中日在東南亞之間進行基礎設施投資的“新大競爭”: 過渡國際秩序的英國學派分析 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in AsiaPacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University 政治大立. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. y. Nat. 過渡國際秩序的英國學派分析. n. al. er. io. sit. 中日在東南亞之間進行基礎設施投資的“新大競爭”:. iv. n Investment A ‘New GreatCGame’ of Infrastructure U h i e h n c in Southeast Asia: between China and g Japan An English School Analysis. Student: Andrew Lee 李嘉和 Advisor: Chiang Chia-Hsiung 姜家雄. 中華民國 109 年 9 月 September 2020. DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(2) 中日在東南亞之間進行基礎設施投資的“新大競爭”: 過渡國際秩序的英國學派分析 A ‘New Great Game’ of Infrastructure Investment between China and Japan in Southeast Asia: An English School Analysis. 研究生：李嘉和. Student: Andrew Lee. 治政大 Chia-Hsiung 指導教授：姜家雄 Advisor: Chiang 立. 碩士論文. y. n. er. io. sit. ‧. ‧ 國. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. Nat. al. 學. 國立政治大學. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. A Thesis. Submitted to International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies National Chengchi University In partial fulfillment of the Requirement For the degree of Master in Asia-Pacific Studies. 中華民國 109 年 9 月 September 2020 ii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(3) 摘要. 隨著中國的崛起，對於中國在亞洲乃至世界範圍內的影響力，有許多悲觀的批評家。即使美國在該地區的影響力和全球領導力明顯下降，日本也需要對中國應該不僅在該地區而且在世界秩序中占主導地位之前應採取的行動作出迅速有效的反應。儘管日本仍被認為是亞洲. 政治大. 的經濟大國，但無論從軍事上還是從經濟上來說，中國都比日本強. 立. 大。日本將如何應對中國的影響力擴大？本文旨在分析中日之間的持. ‧ 國. 學. 續關係，因為隨著基礎設施投資已成為必不可少的因素，競技場似乎正在從西方主導的國際秩序轉移過渡秩序。本文試圖闡明兩個亞洲大. ‧. 國在東南亞地區投資基礎設施建設時的相互作用。因此，隨著國際秩. sit. y. Nat. 序從西方主導的自由國際秩序向更加平衡的國際秩序的過渡，中日關. er. io. 係導致了一種不同的方法，並進入了新的“平衡”競爭與合作階段。確. n. 保國際社會的和平與穩定？ a. iv l C n hengchi U. 關鍵字：中國，一帶一路，英國學派，基礎設施投資，日本，東南亞. iii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(4) Abstract. With China’s rise, there are multiple pessimistic critics on China’s influence in Asia and even around the world. Even with the apparent decline of the U.S. influence in the region and of the global leadership, Japan needs to respond efficiently and quickly on what it should do before China could dominate not only the region but of the world order. Though Japan is still considered an economic giant in Asia, China is even stronger than Japan,. 政治大. both militarily and economically. How would Japan respond to China’s. 立. expansion of influence? This thesis is intended to analyze the ongoing. ‧ 國. 學. relationship between China and Japan as the arena seems to shift a transitional order from the Western-led international order as infrastructure. ‧. investment has become an essential factor. This thesis seeks to clarify the. sit. y. Nat. interaction between the two indigenous Asian great powers as they invest in. er. io. infrastructure development in Southeast Asia. Therefore, with the transition. n. a lfrom the Western-led liberal of the international order i v international order to n. C. U a more balanced internationalhorder, between China and e n giscthe h irelationship Japan leading to a different approach with a new stage of a ‘balanced’ competition and cooperation to secure the peace and stability of the international society?. Keywords: China, Belt and Road Initiative, English School, Infrastructure Investment, Japan, Southeast Asia. iv DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(5) Table of Contents. Abstract ..........................................................................................iii List of Figures ............................................................................... vii Chapter One: Introduction ........................................................... 1 Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 The Gap in the Literature ..................................................................... 7 Methodology ......................................................................................... 8 The Structure of the Thesis ................................................................... 9. 治. Chapter Two: Literature政 Review ............................................... 12 大. 立. International Relations in East Asia ....................................................12. ‧ 國. 學. Development Assistance between China and Japan ........................... 19 English School of International Relations Theory ..............................23. ‧. Chapter Three: The Evolution of the English School .............. 26. sit. y. Nat. Introduction .........................................................................................26. er. io. The Concept of International Society .................................................27. n. An Alternative Dimension of the Primary Institutions of the al v i Ch International Society............................................................................ 32 Un. engchi. Great Power Management ...................................................................34. Balance of Power.................................................................................36 Sphere of Influence .............................................................................40 Balance of Influence............................................................................47 Conclusion ........................................................................................... 49. Chapter Four: The Sino-Japanese Relations – The Existence of Coexistence & Cooperation ........................................................ 