IV. Research Design
2. Research Method
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2. Research Method
This research falls into descriptive category. I would use qualitative discourse analysis and case studies as the research method. Since discourse analysis considering all texts, regardless of written or oral forms, as data is believed to be justified for my research questions. Also, case studies are of great support since they show sufficient and convincing evidence to assess my propositions (as mentioned above).
More specifically, regarding discourse analysis, I would study the speeches of Vietnamese leaders, national defense papers, books/ articles from experts and professionals, conversations/
talks’ memos from former officials, critical national/international conferences/ meetings’ minutes, news from mainstream newspapers, etc. Due to the Vietnamese political system (communism), homogeneity characteristics exist in governmental sources, mainstream media as well as local public opinion. Therefore, it is stated that my thesis focuses on official viewpoint of Vietnam.
Regarding case studies, I would consider two cases. The first one concerns the Mekong River. Given different benefits, involved ASEAN countries hold various attitudes and perform diverse levels of involvement in the regional community when it comes to Mekong cooperation.
Examining the part of Vietnam under this case would help to understand its standpoints and values among ASEAN.
The second one, and probably the most crucial one, is about South China Sea disputes.
From this case study, I could analyze both shifting perspective and role of Vietnam in ASEAN, based on Vietnam’s reactions and actions. Last but not least, from comparing these two cases, I could draw some conclusions regarding the changing importance of ASEAN to Vietnam as well as the significance of Vietnam in this regional association.
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CHAPTER 2.
THE CHANGING PERSPECTIVE OF VIETNAM ON ASEAN
This chapter will study the Vietnam-ASEAN relations in detail. In order to assess the Vietnam’s perception on ASEAN, two cases of the Mekong River and the South China Sea disputes will be taken into consideration. More specifically, Hanoi’s changing perspective will be analyzed and compared through the way ASEAN deals with these two matters.
I. The case of the Mekong River
Background
Being the longest river in the Southeast Asia (SEA) with the length of 4,350 km, Mekong River holds a crucial position in this area (MRC, 2020). The river originates from the Qinghai province of China. After that, it flows through five SEA countries Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Finally, it drains into the South China Sea south of Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Each place names the river in their own languages. It is known as Lancang Jiang (Turbulent River) in China; Mae Nam Khong (Mother Kong River) in Thailand, Myanmar and Laos; Tonle Sap River (Great Waters) in Cambodia and Sông Cửu Long (Nine Dragons River) in Vietnam. The river can be divided into two parts: the Upper Mekong Basin and the Lower Mekong Basin. In Lower Mekong Basin, the part of the river flowing from Phnom Penh, Cambodia to Vietnam is called Mekong Delta in which it develops into a complex of delta system before entering the South China Sea.
According to Cosslett T. and Cosslett P. (2018), Mekong Delta is the source of food security for basin’s habitants. It is considered as the “rice bowl” for southern Vietnamese with extensive rice production. The floods bring with them deposition of sediments to enrich the lands, alter the soil nutrient loss caused by natural erosion, which contributes to the development of agriculture in the Mekong Delta. Also, the flow of river provides a huge amount of fish and spawn.
However, those benefits are limited by the water amount in dry seasons. Especially, it is closely linked to the development of hydropower dams on the mainstream river (Johnson K. & Wongcha-um, 2020) (See Figure 1). On one hand, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
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(2011) argues that dams could serve as reservoir re-distributing water flow that saved from wet seasons. On the other hand, it is contended that building dams establishes barriers to fish migration and therefore leads to the loss of fish populations (Pittock, 2019).
Figure 1
Mekong mainstream dams
Note. From Amid hydropower boom, Laos streams ahead on latest Mekong dam, by Johnson
& Wongcha-um, 2020 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mekong-river-dam/amid-hydropower-boom-laos-streams-ahead-on-latest-mekong-dam-idUSKBN2010B8). In the public domain.
