1 Introduction
1.3 Theoretical Framework
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kuan Tao mission in Malaysia and discusses how propagation of Confucian ethics serves to raise credibility in the eyes of local authorities.65 Jordan and Overmeyer focus on spirit writing halls, but also mention I-kuan Tao as well, although the book shows its age.66 Even though the previously mentioned Palmer, Katz and Wang focus on redemptive societies in early republican China, the theoretical framework useful for study of I-kuan Tao in Taiwan, and these articles ought to be a starting point for such research.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
This thesis is situated within a larger framework of the lived religion approach, which was popularized by two seminal works, the Madonna of 115th Street by Orsi and Lived Religion in America edited by Hall.67 They were soon followed by other scholars, such as Ammerman, Bender, Luhrman, McGuire, and still others who have applied this perspective to different topics in the fields of history and sociology of religion.68
Instead of a one-sided focus on doctrines and theologies, this approach acknowledges differences between doctrines about what people actually do and also pays attention to interpretations and practices of social actors and how the religion is constructed in peoples’
lives. This shift in perspective does not mean condoning dualism between “elite” and “popular”
culture. Instead, as Orsi points out, such a distinction may serve to classify certain forms of religious life as normative while marginalizing others.69 Focus on everyday life does not mean ignoring the role of official spaces of worship, such as churches, in favour of home setting.
Rather, it means to look at how people talk about or how they re-create religion in other spaces and contexts, the differences, the interactions between these different spheres of social life, and why people avoid bringing religion into certain contexts or refuse to classify certain practices or ideas as religious. The lived religion approach thus pays attention to how social negotiation between different actors, including the laity and the clergy, without privileging an elite perspective.
When applied to the study of Confucianism, this approach means that I try to abandon the normative view of Confucianism, which would understand "official teachings" as what is contained in Classical texts such as Analects and categorize other forms of interpretation and practice as variants or deviations from these textual norms. Instead of focusing on
65 Khin Wah Soo, “A Study of the Yiguan Dao (Unity Sect) and Its Development in Peninsular Malaysia,” PhD Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1998.
66 David Jordan and Daniel Overmyer, The Flying Phoenix: Aspects of Chinese Sectarianism in Taiwan, Princeton University Press, 1986.
67 Robert A. Orsi, The Madonna of 115th Street: Faith and Community in Italian Harlem, 1880-1950, 3rd ed., New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010; David D. Hall, Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997.
68 Nancy Tatom Ammerman, Sacred Stories, Spiritual Tribes: Finding Religion in Everyday Life, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014; Courtney Bender, The New Metaphysicals: Spirituality and the American Religious Imagination, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010; T. M. Luhrmann, When God Talks Back: Understanding the American Evangelical Relationship with God, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012; Meredith McGuire, Lived Religion: Faith and Practice in Everyday Life, Oxford University Press, 2008.
69 Orsi, The Madonna of 115th Street, p. xxxiv.
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philosophical doctrines in sacred texts or works written by great Confucian thinkers, I tried to look at beliefs and practices, i.e. how people modify doctrines and create Confucianism through interactions and look at diversity within this sphere. I question the boundary line between “official or philosophical” Confucianism and “popular” Confucianism. For example, the Four Books Study Group in the Taipei Confucius temple is open to the public and the teacher is a student of Mou Zongsan, one of the important figures in contemporary Chinese philosophy. Are these lessons to be classified as philosophical or popular Confucianism?
Moreover, how does such classification help us understand the motivations and actions of teacher and other participants?
Although postcolonial theory is overly focused on literature studies, the themes discussed by the scholars have influenced my research approach by focusing my attention on certain issues during the fieldwork, as well as in making me careful about more or less hidden agendas and ideological influences in scholarly writings. Over the course of my research, I have discovered that it is necessary to ground the study of contemporary Confucianism in theories of nationalism in addition to those of colonialism and secularism. Secularism is a concept different from secularization as a universal historic process as discussed in past sociological and religious studies scholarship. Instead, secularism refers to an ideological stance adopted by social actors in concrete historic contexts and aimed towards defining and managing
“religion” in public life as discussed, for example, by Asad, Gorski, or Mahmood.70
In this section, I first discuss the definitional problems of “Confucianism” and “religion”.
