Under the general idea that character is mainly composed of a number of character traits, character education is often devoted to the inculcation of specific virtues at the cost of constructing moral character as a whole, and the individualisation of moral character.9 To correct this defect, such ideas as moral identity and integrity (see Blasi,
9 Davidson’s (2005, p. 226) observation below is a case in point:
In other words, I would suggest that character education has broken character down into its composite elements, but has failed to present an adequate vision of character in its wholeness-especially for pre-adolescents and adolescents who acquire a deeper rationale of what it is and why it’s important.
2005, p. 96; Bohlin, 2005, p. 6; Davidson, 2005, p. 226) are proposed to remind us to consider the formation of moral character as a whole. Among others, Davidson’s criticism is representative, and is therefore worthy of a full citation:
Moral identity, I believe, is the missing piece of the character education puzzle, a theoretical concept that pulls the constituent pieces of character education practice into a coherent whole-even at elementary levels where identity formation isn’t an active developmental reality, the idea of moral identity offers a sense of direction and purpose, a reason for existing, for character education practices. (Davidson, 2005, p. 226)
The simple characterisation of character education in terms of the inculcation of virtues is at risk of overlooking the individual’s active role in constructing his/her character as a whole. Also, the important question of “what sort of person do I want to be?”, and the individualisation of character are less addressed. This is a missing piece of the puzzle of character education which needs to be recovered.
In summary, a more plausible interpretation of UV indicates that the integration of the virtues must accompany the conversion of local virtues to more global ones of necessity. For that matter, UV is a further step of the proposed notion of the conversion of virtue. It can be said that the more global one’s local virtues are, and the more integrated these virtues are with each other, the more virtuous one is. In this case, becoming more virtuous is judged both in terms of how global one’s acquired local virtues are, and the extent to which they are integrated with each other. Since this version of UV highlights the varieties of moral personality, the generally overlooked issue of the individualisation of character is proposed for further investigation.
Conclusion
In order to respond to Kohlberg’s suspicion whether or not character education is simply a duplication of the “bag of virtues” approach, it is imperative to elucidate the close connection among the various virtues which is rendered by the doctrine of the unity of the virtues. I suggest that considering its extreme demandingness and implausibility with respect to actual embodiment in real people, we should abandon the orthodox interpretation of Aristotle’s thesis of UV in favour of Wolf’s version of UV. Taking this weak interpretation of UV on board, character education can drive Kohlberg’s criticism away by highlighting the point that if the virtues are to be full, the inculcation of virtues along the spectrum from local to global must go along with the integration of the acquired virtues of necessity. For that matter, moral character is not barely the aggregation of the various freestanding virtues which are individually independent and detached one another; quite the contrary, they are organically united into a whole. Therefore, the more global one’s acquired virtues are, and the more integrated they are with each other, the more virtuous one is. Also, the doctrine of UV thus understood naturally brings out a missing piece of contemporary character education puzzle, i.e. the crucial issue of the individualisation of character, which is incarnated in the day-to-day observation that virtuous people are at bottom of different sorts.
Acknowledgments
This paper is a revised version of one chapter of my doctoral thesis. I would like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Graham Haydon, and two examiners of my doctoral thesis, Professor K. Kristjánsson and Professor P. Standish. Also, I thank the anonymous reviewers for offering helpful comments on this paper.
DOI: 10.3966/102887082013125904003
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