CHAPTER 2- THE CHANGING PERSPECTIVE OF VIETNAM ON ASEAN
III. Evaluations of both cases
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SCS disputes were affected by China’s growing influence in the region. Therefore, involved parties had to work with other big countries for better solutions (Nguyen Q., 2020).
In essence, Vietnam has focused on its military buildup with supports from Russia, US and Japan. Manyin (2018) mentions that Vietnam has actively brought six Kilo submarines and two Gepard frigates from Russia since 2009. Those procurements started a new page in the history of Vietnam’s navy, says Hoang T. & Hoang P. (2017). Moreover, Hanoi has deepened its military cooperation and information sharing with Japan. Manyin (2018) states that before the 2014 oil rig incident (Hai Yang Shi You 981 crisis), it is reported that Hanoi proposed a trilateral security dialogue with Japan and US. Also, Hanoi allowed the USS John S.McCain (a US frigate) to dock at the Danang port, on the occasion of the 15th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations between Vietnam and the US in August 2010 (Taylor, 2010). One could suspect whether those military enhancements related to the SCS disputes, given Vietnam’s commitment to peaceful solutions.
Answering this question, Deputy Minister of National Defense of Vietnam, affirmed the connection between military expansion and peaceful means in the SCS challenges. He also stated that Vietnam did not desire armed conflicts or any violent acts with other nations, yet the country
“can’t negotiate with bare hands”, and had to defend itself in case of further escalation (Shoji 2012, p. 12).
III. Evaluations of both cases
One similarity in both cases was that Hanoi at first placed high expectations on ASEAN for settling the issues of the Mekong River and the SCS. The sameness in objectives as well as dispute-solving mechanism through peaceful solutions between ASEAN and Vietnam justified for its expectations on the 10-member regional framework. However, ASEAN proved the ineffectiveness in both circumstances. The shortage of mutual interests from members made the AMBDC proceed with little achievement while a wide degree of concerns hindered ASEAN from achieving a common voice. Also, in both cases, ASEAN lacked restraint mechanism to penetrate the violated parties. In the Mekong River conflicts, the MRC did not have sufficient power to stop the dam building projects of its member. In the same vein, ASEAN was struggling to manage the SCS problems without any legal-binding documents to control offensive actions of involved
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parties. Obviously, Hanoi felt disappointed about ASEAN in both situations since its expectations and ASEAN’s functions in reality did not match.
Furthermore, the two cases shared a common ground of China’s involvement and its preferred approach to solve the problems. In order to tackle both issues, Beijing insisted on bilateral negotiations with the beliefs of fully controlling the circumstances over other weaker concerned parties given its economic advantages and military capabilities. In regard to the Mekong River, China denied the membership of the MRC- one of the ASEAN-based institute, because it did not want to be restrained by any organizational rules. Instead, it created its own platform with the LMC and acted as if it agreed to cooperate with riverine nations in terms of economic growth and social development for the sub-regional country. Similarly, in the SCS case, Beijing did not favor interventions by any multilateral frameworks, neither UNCLOS 1982 nor PCA. It was also reluctant to proceed with the CoC and always preferred a non-binding agreement in order not to be obstructed by any institute’s law. In contrast, Vietnam understood that it could not deal with China on an equal level providing the fact that it was a smaller country. Therefore, multidirectional solutions were better approach for Hanoi in both situations. It explained the country’s simultaneous approach of utilizing multilateral platforms such as ASEAN and keeping close ties with other great powers.
Yet these two situations were different to some extent. While the Mekong River issues were related with economic and social factors, the South China Sea disputes referred to more political elements. As in line with one of the most essential national interests of Vietnam as
“safeguarding the country’s sovereignty” (MOFA, 2015), the nation has displayed a firm attitude and placed more efforts into the SCS challenges. One could also support that Hanoi would gain more advantages in the situation of the SCS disputes compared to the case of the Mekong River, given its geographic disadvantages of a downstream country.
After examining two cases of the Mekong River issues and the SCS disputes, it could be concluded that the proposition 1 is reliable: “From the 2000s, the significance of ASEAN to Vietnam seems to be diminishing”. Given the changes in Vietnam’s attitude toward ASEAN, whether Vietnam’s role in the organization has changed over the course of time will be the puzzle this paper tries to figure out in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3.
