1. Introduction
1.4. The Net and the State
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1.4. The Net and the State
The first impression of the Net on its arrival seemed to create the illusion of a new order, a libertarian society that would free individuals forever from state rule: control without government, consensus without power (Goldsmith, and Wu, 2006). It was not just that the state would not regulate cyberspace, but it was that the state could not even if cyberspace existed. It was unavoidably free by nature. However, this nature of the Net is for sure not God's will - it was a product of its design that the ability to identify who someone is, their actions, and their location would not be impossible but at least difficult to enforce by rule (Lessig, 2006).
However, there was one way, and it was control, not necessarily by a state or an actor, rather control at a distance through devices - it is code that controls the whole system of being (Lessig, 2006).
Different codes bring on differently controllable networks that differ in the extent to which they make behavior within each network regulable -a difference in the software and hardware that grants users access. Regulation requires a subject who performs the action. This action first started as the basic need to uncover the identity of someone using the network, then to ascertain whether or not that someone carries the proper credentials. As it will also be considered in this research, this is granted to the state who has a domestic authority structure and holds power to require codes to impose this condition. (Vig, 1988). State role is here mentioned as the institutional means for making public decisions about the introduction and use of technologies (Krasner, 2009). State-theory is a whole other book, but defining the state in terms of institutional mechanism and foundational enforcer of state power is an escape route from all complexity (Jessop, 1990). Jessop (1990) defines the state:
“The state is a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially accepted function is to define and enforce binding decisions collectively on a given population in the name of their common interest or general will.”
However, the roles granted to a state use of the introduction of the Net is another story.
Even though these are some technologies out there to make the Net more regulable, albeit not perfectly, the by-product of these technologies does not create enough incentives as state action does. Jessop (2006), therefore, simplifies the role of the state in regulating this complex system over a dot representing someone who is regulated through the sum of the constraint imposed that by a regulator: law, norms, the market, and architecture. Norms are social constraints a
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community imposes; markets regulate through price; architecture makes physical change into a constraint, and law constrains through sanctioning power. Wagner (2005) states that the interaction between these regulators is dynamic. The role of the state as the power of all regulators is to decide which regulator is the most effective on the desired constraint, not necessarily the most efficient. The law above all regulators can change the constraints of all regulators; it can muck them up just as easily as it can improve them. However, the point is not to criticize but to demonstrate which means best advance the regulator's goal (Appendix A).
Each action comes with a cost, and the state is the power who weighs a cost against its benefit by selecting the most effective regulator to do so.
The adoption of technology depends on the characteristics of both the technology in question and the adopting unit. While one approach focuses on the characteristics of the technology, the other focuses on the characteristics of adopter, which is the state (Corrales, and Westhoff, 2006). Controllability of the technology, thus, is a catalyst for extending the reach of the state.
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Chapter II 1. Literature Review
As roughed out in the Introduction, understanding between technology and state power within the complex nature introduced by the information age is the central datum of this study, is also an area that existing paradigms of IR are struggling to deal with. Through an epitome of analysis of IR literature that deals with questions arising from the emergence of Internet technology, this chapter specifically aims to identify dominant paradigms in the literature.
First, the two main approaches are presented: instrumentalism and technological determinism, which aim to identify of the nature of technology in general. Both of these approaches have seen technology as an artifact that alters human interaction with it by totally disengaging or devolving the control of the technology from them. One believes technology is morally neutral - whether it is good or bad depends on how humans interact with it- while the other considers technology to have a universally applicable effect regardless being good or bad is unstoppable.
Thus, both approaches remain unable to engage with political or social actors of power, an engagement that is needed for this research to answer how conceptions of power in the context of China have impacted the integration of Internet technology, and also how these technologies relate to power.
Secondly, existing paradigms are better in combining the technology with power, though they are the continuation of either instrumentalism or determinism. These approaches are grouped according to the time at which they emerged in IR literature. Industrial-age approaches combined the instrumentalist approach with the realist power theory in which technology is an artifact that states use as a source of power. Information-age approaches top the technological determinism approach with an expanded view of power concepts in which the state is no longer seen as the only actor of power. Information power introduced by Internet technologies created a polemic in the IR literature splitting the argument into two: optimists and pessimists. The optimists considered technology to be a liberation tool with motivating potential while the pessimists found this tool reciprocal to all actors; specifically, they believed
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the state remains in control of the technology due to its ability to reach better sources of information.
Even though these approaches come close to considering state responses to the impact of Internet technology, still many of approaches emerging from this paradigm insist on regarding the technology as following a pre-determined path which is imposed upon the state or other actors which have little or no ability to stop it from integrating. This persistent emphasis failed to engage with technical debates, and thus, was unable to address the relationship between power and technology in IR.
Lastly, a broader view completes the missing piece of the puzzle by combining technical knowledge into all these efforts in IR literature that consider both the impact of technology and the use of technology simultaneously. The approaches outlined in this chapter provides a conceptual framework to this research for moving beyond the long-considered assumptions about technology which have dominated IR literature in order to explain state power in the information age, specifically, the unique way in which China has responded to Internet technology.
