Ⅱ. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.4 Remarks
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More refined analyses on the semantic extension of these interrelated senses can be found in Lai (2003b).
In addition, cross-linguistically, Tsao (2002) holds that lau in TH is syntactically similar with ka in TSM (Tsao 2002: 134). That is, their preverbal functions are both derived from the comitative meaning. However, the same situation, as ka found in TSM, also occurs. Though the multiplicity of lau has been examined, the ordering meaning such as (10) is missing.
(10) 這草籃仔你摎 等先行
Lia colame ni LAU ngai kai den xien hang.
this basket you LAU I carry on ASP first leave
‘Please carry this basket for me and leave first.’
2.4 Remarks
Gei in TM exhibits multiple meanings and functions as previous researches have
demonstrated. The mechanism for the semantic extension has attempted to examine the various meanings by means of metonymy, metaphor, and usage-based approach.
However, although the special imperative [gei wo] construction has been examined, including its mechanism and motivation, a complete survey on each phase of its development should be conducted. In particular, the linguistic data that can trigger the emergence of the ordering meaning needs to be identified and elaborated. Moreover,
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regarding the emergence of the evaluative meaning, neither the mechanism nor the motivation has been explored.
With a cross-linguistic comparison, while semantic relatedness of ka in TSM and lau in TH has been investigated, attention has not been paid to their ordering
meanings, i.e., [ka gua] and [lau ngai] constructions. More specifically, researches are not yet available concerning the motivation and mechanism for the emergence of imperative [ka gua] and [lau ngai] constructions.
With the insights evoked by previous studies as well as the issues that remain unexplored, we will, hence, present theoretical foundations grounded upon
mechanisms of grammaticalization, including reanalysis and analogy, metaphor and metonymy, and subjectivity.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Grammaticalization is originated in Meillet (1912), which leads to a broad investigation (Lehmann 1982 [1995, 2002], Hopper and Traugott 1993 [2003], Campbell and Janda 2001, Heine 2003, among others). A general view of
grammaticalization can be seen in Heine’s (2003) study, which mainly focuses on the framework of grammaticalization and the process of grammaticalization. Concerning the framework of grammaticalization, mechanisms and motivations are proposed.
Heine suggests that “the main motivation underlying grammaticalization is to communicate successfully” (Heine 2003: 578). For mechanisms, desemanticization, extension, decategorialization, and erosion are held by Heine (2003: 579). More specifically, desemanticization refers to semantic bleaching; extension indicates uses in new contexts; decategorialization represents the loss in morphosyntactic properties, such as cliticization, affixation; erosion means the loss in phonetic characteristics (Heine 2003: 579).
Grammaticalization can also be taken from a synchronic view, examining the
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language change at a single point of time, as can be seen from the synchronic
parameters of grammaticalization put forward by Lehmann (cf. Lehmann 1985, 2002, Heine el al. 1991). Another line of grammaticalization can be seen in Traugott’s (2010a) study, which compares two opposite viewpoints of grammaticalization, i.e.
reduction versus expansion. Traugott (2010a) argues that while considering
grammaticalization as reduction is convincing, especially in morphosyntactic change, the view of expansion is also crucial and fundamental when concerning semantic change and pragmatic inference. In addition to the stance of grmmaticalization, she also examines mechanisms and motivations of grammaticalization, including analogy, reanalysis and pragmatic inference.
In this section, attention will be drawn on the mechanisms and motivations for grammaticalization. Specifically, mechanisms will be divided into syntactic mechanisms, i.e. analogy and reanalysis, and semantic ones, i.e. metonymy and metaphor (Traugott 2002, 2010b). Furthermore, motivations will be illustrated by means of pragmatic strengthening, including invited-inference and context-induced reinterpretation.
This chapter will be organized as follows. Mechanisms for syntactic change will be discussed in section 3.1. Next, in section 3.2, mechanisms for semantic change will be presented. Then, the motivation for semantic change will be concerned in section
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3.3. Finally, some remarks are given in section 3.4.
