gathered news from seven Russian and Mongolian mainstream media from May 15 to May 22, 2017, and concluded that they showed ‘a cooperative and friendly tendency’,. 政治大 news from JP to study how the image of China is depicted, and found that frames are 立. and ‘serving national interests is the fundamental theme’. Liu (2017) collected 372. used interchangeably. The most common frame is the explanation frame (77.4 percent),. ‧ 國. 學. which explains the reason for the event. Cooperation, competition and risk frames are. ‧. fewer. China is also described with a negative image when concerning the SCS dispute.. y. Nat. Han (2017) studied JP and ST, and discovered that the former holds a doubtful attitude. er. io. sit. and warn ASEAN states for China’s real intention; the later sees the project as a product of geopolitical conflict between China and the US, which can be destructive to the. n. al. Ch. balance and cooperation between ASEAN states.. engchi. i n U. v. From the critical discourse perspective, Wang, T. (2016) compared 40 articles from China Daily and 40 from NYT and WP. Based on Fairclough’s (1995) Threedimensional Model, Wang, T. (2016) found that Chinese media use more positive words to describe the BRI and stresses it’s China’s responsibility to improve other countries’ economy. On the other hand, American media tend to choose more negative words to ‘politicize’ and criticize the infeasibility of the project. Bao (2017) collected 20 pieces from NYT and found it imposed a negative image on the BRI by presenting the China Threat Theory and questioning its leadership. 20. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(38) As for the reasons behind these frames, only a few try to explain. Wang, C. (2016) wrote that the differences in the US, the UK and China’s political system, media culture and national interest cause the variety of frames. Liu (2017) points out that the cultural difference, lack of mutual trust, and stereotypes about China contribute to the distribution of frames. To sum up, no BRI in media studies have explained the reasons for various frames and explored the interactions between political and economic frames. Most BRI studies mostly look at the macro level by showing the traits of news flow, and labeling news as. 政治大 media content in foreign presses makes it necessary to look at this issue from a 立. supportive or against the project. The lack of explanation on the factors of deciding. constructionist approach. This study set out by understanding the sociopolitical, media. ‧ 國. 學. ownership background, identification and categorizations of frames, and gives a general. y. Nat. er. io. sit. 2.3 Framing Theory 2.3.1 Overview. ‧. view of BRI representations in Southeastern Asian countries.. al. n. v i n This research uses framingCtheory to explain theUvarious representations of BRI hengchi. due to its function and hypotheses. Framing research is about understanding why news media select certain content, and how much do they select (Tsang, 1999). Goffman (1974) suggests ‘frames are classes or sets of messages’ that people use as primary framework, which can be traced back to past experiences or social and cultural awareness. Gamson et al. (1992) develop the concept of framing as ‘a central organizing principle that holds together and gives coherence and meaning to a diverse array of symbols’. Chung et al. (1996), Tsang & Chung (1997) suggest in the process of constructing meaning, selection and reconstruction of information is inevitable. The 21. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(39) audience are informed ‘what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue’ (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987). Entman (1993) believes that through this subjective cognitive structure, people are able to define problems, understand and attribute reasons for an event, and further offer decisions or solutions. As for how frames interact, Tsang (1999, p.55-62) pointed out that frames compete with each other for the power of interpretation. Several researchers see frames as dependent variables that are influenced by social factors. Gitlin (1980), Gamson and Modigliani (1989), Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) suggest that news frames can reﬂect the prominent political and. 政治大 appear in organization, personal and textual levels. In addition, political, social, 立. social ideologies shared within the society. For Tsang (1998), the result of framing. historical and cultural factors within the society reflect its influence on the content. ‧ 國. 