Summary

After Austin (1962) proposed the theory of speech acts, Searle (1969) determined the necessary and sufficient conditions and rules which govern successful illocutionary acts in the example of promises. The speech act theory therefore builds a bridge between humans and language. Later, through examining Searle‘s (1969) conditions, Mey (1993) discussed other factors that might affect the performing of illocutionary acts: context and societal condition. There is no doubt that his idea about the speech act theory is inspiring. How to form a speech act appropriately then becomes an intriguing issue. The speech act theory has influenced the studies of linguistics, sociolinguistics, pragmatics, and language acquisition.

2.3 Major Components of the Speech Act of Promise

In the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English (5^th

edition, 2009), a

―promise‖ refers to ―telling someone that you will definitely do or provide something or that something will happen.‖ The insight of the speech act of promise is well-discussed in many studies (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; Searle and Vanderveken, 1985; Vendler, 1972). Among these studies, Searle‘s (1969) analysis of promise—which contains the four major components of propositional content condition, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and essential condition—has been widely adopted by many researchers to examine children‘s understanding of promises as a speech act (Astington, 1988a, 1990; Bernicot and Laval, 1996, 2004;

Laval and Bernicot, 1999; Maas, 2008; Maas and Abbeduto, 1998, 2001). Therefore, the definition of promise used in the present study is mainly based on Searle‘s classification.

2.3.1 Propositional Content Condition

The most fundamental component of a promise is the propositional act delivering from a promiser to a promisee. The propositional act is usually an utterance or a statement which is made by the promiser to accomplish a future action (Searle, 1969). Two intrinsic parts should be included in a propositional act: the indicator of illocutionary force and the indicator of propositional content³. The illocutionary force indicative devices can be any feature of a language such as word order, intonation contour, performative verbs, etc., as long as it points out what the speaker is performing (Fraser, 1974; Searle, 1969). A promise would be considered defective if either of the two parts is missing, as shown below:

(5) I promise I‘ll be there tomorrow. (Mey, 2001:99) (6) Wo daying hui mai liwu huilai gei ni.

1SG promise will buy present back for 2SG

‗I promised to bring you presents.‘

In (5), the illocutionary force indicative device refers to the first half of the sentence ‗I promise‘, while the second half ‗I‘ll be there tomorrow‘ is the indicator of propositional content. In (6), the illocutionary force indicative device refers to the first half of the sentence wo daying ‗I promised‘, while the second half hui mai liwu huilai

gei ni ‗to bring you presents‘ is the indicator of propositional content. Sometimes,

these two parts are combined together and become difficult to distinguish in the surface structure (Searle, 1969), as in (7):

(7) a. I promise that I will come.

b. I promise to come. (Searle, 1969: 30) In (7)a, the two parts are ―I promise‖ and ―that I will come‖. In (7)b, the same

3 These two terms are taken from Searle (1969:30).

illocutionary force indicative device and the indicator of propositional content lies in the deep structure, while in (7)a the boundary of the two parts is in the surface structure. However, both sentences involve the same underlying phrase marker ―I promise + I will come.‖ Similar sentences in Mandarin Chinese are shown in (8):

(8) a. Wo daying wo hui bang ni.

1SG promise 1SG will help 2SG

‗I promise that I will help you.‘

b. Wo daying bang.

1SG promise help

‗I promise to help.‘

In (8)a, the sentence can be clearly divided into the two parts wo daying ‗I promise‘

and wo hui bang ni ‗that I will help you‘. In (8)b, it is difficult to determine the boundary of the illocutionary force indicative device and the indicator of propositional content, but the same underlying phrase marker ―I promise + I will help you‖ lies in the deep structure as in (8)a.

An important element in the illocutionary force indicative device is the so-called performative verb ―promise‖. Without invoking an explicit illocutionary force indicative device, a promise may still be a promise. That is to say, without the performative verb, we can still explicitly express the speech act of a promise (Searle, 1969). Compare (9) to (7):

(9) I‘ll do it for you. (Searle, 1969:68) In (9), with the missing of the performative verb, we still can get the illocutionary force in this speech act. The main function of the performative verb is to present the satisfaction of the essentiality which is the obligation to finish a future action (Fraser, 1974; Searle, 1969). Thus, as long as the meaning of the utterance is clear and the essential condition of a promise is satisfied, the performative verb is no longer needed

in the speech act of promise. The speech act of a promise in Mandarin Chinese can also be well-interpreted without the performative verb, as in (10):

(10) Wo hui dasao fangjian de.