THE CHANGING ROLE OF VIETNAM IN ASEAN
This chapter provides the evaluation of Vietnam’s role in ASEAN. It will include the Vietnamese official statements and the reports of local media about Vietnam’s performance in ASEAN since 2000, pertaining to two cases of the Mekong River and the SCS. Also, assessment from external media and academic journals will be taken into consideration for a complete picture.
Before examining whether the role of Vietnam in ASEAN has become more and more active, it is of great importance to look back upon the history of Vietnam’s involvement in the regional institution. By understanding the motives behind Vietnam’s membership of ASEAN, it would be clearer why Hanoi has played an eager role or vice versa.
I. Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN
The idea of getting involved in ASEAN was firstly mentioned by the Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet in 1991 and the country was given the observer status one year later. It officially became an ASEAN member in July 1995. There were several justifications for the membership of Vietnam in ASEAN, mainly due to economic benefits and a quest for identity. In the first ten years after the national reunification (1975-1985), Vietnam’s economy deteriorated so dramatically that the living standards of citizens were tremendously affected. Furthermore, the military conflicts with Cambodia and China placed enormous strains on Vietnam’s economy in the mid-1980s. With the centrally-planned economy and main aids coming from Soviet Union, Vietnam had little economic exchange with other nations. The end of its Soviet Union ally pushed Vietnam to change its foreign policy, otherwise it would have faced the dead-end economic turmoil with limited resources and capability (Vu, 1994).
Understanding that, the CPV was in urgent need of political and economic reforms. It was, therefore, not surprising that Vietnam’s three critical objectives, under Doi Moi policy in 1986, were all economically- related. They were to prevent the international isolation and economic embargo, create a peaceful environment for domestic reforms as well as smoothen the process of global economic integration, as summarized by Le (2013). Against that backdrop, Vietnam found
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ASEAN the most strategic option in pursuit of its Doi Moi’s goals. The accession to ASEAN helped Vietnam to avoid being international isolated and boosted regional trade. With the membership card of ASEAN, Hanoi had a chance to join the bigger markets of other member states.
What is more, Vietnam became ASEAN member in a search for a new cooperative image of the country, as in line with its fresh foreign policy of “being friends with all countries” and its commitment to peaceful means for dispute- solving mechanisms (CPV, 1991, p. 43). Looking back upon Vietnam’s history, it has experienced four destructive wars since 1945. Its experience justified for the country’s approach of armed conflicts when it encountered disputes in the past, comments (Hoang, 1996). Yet after the Doi Moi policy, Vietnam determined to change its perception on the foreign policy and upheld regional peace and stability where possible clashes were preferred to be solved in peaceful manners. In that context, Vietnam found its fresh objectives similar to what ASEAN aimed for. As a result, from having friend-enemy relation, Hanoi desired to become one part of the regional institution.
Despite little knowledge and experience Hanoi had pertaining to the operation of ASEAN, the nation steadily showed its commitments to the Association. ASEAN was a treaty-based intergovernmental organization which indicated that all members had to be bounded by its legal document- the Bali Treaty. Vietnam therefore agreed to sign that treaty in 1992. Particularly, the Vietnamese leader Vo Van Kiet expressed the country’s determination to become deeply involved in ASEAN: “under specific conditions, we will do all that is necessary to fully participate in the work of ASEAN, contributing actively to peace, stability and co-operation in the region” (Hoang, 1996, p. 75). Furthermore, Vietnam understood that to be fully immersed in the organization, it had to adopt the dispute resolution through multilateral settings of ASEAN. The multilateral settings indicated that whenever issues happened, the solutions would only be achieved by mutual consent. In fact, this approach was compatible with Vietnam’s new foreign policy. The country no longer wanted to bilaterally settle critical clashes with the concerned party only, instead, consultation and consensus of ASEAN members mattered as well. Hence, with matching dispute-solving mechanisms of peaceful means and multilateral negotiations, it was understandable for Vietnam to seek ASEAN’s membership in pursuit of building its fresh cooperative identity after the Cold War.