學. selected and reorganized by news organizations and news sources (Tsang, 1998).. ‧. Scheufele (1999) found that frames are influenced by social-structural, organizational. y. Nat. variables, or individual, ideological variables. Shoemaker and Reese (1996, 2014, 2016). er. io. sit. also regard media content as dependent variables and develop the hierarchy of influences model on the basis of media sociology and psychological studies perspective. al. n. v i n C h ranges the level (2014, p.2). The theoretical framework of media analysis as follows: engchi U. individual (e.g., news workers’ value), routine (e.g., journalistic routine), organizational (e.g., organizational policies and structure), social institutional (e.g., transorganizational field such as the audience or public relations), and social systems (e.g., ideological forces within the society) levels. Shoemaker and Reese (2014) point out that in cross-national media studies, considering only the individual or routine level is incapable of explaining the difference of how their media content are affected. Explanation of these cross-national differences requires the consideration of the globally connected political, economic or cultural forces (Shoemaker and Reese, 2016, 22. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(40) p.404). Other scholars who look at frames as dependent variables include Clausen (2003), who develops the domestication model to find out influencing factors of news selection and construction at global, national, organization and professional levels. Clausen (2003, p.110) suggests that the strategies of domestication may vary because of national, organizational or professional factors. This research also studies frame as a dependent variable that can be influenced by economic, political forces at the social institutional level, so the following section will review frames in these fields.. 2.3.2 Economy related frame. 政治大. According to Neuman et al. (1992, p.63), American media often report on the costs. 立. of government programs, and the economic consequences of implementing the project. ‧ 國. 學. or not. Semetko & Valkenburg (2000, p.96) defines the economy consequence frame as the economic influence of ‘an event, problem, or issue’ that can have on ‘an individual,. ‧. group, institution, region, or country’. It has been used in framing analysis of. y. Nat. sit. biotechnology news (Durant et al., 1998), Political television news (Semetko and. n. al. er. io. Valkenburg, 2000; Vreese, 2015), Crisis news (An & Gower, 2009), nuclear waste policy discourse (Kang & Jang, 2013).. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. In the case of BRI news, the author presumes that journalists or commentators can point out the economic consequence of joining or not joining BRI. Positive consequence include creating more jobs, increase exporting numbers or raising the standard of infrastructure. Negative sides can include unbearable debt or too many Chinese products and workers in the country.. 2.3.3 Politics related frame Semetko & Valkenburg (2000, p.95) points out that media use conflict frame to simplify complicated political issue, and this frame ‘emphasizes conflict between 23. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(41) individuals, groups, or institutions’ to attract attention from the audience. Compared to other frames, media also prefer using conﬂict frames in international news (Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; De Vreese, 2005; Hamdy and Gomaa, 2012; as cited in Cozma & Kozman, 2018). Territorial issue can be regarded as one of the major conflicts between China and Southeastern Asian countries. For Southeastern Asian countries, China is a superpower whose economy and military power are hard to match. The discourse of China Threat Theory can be seen in foreign media. It argues that the rise of China in economic and military power will pose a threat to other nations (Al-Rodhan,. 政治大 challenging the international order (Shi, 2016, July 9) or interfere with any other 立. 2007). China, on the hand, has been clarifying by saying it has no intention in. country (Xinhua, 2017 May 14).. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. 2.4 South China Sea Issue. y. Nat. The importance of SCS includes its richness in natural resources such as fisheries. er. io. sit. and oil reserves and its waterway for global trade route (Fisher, 2016, July 14). Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, PRC, ROC (Taiwan), the Philippines, and Vietnam are the. al. n. v i n C hhas been reported constructing claimant countries in SCS. Beijing artificial islands and engchi U. airstrips for military jets (Watkins, February 2016; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, December 2016; The Guardian, December 2016). Photos of reefs before and after reclamation are recorded by Asia Maritime Transparency Institute to show the increasing militarization in the region (Hernandez et al., 2016). US official has concluded that from 2014 to January 2016, China had reclaimed more than 3,000 acres by building artificial islands. On the other hand, for the last 40 years, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and ROC reclaimed a total of 215 acres of land (Perlez & Huetteman, 2016, January 31). 24. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(42) 立. 政治大. ‧ 國. 