1SG will clean room EVI

‗I will clean up the room.‘

Unlike in (6) and (8), the performative verb of commissives daying ‗promise‘ is not uttered explicitly in (10). However, the illocutionary act is well understood with the speaker guaranteeing a future action; thus cleaning up the room, as uttered in this sentence, will be carried out. In Mandarin Chinese, it seems that the performative verb

daying ‗promise‘ is not commonly used. In Wang‘s (2009) study, the young

participants showed no sensitivities between the forms with or without the performative verb. To further prove this point, we had designed a questionnaire survey to investigate Chinese speaker‘s usage of the performative verb daying

‗promise.‘ In the result, we found that among the 50 adult Chinese speakers, none of them had employed the performative verb daying ‗promise‘ to make a promise.

To make a promise, there are many effective ways, as long as the two elements mentioned above—the indicator of illocutionary force and the indicator of propositional content—are expressed either explicitly or implicitly. Sometimes, the content of the promise can be implied in the context, and the context can determine if a specific expression counts as a promise (Mey, 2001; Searle, 1969). Therefore, a simple affirmative expression, such as ―OK‖ or ―Sure‖, can be recognized as a promise, as in (11):

(11) A: Shall we meet at the theater at 7?

B: OK!

In (11), A will consider B as having made a promise since the content of the promise

―to meet at the theater at 7‖ is shown in the context. Hence, B has to take responsibility if B does not show up at the theater at 7 o‘clock.

In Mandarin Chinese, the basic form of making a promise is simply wo daying

ni ‗I promise you.‘ The subject, which is usually first person wo ‗I‘, and the object, ni

‗you‘, will not be omitted (Chang, 2007; Dong, 2010). Following the basic form, an explanation of the concrete content of the commitment will be elaborated. Therefore, a common strategy of making a promise will be the basic form adding another complete sentence: Wo daying ni + S ‗I promise you + S‘ (Dong, 2010). Nevertheless, this common form of making a promise is usually used in written language such as a fiction or a script.

2.3.2 Preparatory Condition

The preparatory condition can refer to two parts. First, the speaker has to believe that doing this future act is in the hearer‘s best interest (Searle, 1969). It should be obvious that the content of the promise is mainly beneficial for the promisee, not the promiser, otherwise the promise would be defective. Also, if the promiser misinterprets the promisee‘s preference, the promise would be defective.

Therefore, both the promisee‘s preference and the promiser‘s awareness of the preference are necessary. This feature of a promise is the most crucial distinction between promises and threats. Consider Searle‘s example saying to a lazy student:

(12) If you don‘t hand in your paper on time I promise you I will give you a failing grade in the course. (Searle, 1969:58) It is rather obvious that (12) is more of a warning than a promise, since ―getting a failing grade‖ is never a student‘s desire. As a matter of fact, it is a structure of conditional promise in which one changes another person‘s behavior in order to reach

one‘s own goals. This usage of promise can be interpreted as a threat. In Mandarin Chinese, the corresponding situation can be found as well. Consider the following examples of a mother talking to a child:

(13) a. Wo daying mai wanju gei ni.

1SG promise buy toy for 2SG ‗I promise to buy toys for you.‘

b. Wo baozheng ni meiyou dianxin chi.

1SG guarantee 2SG no dessert eat ‗I promise that you won‘t get any dessert.

When comparing (13)a and (13)b, it is readily apparent that ―having toys‖ is a more highly sought after choice than ―losing dessert‖ for the addressee. Thus, (13)a is considered a promise without any doubt because the speaker knows the addressee wants some toys, and getting toys is preferred by the addressee. As for (13)b, although it contains the explicit expressing commissive performative verb like

baozheng ‗guarantee‘ in the illocutionary force indicative device, this speech act is

closer to a threat than a promise, since the content of the promise is obviously not desired by the addressee. It is a pledge to do something to the addressee rather than

for the addressee.

In (12) and (13), we can see that it is sometimes not possible to judge the category of a speech act according to the performative verb. The presence of a performative verb does not guarantee that an utterance is the speech act of a promise.

Consider another apparent counter-example in both English and Mandarin Chinese:

(14) A: You stole that money, didn‘t you?

B: No I didn‘t, I promise you I didn‘t. (Searle, 1969:58–59)

(15) A: Ni jintian shuaya le ma?

2SG today brush teeth PF PT ‗Did you brush your teeth today?‘

B: Wo baozheng wo shua le.