3.1 Mechanisms for Syntactic Change
3.1.1 Reanalysis
Let us begin with reanalysis. Harris and Campbell (1995) propose that there are only three mechanisms for syntactic change, including reanalysis, extension, and borrowing. What we concern are reanalysis and extension, or analogy, both of which are internal mechanisms (Hopper and Traugott 2003). Traugott and Dasher (2002) also maintain that “for most of this century, reanalysis has been considered the major factor in morphosyntactic change” (Traugott and Dasher 2002: 27). More specifically, reanalysis is referred to as a mechanism “which changes the underlying structure of a syntactic pattern and which does not involve any modification of its surface
manifestation” (Harris and Campbell 1995: 51). One of the examples in English is try and VERB sequence in I’ll try and contact you, where reanalysis occurs, combining
try and as a single word (Hopper and Traugott 2003: 50). Based on the example,
reanalysis can be characterized as the change on the underlying structure, rather than on surface manifestation.
A developed view of reanalysis can be seen in De Smet’s (2009) study. He deals with the logical flaw in ambiguity and ontological difficulties on the appearance of
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innovative structural representations. The example that can exhibit the issue in question is the development of Dutch kei ‘boulder, peddle’, which can be used as an intensifying prefix, such as keimooi ‘very beautiful’ or keilang ‘very long’. Such a
development can be attributed to the comparative N+A compounds, e.g. bloedrood
‘blood-red’ or beenhard ‘bone-hard.’ The crucial example, keihard ‘rock-hard,’ could
be seen as the context for reanalysis. The following figure visualizes the development of kei.
Figure 3.1 Reanalysis of Dutch kei. (=De Smet 2009: 1729, Figure 2.)
As Figure 3.1 illustrates, rectangles indicate surface sequences; circles mean the more abstract syntactic structures. Full lines refer to the starting point of change, and dotted lines, the innovations. Double arrows mark the relationships of instantiation, and numbering demonstrates different stages (ibid., 1729). More specifically,
concerning the issue that De Smet (2009) raises, that is, the logical flaw in ambiguity
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and ontological difficulties on the appearance of innovative structural representations, it seems difficult to explain how language users could apply N+A compounds to Pref+A structure. Thus, there could be more basic mechanisms prior to the
application of reanalysis (De Smet 2009: 1729-1730).
To underline the notion of reanalysis, De Smet further suggests three basic mechanisms, involving categorial incursion, gradual category-internal change, and automation. One of the cases he proposes to exemplify the analysis is that worth is developed from a transitive to an intransitive use, and worthwhile is changed from an intransitive to a transitive use (De Smet 2009: 1732ff). Consider the following examples:
(1) a. A touchdown is worth six points. (=De Smet 2009: 1732, (1)) b. The outcome had been worth the long battle.
(2) a. The restaurant was crook and therefore not worth visiting. (=ibid. 1732 (2)) b. Now was not this heroic lover worth running after?
(3) a. With anthems like that it’s worth emigrating isn’t it. (=ibid. 1733 (3)) b. However, I think it is worth issuing a word of warning about unusual
vegetables.
In (1a-b), they are transitive structures due to that worth should select a subject and an object; that is, the deletion of object can cause ungrammaticality. In (2a-b), the
syntactic structure is changed in that the object of worth turns into a gerund clause,
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which can be represented as an adjectival predicate; however, worth is still transitive because it requires an object. Crucial examples are in (3a-b), which can be interpreted as intransitive since syntactically worth behaves like other intransitive adjectives such as easy in it hadn’t been easy breaking the news to Nicole (De Smet 2009: 1732), and semantically the gerund clause following worth acts as “a positive value” by itself, rather than “an exchange value for a given subject” (De Smet 2009: 1732). Then, consider the examples of worthwhile:
(4) a. all the work has been worthwhile. (=De Smet 2009: 1733 (4a-b)) b. Hardly any novel writing, or reading, seemed to him worth while.
