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views between many social others and the poet herself, in terms of the dreamscape consisting of simulacral fantasies. Of most importance, a particular Dickinsonian panorama of whether the semiotic dreamscape is a show of utopian/dystopian dreaming will be also accordingly divulged in a rather in-depth, careful way.
Concerning the paradoxical complexity between the utopian/dystopian, as well as the equivocal nature of simulacra and signs in obliterating any oppositions, it is argued that Emily Dickinson’s poetry in fact unfolds a relatively hyper-real dimension of the dreamscape, which not only effaces any sharp boundaries between the utopian and the dystopian, but also severely defers and deters any intentions of clarification from any binary differentiation. The doubt that abides in Dickinson’s paradise and heaven poems does in a way record such an intensity of deferring and deterrence.
II. A Fairer Paradise in Doubt: Utopian or Dystopian?
The imagery of “paradise” in Dickinson’s poetry, as familiar to many readers, is at all times an important motif to note; it is not only dominantly discernible but also often intractably associated with its synonym of “heaven”. As many Dickinson poems display, the two distinctive terms are indeed intimately related and collocated, and few critical readings can even genuinely interrogate either of the concepts solely apart from the other. Critics such as Brian F. McCabe, Magdalena Zapedowska, and Barton
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Levi St. Armand, to name a few, read intensively the magnitude of the poet’s concern about the paradisiac. They mostly investigate her literary utilisation of both words
“paradise” and “heaven” preferably as a whole, or at least without any differentiation especially made in between.28 In an close inter-referentiality between the two
conceptual equivalents, these previous critical voices seem even to further posit the poet’s account of “paradise/heaven” in a rather positive light, where the alluringly delightful, encouraging nature of paradise/heaven is in particular witnessed.29 Indeed, in much of Dickinson’s writing, the prevalence of “paradise/heaven” is often typically conceived of as a token of elation and rapture, suggesting considerable benefits that can be possibly derived from its appearing beneficence.
However, just as in many other poems of hers, there is still an air of suspicion
28 Magdalena Zapedowska equals paradise to heaven in her unfolding of Dickinson’s quest for being
“the Citizen of paradise” and a guaranteed happiness in heaven (88). Barton Levi St. Armand also similarly implies the synonymy in his chapter title “Paradise deferred: Dickinson, Phelps, and the Image of Heaven” and as well in his reading of her poem “I went to Heaven –” (J 374), or “What is –
‘Paradise’ –” (J 215). Even Brian F. McCabe, who differently discusses the subject of heaven in his collected section “Heaven” in All Things Dickinson, also rarely pinpoints the divergences between the use of the two terms.
29 A good consistency of reading Dickinson’s paradise/heaven as positive can be detected from the critical point that centralises the home-like allegory.Apart from the dwelling of joy and ecstasy (Zapedowska 86-88), the paradise/heaven in Dickinson’s writing also alternatively postulates a certain domestic, private domain which combats and supersedes any other socially dominant dogmas in order to claim her personal individuality (St. Armand 129, 131, 136). This individual dimension of paradise/heaven in ways echoes Brian F. McCabe’s reading, which showcases her departure from the orthodox (439). Further, in the reading of Robert Weisbuch, the meaning of paradise(/heaven) is also
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that can be detected as prevailing deeply in much of her alleged “glorification” of paradise/heaven. A point of dubiety, at the moment, lies perceptibly in the curious distinction that stands critically between “paradise” and “heaven.” Of much
importance, no matter how semantically close they are, the two synonymous ideas, for Dickinson, are in fact still a pair of distinctive notions that not only possess certain discrepancies but also critically practise some serious otherness against each other. In a consistency of her famous definitional gestures, Dickinson’s delicate consideration of “paradise” and “heaven” surely in a way negotiates between the two neighbouring terms and offers readers with much critical space for crystallising the fine distinction in between.30
Consider, for example, the early mentioned Dickinson poem “‘Heaven’ has different Signs – to me –” (J 575):
“Heaven” has different Signs – to me – Sometimes, I think that Noon
Is but a symbol of the Place – And when again, at Dawn,
30 Just not unlike any of her definition poems, Dickinson never ceases to define concepts with a wide array of gestures deployed for this purpose. Given the relatedness between “paradise” and “heaven,”
the poem “‘Heaven’ has different Signs – to me –” (J 575), for example, belongs to the category in the sense that it can be recognised as a “differential” poem dealing with “fine distinction between neighboring concepts” (Jed Deppman, “Amherst’s Other Lexicographer” 126).