1SG guarantee 1SG brush PF ‗I promise that I did.‘

In (14) and (15), it is obvious that the indicators of propositional content are not a future action desired to be done by the addressee. Rather, they are statements. The use of the word ―promise‖ does not function as a performative verb in the speech act of promise, but as an expression which emphasizes the denial.

The second meaning of the preparatory condition is that the promise content is not a usual or normal event for the promiser, for it would be meaningless to make a promise about something which is obviously already being performed, or about to be performed, by the speaker. What is promised should be something preferred by the addressee so that the speaker has to do it on purpose, especially for the sake of the addressee. It is definitely not daily routines like eating and sleeping, as in (16):

(16) I promise the sun will rise tomorrow. (Mey, 2001:99)

One cannot promise a definite fact that will happen in the future as in (16). That is to say, the speech act of promise implies both the promiser and the promisee are aware of the truth that the promise content is something rarely done by the promise, as shown below:

(17) I promise to cook for you tomorrow.

(18) Wo baozheng jintian zaodian huijia.

1SG promise today early go home ‗I promise to go home early today.‘

In (17), the promise entails that the promiser does not usually cook; therefore,

cooking will be a future action specially done for the promisee. In (18), we can assume that the speaker usually goes home late every night. Because the family wishes the speaker to be home early today and the speaker knows it, this is a promise.

S/he breaks the routine especially to accomplish the family‘s need.

2.3.3 Sincerity Condition

One of the important components of the speech act of promise is that the speaker has to be sincere (Searle, 1969). Whether the promiser is sincere or not is an important criterion to judge a speech act as the commisive speech act; that is, the promiser must utter the propositional act honestly. To fulfill this condition, the promiser has to recognize three factors. First, the promiser has to promise with intention to do the future act for the promisee. While performing the propositional act, the promiser has to be sincerely ready to accomplish the future action to reach the promisee‘s best interest. Second, the promiser has to deliver this intention to the promisee in his utterance. Last but not least, the promiser must imply that he has the ability to complete the action. The promiser has to be capable of doing the future action and make the promisee believe that he has the controllability of the promise content. Consider the following examples in English and Mandarin Chinese:

(19) I promise that I‘ll kill him for you.

(20) Wo baozheng zhai yi ke xingxing huilai gei ni.

1SG promise get one CLF star back for 2SG ‗I promise to get one star for you.‘

If the promise content is beyond the promiser‘s controllability, it is highly predictable that the essential condition might not be satisfied.

If the promiser does not reach the sincerity condition, he would create a false belief for the promisee. A false belief of a promise would probably lead to an

insincere promise, which is still a promise according to Searle (1969:62), or a lie if the promisee senses the insincerity of the promiser, as illustrated below:

(21) a. I promise to go to movies with him.

b. I promise to go to movies with him (but I don‘t want to go).

(22) a. Wo daying mingtian bang ni daixiaohai.

1SG promise tomorrow help 2SG babysit ‗I promise to help you babysit tomorrow.‘

b. Wo daying mingtian bang ni daixiaohai (keshi wo 1SG promise tomorrow help 2SG babysit but 1SG xiang guangjie.)

want go shopping

‗I promise to help you babysit tomorrow (but I want to go shopping.)‘

If the promisee does not recognize the insincerity of the promiser and the future action is accomplished, the insincere promise may still remain as an effective promise as in (21)a and (22)a. However, the promiser‘s intention cannot always clearly be obtained simply based on the propositional act uttered. Compare b to a in (21) and (22); it is obvious that the promiser has lost the sincerity to keep a promise, thus making it an insincere promise. There is a slight possibility that the promisee may never know if the promiser is truly sincere.

2.3.4 Essential Condition

The last and the most important condition for the speech act of promise is the essential condition (Searle, 1969), also known as obligation condition (Maas and Abbeduto, 2001). After promising to perform a future action, the promiser must place himself under an obligation to finish that future action (Searle, 1969). Thus, the fulfillment of the commitment becomes the decisive factor for the speech act of promise to be distinguished from other illocutionary acts. Sometimes, in (21)b and

make the promiser finish the action. The promisee may not be certain if the sincerity condition is fulfilled but he will know if the essential condition is fulfilled.

When the promiser makes a promise and undertakes an obligation for a future action, it entails that the promiser must also take responsibility for the accomplishment of that action at the same time. If the promiser does not achieve the obligation or cannot afford to finish the future action, the promise will be defective and the promiser has to be blamed for the broken promise, as in (23):

(23) I promise to take you to the park tomorrow.