(5) a. it is certainly worthwhile stopping off on the way. (=ibid. 1733 (5a-b)) b. Sir William does not think it worth while making another application.
(6) a. no more than a shadow too vain and futile to be worth while watching as it passed. (=ibid: 1733 (6a-b))
b. there is much that is worthwhile visiting.
Worthwhile is originally an intransitive adjective, as (4a-b) indicates. In addition, it
can be followed by extraposed gerund clauses as (5a-b) shows. What attracts our attention are examples in (6a-b), whose subject (a shadow; that) “simultaneously functioning as the missing object of the gerund clause following the adjective” (De Smet 2009: 1733). Such a construction can be considered as a transitive construction.
Let us begin to introduce these three mechanisms. First, categorial incursion refers
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to that one construction extends to another one which already exists. Such a mechanism can clarify the notion of ambiguity as the interpretation to an existing model, as the following figure shows. In figure 3.2, step 1 manifests the interaction between one construction and the other already existing construction, as the circle drawn by dotted lines, and then step 2 demonstrates the appearance of new meaning independent from the sources, as the rectangle drawn by dotted lines.
Figure 3.2 Categorial incursion. (=De Smet 2009: 1749, Figure 7.)
Categorial incursion can be well demonstrated by the change of worth and worthwhile.
The transition from transitive worth to intransitive one is not random but is the analogical extension to the already existing construction, i.e. worthwhile. This can also explain why worth is able to become intransitive like worthwhile, while other adjectives are not.
The second mechanism is called gradual category-internal change, defined as that
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“a construction undergoes minor semantic change which manifest themselves in new
instances, but not necessary in a new category” (ibid., 1749), as the following figure illustrates. There are two steps for the process. The first step is the expansion of the syntactic structure, denoted by the extended dotted circle, thereby the meaning extension becoming possible. The second one is the result of actualization,
symbolized by the dotted rectangle, thereby the new meaning being established, free from the source construction.
Figure 3.3 Category-internal change. (=De Smet 2009: 1749, Figure 8.)
The instance of the application of such a mechanism can be held by the rise of intransitive worth. The emergence of intransitive worth can be seen as a process, whereby the transitive meaning of worth is weakened, and its existing categorial boundary is extended, allowing worth to receive the effects of categorial incursion from worthwhile.
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The third mechanism is automation, referring to the process whereby “a less schematic construction gradually becomes alienated from its more schematic parent construction” (ibid., 1750). Such a mechanism can support the phenomenon of language use, which results in a specific construction becoming a chunk, independent from the original construction. As the following figure shows, the instantiations can be connected by the arrowless dotted lines, which means that the link is weakened. As the construction is alienated, it can operate automatically and independently.
Furthermore, such a process is likely to occur in different levels, including from a more schematic to less schematic connection or from a schematic to surface one.
Figure 3.4 Automation. (=De Smet 2009: 1750, Figure 9.)
Automation can be applied to account for the difference between intransitive worth and other intransitive adjectives. Even though worth behaves like an intransitive
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adjective, some constraints, such as fronting of the gerund clause, are imposed.
Compare the following examples:
(7) a. With anthems like that it’s worth emigrating isn’t it. (=De Smet 2009: 1733 (3a))
b. *emigrating is worth with anthems like that, isn’t it. (see ibid. 1733) (8) a. It’s easy imagining a scenario.
b. Imagining a scenario is easy.
From the above examples, it is represented that although worth can be characterized as intransitive, it can neither be originated from its original function, nor be the same as other ordinary intransitive adjectives; in other words, the construction of
intransitive worth has developed through the mechanism of automation.
In addition to ambiguity for reanalysis, Harris (2005) maintains that causes of reanalysis can involve not only ambiguous readings but also the provision of stylistic variety or greater expressiveness. The latter cause, i.e. the provision of stylistic variety or greater expressiveness, indicates that when reanalysis appears, the innovative structure can co-exist with, rather than replace, the source structure. Take unda in Georgian as an example. The innovative modal usage of unda in mas unda (rom) gaak’etos ‘S/he wants to do it.’ exists side by side with the source ‘want’ usage as in
man unda gaak’etos ‘S/he should do it’.
