3. Chapter Three: The Evolution of the English School
3.3. An Alternative Dimension of the Primary Institutions of the International Society
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power, are the midpoints of the purpose to understand the transitional order for international society, but there must be a better understanding of the evolution of international society as it differs from international societies from the nineteenth century to the Cold War.
3.3. An Alternative Dimension of the Primary Institutions of the International Society
Within the international society, as Bull marked this as ‘the anarchical society,’ the foundation of primary institutions plays a vital role in ordering “the players and the game of international relations, and to define what behavior is and is not seen as legitimate” (Buzan, 2010, p. 6). These institutions, such as sovereignty, non-intervention, international law, diplomacy, and the great power management, allow the society of states to compile a common value with principles, norms, and rules, but these primary institutions are not static structures in the society. Instead, they are
“dynamic and always evolving” that could drive the evolution of international society (Buzan, 2010, p. 7).
This thesis sets the arena in a time of an order transition and not of a power transition. According to Buzan and Goh (2020), power transition of the international order is merely when a dominant power hands over the ‘baton’ to another, which usually occurs after a war or reluctantly. Here, from the classic realist scholars, such as E.H. Carr, Robert Gilpin, and Paul Kennedy, they argue that the “international order is a byproduct of the concentration of power, [where] order is created by a powerful state” (Ikenberry, 2018c, p. 19). However, Ikenberry (2018c) stated that the international order is not just of power and a political formation, but of being complex already by being ‘multilayered’ and ‘multifaceted.’ Hence, from an order transition, it
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does not entirely have to be like the process of a power transition, but instead of a
“significant alterations in the common goals and values, rules of the game, and social structure of international society.” As an order is in a transition, the members of international society also change with its primary institutions as “becoming obsolete (e.g. imperialism, dynasticism, human inequality) and [as] new ones arising
(nationalism, the market, environmental stewardship)” (Buzan & Goh, 2020; Goh, 2013).
In this thesis, though the five primary institutions are always interrelated, it mainly focuses on two of the primary institutions, the great power management and balance of power. However, again, as international society is a social institution with norms and rules, its norms and rules could gradually evolve differently and affect the primary institutions. A clear example of the evolution of a primary institution is ‘war.’
According to Parreñas (1990, p. 209), with the transition of the Cold War international order to the Post-Cold War era, there was a ‘shift of dimensions of conflicts from East-West to North-South, but it was a change from ‘military confrontations’ to issues of trade and economic development. Even according to Buzan, there is an apparent decrease in wars between great powers these days. Thus, causing the international security to emerge into a more aspect of a non-military agenda and be more noticed on the non-traditional security (NTS), like economic security, environmental security, and cyber-security. This evolution of the international society not only shifted its traditional security to NTS but has also affected how the great power management should be seen that has been altered in a different view from Bull’s presumption on the roles of great powers (Buzan, 2015, p.
128; Cui & Buzan, 2016, p. 181; Bull, 2012, p. 200). The main principle of great power management is those who are considered ‘great powers’ have ‘special rights
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and responsibilities’ for the international society to be stable and peaceful, but some aspects of great power management have evolved, particularly of the balance of power and the sphere of influence. Therefore, the traditional balance of power has been usually defined by the use of military forces and capability from each state to another. However, there seems to a growing change in the limitations of the term
‘balance of power.’ In particular, there are two types of balance of power: adversarial balance of power and associational balance of power. Nevertheless, the first to understand that point, we must know the purposes of great powers and the transition of its management for international society.
3.3.1. Great Power Management
For the first primary institution of an international society, which has crucial roles in stabilizing and maintaining peace between great powers and nongreat powers, it is the great power management. With having the focus on great power management, it brings the spotlight on more actors rather than doing theories of unipolarity or power transition (Marquez & Spanakos, 2014). From Bull’s perspective, this exclusive institution is quite unique for it has ways to “manage relations with one another [of great powers] in the interests of international order by” six ways:
(i) preserving the general balance of power,
(ii) seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another, and (iii) seeking to limit or contain wars among one another. They exploit their preponderance in relation to the rest of international society by
(iv) unilaterally exploiting their local preponderance, (v) agreeing to respect one another's spheres of influence, and
(vi) joint action, as is implied by the idea of a great power concert or condominium.
(Bull, 2012, p. 200)
In other words, great powers of international society are “regulating the boundaries within” of where each great power exert their influence to preserve the society of the
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international order. Great powers do not want to disrupt the society even if there might be rivalries between them. For that, they want to maintain the balance of power, manage conflicts, limit wars, and most importantly to be legitimate to take leadership for the society on a ‘central direction’ to uphold the stability and peace among the states (Goh, 2011b, p. 2).
The great power management is considered a vital point of an international society. According to Benjamin Zala, the one hallmark that differs from international society from the international system is the management of the great powers with its
‘recognized patterns of shared practices’ and its mix of norms, rules, and principles.