I avoid a discussion of defining religion and deciding whether Confucianism is a religion or not because, in my perspective, it is more fruitful to explore how others make these definitions and how they are influenced by historic, social and ideological contexts, and how these definitions inflect. For this reason, I also discuss the issues of colonialism, nationalism, and tradition versus modernity. In this way, I aim to engage in a dialogue with the Confucian Studies, which tend to omit concrete social settings and do not pay attention to the role of ideologies such as nationalism or secularism in their efforts of defining, interpreting and practicing Confucianism. The theoretical section concludes with a discussion of ritual theory.
Problem of Definitions
I do not provide my own definition for “religion” and “Confucianism”, nor do I try to decide whether Confucianism is religion or not. Instead, I aim to explore how others make and use their own definitions, i.e. how Confucianism is constructed by different actors in changing social, cultural, and political contexts. Similarly, I do not try to draw boundary lines between religion, Confucianism, or scriptural and popular Confucianism. I am more interested in how people refer to Confucianism, why some cultural elements or practices are defined as Confucian and other not. I emphasize an approach of verstehen rather than erklären, since I
70 Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, Baltimore;
London: JHU Press, 2009; Philip S. Gorski and Ateş Altınordu, “After Secularization?,” Annual Review of Sociology 34: 1 (2008): 55–85; Saba Mahmood, Religious Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report, Princeton University Press, 2015.
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do not see a need to classify the “messiness” of social reality into neat premade categories, which I view as ideal types. That is, concepts such as religion are interpretational tools that ought to help us to understand but should not become a Procrustean bed. Understanding concepts such as religion as an analytic tool, and there is not much purpose in categorization with an aim to create taxonomic system. For this reason, I am more interested in how actors in different context draw boundaries between religion, superstition, science, politics etc. This includes scholarly discourse, too, because production of knowledge is tied to power and concepts such as religion, superstition, philosophy, or Confucianism are tied to ideological and colonialist discourses. These issues have been discussed for example by Asad or Josephson.71 It is important to keep in mind that definitions and categorizations can be political actions, and I do not attempt to claim to have the authority to decide, for example, who is a Confucian, but rather notice when and why someone might identify as a Confucian, what “I am a Confucian” does for the person making that claim and for others. In contemporary Taiwan, such proclamations might be tied with a China-centred nationalism, linking it with a declaration of loyalty to an imagined community of the Chinese nation and the myths relating to five thousand years of Chinese culture and polity.
I try to avoid essentialism, instead trying to understanding culture as pre-existing and being reproduced though human interactions, and see texts as part of these interactions.
Therefore, what I see as necessary is to interpret their contents within their contexts – and how they are interpreted by different actors in different historical periods. For this reason, I also understand the Confucian Classics not at the source of tradition containing original teachings, but rather as a product of continuous invention of tradition and negotiations over which texts to include into the canon, and how to interpret their contents. This process of canonization is ongoing and not concluded. The concept of cultural toolbox as introduced by Swidler and bricolage as introduced by Levi-Strauss is useful in trying to approach Confucianism, in looking how different actors create and use these tools, and how the tools and their availability, is shaped by larger social, cultural, political, or economic contexts.72
Colonialism
Through the field research, I realized a two-fold colonialism linked with the study of Confucianism in Taiwan. Firstly, there is the general context of post-coloniality that emerged as result of nation building under the Kuomintang dictatorship, which in addition did not allow for reflection on colonial experience under the Japanese empire. Because of the Kuomintang policies, Confucianism in Taiwan in practice and interpretations is intertwined with nationalism, which is inculcated through state institutions. Secondly, scholarly definitions are linked to colonialism. The question such as “Is Confucianism religion?” or “Is Confucianism compatible with democracy?" are the same questions as “Is Islam compatible with democracy?” That is, they are ideologically loaded with political implications as they try to
71 Asad, Genealogies of Religion; Jason Ananda Josephson, The Invention of Religion in Japan, University of Chicago Press, 2012.