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A mighty look runs round the World And settles in the Hills –
An Awe if it should be like that Upon the Ignorance steals –
The Orchard, when the Sun is on – The Triumph of the Birds
When they together Victory make – Some Carnivals of Clouds
The Rapture of a finished Day Returning to the West –
All these – remind us of the place That Men call “Paradise” –
Itself be fairer – we suppose – But how Ourself, shall be Adorned, for a Superior Grace
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Not yet, our eyes can see –
Obviously, this rather philosophical poem indeed dedicates itself to proving the radical otherness that fundamentally lies within the polarity between the concepts of
“Paradise” and “Heaven.” Distinguishing within the particular enclosure of double quotations marks, the two concepts are both not only specified as two focal points under interrogation which are altogether exterior to other textual elements of the entire poems. In fact, they are also meanwhile levelled in a palpable intensity of comparison in which the conceptual gapping between the two is intensively discerned and examined. Certainly, a more personal, subjective hierarchical structure is in particular made as much noticeable in the contrasting parallelism between “Paradise”
and “Heaven.” It is the uniqueness and singularity of “Heaven” that, in the introductory line of the poem, are significantly signified with the “Signs” of
difference. It is also this peculiar specialness that sublimates the idea of “Heaven” to be rather conflictingly superior to its counterpart “Paradise,” which is yet limitedly only determined in a way of name-dropping from others or some passively provoked reminiscences. “Paradise,” in this manner, as opposed to “Heaven,” which is signified much differently, is relatively labelled as something that pertains only to an external realm of others (“Men”). The textual emergence of this “Paradise,” at the moment, seems particularly externalised as well to be a rather less lauded and celebrated
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existence, and its everlasting otherness, in a way, seems even to articulate an outside indirectness that distances the self (“me,” “I,” and “we”) from the entirety of the exteriority of experience. The discord between the self and others, indeed, finds expression especially in the contrast between the “me” and “Men,” which practically serves as an arguable example. Here, as the poem shows at the moment, the
discrepancy between “Heaven” and “Paradise” is never just a form of relationality involving the two contrasting differentials; instead, it essentially and even more extensively hints at the dynamics of how self and others contradict one from the other.
With the distinction that the poem hierarchically communicates between
“Paradise” and “Heaven,” Emily Dickinson’s image of the paradisiac is indeed different to something heavenly, and, in the sense, should not be just read as an expression of sheer glorification of any ecstasies. In fact, the image of the paradisiac in Dickinson’s writing is rather a distorted kind which, with its peculiar externality and certain distantness, demonstrates little reliability and yet considerable
dubiousness. The fundamental otherness of this discredited model of the paradisiac, in the sense, does not just question and diminish what conventionally defines a paradise.
Of most significance, a climate of uncertainty that circulates in the property of this
“Paradise” in this manner is also indicative of a much deeper vagueness that actually
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wanes and endangers the attributes of the utopian.31
The utopian imagery that comes with the mention of what the poem labels as
“Paradise,” for sure, is open to doubt. Albeit an intensive landscape of certain idyllic prosperity is displayed in the poem, a certain utopian state of a paradise is never tenaciously evidenced in such exquisite mapping of what seemingly constitutes the allure of the “Paradise.” In fact, with the sceptical tone of the last stanza of the poem, the glamorous impression of this “Paradise” is still seemingly left in severe doubt.
