A doubt possibly cast on UV is that it seems to imply that any two virtuous people are identical in terms of moral character, since they are supposed to ultimately fully possess the same package of virtues. However, this is not a problem in Wolf’s version according to which a virtuous person can be virtuous in some respects, but not in others. Therefore, the observation that even moral paragons like Mother Teresa, Gandhi, and King individually displayed different excellences of character is readily accepted. In other words, the fact that virtuous people are of different sorts is perfectly consistent with the unity thesis, and it backs up Flanagan’s (1991) idea of the “varieties of moral personality”.
As noted, in response to the traditional notion that UV means that a virtuous person has to possess a full and complete complement of the virtues, Wolf (2007) contends that this need not be understood so strongly. In addition, Flanagan (1991) argues that the idea of “a full complement of virtues” is incomprehensible, because there are innumerable good traits of character which qualify as virtues, and new social circumstances may create new virtues.7 Thus, the idea cannot be exactly specified, and no one can afford to make a comprehensive list of the virtues in question (Flanagan, 1991, p. 10). In short, the notion of an individual possessing the full complement of virtues is inconsistent, and indeed, it is a nonstarter (Badhwar, 1996, p. 306; Flanagan, 1991, p. 10). One way to replace this tricky concept is to make a clearly specified list of virtues. In fact, this tactic is widely used in contemporary character education. Schools
7 For instance, environmental friendliness is a “relatively newly discovered virtue” (Swanton, 2001, p. 35).
are encouraged to cooperate with parents and other community members to arrive at a common consensus on the virtues which should be inculcated in their children. This practice may give a false impression that all pupils are expected to ultimately turn into virtuous people of the same sort of moral character, who are in full possession of all of the virtues on the list.
Taking to heart the ideas “virtuous people are of different sorts” and “virtuous people need not be alike”, I shall argue that the inculcation of virtues should pay sufficient attention to individual differences in terms of moral character. Among other things, temperament, social roles and occupations, and the pursuit of a different good life are suggested as certain main factors which may be conducive to the individualisation of moral character in question.
Temperament
The influence of temperament on the cultivation of moral virtues is briefly touched on in Aristotle’s treatment of natural virtue, but does not receive its deserved attention in contemporary character education discourse. If it is sensible to suppose that some character traits are more associated with temperament than others, and since temperament is largely innate, the acquisition of those character traits raises the issue of “moral luck”, and this idea is supported by some psychological evidence. For example, shyness as a personality trait is found to be highly related to heredity, and quite impervious to artificial intervention (Flanagan, 1991, p. 271), and since shyness is in conflict with warmth and gregariousness, if we are to acquire these two morally desirable traits, it is imperative to rid ourselves of the impact of shyness, at least to some extent. However, given the power of temperament, a shy person seems destined to have a gap in these respects (Flanagan, 1991, p. 271). That is, it is difficult, if not impossible for him/her to be a warm and gregarious person. The same point is captured very well by McKinnon (1999, p. 62):
If someone is naturally disposed to be lazy, she may find it difficult to develop virtues that require perseverance or industry. If someone is naturally
self-centred, she may find it difficult to appreciate the need to empathize with other humans…Of course, the converse of this holds as well: some people have generous, or relaxed, or energetic temperaments, any of which, in the absence of other countervailing factors, makes it easier for them to acquire certain virtues.
A striking implication of this thought for character-building is that character cannot be voluntarily constructed at will entirely irrespective of the constraints of temperamental dispositions or personality broadly, and for that matter, moral agents
“do not start their moral lives on a level playing-ground” and the issue of “moral luck”
turns up accordingly (McKinnon, 1999, p. 62).
In summary, given the effect of temperament on virtue, the individualisation of character is the natural consequence of the inculcation of virtues. In this regard, it is imperative for character educators to think about how to deal with the adverse effect some unfavourable temperamental dispositions may exert on the acquisition of certain virtues. Also, some favourable temperamental dispositions may pave the way for the cultivation of certain related moral virtues, and how to take advantage of this fortunate condition for educational sake needs to be thought about.
Social roles, occupations and different forms of life
Since different social roles and occupations and various forms of life tend to place more weight on varied virtues, and it is argued that people playing different social roles, assuming different occupations, or choosing different ways of life are apt to stress, and give priority to, different virtues. For example, courage is typically seen to be a military virtue, because military men are supposed to be constantly confronted with risky circumstances by the nature of their jobs, and therefore need to summon a great deal of courage, which demands a willingness to expose themselves to physical danger when necessary. By the same token, we are inclined to think that policemen and firemen also need this specific virtue far more than common people, since their courage is tested every day (Wolf, 2007, p. 157). In fact, the practice of assigning different virtues to
various social roles and occupations is not uncommon. For example, policemen are expected to be courageous, judges just, nurses compassionate, and so on.
Given this, some people may wonder whether someone who determines to lead a different kind of life, say, be a scholar, also needs courage. This doubt relates to the common problematic practice of defining a particular virtue too narrowly. For example, although courage is paradigmatically concerned with physical danger, it also involves other sorts of harm; likewise, generosity should not be confined to money giving, for it also concerns other valuable things, such as material goods, time, and emotional energy (Wolf, 2007, p. 158). As a result, generosity is no longer a privilege of the wealthy, and courage is not only needed by policemen and firemen. In general, they are fundamental traits for all good human lives. Although different social roles and occupations, and different forms of life, lay special emphasis on different virtues and require the various virtues to varying degrees, “any or almost any kind of life might have need of any of the basic virtues, abstractly defined (Wolf, 2007, p. 158).”8
In summary, two points must be taken into account, the first of which is that, since some basic virtues are essential to any good human life, they must be inculcated in each individual. The other is that, since people who assume different social roles and occupations, and pursue different forms of life, are inclined to stress different virtues, these factors affect the extent to which the various virtues are developed in different people. By and large, this corresponds to G. Watson’s analysis of two aspects of moral character, namely, virtue and style. The former stresses that whoever lives a worthwhile
8 A follow-up question is “what are basic virtues?” It is generally acknowledged that the answer is premised on how we define a good human life. Since what a good human life consists of is also under dispute, there is no common consensus on the content of basic virtues. This question is also raised by Oakley and Cocking (2001, pp. 31, 32), who ask “how do we determine what the basic virtues are, and thus, what a virtuous agent would be like?” A general answer is “which character-traits count as virtuous is determined by their involvement in human flourishing or their admirability”. In any case, the main point is that the virtues “cannot simply be taken as given; rather, they must be shown to reflect a commitment to an important substantive human good which contributes to our living flourishing human life (Oakley & Cocking, 2001, p. 75).”
life must give due concern to moral considerations which pertain to all the basic virtues, whereas the latter indicates that each life or character has a different focus and emphasis, which reveal one’s moral personality or moral individuality (Watson, 1984, pp. 64-66).
Two implications for character education are as follows. Firstly, the current practice of specifying certain virtues for inculcation is understandable, but a major problem with it is that the close connection between the virtues and a good human life, and the fundamental question of “why people need the virtues” is seldom addressed.
In this regard, Kohn (1997, pp. 160, 161) suggests that character education should engage students in a “deep, critical reflection about certain ways of being.” Secondly, the idea that basic virtues are demanded by any good human life does not mean that all morally good lives will manifest each of them equally (Watson, 1984, p. 66). In fact, different ideal lives pursue different virtues in varying degrees (Wolf, 2007, p. 158).
However, it should be noted that what is implied by the view is not the incompatibility of the virtues, but the impossibility of a particular way of life to give full and equal expression to all of the virtues (Watson, 1984, p. 65). In this case, the individualiszation of character comes from necessity.