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China is the earliest country to start dam-building activities on the Mekong River. Back in 1990s when China built its first dams on upstream Mekong river, many predicted that it would use the dams to hold back water from flowing to downstream countries, says Eyler & Weatherby (2020). Similarly, former Chairman of Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry- Pham Chi Lan supposes that China has used its dams on the upper Mekong River as political tools to dominate downstream nations, including Vietnam (Viet & Minh, 2019). Until now, China has finished and operated 11 mega dams. According to Beech (2019), the water level of Mekong River has completely replied on the water China released from its dams. Moreover, a study from Eyes on Earth published in April 2020 shows that during the period of 1992-2019, China intended to keep water several times more than the amount they released over the past 30 years (Eyler &
Weatherby, 2020). As a result, downstream countries have observed an increase in droughts;
especially Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam are suffering from the most serious drought ever. The study further suggests that out of ten most critical droughts of the lower Mekong River, eight have happened since China began its first dam’s construction.
In addition to dams built in upper Mekong basin by China, downstream nations also participate in constructing dams. According to International Rivers (2013), in the middle of 2000s, there is a plan of 11 huge mainstream hydropower projects in Lower Mekong Basin, among those are nine in Laos and the other two in Cambodia. The investors for those projects are Chinese, Thai, Malaysia and Vietnamese companies. Furthermore, there are also 120 tributary dams to be constructed by 2040. Among those Mekong downstream countries, Laos accounts for the highest number of dams projects that are planned to be built in its region. Until now, Laos has proposed the sixth dam Sanakham. The other five projects constructed in the Mekong mainstream are Xayaburi, Don Sahong, Pak Beng, Pak Lay and Luang Prabang (Xayaburi and Don Sahong have been operated since November 2019 and January 2020 respectively). It is explained that Laos harbours the dream of becoming “battery of Asia” (Ferrie, 2010, para. 2; Kang, 2018, para. 1).
Especially, among public constructors and operators of dams in Laos, around half of them are linked to Chinese companies. Simply put, China has massively funded those projects of Laos.
As a further note, the re-distribution of water among seasons depends much on the countries with hydropower dams. In other words, the countries in lower parts of river would not be beneficial if the upper basin nations release little water, or decide not to do so. Water scarcity amid dry season threatens food security in terms of fish species and rice production. Farmers do
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not have enough water to irrigate, as well as degraded soils are challenging for rice growth.
Although one could argue that water shortage and the irregular shifts among seasons are due to climate change, it could not be denied the building of upstream dams of Laos and China is considered “as an accomplice” (The New Lens, 2020, para. 10). It also raises a big concern over regional ecology and economy, plus basin residents’ lives. In Vietnam, where 20 percent of 96 million people live in the Mekong Delta, the negative impacts of hydropower dams seem obvious (Giao duc, 2018).
In particular, the Mekong Delta accounts for more than half of rice and fruit production of Vietnam. If all the proposed dams are completed in the Lower Mekong Basin, the loss of sediment for the downstream countries could be up to 94% (Victor, 2018). By saying that, the nutrients needed to nurture soils for farming and the fish amounts for fishing would significantly decrease.
As a consequences of building 11 large dams on lower Mekong mainstream, by 2030, the loss of fish amount would fail into 550.000- 880.000 tons, which is 26% to 42% decrease compared to 2000, as reported by International Centre for Environmental Management (ICEM) (Orr et al., 2019). Not only food security (rice and fruit volume, fishery production, etc.) is threatened, the environmental degration also comes into reality. Without the flow of water bringing the deposition of sediments to downstream basin, Vietnam has seen riverside erosion increasing, which causes house collapse and puts citizens into emergency state (The New Lens, 2020).
In pursuit of solving Mekong River issues, riparian countries create multiple cooperative frameworks within ASEAN members as well as with external players. Under ASEAN-based platforms, the paper will mention ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) and Mekong River Commission (MRC). In terms of non-ASEAN organizations, there are four institutes to be discussed Lancang- Mekong Cooperation (LMC), Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) and Mekong-Japan Summit (MJS) (See Table 1). Despite those attempts from riverine nations, no platform has proved to be successful in managing the cooperation among related parties for sustainable development of the Mekong River. The justifications of those failures can be attributed to five factors: (1) little interests from member countries, (2) membership issues, (3) improper objectives of the organizations, (4) a lack of restraint-mechanisms and (5) asymmetric influences distributed among member countries.