72 Ann Swidler, Talk of Love: How Culture Matters, Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
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establish supremacy of one’s culture, even though the scholars in question may not necessarily realize their ethnocentric perspective. Moreover, scholarly discussions on relationship between Confucianism and religion or democracy tend to rest on personal worldview, which supported with appropriate quotations from the Classics.
Scholars in Confucian studies tend to adopt a colonialist approach, which can be also observed in studies of Buddhism or Hinduism and other religious traditions. These religious traditions were created though oriental imagination according to the needs of Euro-American scholars, who might emphasise mysticism in Hinduism or rationality in Confucianism, in trying to fit heterogeneous histories and practices into the fixed categories of religion or philosophy.
On the one hand, this leads to compartmentalization of lived religious experience along the lines of “confessional” boundaries. On the other hand, the study of non-European religions is linked with “area studies”, which again compartmentalize world cultures according to geopolitical needs. Consequently, research on Confucianism treats Chinese, Korean, Japanese, or Vietnamese Confucianism as separate entities that are studied in isolation within separate modern nation state boundaries. Lastly, these scholars replace local exegetes in claiming authority on knowing the true nature of the teachings.
Since colonial encounters often lead to elimination of autochthon traditions of exegesis and methods of knowledge production (in cooperation between colonial officer and scholars, and local politicians and scholars), the scholarship then appropriated the role of exegetes in analysing and explaining the true meanings sacred texts from other cultures, and deciding what constitutes Confucianism, Buddhism etc. At present, we can see scholars argue over what is the true Islam, compatible with the Western Civilization, and what is a perverted fundamentalist other, which only claims to be Islam.73 The newly emerged “Confucianism” has been confined in departments of philosophy, Chinese literature, or national studies.
Consequently, the question whether Confucianism is religion is also a twofold problem because both the definition of religion and Confucianism depend on cultural and ideological background of a scholar. For example, Jensen argues that Confucianism had already been identified with “Chineseness” in the European imagination by the 16th century.74 It is important to keep in mind that these definitions are not an abstract “language game” among scholars cloistered in academia. The scholarly discourse has tangible impact on social reality as part of an agenda of the scholars themselves, how their ideas are used in textbooks, and how interested parties read and interpret these books. These definitions are often evoked in specific contexts with specific intentions, often connected with issues of power and control such as in the case of the Kuomintang and the nationalist scholars redefining Confucianism in order to incorporate it into the secular framework of national symbols.
Following these issues, this thesis pays attention to the colonial legacy in Taiwan and how the Japanese colonial government made use of Confucianism as a shared cultural language between colonizer and colonized, e.g. colonized elites. Second, how the Kuomintang
73 For a discussion of this issue, see for example Robert Orsi, Between Heaven and Earth, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
74 Lionel Jensen, Manufacturing Confucianism, Duke University Press Books, 1998.
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used Confucianism as a “non-religion” to buttress its nationalist ideology and discipline in the population in Mainland China and after arrival in Taiwan. In addition, I pay attention to how Confucianism used in Taiwan during the Qing era, under Japanese, and under the Kuomintang, as well as in contestations between the Republic of China and the Japanese empire over legitimacy, or between New Confucians and Chinese scholars etc.
Nationalism
Since I realized during field research that Confucianism in Taiwan is intertwined with nationalism, I had to incorporate this theme into my analytical framework. Gellner classically defined nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.”75 Gellner points to an invented nature of nation and national culture, despite the fact that many moderns perceive nation as a universal natural category. In addition, Gellner argues that nations are a historical contingency and that nationalism and the idea of a nation in fact precede the nation, and not vice versa. Gellner also points to the role of the state education system and academia in dissemination of national culture. Another often quoted theoretician of nationalism is Anderson and the concept of an
“imagined community”.76 In my perspective, it is also important to ask who is actually making the work of imagination, and to pay attention to coercion behind the nationalist narratives of harmonious unity, and how nationalists seeks to impose homogeneity of national culture over heterogeneity of lived cultures. Despite its rhetoric of unity, the political and social practice of nationalism imposes hierarchic distinctions between people such as between men and women, or leaders and citizens who are supposed to play different roles with unequal access to power. In addition, following Spencer and Wollman, I do not subscribe to distinctions between “good nationalism” and “bad nationalism”, which include making distinctions between progressive Western nationalisms and retrogressive nationalisms in the Third World.77
Although Confucianism in Taiwan has become an integral part of nationalism and nation building ideology of modern nation state, studies on nationalism in Taiwan or China, such as Unger and Barmé, or Hsiau do not discuss in detail how Confucianism was utilized to serve these goals.78 Role of Confucianism in competition between China-centred and Taiwan-centred nationalists is also mentioned by contributors in anthology by Makeham and Hsiau.79 Stafford looks at social realities of filial piety in local community, how the Chinese nationalism
75 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism, Washington Square, N.Y: New York University Press, 1997, p. 1.