This hallmark is the foundation of an international society where the nongreat powers allow the great powers to have ‘special rights and responsibilities’ by its status. Thus, this is “at its core, a social arrangement” (Zala, 2019, p. 4).
From the perspective of the international society approach, in the international order under anarchy, great powers are the ones that are capable to “manage
international conflicts more effectively than other agents.” As Miller (1995, p. 14) stated, the reason for this is because, as great powers set the roles in the international society, they are “related to a combination of their lesser vulnerability; relatively high self-sufficiency; and superior diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities…as well as their global interests and system-wide concerns.” Of these capabilities, these great powers are able to have ‘special rights’ “to enjoy sphere of influence, privileged positions in international organization and the ability to set the agenda for multilateral diplomacy” (Zala, 2019, p. 2),however they have the responsibility to manage and act as leaders with one another to act for a common goal, such as either in crisis or threat.
Again, of the evolution of international society, by focusing on traditional security to NTS, it has also affected the great power management, especially of the
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“different meanings and roles…and how they play into the legitimacy that [great power management] requires” (Cui & Buzan, 2016, p. 181). During the Cold War, Bull had been “firmly rooted in traditional, military-political security agenda” for great powers management, but it has gradually changed the function of the security of international society (Cui & Buzan, 2016, p. 195). One central security of the NTSs that has been a growing priority for society is the global economic governance (GEG).
Of the GEG, as according to Cui and Buzan (2016, p. 199), the great powers not only have a pluralist goal of aiming to have a peaceful coexistence but also a GEG’s solidarist goal to facilitate “trade and finance across state boundaries [in the hope to]
increase wealth and development faster than protectionist alternatives.” Therefore, as this thesis focuses on infrastructure development in Southeast Asia as China and Japan invest to gain influence, we must put this idea later on of the thesis. Both China and Japan are considered the indigenous great powers of Asia, and we must wonder how they would react to maintain the peace and stability of the international society.
Nevertheless, the third term balance of power must be understood as it is one of the crucial ways great powers must attain for the international society.
3.3.2. Balance of Power
One of five primary institutions of an international society have remained problematic by its designation and its prominence for international society. Of the five main primary institutions, that primary institution is the ‘balance of power.’ Andrew
Hurrell, an English School scholar, had acknowledged that the ‘balance of power’ was undeniably “the most important foundation for Bull’s conception of international society” (Bull, 2012, p. xix).Bull had even judged that the ‘balance of power’ had facilitated to provide “the conditions in which other institutions on which
international order depends are able to operate.” He continues to claim that the
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‘balance of power’ “underpins the other four institutions.” However, in comparison to Bull’s ‘balance of power,’ Richard Little claims that “all five institutions are mutually interdependent.” According to Little, the ‘balance of power’ is only capable to remain by of the “existence of the other institutions.” Here, as there is a mutual
interdependence, the balance of power, to some degree, “impinges on every aspect of Bull’s conception of an international society” (Little, 2007, p. 128). Thus, as it is fairly debated, there first must be an understanding what is the sense of the ‘balance of power’ and later convey how Little’s stance refutes Bull’s view.
The concept of ‘balance of power’ existed for a prolonged period habitually from the realist standpoint as being the “mainsprings of international politics.”
However, there are yet no acceptable methods on the ‘balance of power’ as its
“meaning and significance have been bandied about for three centuries” (Smith, 1999, pp. 72-73). Even, of de Vattel from the eighteenth century, where he described the
‘balance of power’ as a “state of affairs…[where] no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can lay down the law to others” (Bull, 2012, p. 97).
Nevertheless, Bull (2012, p. 102) declares that the ‘balance of power’ implies
“‘self-restraint’ as well as the restraint of others.” While in contrast, Little (2007, p.
135) deems the ‘balance of power’ is to “preserve an arena where the units are independent.” Here, the balance of power is not merely focusing “to preserve their own autonomy, but also [to] acknowledge a common interest in maintain the essential characteristics of the society within which they operate.” Consequently, the ‘balance of power’ may well become “possible the existence of a diverse communities of states” (Smith, 1999, p. 72).For that, there must be a clear understanding of the fundamental concept of ‘power.’
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However, this general idea of ‘power’ is difficult to define as it is a contested concept. Nevertheless, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. gives us a definition to start with, in which he described that ‘power’ is “the capability to do things and in social situations to affect others to get the outcomes we want.” Of this definition, he is aware that this is entirely “interchangeable” to what some people would consider this as ‘influence.’
From Nye’s perspective (2011, pp. 5-6), he sees that “we live in a web of inherited social forces, some of which are visible and other of which are indirect.” There are two types of power. Of one view of power, this is seen power by the state’s resources and its outcome with it, while for the other is based on the state’s behavior outcome to affects another actor to reach its outcome (see Figure 4.2) (Nye, 2011, p. 10).