53 Introduction .........................................................................................53 The Expansion of the Belt & Road Initiative ......................................55 Readdressing Japan’s Role of its ODA in China ...............................57 v DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(6) A Connection of Interdependency between the Giants .......................64 The Challenges of the BRI & the Reemergence of ODA ................... 68 The Needs of Investment.....................................................................68 The Western Donors and the East Asian Donors ................................70 The Challenges ....................................................................................73 The Reemergence ................................................................................76 Conclusion: The Coexistence & Cooperation .....................................79. Chapter Five: The Revitalization of Roles & the Expansion ... 83 Introduction .........................................................................................83 Historical Background.........................................................................87. 政治大. The Sino-Japanese Relations in Southeast Asia .................................91. 立. The Balancing the Influence in Southeast Asia ................................ 100. ‧ 國. 學. The Mekong Region ..........................................................................102 Indonesia ...........................................................................................106. ‧. The Philippines ..................................................................................107. y. Nat. Malaysia ............................................................................................109. io. sit. Myanmar ...........................................................................................110. n. al. er. Thailand .............................................................................................113. iv. Vietnam ............................................................................................. 115 C Un. hengchi. Conclusion .........................................................................................116. Chapter Six: Conclusion – A Transitional International Order? ......................................................................................... 119 References ................................................................................... 125. vi DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(7) List of Figures and Tables. Figure 3.1: The Spectrum of International Societies .........................................................29 Figure 3.2: Power as Resources and Power as Behavioral Outcomes ...............................38 Figure 3.3: Keal’s Diagram of Five Categories of Relationship .......................................42. 治政 Table 3.4: Costa Buranelli’s Instances of Acceptance大 of/Resistance to Hegemony .........46 立 ‧ 國. 學. Figure 4.1: Japan’s Bilateral ODA Total on China............................................................63. Figure 4.2: Japanese Economic Aid to China ....................................................................64. ‧. y. Nat. Table 4.3: Infrastructure Investment Needs by Sector, 2016-2030 (US$ billion in 2015 prices) .................................................................................................................................69. sit. Table 4.4 Indicative Investment Needs for Regional Infrastructure by. er. io. Regional/Subregional Programs and Sector (US$ billion) ...............................................69. n. a. v. l C Projects in Southeast Table 5.1: Number of Infrastructure n i Asia .......................................92. hengchi U. Figure 5.2: FDI Inward Flow to ASEAN by China and Japan, 2009-2018 .......................93 Figure 5.3: FDI Inward Flows to ASEAN by China and Japan, 2013-2018 .....................93 Figure 5.4: Present Configuration of East-West Economic Corridor, North-South Economic Corridor, and Southern Economic Corridor .....................................................94. vii DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(8) Chapter One: Introduction This thesis is to analyze the ongoing relationship between China and Japan in an arena that seems to shift a transitional order from the Western-led international order as infrastructure investment has become an essential factor. With the continuous rise of China, the Western-led international order has been alerted of an impending transition of the international order, but many questions such as how this transition would affect the system of states and whether there is a power transition of leadership remain unanswered. However, the primary aim is not to provide indications that China is. 政治大. approaching the leadership to establish a new global international order with new. 立. norms and rules. Instead, this thesis aims to illustrate that though China has been. ‧ 國. 