Identity Conflicts between BETA Group and Ba Co
Identity 2: A shift in perceptions and usual practices
group headquarters’ specialty but Ba Co. could not overcome, to create his subordinates’ willingness to interact with group members. Building on informal links, technicians and managers in Ba Co. progressively learned some working practices or basic concepts from people who came from the group headquarters.
Identity 2: A shift in perceptions and usual practices
As for members of Ba Co., thanks to the guidance provided by individuals from the group headquarters, they were able to progressively overcome all the obstacles in the area of production, which had been placed in their path. As the production efficiency was beginning to improve and they were more acquainted with individuals from the other side, technicians and managers in Ba Co. gradually relaxed their hostile attitudes to BETA Group and were willing to adopt relatively open minds to some practices and ideas which their friends, who belonged to the BETA Group, poured into their knowledge pool. As one executive noted,
In the past, we did not need to record the current status of our machines and a history of maintenance.
The experience of machine maintenance was stored in maintenance workers’ minds. … [Afterwards,]
they (technicians from BETA Co.) implanted a sense of EAM (a machine management system developed by BETA Co.) in our minds. We [learnt how to] code each machine separately and keep track of it.
Furthermore, as a vice president stated,” via internal rotation and an exchange of visits, such production-related practices, [which the group headquarters instilled into the central mill of Ba Co.], were diffused and adopted by other mills.” This shows that social interaction served as a catalyst for change. People in Ba Co. gradually accepted professional knowledge transferred from the group headquarters, adjusted their daily production-related routines, and redefined their own attitudes to the group.
As for members of BETA Co., after interacting with the opposite side, they dispelled prejudice against Ba Co. because Ba Co.’s steady improvement in
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production performance and its shift in working styles gradually changed their minds and diminished negative stereotypes. As one supervisor noted:
The production in my mill is large in scale. We use seconds to calculate the volume of production.
In BETA Co., it only took 120 seconds to produce a product. …[In 2000,] we need more than 200 seconds to produce a product. After four consultants came [to our company], production rate [in my mill] was 160 seconds. …[Subsequently,] we ever invited the heads of BETA Co.’s labor union to visit our mill. They really appreciated our improvements.
Through social interaction, although conflicting parties did not change a large part of their identities or completely extricate themselves from an identity conflict trap yet, they did attempt to view one another as anything but the enemy. On one side, Ba Co. attempted to appreciate the opposite party’s merits and imitate the other side’s good practices, especially in production area. The opposite side, the group
headquarters, attempted to appreciate the transition in Ba Co., even though it did not extend to the whole company.
Interaction 2: Cutting off links with Alpha Group and expanding the boundary of connections within BETA Group
As suggested above, social interactions motivated members in Ba Co. to review usual practices whether they were outmoded or improper and to rethink what they believe defined the organization. The movement towards a new definition of who they are initiated a set of events that changed this picture dramatically. First, Ba Co.
adjusted a portfolio of its partners. Ba Co. cut off links with Alpha Group to signify that it decided to abandon its outdated thoughts, practices, and images. At the same time, it built links with members in BETA Group who could help it explore possible self. This partner selection decision represents a significant departure from previous policy. As the president noted: “After the acquisition, our comput er system still connected to the Alpha Group…. I decided to cut this connection to prevent them
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from having our information in hand. [Besides,] I would like to send a signal that we completely broke away from Alpha group.” Subsequently, Ba Co. signed a contract with Bh Co. (a group-affiliated firm) which specialized in setting up information system such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). The president stated:
Originally, Bh Co. was a section of technology division of BETA Co. (the group headquarters). [In the past,] BETA Co. drew ERP into the group and implanted its management policy, thoughts, and practices in it. After several years, this section was spun off into a separate company, Bh Co. The experience of setting up ERP and the management thoughts and practices implanted in this system became the core competence of Bh Co… We decided to invite it (Bh Co.) to set up ERP. This decision represented [that] we also accepted those management thoughts [which were developed by the group headquarters].