76 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London; New York: Verso, 2006.
77 Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2002.
78 Jonathan Unger and Geremie Barmé (eds.), Chinese Nationalism, Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 1996; A-chin Hsiau, Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism, London; New York: Routledge, 2000.
79 Makeham and Hsiau (eds.), Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan.
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in Taiwan has utilized the filial piety and the tensions between mothers protecting their children and the state wanting the children to be willing to sacrifice for nation.80
Nationalists in Taiwan have tried to secure monopoly on Confucian exegesis, first, through the legal power of state to define religion and non-religion, set requirements for registration of organizations, compile of school textbooks, and establish non-governmental organizations associated with the Kuomintang such as Confucius-Mencius Society. Second, intellectuals whose exegesis may serve state interests, exercise monopoly through usage of Classical language that is not made available to public that is required memorize texts but does not to learn the grammar of Classical Chinese. Next, philosophical jargon used by scholars makes the texts seem inaccessible to non-specialists. Lastly, reduction of Confucianism on selected classical texts, and exclusion of rituals and social organization besides the state institutions, helps to make the tradition more easily controllable.
Tradition and Modernity
The term of tradition is often invoked in relation to Confucianism in scholarly discourse, and I often heard it during my fieldwork. Following the issue of nationalism, it is important to notice the discontinuity in practice and ideas as newly created national culture is to replace local traditions (for example as “superstitions”), although nationalist myths aim to obfuscate this rupture by the stressing ancient roots and continuity of the newly invented national culture.81 Danger of discontinuity may be then projected on outward influences such as Western culture. The “Confucian tradition in Taiwan” is to a large degree a product of the Kuomintang nationalist policies and education system that limits the scope of available cultural resources. However, I observed different approaches in interpretation and practice in the Taipei Confucius Temple as an attempt to expand on the cultural toolbox.
Scholarly discourse on issues of Confucianism vs modernization or democracy are often based on essentialist understandings of Confucianism as firmly fixed in classical texts.
Moreover, this seems to follow an ideologically motivated image that was created during the May Fourth Movement. As part of a process of creating collective memory after disbanding the “ancient regime”, the reformers imagined the past as autocratic, oppressive, and hierarchic in opposition to a new culture of individual freedom and equality in order to delineate clear boundary between the past and the future. This process is similar to how intellectuals in Europe created their own dichotomy between traditional and modern society.
It is possible to encounter in the field or in writings on Confucianism a dichotomy between tradition and modernity. However, following Hobsbawm and Ranger, I understand
80 Charles Stafford, “Good Sons and Virtuous Mothers: Kinship and Chinese Nationalism in Taiwan,” Man 27:2 (1992): 363-378.
81 Republican anti-superstition campaigns and negotiations between various interested parties are discussed in detail in Rebecca Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity, Harvard University Asia Center, 2009; Shuk-wah Poon, Negotiating Religion in Modern China: State and Common People in Guangzhou, 1900-1937, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011. For discussion on displacement of local gods by national ones, or how Catholic devotional practices have been labelled as “superstitions“, see also
81 Republican anti-superstition campaigns and negotiations between various interested parties are discussed in detail in Rebecca Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes: Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity, Harvard University Asia Center, 2009; Shuk-wah Poon, Negotiating Religion in Modern China: State and Common People in Guangzhou, 1900-1937, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011. For discussion on displacement of local gods by national ones, or how Catholic devotional practices have been labelled as “superstitions“, see also