學. becoming a growing global power of the current international order, China is not the. ‧. only state that has the chance to play a crucial role in the inevitable transition of the international order. For that in mind, Japan, in this situation, is one of the states that. y. Nat. n. al. er. io. international order.. sit. have the opportunities to be one of the crucial powers to affect the transitional. Ch. i n U. v. Several scholars, from various backgrounds, have mentioned that there is a. engchi. possible end of the liberal international order and a change of cycle to a rise of the non-Western powers, not particularly, from the Brexit and the election of United States President Donald Trump, but beyond Post-September 11, 2001 and the U.S. ongoing involvement in the Middle East (Chaisse & Matsushita, 2018, p. 184; Ikenberry, 2018a; Jones, 2019; Paikin, 2020). However, they see the international order in a transition, not particularly in the Middle East, but more in East Asia with the escalating economic growth and competition with the rising nationalism and identity politics (Sohn & Pempel, 2019; Lauridsen, 2019). They are worried about the. 1 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(9) decline of the American-led order and question whether “how the [Chinese Belt and Road Initiative]…might impact the international normative system with new governance standards” (Carrai, 2018, p. 144). Intensively from many scholars, China has been deemed a “China threat” for these years, particularly to the U.S. and Japan, which China seems to be “remodeling the current international economic and geopolitical order” (Chajdas, 2018, p. 416) with the start of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With the enduring rise of China, there are multiple pessimistic critics on China’s influence in Asia and even around the world. Undeniably, it is difficult to. 政治大. disagree that there is a growing concern with China’s rise, especially for Japan, with. 立. the maritime disputes on the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Even with the. ‧ 國. 學. apparent decline of the U.S.’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region and of the global. ‧. leadership as once being the “key guardian of regional order in Asia” (Yoshimatsu, 2019, p. 2). China has been claimed of approaching to take the leadership on the shift. y. Nat. er. io. sit. of order and been considered “an illiberal power” that would diminish the liberal order, of its open free trade and economic interaction and the establishment of the. al. n. iv n C rule-based order. However, fromhthe 1970s to the present, e n g c h i U China has evolved and. liberalized “its economy domestically, and by promoting free trade agreements,…and the creation of infrastructure for increasing connectivity and trade in Eurasia with an emphasis on state rule; it is also contributing to liberalizing trade and investment relations” (Carrai, 2018, p. 136). However, according to Maria Adele Carrai, we do not know whether China or its BRI is aiming to replace the liberal order, but what we do “know is that they want to break away from the traditional donor-recipient model of the Western nations, shifting the focus to developing countries, to invest in. 2 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(10) infrastructure, and are less prone to use political conditionality” (Carrai, 2018, p. 144). The infrastructure development has been a crucial factor for the advancement of the globalized international order as developing countries have been desiring to develop quicker and bigger than ever. With the encouragement of foreign investments, it plays a ‘pivotal role’ for many countries, especially developing countries in development. These developments in developing countries allow them to evolve with “a sound economic structure; [to increase] and [diverse] manufacturing; [offer] novel and more developed services; [create] employment; and [bring]. 政治大. innovative technology; [and] economic and political ties with other nations” (Chaisse,. 立. Ishikawa, & Jusoh, 2017b, p. 13). In 2014, the United Nations Conference on Trade. ‧ 國. 學. and Development (UNCTAD) had announced that developing countries in Asia. ‧. became the largest investing region of the world. Even several countries around Asia had started to invest in Asia more often, such as China, South Korea, Malaysia,. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. These needs of investments not only affected each of the states’ investment regionally but internationally as with a change of direction of. al. n. iv n C the international investment agreements where developing countries are h e n g(IIAs) chi U. starting to call for a “balanced and negotiated terms in future IIAs” to be considered equal in investment agreements between the donors and the recipient countries (Chaisse, Ishikawa, & Jusoh, 2017a, p. 2). Even for the donors, it allows these states to have better economic and political connections with other countries (Chaisse, Ishikawa, & Jusoh, 2017b, p. 13). Thus, according to Chajdas, the BRI “may be perceived as a new model of development aid” (Chajdas, 2018, p. 417) to shift the formation of the international order where there could be a balance between the donors and the recipients.. 3 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(11) Therefore, indisputably, Southeast Asia is an essential region to both China and Japan strategically and economically. For example, for China, its foreign trade is intensely relying up to 90 percent on maritime transportation, of which 75 percent of them are crude oils that pass through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. As one scholar stated, the passage from the Indian Ocean passing through the strait to China is a ‘lifeline’ for China (Kuo, 2018, p. 47). The same goes for Japan as around 92 percent of its crude oil and 50 percent of its natural gas imports pass through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. That maritime line is a ‘lifeline’ to Japan, too, considering its energy dependency (Lam, 2018, p. 159; Koga, 2019, p. 299). For. 