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By joining ASEAN, Vietnam gained economic advantages and successfully formed its new image of a cooperative and friendly nation. For those reasons, it was logical for Vietnam to consistently put emphasis on participation in ASEAN. Especially, the more unified and influential ASEAN becomes, the more benefits Vietnam could grasp. Therefore, since its full access in the organization, Vietnam has continuously participated with much of devotion.
Vietnam’s appointments of ASEAN’s affairs
Vietnam has shown its activeness to the ASEAN-building activities since the early 2000s.
The idea of building a more unified ASEAN community was initially mentioned right after the approval of ASEAN Vision 2020 in the year 1997. In 2003, it was officially accepted (ASEAN, 2019). In order to construct an integrated ASEAN, the organization aimed at developing three main pillars: ASEAN Political- Security Community (APSC), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) with the support of the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community (2009-2015). In that context, Vietnamese government responded with a duty-appointed plan where departments in-charge of ASEAN’s affairs were clearly assigned (See Table 2). In making that, Hanoi presented its eagnerness in fostering the institution’s integration.
According to the legal paper issued by the Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in 2009, Vietnam assigned the MOFA as the leading agency to take responsibility for ASEAN-related tasks. It was also the department managing activities pertaining to ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC). In order to support the work of MOFA, the Prime Minister particularly assigned ASEAN Department to act as the National Secretariat. Following ASEAN’s three pillars, Hanoi showed its determination to immerse itself in ASEAN’s unification by appointing different missions for related agencies. Each pillar of the ASEAN community involved with distinctive activities and therefore, having specific departments to take care of was of considerable significance. One of the most critical pillars of ASEAN- the APSC which aimed at ensuring regional security and stability through peaceful mechanisms was appointed to the MOFA. The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI) was in charge of the AEC which controlled all econonomic affairs. Social and cultural events of the third pillar ASCC were given to the Ministry of Labor - Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA). Moreover, the country had its permanent delegation
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located in Jakarta, Indonesia which was separated from the Embassy of Vietnam to be the national representative at the ASEAN’s meetings/conferences (Thu vien Phap luat, 2009).
Table 2
Departments in charge of ASEAN’s affairs of Vietnam
Assignment Department in charge
National Coordinating Department/ Leading agency for ASEAN Coordinating Council (ACC)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
ASEAN Political- Security Community (APSC)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) Ministry of Trade and Industry (MOTI)
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Ministry of Labor - Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA)
National Secretariat ASEAN Department of MOFA
Permanent Delegation of Vietnam (in Jakata, Indonesia)
Oversea Diplomatic Mission Board of Vietnam (separated with the Embassy of Vietnam in Indonesia)
Note. Apdated from QUYẾT ĐỊNH- Về việc Ban hành Quy chế làm việc và phối hợp giữa các cơ quan tham gia hợp tác ASEAN của Việt Nam, by Thu vien Phap luat, 2009
(https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Bo-may-hanh-chinh/Quyet-dinh-142-QD-TTg-Quy-che-lam-viec-va-phoi-hop-giua-cac-co-quan-tham-gia-hop-tac-ASEAN-cua-Viet-Nam-84511.aspx).
In the public domain.
Apart from the concrete appointment of ASEAN’s affairs for different agencies, the increasing eagerness of Vietnam in the 10-nation bloc has also shown through its active involvement in two noteworthy disputes: the Mekong River and the SCS.
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II. The case of the Mekong River
Recently, Vietnam has been more active in positing the issues of the Mekong River in several regional meetings. In preparation for the annual ASEAN Ministers’ meeting in summer 2020 as ASEAN Chair, it was reported that Hanoi signaled its plan to mention the Mekong River concerns in the 10-member regional bloc’s agenda (Markar, 2020). By doing that, Vietnam stressed the importance of Mekong River as greater regional challenges, instead of issues for riparian nations only. Commenting over Vietnam’s recent attempts in Mekong River problems, Pou Sothirak, an Executive Director at a Phnom Penh think tank and former Energy Minister of Cambodia, said that Vietnam’s effort was a game-changer. He further emphasized that Vietnam had become more serious about the Mekong mainstream dam projects of upstream countries (Markar, 2020). In order to further understand the increasingly active role of Vietnam in ASEAN, the country’s attempts in a search for solutions of Mekong River issues will be examined through its disapproval of dam construction and its efforts to present an image of a responsible member of the regional organization.