The seeming perfection of this “Paradise,” in the sense, is also likewise examined as little trustworthy in terms of its utopian aspect. Even the delirium cultivated within this “Paradise” is rarely able to postulate the very property of what may indicate any utopian delights. As the poem clarifies, it is the doubt about functionality, or
effectiveness, which serves to problematize the image of the utopian and thereby renders the entire constellation of “Paradise” conceptually as less utopian. While the
“Paradise” registers its euphoria in a plethora of certain pastoral marvels, such as some “Carnivals of Clouds” after the “Triumph of the Birds,” or the “Rapture of a finishing Day,” the beneficence that can be traced in this richly marvellous “Paradise”
31 Instead of focusing on a utopia, I suggest that Dickinson’s gesture of questioning can be more relatively regarded as aimed at dealing with the concept of what can be (seen as) the utopian. To highlight her literary treatment of the utopian rather than a utopia is to draw attention to not just a certain structure as a completion, but a state or a trait that can be extensively applied and even collected from a wide range of subjects. A larger-scaled significance of many Dickinson poems should be thus expanded and noted beyond any limitations of their supposed subjects.
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is seemingly not so much anything that may glorify or “adorn” any common minds in a divine sense, but instead just a sheer perception of fairness. As the poem critiques, the expression of this paradisiac fairness is in fact just a particular show of little authenticity which to some extent is only supposed or claimed in a comparative degree. It is at best a supposedly “fairer” thought of idealism which, as the expression
“we suppose” can thus tell, only circulates in a certain generally recognised understanding of how the outside world is perceived.
Certainly, the perception of such fairness in the “Paradise” is never an access to any sublime experiences. For the uncertainty about whether an individual can be glorified or “adorned,” this fairer “Paradise” indeed claims little possibility of
sublimation that may elevate one’s self. The sublimity of the “Paradise,” as indicated by the divine presence of “A mighty look” running “round the World” and settling “in the Hills,” in this sense, is thus a dubious concept, and perhaps can only be seriously taken as a fake, less authentic, or even radically simulated form of what is defined as
“the sublime.” Even “An Awe,”32 which seemingly supersedes “Ignorance” and perhaps accordingly overwhelms any viewing individuals in the “Paradise,” may be also similarly problematic. As the poem conclusively argues, it is what is later
32Interestingly, the “Awe” that is particularly pinpointed in the poem seems to indicate not so much an absolute singularity. The countable article “a” that precedes the word “Awe” in a way suggests the dynamic of the plentitude where in fact abounds a wide range of awes. The clue of this multiplicity
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signified as “a Superior Grace” that clearly plays an essential place for the divination of an individual mind. Yet, this particular “Grace” is noticed missing in this model of
“Paradise.” It is the absence, or the optic unattainability, of this particular “Superior Grace” that is ascribed to the inferiority of this now problematic “Paradise.”
Concerning the inability to elevate, this dubious model of “Paradise,” in the sense, can scarcely guarantee its utopian qualities to anyone involved.
Here with the failure of indicating any nature of the utopian, Dickinson’s literary “Paradise” indeed poses an array of questions that may subvert a positive view of referencing a traditionally benign paradise. However, it is seemingly also a mistake to define alternatively her focus on “Heaven” as a mere celebratory gesture of bestowing “a Superior Grace” onto the heavenly, or position the image of “Heaven”
in a higher, superior rank as opposed to the paradisiac. It is even slightly odd to thereby confirm the dystopian nature of the paradisiac but heighten the possible utopian qualities of the heavenly for just simple-minded binary differentiation. In fact, though there are some critical voices such as Brian McCabe that are seemingly aimed at the poet’s particular emphasis on the superiority of what is conceptualized as
“Heaven,” Emily Dickinson’s sceptical voice is still never exclusive of her
consideration of what denotes the idea of “Heaven.” For Dickinson, at least in her poetic writing, “Heaven” can be just as much questionable and untrustworthy as
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“Paradise” is now thought of. Rarely can one even at once determine whether the image of “Heaven” is utopian or superior among others.