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After the demonstration on reanalysis, the other significant mechanism for syntactic change, i.e. analogy, will be addressed in this section. In Meillet’s (1912) study, analogy is seen as the model of proportion, applied at the morphological level, such as singular-plural alternation, as in (9).
(9) cat: cats = child: X (= Hopper and Traugott 2003: 64, (24)) X = childs1
In addition to the morphological level, the notion of analogy extends to the structural or semantic changes by means of similarity, applying on the paradigmatic axis (cf.
Fisher 2007; Hopper and Traugott 2003, Traugott 2010). The example for the
application of analogy can be seen in “going construction” (Fischer 2010: 285) as (10) indicates.
(10) a. I am going (to the market) to buy some fish. (=Fischer 2010: 285(4)) b. I am going to marry (tomorrow).
1 Such an analogical process whereby the result is different from adults’ usage, i.e. children, can usually be discovered at the early stage of children’s language acquisition.
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As the above examples indicate, verbs that co-occur with be going to can be changed from concrete movement verbs, such as (10a) and (10b), to more mental ones, such as (10c). Next, the extension can contribute the subject to be inanimate, as in (10d).
Cases in (10e) and (10f) further support that be going to has turned into future tense since the appearance of two concessive go is only allowed when the first one is the auxiliary. Thus, (10g) is not acceptable.
The difference between reanalysis and analogy can be demonstrated as in Hopper and Traugott’s (2003: 39) study, which states that “[i]n reanalysis, the grammatical syntactic and morphological – and semantic properties of forms are modified….
Analogy…modifies surface manifestations and…does not effect rule change.”2 While their difference exists, they are able to interact to deal with grammaticalization. Such an interaction can be exemplified by the development of be going to from directional expression to future representation, as the following figure exhibits.
2 Different from Traugott’s viewpoint, Fischer (2007, 2008) argues that analogy can involve reanalysis.
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Figure 3.5 Schema of development of auxiliary be going to (=Hopper and
Trasugott 2003: Figure 3.2)
As the figure illustrates, be going to at stage Ⅱ is changed from a progressive directional marker to a tense marker, demonstrating a constituency change via reanalysis. Then, at stage Ⅲ, analogy is applied due to the extension from an active verb, i.e. visit, to a stative one, i.e. like. Finally, at stage Ⅳ, reanalysis is exerted again, turning be going to into gonna whereby phonological contraction occurs. Thus, from the observation of the development of be going to, reanalysis is applied on the underlying structure, while analogy is manifested on the surface structure.
In this section, we have already presented mechanisms for syntactic change, i.e.
reanalysis and analogy. Specifically, we have sketched how reanalysis applies to
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grammaticalization, and more importantly, examined three basic mechanisms that underlie the notion of reanalysis. These three more basic mechanisms will be undertaken for our research.
3.2 Mechanisms for Semantic Change
Metaphor and metonymy are generally regarded as mutually related concepts and mechanisms to account for not only human conceptualization, but also meaning change (Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer 1991). In this section, a general idea of metaphor and metonymy will be laid out, and further elaboration on how they interact with grammaticalization will be presented.
3.2.1 Metaphorization
Metaphor is generally defined as the understanding of one thing by means of another, or the transfer from one concrete meaning to more abstract one. The
understanding or the transfer can refer to the mappings between conceptual domains, i.e. from concrete sources to abstract concepts (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Heine, et al.
1991; Croft and Cruse 2004). For example, our sensorimotor domains can be mapped to the subjective experience domain (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 45ff), such as up in I’m feeling up today, which represents “feeling happy and energetic and having an
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upright posture,” applying the primary metaphor, HAPPY IS UP (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 50).