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1.1. Searching for the nature of technology
In the search for the nature of technology, two key approaches, instrumentalist and technological determinists, dominate and shape the existing paradigms in literature.
Instrumentalists exclude human interaction from the technology. Technology is a morally neutral artifact that has no values or political meaning embedded in it –human engagement with it deems whether the technology is good or bad. However, by disengaging the technology from the outcomes of its use and implementation, this approach fails to understand power. For instance, this approach may lead the question in the literature of whether or not the technology is good, but it is unable to possess who address problem or purpose, whose perception of problems are going to be privileged in deciding, is also unable to define the legitimate use of technology.
In contrast, technological determinism regards technology as advancing on a predetermined path, and as an external force over which humans largely have no control. One suggested that technology shapes humans, though is not sure whether it is beneficial or not, but nonetheless it is unstoppable (Vig, 1988; Carr, 2016). Later the argument changed with the introduction of the logical sequence approach which dictates that the existence of two comparable technologies will inevitably end up with the innovation of a new technology out of their combination (Heilbroner, 1961). Mumford (1970) brought a new perspective to the argument by distinguishing between mono-technology and authoritarian technology. Technology is not the problem, it is the human that is unable to synthesize technology with its perception because once a technological system is set in place, it is hard to alter or reverse such a system is that already deeply rooted in human development – it becomes not necessarily responsive to any change in perceptions. This due to the fact that Internet technologies are embedded in economic, cultural, social and political aspects of human development, and the states that adopted this technology technological system the first have binding outcomes for those who use the Internet technologies (McKinnon, 2010; Carr, 2016). However, Mumford remained incapable of explaining how the decisions of adapters were or were not made, in other words, he ignored the role of social and political implications (Winner, 1985; Borgman, 1984) where there were numerous options for deciding how technology should be advanced or how it should function.
This pessimistic focus on the future impact of technology circulates in the debate around whether Internet technology empowers the state, or devolves power from the state.
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1.2. Existing Paradigms
There are two approaches found in IR literature that demonstrate how the understanding of the relationship between technology and power remained stable, while the approaches to power kept on changing due to the emergence of ICTs. The first approached the relationship between technology and power through the combination of realist power theory in which the state is considered as a self-interested unit and technology as a power-maximizing mechanism to get the advantage of more efficient economic power and military power (Morgenthau, 1978). This approach dominated the literature during the industrial age, from the Second World War to late 1980s. Theories concerned with material power treat the technology as an artifact, as does the instrumentalist, thus they have not synthesized a theory of unique nature of ICTs (Waltz, 1979;
Wendt, 1999; Mearsheimer, 2001; Nye, 2004). These theories, because of their inability to engage with social and political elements of power and technology, are mismatched with the approach addressing state responses to the impact of technology.
The second paradigm, the information age approach exhibits the determinist approach in its expanded view of power, comes closer to providing a better approach. Rothkopf (1998) describes that states are no longer the only actor of power; raw power can be countered or can be strengthened with information power. Two broad arguments have preoccupied the debate in this paradigm. First, optimists have worked to understand the ability of Internet technology, they deeming it to be a tool of liberation that changes the dynamic of power between the state and the individual (Smith and Naim, 2000; Drezner and Farrell, 2004; Diamond, 2010). They support the idea that by facilitating mobilization and communication, liberation technologies expand an individual’s freedom of report and exposes wrongdoing, protest, scrutinizing the government, it empowers them.
The struggle, in turn, is a function of shifting power, in which the majority of optimists believe that ICTs with Internet connectivity will vanquish the dictators and authoritarian regimes by eroding the institution of sovereignty, and motivating democratization and liberalization (Aronson, 2002, pp. 41–58; Hachigian, 2002, pp. 41–58; Nye, 2002, p. 76). ICT gave a path into increasing the influence of non-state actors besides individuals, such as transnational corporate sectors and non-governmental organizations, and undermined the authority of the state by turning the advantage of easy access to information against the state
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(Castells, 2000; Mayer-Schoenberger, and Brodnig, 2001; Aronson, 2002; Langman, 2005;
Lorentzen, 2013).
Computers, the Internet, mobile phones and numerous other applications including social media are the modern interrelated forms of digital ICTs and are multiway forms of communication (Diamond, 2010). Therefore pessimists, in contrast, insist that authoritarian states remain firmly in control and beyond charge against the tides of liberation from ICTs, even harnessing it or commandeering it as an information tool, though they have acquired advanced an technical ability to censor and control in order to monitor and identify the dissenters (Diamond, 2010; Hachigian, 2002). Internet technologies were found to be used as a new tool of repression and devolved a state’s power, to monitor and control citizens, ultimately forestalling democracy and preserving state’s power (Morozov, 2011).