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Table 1
Some important Mekong River cooperation frameworks
ASEAN-based platforms Non-ASEAN platforms
AMBDC MRC LMC GMS LMI MJS
10 ASEAN members Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam
China Laos Laos Laos Laos Laos
Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Thailand Thailand Thailand Thailand Thailand
Myanmar Myanmar Myanmar Myanmar
China China US Japan
Little enthusiasm from member countries contributes to unsuccessful operation of the platforms. Take AMBDC for example, it was found in 1996 with 10 ASEAN members and China in order to foster better regional economic and social cooperation. Over the period of more than two decades, this institute had made little progress in its projects (Ho & Pitakdumrongkit, 2019).
One evidence is the incomplete Singapore-Kunming Rail Link plan which was set up more than twenty years ago. Since AMBDC also includes non-Mekong River nations, it is challenging to achieve the same level of concerns on the river’s development within the organization. By saying that, it is unlikely for them to invest their times into the Mekong River case.
The second factor affecting the effectiveness of those institutes is incomplete memberships, especially the lack of one important player- China. In particular, MRC was established in 1995 with four Mekong downstream nations: Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. This institution aims at sustainable management of water resources as well as ecological balance of the river by facilitating dialogue among its members, says MRC (2020). According to Goichot- a World Wide Fund Greater Mekong Program’s expert, the most obvious problem of MRC lies at its membership:
only four out of six Mekong riparian countries join as official members (Wong, 2018). With China
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only agrees to be a dialogue partner of MRC, the institution fails to have any effects on China’s water management as well as dams building projects (Hensengerth, 2009).
Having incomplete objectives also obstructs the effective operation of the organizations.
AMBDC focuses on economic growth as well as social development in pursuit of better integration at Lower Mekong Basin, yet sustainable water use and water security of Mekong River are not taken into much consideration. In the same vein, GMS’s objectives exclude sustainable development of water resources in Mekong River, as mentioned by Cosslett T. & Cosslett P. (2018).
Another justification for the decreasing importance of Mekong multilateral platforms is their shortage of restraint mechanism. Although MRC concerns over the sustainability of Mekong River system and ecology environment, the organization does not have sufficient power to stop its members from building hydropower dams on the mainstream flow. The case of building Xayaburi dam in Laos is an instance. Without completing the Procedure of Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA)- a mandatory process for all mainstream projects for all MRC members, and ignoring the objections from Vietnam and Cambodia, Laos decided to complete the Xayaburi dam at all costs, reports Choonhavan (2014). As such, MRC has shown its incapability of consulting and intervening when one member unilaterally proceeds with dam construction.
The last but never the least reason behind the incapability of Mekong River-related frameworks in dealing with the issues is the asymmetric influences distributed among member countries. Simply put, the nation with highest power decides the operational direction of the organizations. With six official members, LMC is a more complete platform than MRC (with four countries). This mechanism was initiated in 2014 by China, and later was officially launched in 2016 (LMC, 2017). Although the strategic value of LMC is a full attendance of all riverine countries, it was far from a fair platform for all members (Son, 2017). LMC, indeed, is a Beijing-led institution, comment Cosslett T. & Cosslett P. (2018). Particularly, Cosslett T. & Cosslett P.
(2018) point out that under LMC, hydropower construction in China was never brought into discussion. China, as the leader of LMC, has kept a silent attitude toward the building and operation of its dams on Mekong mainstream flow, which causes significant criticisms from various NGOs and environmental organizations. As a result, LMC are incapable of improving the Mekong River situations given the fact that it is mainly represented intentions and plans of China.
It is a similar concern of the LMI and MJS with major influences from US and Japan respectively. LMI started in 2009 by the US and other five Mekong riverine countries. Its goals
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are to enhance the regional economic growth of five partner countries as well as address transborder political challenges (LMI, 2020). According to Cosslett T. & Cosslett P. (2018), LMI significantly depends on US’s interest in the Lower Mekong Basin, and therefore, does not guarantee a sustainable operation when the foreign policy of US in Southeast Asia changes.
Likewise, Popovic (2019) notices that since Trump administration, US investment into ASEAN has been cut considerably. He further worries that it is difficult to predict whether in future US will continue to invest into LMI comparing to the time of Obama’s presidency. In regard to MJS, it was first held in 2009 with the participation of all five Mekong riparian nations and Japan as the host. One question over the operation of MJS is whether Japan would recalculate its investments in the Mekong region in future, say Cosslett T. & Cosslett P. (2018).