政治大. some scholars, they see the two to compete to secure their security by gaining. 立. influence, not by military forces, but by official development assistance (ODA) and. ‧ 國. 學. foreign direct investment (FDI) as the region's necessity of development assistance. ‧. have been demanded more than ever. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Asia needs approximately US$14.7 trillion. y. Nat. er. io. sit. for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure by 2030, which more than half of the investment needs are for energy and power (56 percent). A third of it is needed. al. n. iv n C for transport infrastructures, 32 percent total (OECD, 2018, p. 6). With these h e nofgthe chi U. growing demands for investments, scholars have called it a race, a new ‘Great Game’ where China and Japan are competing to be named the “master builder” of infrastructure in Southeast Asia (Lam, 2018, p. 168; Yamamoto, 2020a). The relationship between China and Japan has always been lopsided of the balance in East Asia. Still, nonetheless, they could never avoid one another as both are considered the great powers of the region. Though their rivalry has been leading the two great powers of stepping closer to the edge of the cliff, they would, especially at this time, never yearn to go too far with any of the use of forces against one another. 4 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(12) that could lead to a hostile conflict and an unstable region. The relationship between them is what some scholars describe the relations with ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics.’ Their economic relationship is essential on both sides, which makes them interdependent, even if they could despise one another. From 2013 to yet in 2019, their relationship has been complicated to be unknotted, but it is slowly being untightened. Such as, in late 2018, the Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo have concurred that they plan “to realign their bilateral relationship in accordance with three key principles: ‘shifting from competition to cooperation,’ ‘forging a relationship as partners, not as threats,’ and developing a free. 政治大. and fair trade regime,’” (Kawashima, 2018). For that, it would be tough for Japan to. 立. go against China, especially now.. ‧ 國. 學. This thesis seeks to clarify the interactions between the two indigenous Asian. ‧. great powers (China and Japan) as they invest in infrastructure development in the developing countries of Southeast Asia. Here, though there has been an ongoing. y. Nat. er. io. sit. rivalry between China and Japan, as each has different perspectives on other, I aim to set on an unbiased view. For throughout history on any event, history is either seen. al. n. iv n C divided between heroes and villains, winners and losers from one h ebetween ngchi U. perspective. However, in the reality of our international order, it is more complicated to classify one from another. With the current situation with the growing rise of China and spread of China’s influence from its BRI, many Western states, particularly the U.S., had the notion that China is the one that aims to dissolve the current international order. Even with the ongoing trade dispute between the U.S. and China, it has not only weakened their relationship but in fact, it had demeaned other states to persuasively lean on one’s side, such as an example of the restriction on China’s Huawei and its 5G technology.. 5 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(13) But from other states, particularly for Japan and countries in Southeast Asia, they are setting their approaches on how the shift of the international order would play on in the future. In that, Japan is one of those states that presents an opportunity to become a global power to balance the leadership between the United States and China as Japan has already started to be involved in various regions, particularly in Southeast Asia, to offer an alternative choice in investment as the BRI continues to expand. To an extent, PM Abe has led and allowed Japan to raise the country’s regional and global influence (Sohn & Pempel, 2019). Therefore with China’s influences in various. 政治大. countries with its expansion on the BRI and as Japan is beginning to cooperate more. 立. with China not only within their region but also beyond the region, Japan would not. ‧ 國. 學. completely allow China to manipulate and suppress developing countries. Of not only. ‧. that, Japan wants to maintain a balance of influence of the region with China’s approach on development assistance by offering and retain its alternative approach to. y. Nat. er. io. sit. countries instead of the BRI, thus allowing these countries to have a more extensive power of negotiating with China, and to stand firm with the existing norms and rules. n. al. i n C h international order. of the region during this transitional engchi U. v. With the growing possibility of a transition of the international order from the. Western-led international order to a more ‘balanced’ international order (Ikenberry, 2018b), this thesis aims with the question: is the relationship between China and Japan leading to a different approach with a new stage of a ‘balanced’ competition and cooperation of the two Asian giants to secure the peace and stability of the (regional) international society for the coming future? However, to respond to that question, we must first examine and articulate these five questions: What is the status of the relationship between China and Japan? Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) a. 6 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(14) danger to the world’s security and economy from China’s expansion of influence? Is there an infrastructure development race between China and Japan? What is Japan’s role as the United States’ global leadership dampens and as China rises? And, is Japan capable enough to balance China’s expansion of influence in each region of the world? With these questions set in mind, we could understand the complexity of the relationship between China and Japan, and not from a narrow perspective. Besides, in a broader sense, by evaluating these points, we may not only indicate the alteration of the relationship between the two indigenous great powers of East Asia, but reveal a signal of a transparent process of a transitional international order.. 政治大 1.1.Gap in the Literature 立. ‧ 國. 學. In this thesis, there are multiple gaps in the literature with the coming transition of the international order from the Western-led international order and the understanding of. ‧. International Relations (IR) in East Asia, particularly of the existence of China in the. y. Nat. sit. Asia-Pacific region. Overall, several scholars have mentioned that there is a growing. n. al. er. io. number of rising or reemerging powers that are beginning to make use of their power. Ch. i n U. v. to influence the international system (Beeson, 2019) and see a beginning of a. engchi. transition from the end of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, though only one superpower had triumphed over the other, new great powers are rising and claiming to accumulate a ‘new, stable international order’ (Goh, 2011b). However, according to Benjamin Miller, he stated that the “contemporary international relations theory fails to provide an adequate and parsimonious model that can both explain patterns of great power cooperation and conflict in earlier eras and predict these patterns for the post-Cold War era” (Miller, 1995, p. 1). In other words, there is a gap in IR theory as most of the perspectives have been observed by the Western view and not much by the non-Western perspective, especially considering the ongoing 7 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(15) international order. Besides, as there are still gaps in IR theory from a non-Western perspective, it would also bring a gap to the relationship between China and Japan and the infrastructure investment in Asia. The region of East Asia is complicated as each country has a unique behavior to each other. Still, there are certain common norms and rules between them, considering the growing need for infrastructure investment in Asia. Therefore, Chapter Two aimed to fill in the gaps of the IR in Asia and investment assistance, respectively.. 1.2.Methodology. 政治大. Though recently there are growing tensions between China and the United States with. 立. the ongoing trade dispute and the territorial disputes in Asia, most perspectives of IR. ‧ 國. 學. seems significantly indulged in a realist view with traditional security issues, such as with the growth of military spending. Even the aspect of the return of the ‘sphere of. ‧. influence’ is questioned if the international order is becoming similar to the Cold War,. y. Nat. sit. with another Cold War between the United States and China. However, several. n. al. er. io. scholars, particularly Chinese scholars, have argued that the ‘sphere of influence’ is. i n U. v. “out-of-date in the 21st century” (Cui T. , 2016) and that China “does not want to be. Ch. engchi. the predominant power in the Asia Pacific, or build sphere of influence and military alliance” (Liu Z. , 2016). Even Xi Jinping has called that China’s “Belt and Road infrastructure and investment initiative in attempts to reassure global critics…‘is a pursuit not to establish China’s own sphere of influence, but to support common development of all countries” (MOFA, the People's Republic of China, 2016). Therefore, in this thesis, the English School of IR theory approach is articulated as the fittest theory of IR to observe China’s BRI and Japan’s role in a region. The English School offers us an alternative choice from either going from a realist perspective or a liberal institutional approach. Though the English School is 8 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(16) still considered a new and broad IR theory, it allows us to investigate in a flexible way that tolerates us to investigate IR in Asia better, particularly with the use of the balance of power and the sphere of influence. Both concepts of the balance of power and the sphere of influence have been debatable for decades, but with the English School, it opens up a different perspective from an adversarial point of view to an associational viewpoint, particularly as the international order seems to be going through a process of transition of the post-Cold War. With the use of the English School approach, it opens up the international order better by a ‘web of norms and rules’ among the members than just of ‘a simple hierarchy’ (Goh, 2013).. 政治大. Nevertheless, Chapter Three would focus on the English School approach to define. 立. and contemplate the international society, the management of the great powers, the. ‧ 國. 學. balance of power, and the sphere of influence.. ‧. 