However, technology is rarely a tool, given its design that allows for the regulation and control of all users, thus any user can improve and better the use of these tools. There is an equal probability that the same technology can allow individuals and non-state actors to bring down authoritarianism, and it can also allow a state to advance its power over other actors, as was the case in several scenarios. Boerl (2008) stated that development of the Internet and multiway forms of ICTs unlike a zero-sum game between the state and individuals or non-state actors, are a new infrastructure that allows engagement and disengagement between these actors. As proof of this statement, Deibert, Rohozinski, and Zittrain (2010) point out that there are a number of countries actively using Internet filtering to alter the opportunities equally given to all users on the ground, more interestingly, as opposed to the perspective of optimists who suggested that ICTs would bring major challenges to authoritarian forms of power, not all of these states using censors are authoritarian states. Due to lack of technical knowledge or interest, none of these polarizing debates can make an accurate distinction between whether the merging of ICTs results in the loss of state control or the relinquishment of state power.
Many studies emerging from these paradigms kept on regarding Internet technologies as having followed a predetermined path and conveying a set of norms and values which are imposed upon the state, leaving minimum chance to influence, or even leaving no choice but to adapt - or else. These arguments do not provide an appropriate conceptual framework for this research as it leaves out too much of bearing for understanding power, but because it does play a role in political debates about Internet technologies, and it is the very early steps of analysis, it is important to articulate here. The pessimist approach mentioned here offers some important insights into the question driving this research, but this approach remains dedicated emphasizing the impact of technology, and thus fail to engage with the different aspects of
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technology that are the consequence of state decisions and those which are beyond the immediate control of states (Sassen, 1999). This literature frequently negates the role of choice and an actor’s influence on technology. To do so, they disregard the fact that states can and do exert influence over the development of new technology.
These approaches are helpful as an analytical tool in identifying the Chinese approach as some of them engage with these views while formulating Internet technology policies. In this way, besides providing a methodology, it becomes a conceptual tool for making sense of particular points in the search for a pattern unique to the Chinese case. To date, this research has followed the more ideationally inclined studies on the relationship between state power and technology in order to connect the lines with the unique pattern of Chinese integration of Internet technologies, and it is to these studies that this chapter turns next.
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1.3. The Missing Link
‘Blaming the hardware seems even more foolish than blaming the victim when it comes to judging conditions of public life’ (Winner, 1985). Opposite to those technology diffusion theories that neglect the role of choice during the adoption of technological systems, authors like Patel and Connolly (2007) found the relationship between technology and state power as mutually responsive, in which Internet technology adoption depends not only on the characteristics of the technology in question, but also the country-specific characteristics. The approaches to Internet technologies sprang into a more complex and inclusive manner, in which they determined that technology, in a unique way, is both enhancing and undermining state power simultaneously (Cleaver, 1998; Sassen, 1999; MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999; Latham, 2007; Franklin, 2004; Carr, 2016). Thus, it is neither empowering the state nor devolving its power in a way. Given the essential aspects that Internet connectivity ascribed to ICTs, in which the Internet has no pre-determined path or a specific purpose, the expression of the interests and values of those who engage with Internet technology becomes more and more significant (Carr, 2016). As Larry Diamond (2010) once stated, technology might be seen as the technology prevailing over skirmishes, but one cannot assume that governments, organizations, and people will completely remain weak and unskilled against it; they rather will be the judge of this triumph.
In order to illustrate a better linkage between Internet technology and state power, this research underscores the missing link by equally relying upon the technical specs of Internet technology that allows for the engagement and disengagement between actors, and the actors’
use of ICT applications to enhance power–sometimes collaboratively, but mostly competitively.
In the same way, Lessig (2006) argued that the Internet attained a new characteristic of ICT:
controllability or being able to be regulated. Simply put, the regulation of the network and networked ICT and the rules and the freedoms allowed therein, or the values embraced to them, may differ. Thus, controllability becomes a function of its design (Lessig, 2006). Those who design the ideas and values of a given technology are fundamental to its structure and design (Lessig, 2006). Moreover, they are constantly reinforced through its use in determining the defaults of the technology: whether privacy will be protected, the degree to which anonymity will be allowed, and the extent to which access will be guaranteed (Lessig 2006; Carr 2016).
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Lastly, their decisions define what that specific technology is, and these decisions will influence the key sectors of that technology (Lessig, 2006).
The regulation can be performed in a variety of ways. Changes in the design of Internet technology that have been mentioned so far were to make regulation simpler in order for the state to create incentives for individuals and non-state actors to obey the rule, to take advantage on its threat, and to decrease criminal behavior to below zero (Lessig, 2006). The effectiveness of state power functions through traceability which builds stronger incentives to obey the state-regulated rules (Lessig, 2006). However, this research does not narrow down the view by focusing only on the complexities of state responses and regulations with regard to Internet technologies.
Regulation is also attributed to the design of the technology itself: the code. As Lessig
Regulation is also attributed to the design of the technology itself: the code. As Lessig