Vietnam’s increasing concerns over the Mekong River challenges
Vietnam has become more and more concerned about the issues of Mekong River. An obvious explanation is that Vietnam is a downstream country that “feels vulnerable to dam-building activities” of upstream nations which were extended along the time (Hensengerth, 2008, p.101). Not only dams affect the fish stocks, the shifts between dry-wet seasons but they also have influences on the sediments and water amount that are beneficial for farming. The severe drought in 2016 proved that fear of Vietnam. During the dry season of that year, Vietnam experienced the worst drought ever in its history. The water scarcity plus the saltwater intrusion is too serious that more than 600,000 people do not have water to drink, not to mention water shortage for irrigation.
As a result, the drought placed a great pressure on the rice production of Vietnam where farmers were reported to lost 800,000 tons of rice which was equivalent to $237 million US dollars (Huu, 2020). Experts have criticized the El Nino phenomenon and Chinese dams for damaging the Mekong Delta.
Furthermore, it is not until the Xayaburi dam project of Laos in 2012 that Vietnam officially vocal about the Mekong River problem “at regional fora or even in bilateral settings” (To & Le, 2019, p. 403). As the first mainstream dam project of a downstream nation, the construction of Xayaburi undoubtedly brought fears in terms of its negative effects on the environment and economic loss to the Mekong Delta communities, among them are Vietnamese farmers. Together with the time, when the ambitions of building hydropower dams from other countries increase, Hanoi have turned to be increasingly aware of the situation and therefore, publicized its concerns.
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Taking more consideration of the Mekong River issues means that Hanoi puts more efforts into finding the solutions. Among the possible ways to settle Mekong problems, however, ASEAN-led platforms are losing its significance to Vietnam. According to Giao Duc News (2018), Vietnam regconizes ASEAN’s efforts in tackling the Mekong River issues, yet also perceives that those attempts are not sufficient: “Although ASEAN did make some efforts to uphold water security in the Mekong subregion, those solutions have not solved the challenges in reality” (para.
2). The reasons of Vietnam’s disappointment are the discrepancy between Hanoi’s expectations on the functions of ASEAN platforms and the operation of those frameworks in reality, as well as its own assessments of dam-building projects.
Vietnam’s expectations for ASEAN
Vietnam considers ASEAN as an important platform in its foreign policy, especially when ASEAN offers the AMBDC in pursuit of solving Mekong-related issues. Compared to other cooperative frameworks in Mekong River concerns, AMBDC provides VN with the access to a full attendance of all riparian countries as well as China. The full involvement of Mekong riverside nations is considered enormously essential, especially when the issues of dam construction affect all the concerned parties. One may argue that consideration should be given to dams in the lower basin since they have huge potential of hydropower. Yet Chinese dams possess great threats to downstream countries given their negative effect on fish stocks, farming and degradation of environment. As such, having all related parties in one place, AMBDC brings hope to Hanoi in order to settle the Mekong River challenges. As in line with AMBDC’s objectives, economic development through regional connectivity and improved infrastructure is one of the major national interests of Vietnam.
Apart from AMBDC, MRC is listed here as an ASEAN-based platform due to its memberships of four ASEAN countries. Vietnam also places a high expectation over the function of the MRC. It is the only platform among multilateral attempts that is “a treaty-based intergovernmental cooperation”, with the 1995 Mekong Agreement signed in Thailand (Hensengerth, 2009, p. 338; To & Le, 2019, p. 396). One remarkable point is that the MRC emphasizes on the sustainable management of water resources and ecological balance where dam construction is examined in a critical light. As the lowest-lying nation in the Mekong flow, Vietnam has an urgent intention of preventing other countries from building more mainstream
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dams which surely creates negative impacts on the nation. By saying so, Hanoi expects that the MRC could affect the construction of dams from other members.
ASEAN’s work in reality
However, the reality proved the opposite way. Despite the full membership of Mekong
However, the reality proved the opposite way. Despite the full membership of Mekong