Vietnam’s role in the disapproval of dam projects
As an active member of the MRC, Vietnam has expressed its concerns over consequences of the mainstream hydropower projects for multiple times. It was of considerable concern for Vietnam where mainstream dam-building activities brought with them cross-border and cumulative negative impacts to the local residents given Vietnam’s position of a downstream country. Therefore, Hanoi has voiced out its worries in response to the dam plans from its neighbor nations for various times. In essence, against the backdrop of the sixth proposed dam of Laos, Hanoi emphasized its beliefs in the equal benefits shared among riparian nations, accompanying with mutual responsibilities in maintaining the sustainable use of water resources and development plans (Phuong, 2020). In the same manner, the nation had a careful statement when being asked to react to the trial operation of Jinghong dam of China.
Vietnam has considered, researched, and assessed activities relating to the Mekong River’s water resources. We believe that together with rightful benefits in using water resources
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for development purposes, all Mekong riverside countries have to share the duties of equal use, sustainable management of water and other water-based resources, as well as fair benefits shared among involved nations; in order to achieve sustainable growth and prosperity of the region (Nguyen H., 2020, paras. 2-3).
One could notice that Vietnam did not directly show its disapproval of new dam projects, instead, Hanoi chose to express the attitude in a diplomatic and constructive way. The justifications for Vietnam’s cautious objection of dam construction by other Mekong riverine countries were attributed to its foreign policy direction as well as the lack of a powerful organization who could fully control the situation. In particular, Vietnam committed to the regional peace and stability which indicated that the country had to be careful in its public statements so as not to cause unnecessary clashes. Also, the nation was well aware of the limitations of the ASEAN-led platforms in solving the Mekong issues. With the indifference of AMBDC in sustainable development of Mekong River, Hanoi found no hope in preventing dam-building activities through this framework. Similarly, the MRC could not make up for AMBDC’s malfunctions in solving the Mekong challenges, since it did not have sufficient power to stop its member states from building dams.
Given that circumstance, what Vietnam could afford was to voice its discouragement against dams through the MRC’s discussions. One of the MRC’s compulsory rules in any water-use projects was the PNPCA. This process aimed at reducing the consequences of the proposed projects in the Mekong environment as well as the lives of riverside communities. It involved the information sharing of the project from proposed nations to other members, a six-month process of technical assessement and consulation, and final agreement achieved by consensus among all MRC countries, mentions MRC (2016). Vietnam, together with other MRC members, contributed to the first time that MRC sucessfully completed the Offical Prior Consultant Process for the Pak Beng project of Laos in 2017 (MRC, 2017). The final statement from that process called for Laos government’s actions in settling transborder effects of the proposed project. Also, MRC suggested to make a Join Action Plan to encourage Laos and its investors to collect more data, keep sharing information and continue the evaluation of potential impacts caused by mainstream dams (including Pak Beng and other hydropower dams) on the river ecology and residents’ livelihoods.
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In addition, Vietnam utilized the scientist approach to discourage hydropower dams construction. In other words, Vietnam actively investigated the impacts of mainstream dams. One of those projects was the Delta Study completed at the end of 2015. This research studied and evaluated the influences of mainstream dams on Mekong Delta, with the participation of Laotian and Cambodian experts (Vietnam’s Ministry of Natural Resource and Environment 2020).
Furthermore, during the Prior Consultation Process of Xayaburi dams of Laos, Hanoi called for a halt in the dam’s construction for at least 10 years while further research was made. Hanoi’s suggestion directed MRC to the idea of environmental assessment so as to grade dam projects in terms of theirs risks and benefits, reports International Rivers (2019). According to Lam (2018), those studies provided objective evidences to weigh the potential impacts of dam construction and looked for comprehensive, long-term solutions, in pursuit of ensuring involved parties’ interests yet not violating the 1995 Mekong Agreement. By having those scientific evidences, it was believed that Vietnam had a more persuasive argument in the discussion of dam projects within the MRC or other Mekong- related institutions.
An image of a responsible ASEAN nation
The responsible image of Vietnam was shown through its continuous attempts in both
The responsible image of Vietnam was shown through its continuous attempts in both