With the view of dynamic dimension, metaphor can be viewed as a dynamic process in meaning change, i.e., metaphorization, which is claimed as a mechanism for semantic change (Traugott and Dasher 2002). Moreover, metaphoric processes are argued to be the motivation for early grammaticalization (Hopper and Traugott 2003:
85). As Hopper and Traugott (2003) state, the development of spatials into temporals can be accounted for by the metaphor, TIME IS SPACE, illustrated by be going to, in the years ahead, both of which denote future tense.
3.2.2 Metonymization
From a traditional view, metonymy is merely a way that we apply the name of something to signify the other, as the following definition indicates: “metonymy is a figure of speech in which the name of one thing is used in place of that of another associated with or suggested by it” (Webster’s New World Dictionary Third College Edition, S.V. “metonymy” p.854). However, from the cognitive viewpoint, metonymy not only reveals language use, but also fundamentally reflects human cognitive processes. Kövecses and Radden (1998: 39) indicate that “metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another
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conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain, or [idealized cognitive model]
ICM.” In addition, Kövecses and Radden propose several ICMs3, among which we adopt Causation ICM to account for semantic extensions in our study. Causation ICM is defined as “[w]hen one thing or event causes another, we have a cause-and-effect type of relationship” (Kövecses and Radden 1998: 56). Two possible relationships can be produced; that is, CAUSE FOR EFFECT or EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymies.
The following examples illustrate these two kinds of metonymies, respectively:
(11) healthy complexion
(12) sad book
The realization of (11), healthy complexion, relies on the fact that a better health condition can bring out a healthier complexion. On the other hand, in (12), it is the book that can make the reader feel sad; in other words, the book is the cause that leads to the effect of sadness.
More importantly, compared with metaphor, as some researchers have argued, metonymy is a more basic and fundamental phenomenon to language and cognition (cf. Barcelena 2000). In this regard, semantic changes can occur by metonymization
3 Two categories of ICMs are proposed. One is Whole ICM and its parts, including Thing-and-part ICM, Scale ICM, Constitution ICM, Complex event ICM, Category-and-member ICM,
Category-and-property ICM, and the other is Parts of an ICM, including Action ICM, Perception ICM, Causation ICM, Production ICM, Control ICM, Possession ICM, Containment ICM, Assorted ICMs involving indeterminate relationships, Sign and reference ICMs.
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as the following example illustrates (cf. Stern 1968:376):
(13) concern (n.): interest (in some matter) > (the) matter that concerns
The example illustrates a metonymic process from a mental state to its object or cause.
Or, for other examples, consider the following semantic change:
(14) England for Great Britain (Kövecses and Radden 1998: 50)
The metonymic principle of a part-whole relationship can contribute to such a kind of semantic change whereby the notion of PART entails the notion of WHOLE. In addition, R-heuristic can be seen as the mechanism that accounts for the part-whole metonymy; that is, “Say no more than you must, and mean more thereby” (Levinson 1983: 146).4 Likewise, compared to metaphor, metonymy is argued to play a more important role in the change of syntactic constituents (Hopper and Traugott 2003:
88ff).
More importantly, semantic mechanisms, i.e. metaphor and metonymy, and
syntactic mechanisms, i.e. analogy and reanalysis, are mutually related, as Hopper and Traugott put.
4 The R(elevance)-heuristic is also called the Principle of Informativeness (Levinson 1983: 146), which is inspired by Grince’s Quantity Maxim. Not only in writing but also in speech can we find the application of R-heuristic.
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[M]etonymic and metaphorical inferencing are complementary, not mutually exclusive, processes at the pragmatic level that result from the dual
mechanisms of reanalysis linked with the cognitive process of metonymy, and analogy linked with the cognitive process of metaphor (Hopper and Traugott 2003: 93).
The following figure represents the relation between semantic and syntactic mechanisms.
Figure 3.6 Revised Schema of development of auxiliary be going to (=Hopper
and Trasugott 2003: Figure 4.1)
In figure 3.6, the syntactic reanalysis occurs on the syntagmatic axis, followed by the
In figure 3.6, the syntactic reanalysis occurs on the syntagmatic axis, followed by the