Indeed, in terms of the question of being utopian or not, Dickinson’s “Heaven”
is nearly undefinable, and, in the sense, even possesses a great degree of ambivalence for its distinct semiotic texture. Certainly, as the first stanza of the Heaven-Paradise poem defines, “Heaven” is in fact also a certain constellation which distinctively comprises many “different Signs.” Here, as readers can see, the “Signs” that differently signifies “Heaven” are by no means elements from the dogmas of any strong metaphysics such as Christianity or any other grand narratives. Instead, as exemplified by the images of “Noon” and “Dawn,” which clearly indicate some moments in a common day, the “Signs” in particular are certain humble trifles that are mostly gathered from the very ordinary facet of life. With the ordinariness of these everyday trivial elements, it is seen that the so-called “Heaven” is not necessarily anything celestial or spiritual, but conversely, something which is largely mapped out by common daily life-things traced in a certain unspecified but divine “Place”.33 Most
33 Here in the poem, there is rather an interesting comparison/difference that the poet embodies in the word “place” by means of capitalisation. While the image of “Heaven” is located collectively in the capitalised “Place” as the first stanza shows, the “Paradise” by contrast is however bestowed onto a non-capitalised “place” as the fourth stanza clarifies. The “Place-place” parallel seemingly suggests not just alone a simple difference in between but more critically a radical hint of degradation that
“Heaven” is a “Place” now degraded to a certain “place” which is often mistakenly called
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importantly, it is particularly clear that the “Heaven” is actually the semiotic representation of what altogether composes everyday life.
However, it is just this sign-constructed nature that indeed makes the utopian quality of the “Heaven” controversial. Since it devises “different Signs” as its constructs, this particular “Heaven” in fact also offers a critical aspect of
indeterminacy that severely influences one’s perception of what is the utopian and not-utopian in his/her surroundings. Arguably, it is the indeterminacy of signs that takes an imperative role in deepening the vagueness in the polarity among the utopian and the not-utopian, and even radically dystopian. As Jean Baudrillard has been always reminding his readers, it is the gesture of signs, or simulacra, which blurs the clear division between any binary extremities and tends to hinder any existing dichotomies from being differentiated. Thus, with its sign-based composition, the
“Heaven” in Dickinson’s text also clearly exemplifies such escapism from any fine distinctions among utopian/not-utopian/dystopian, or even good/bad. For its semiotic texture, the distinction between good and bad seems also hardly located, and neither does the distinction between the utopian and dystopian. It is hard, in this manner, to differentiate whether or not “Noon” can be good and utopian. It is also a difficulty to recognise if “Dawn” suggests beneficence when it is just controversially part of certain various “Signs,” as the poem shows.
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Intriguingly, there is even an enigma that can be further traced in terms of the idea of the dystopian. In the sense, compared with the utopian, the dystopian is equally not likely differentiable. Since good and the utopian are not able to be located as from the image of “Heaven,” then to some extent, the dystopian, which by
definition stems from the opposite nature of the utopian as a certain dimension of bad, should be also a serious mystery. The alleged dystopian idea seems not likely (or not appropriately) able to be chained with the “Paradise.” Signs, for its equivocality, clearly subvert and even dismantle the fixation of the plane between good/bad,
utopian/dystopian. In this regard, though “Paradise” does little beneficence for its lack of some “Superior Grace,” the question of how or whether this “Paradise” can be thus found dystopian seems also an unanswerable mystery. The delicate elusiveness between “Heaven” and “Paradise,” in the end, seems merely to leave a certain state of what Baudrillard constantly identifies as hyper-reality in which survives only a signifier-signifier structure among the referential, with no referents.