One executive illustrated the influence of ERP:
In the past, we did not have the habit of doing paperwork. When I would like to buy something, …If I was in a bad mood, I just wrote the item on the paper and delivered it to purchasing department. If I was in a good mood, I would give a brief description. …[After the launch of ERP,] I had to fill in a form on-line if I wanted to take a day off. If I would like to buy spare parts, I had to fill out an application form, including the provider, the item, the quantity, the reason, the application date, etc. … [Gradually,] we got used to it (ERP); everything has been well documented.
Apparently, partner selection acted as a trigger for a series of changes in Ba Co.’s usual practices which became progressively more consistent with those of BETA Group.
Second, figure 3.2 displayed the evolution of Ba Co.’s transaction network.
The dynamics of ego network change clearly indicated that Ba Co. actively and extensively built formal relationships with group members. This connection transition fully reflected Ba Co.’s attitudinal change and determination to adjust its partner portfolio for the sake of creating the feelings of membership and seeking appropriate and expected behavior which may give Ba Co. a new self-definition.
Furthermore, the arrows in figure 3.2 showed that sister affiliates could sell products
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and services to Ba Co. As the president stated,” My principle was very clear. We would like to build enduring relationships with group affiliates. I also transmitted this message to my subordinates. Therefore, if the price range was reasonable, I would choose group members as our providers.” Gradually, group members were aware that they could obtain strong support from Ba Co. As one president of a group-affiliated firm noted: ” When I were in financial straits, Ba Co. placed an order for our products to back me up. This order touched us all deeply. It gave me more support than the group headquarters did.” The strategy of building extensive
connections with sister affiliates helped Ba Co. to show its attitudinal change, to win sister affiliates’ gratitude, and to push them to reconsider what this newcomer stands for.
Third, by signing a technical exchange contract, Ba Co. further established formal and frequent contact with the group headquarters, not merely informal
friendships and infrequent relations as before. Moreover, Ba Co. expanded the scope of contact, covering different functional areas in BETA Co., not merely the production division. As one general superintendent put it:
We contracted with T division (the technology division of BETA Co.) to transfer technical knowledge to us…. [The function of] T division seems like a hub. When we came to them for advice or expertise, they would send individuals from varied functions or mills to us. …[For instance,] they sent people from T to help us develop oil drums. Technicians from W6 taught us how to maintain our machines in good condition. Brothers from Y5 gave advice on the improvement on product quality.
Such formal and frequent contact channeled not only technical knowledge but also non-technical ideas (such as shared values) into Ba Co. Ba Co. was able to reconstruct who they are with these new elements.
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2001 2002 2003
2004 2005 2006
FIGURE 3.2: The Evolution of Ba Co.’s Ego Network (to be continued)
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2007
FIGURE 3.2: The Evolution of Ba Co.’s Ego Network
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As we mentioned before, in identity 2, informal contact gave Ba Co. an
opportunity to make a comparison of production-related practices between both sides, to learn from the group headquarters, and to further change its attitude towards BETA Group. Clearly, informal contact breeds attitudinal change. Such attitudinal
change further initiated a series of shifts in the combination of connections via partner selection. First, departing from a prior way of choosing partners, Ba Co. cut off links with original partners such as Alpha Group to abandon outdated images but, meanwhile, built the links with BETA Group affiliates to explore new and possible self-definitions. The choice pushed Ba Co. to step forward on the way of changing thoughts and practices which gradually conformed to those of BETA Group. Second, Ba Co. established extensive relations with sister affiliates. On the one hand, it won other affiliates gratitude and affection. On the other hand, it pushed other affiliates to rethink what this newcomer represents. Third, Ba Co. built more formal and diversified connections with the group headquarters. On the one hand, staffs had more opportunities to interact with or learn from individuals coming from varied functional areas or mills in the group headquarters. On the other hand, the group headquarters progressively and imperceptibly instilled shared values or common characteristics in Ba Co.