If the promiser ―I‖ does not take the promisee ―you‖ to the park the day after today, this promise will be considered as a defective promise because the essential condition is not satisfied. Consider the same situation in Chinese:

(24) Wo daying yao bang ni xie gongke.

1SG promise to help 2SG write homework ‗I promise to help you with your homework.‘

Once expressing the utterance, the speaker wo ‗I‘ in (24) has put himself under the obligation of finishing the future action of bang ni xie gongke ‗to help you with your homework.‘ Nevertheless, even if the promiser is sincerely intent on keeping the promise, there is still a possibility that the promise might not be carried out (Maas and Abbeduto, 2001). Consider the following examples which could keep the promiser from the obligation to keep the promise in (25) and (26):

(25) a. After Nevin ate lunch, he felt so sick that he just had to lie down. Nevin didn‘t come back to the park. (Maas and Abbueduto, 2001:521) b. Sally never came back to play with her classmate because her mother asked

her to help in the kitchen.

c. Jenny can‘t go shopping with Samantha because she hasn‘t finished her homework.

(26) a. …keshi wo duzi hao tong.

but 1SG stomach very hurt ‗…but I have a stomachache.‘

b. …keshi wo mama jiao wo qu mai dongxi.

but 1SG mother ask 1SG go buy something ‗…but my mom asked me to buy something for her.‘

c. …keshi woziji de gongke hai mei xie.

but myself GEN homework still not write ‗…but I haven‘t written my own homework yet.‘

In (25)a and (26)a, an unforeseen event (e.g. illness) may stop the promiser from accomplishing the future action. In (25)b and (26)b, the involvement of an authority figure (e.g. an elder asking the promiser to help with other tasks) may also be a potential obstacle to keep the promiser from fulfilling the promise. Last but not least, it seems as if there is another kind of obstacle falling in between the two, i.e. a dilemma. When the promiser is obligated to do something perceived to be very important, s/he may hesitate between carrying out the obligation or the promise, as in (25)c and (26)c.

2.3.5 Summary

In this section, we have discussed the four major components of the speech act of a promise and the insight of them proposed by Searle (1969). In a successful and effective promise, all of the four conditions must be fulfilled. The promiser needs to sincerely offer the utterance of the promise. Also, the promised content should be beneficial to the promisee. Most importantly, the promiser is obligated to complete the promise of carrying out the future action. Although, it is controversial to judge if an insincere promise is still a promise, Searle (1969) believes so, as he states, ‗a promise involves an expression of intention, whether sincere or insincere‘ (1969:62).

After discussing the vital components in the speech act of promise, we review

some previous empirical studies on young children‘s understanding of promise in the following section.

2.4 Previous Empirical Studies of Children’s Understanding of Promises

In this section, three previous empirical studies of children‘s understanding of promises are reviewed. In the literature, little research has been done to examine children‘s concepts of promise. Chomsky (1959) found that 5-year-old children were capable of using the performative verb ―promise‖ properly in sentence structure. They acquired the concept of promise to finish doing what they were asked to do, but they could not accurately define the word ―promise‖ before the age of nine (Mant and Perner, 1988). The developmental progress of children‘s understanding of promise is intriguing. What is assured is that children‘s pragmatic and metapragmatic concept of promise evolved with age (Astington, 1988a; Bernicot and Laval, 1996; Liu and Fang, 2003). Astington (1988a) is probably the first study that focuses on children‘s understanding of promise. Other studies continued to explore this issue and their results further confirm Astington's findings (Maas, 2008; Maas and Abbeduto, 2001).

Wang (2009) reports a pioneer study of promise on Chinese-speaking children. These studies are reviewed in the following subsections.

2.4.1 Astington (1988a)

Astington (1988a) provided a preliminary investigation of children‘s understanding of the speech act of promise. Due to the fact that the performative verb

―promise‖ is frequently used in the colloquial phrase ―I promise‖ without the speech act of promise involved, Astington aimed to examine if children‘s mental concept of promise would be affected by the performative verb. In her study, she designed six stories in which one of the speakers saying ―I promise‖ and had the subjects judge

what kind of speech acts were described as a promise. Among the six stories, only two of them were a promise for a future action, while the others were predictions and assertions. The examples are as follows:

Table 2-3. Different Meanings Implied in the Performative Verb ―Promise‖

Types of Speech Act Examples

Promise I will take you (to swimming pool) next week, I promise.

Prediction Yes, you will (be better), I promise.

Assertion Well, I did (take out the garbage) today, I promise.

Assertion Well, I did (take out the garbage) today, I promise.

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