學. ‧. Figure 2 Claimants of Exclusive Economic Zones by China, the Philippines and Malaysia in the South China Sea (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2017). China: red, Malaysia: Indigo, the Philippines: Pink.. sit. y. Nat. Figure 2 shows the overlapping of territorial claims between China, Malaysia, and. n. al. er. io. the Philippines (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 2017). China’s nine-dash line. v. overlaps with Malaysia and the Philippines’ claimants. The latter two countries’. Ch. engchi. i n U. claimants also overlap with each other. Singapore’s territorial claim does not overlap with China’s.. 2.4.1 The Republic of Philippines’ Claim The Philippines has claimed the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island in Chinese) since its independence in 1946. In May 2009, Philippines stated that the territorial claims made by Vietnam and Malaysia in the joint submission to UN is controversial because they include the Philippines’ territories (DOALOS, August 2009). On January 21, 2013, the Philippines initiated an arbitration process under the U.N. 25. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(43) Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to prove that China’s nine-dash claim that covers some parts of the West Philippine Sea is ‘illegal’. After the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in July 2016, the Philippines government has reaffirmed its stance. It reassures that it will not give up sovereignty while negotiating with China (Sabillo, 2017, May 22). In July 2016, China’s nine-dash lines were denied by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in July 2016 (PCA, 2016), so they were not recognized as Exclusive Economic Zones or territorial waters under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Not only did PCA derecognize China’s claimants, but also. 政治大 economic zone’ by ‘interfering with Philippines fishing and petroleum exploration’, 立 concluded that China ‘violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive. ‘constructing artificial islands’ and ‘failing to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing. ‧ 國. 學. in the zone’ (PCA, 2016). The court sees it as ‘incompatible’ to the economic exclusive. ‧. zones and has no right to claim it, only the right to navigate in the water (PCA, 2016).. y. Nat. Furthermore, PCA found China’s artificial construction is a threat to the local. er. io. arbitration (PCA, 2016).. sit. ecosystem and species, and said China has aggravated the dispute since the start of the. al. n. v i n C h do not accept orUrecognize the court’s findings The PRC and the ROC (Taiwan) engchi. (Phillips, Holmes and Bowcott, 2016, July 12). The court also states that the area within 12 nautical miles (around 22.2 km) of the country’s coastline is under its jurisdiction (Hsu, 2016 September 2). From the Philippines’ perspective, Chinese ship have been spotted appearing in Philippines seas (Branigan & Watts, 2012, May 23; Gomez, 2016, March 21; AP, 2016, September 7; Placido, D., 2017, March 9; Reyes, 2018, May 10; Ongcal, 2018, August 1). However, the Duterte administration is reported to ‘downplay’ the situation by avoiding using critical words in official statement of China’s behavior in SCS 26. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.

(44) (Parameswaran, 2017 May 5), and calling visits of Chinese vessels ‘natural’ (Legaspi, 2017, October 5). On April 28, 2018, Philippine President Duterte offers 60-40 deal of joint exploration with China in SCS (Guzman, 2018, April 28).. 2.4.2 Malaysia’s Claim On May 6, 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam jointly submitted to United Nations to resolve the undefined territorial disputes in the southern part of South China Sea (DOALOS, 2009 May 6). Malaysia has claimed a small number of islands in the. 政治大 officially recognized the Philippines’ claim to the state of Sabah (North Borneo) and 立 Spratlys are within their economic exclusion zones (BBC, 2016 July 12). It has never. criticized that it has no basis under international law (DOALOS, 21 August 2009).. ‧ 國. 學. Critics has described Malaysia’s SCS strategy as ‘playing safe’ under Prime. ‧. Minister Najib Razak (Parameswaran, 2015 March 6), who openly praised China’s BRI. y. Nat. (Xinhua, 2017, August 8). According to Parameswaran (2015, March 6), Malaysia is. er. io. sit. being careful not to worsen its relationship with China in consideration of economic ties with China and regional security. One reason is that China is Malaysia’s largest. al. n. v i n trading partner (Parameswaran, C 2015 March 6). Another h e n g c h i U is that Malaysia owns several. hydrocarbons fields and platforms that are within China’s nine-dashed line, and so far China has not disrupted them (Parameswaran, 2015 March 6). Unlike Vietnam and Philippines’ open complaints against China, Malaysia tends to express its concerns more privately (Parameswaran, 2015 March 6). On June 2, 2015, a Chinese vessel entering disputed water was reported, but no confrontation from the Malaysian government to Beijing (Parameswaran, 2015 June 9). In September 2015, Malaysia and China jointly conducted a military exercise at the Strait of Malacca, which was the first between China and an ASEAN country. According to Malaysian media, 27. DOI:10.6814/THE.NCCU.COMM.006.2019.F05.