國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
The elusiveness of the poem, therefore, may require readers to re-define the signification of dream and dreaming. It raises critical questions such as on what ground and in what manner dream and dreaming insinuate an undecidability between positivity and negativity. The undecidability of dream and dreaming seems also to make vague and call into question the distinctive edge between dream and reality. To elucidate these preliminary questions about dream and dreaming, it seems particularly helpful to associate Jean Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra and simulation, which shares a thoughtful insight into the complexity of the simulacrum and its notorious play on differentiation of the imaginary and the alleged “reality.” With the work of Baudrillard’s concept of such matter, I intend to define Emily Dickinson’s dream as fantasy about pursuing the ideal, mainly focusing on the problem of signs which precede what is desired and the problem of hyper-reality signs formulate. I would also like to reveal in this chapter that the exemplary dream poems of Emily Dickinson, pregnant with the philosophical investigation of the simulacrum of ideals, not only shed a profound light on the distinctive uncertainty of the dream image but also give incredible insight into its sheer deceptiveness in a nuanced sense.
II. Warning against Dream and Dreaming
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
As seen earlier, the interpretively difficult dream poem “We dream – it is good we are dreaming –” is more surprisingly penetrated by an apparent tone of warning in its entirety. The dominant sense of warning seems traceable in the very beginning of the poem, in which the first two stanzas address a sensitive awareness of, as Helen Vendler suggests, “the intent to kill” (263) and, too, of the dubious playfulness of “the ghastly game being played in dream” (261). Vendler explores the warning signs sparkled in this poem. The sensitive awareness observed here not only clarifies the critical attention of warning which targets the playful but dangerous game of killing in dream, but also crystallizes, to some extent, the perilous aspect of dreaming which in fact can derive from the playfulness of the game-like practice of killing.
Noticeably, an attitude of sarcasm and scepticism is seen in the first two stanzas:
We dream – it is good we are dreaming – It would hurt us – were we awake – But since it is playing – kill us, And we are playing – shriek –
What harm? Men die – Externally – It is a truth – of Blood –
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
But we – are dying in Drama – And Drama – is never dead –
The playfulness, for instance, which arguably attaches to a game of fright, is interwoven with the obvious intent to hurt and kill. Just insomuch as the poem describes “it is playing – kill us / And we are playing – shriek –,” this sense of playfulness serves to victimize whoever indulges in dream. With a sense of dramatic embodiment, an experience of death perceived here seems to be neutralized rather as a certain on-stage performance in which the dream-victimized “we,” though escaping from its doom determined “Externally” in reality by “a truth – of Blood –,” becomes compelled to perform in the plot-like situation of being “dying in Drama.” As regards the staged scheme of victimization, the benign sense of dreaming, which accords with the assertion that “it is good we are dreaming –,” attracts critical attention of great scepticism. The assertion of positive dreaming, with this respect, become regarded as but a conditional occurrence. The “It” which “would hurt us – were we awake –,”
seems to refer more preferably to the fact itself that “we are dreaming –,” instead of reality.
Noticeably, the signal of warning is intensified when the poem proceeds to the last two stanzas which pattern a troop of words of notice such as “Cautious,” “Lest,”
and, again, “prudenter”:
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Cautious – We jar each other – And either – open the eyes –
Lest the Phantasm – prove the Mistake – And the livid Surprise
Cool us to Shafts of Granite – With just an Age – and Name – And perhaps a phrase in Egyptian – It’s prudenter – to dream –
These words of notice here magnify the potential ominous outcome of the ghastly game. The “We,” which is victimised by the act of dreaming, must seek for a means of prevention and self-preservation. Of great significance, the mechanism of defence here, followed by the reminder “Lest the Phantasm – prove the Mistake,” seems helpfully to ignite a critical attention of certain apprehension, while the end-scene of the game is portrayed as climaxing with an eager search for any “Mistake” which concerns the dramatic tension of duality between the cautious “We” and the aggressive “Phantasm.”5 Just as the last two stanzas contrive to elaborate, the
5 Vendler’s association, it seems that, serves to help with a deeper vision about the presence of the
“Phantasm.” Arguably, it seems discernible that the dramatic tension of duality may actually serve as just a pivotal aim of the warning signs, insofar as one may witness in between, as Vendler
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
“Phantasm” here seems not only embodied as the supreme executor of death which serves to terminate the game in dream, but also, more significantly, perceived as lurking as a fierce predator of preying upon the occurrence of a possible careless
“Mistake.”
The analogy of the predator-prey rivalry, to some extent, seems to amplify the dramatized embodiment of death. The wrongly behaved “We” meet with an
unexpected strike of “Surprise” so livid that the death-experience may be sinisterly visualized. Arguably, not only is the plot-like entrapping of being “dying in Drama”
clarified in an emphatic sense, as foreshadowing a later cruel macabre potential in a dynamic hunt game. An overwhelming picture of death-sentence also seems therefore manifested. The “Mistake” confirmed by “the Phantasm,” as the poem resolves, determines an utmost consequence of fixation which compels to “Cool us to Shafts of Granite – / With just an Age – and Name – / And perhaps a phrase in Egyptian –.”
Arguably, the last scene of the poem impressively presents a final judgement.
This judgment is also a consequence that derives from dreaming. It is a predicament that dreaming in fact brings massive signs of what is desired and dangerously fix anyone who dreams. “Age,” “Name,” “a phrase in Egyptian” in fact are something that a dreamer can dream of, in a way, indicating certain form of desire, prosperity, or
interestingly comes to inspire, a fierce rivalry of a deadly hunt between a predator and its desperately
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
success. Yet, to some extent, they are actually only signs. They are signs that not only precede what is desired but also, riskily, lead to a certain misery of dreamers.