1.3.The Structure of the Thesis. y. Nat. sit. Overall, the central theme of this thesis is to examine Japan’s approach toward. n. al. er. io. China’s extension of influence from its Belt and Road Initiative on whether Japan is a. Ch. i n U. v. crucial player in Southeast Asia in infrastructure development but also whether Japan. engchi. could be an influential leader of the global international society. As assumed, Japan seems to be approaching a role to mediate China’s rise by having a balance of influence between the countries’ development assistance in developing countries. This thesis thus focuses on analyzing in Southeast Asia as China’s assistance of development have a gap which is capable of allowing Japan to approach in the opening with the assistance to the developing countries to balance the influence and to maintain the peace and stability of the international society. However, as China does have several frailties of its development assistance approach, a competition between the two great powers does surmise a rivalry of influence in third countries for Japan, 9 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(17) but Japan also faces the weakness of its development assistance. For that, instead, this competition between them actually sets up cooperation, a joint action, to reach their common interests. As Hirono (2019, p. 2) stated, many scholars “tend to focus on the rivalry within East Asia, and pays scant attention to how China and Japan have dealt with their bilateral rivalry outside East Asia.” Therefore, with that, is there a continuing rivalry between China and Japan outside of the region? As China is rising and seems to become more influential than Japan, what should Japan do, and is Japan capable of balancing the influence? For that, I argue that Japan can balance the influences with. 政治大. China from other countries in the regions by, most importantly, the advantages of its. 立. long-standing approach to development assistance with its trust and experience.. ‧ 國. 學. With that in mind, this thesis would divide five chapters. The next chapter, as. ‧. stated before, is meant to fill in the gaps of the literature review. Of the literature review, it would divide three sections: the IR in Asia, the development assistance. y. Nat. er. io. sit. between China and Japan, and a mention of the English School as an appropriate theory for the main points. Chapter Three focuses on the theoretical perspective of the. al. n. iv n C English School. As there are a growing of debates on a new appearance of IR h e nnumber gchi U theories, it seems that the English School would be able to cap the realm of East Asia from a different perspective, especially from the perspective of the balance of power and the sphere of influence. Chapter Four sets to concentrate on a comparison background between China’s BRI and Japan’s investment in China from the 1970s to the 1990s. There is a necessary understanding of the unique relationship between the two countries, precisely the period of Japan’s development assistance in China to China’s BRI, allowing Japan to also return to its past influential power of its ODA. After that, Chapter Five would move into the center arena of the thesis, Southeast. 10 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(18) Asia, where China and Japan compete, invest, and cooperate in the region with Southeast Asian countries. Then regarding China’s expansion of BRI in Southeast Asia, this thesis would examine Japan’s behavior and response to China’s investment in the region. And finally, the last chapter would conclude that Japan’s imminent role is essential not only to balance between China and Japan but to assist the developing countries to have a ‘peaceful rise’ in the region. Ending that there would be a recognition that China needs Japan to have a strong regional role for that China is not capable of obtaining that itself but with the support from other countries.. 立. 政治大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 11 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(19) 2. Chapter Two: Literature Review 2.1.International Relations in East Asia As China is rising, there are questions to ponder on what could the country affect the order. China has always been considered a challenger to the liberal order, either by being a ‘revolutionist’ or a ‘revisionist.’ However, of either perspective, scholars do presume that China is planning to reshape the Asian regional order and even maybe the global order. For that, China’s BRI is considered their ‘grand strategy.’ A strategy that the Western perspective see it as a threat to the global liberal order, of setting up a. 政治大. new ‘standard of globalization’ or even ‘a new set of values and norms’ (Jones, 2019).. 立. Nevertheless, the BRI, as Lee Jones (2019, p. 3) stated, offers other states “some kind. ‧ 國. 學. of normative alternative to the Western-led global system…[that could share a] new models of international cooperation and global governance,” but to what degree?. ‧. With the growing tensions between the U.S. and China, a scholar had. y. Nat. io. sit. considered it a mark of the “return of great power rivalry [that started] forcing states. n. al. er. in the region to consider their geopolitical alignments” (Zala, 2019, p. 1). However,. Ch. i n U. v. how have the relationship between China and Japan been affected by the friction. engchi. between the United States and China? For that, the scholars’ viewpoints of East Asia have always contemplated the relationship between China and Japan on whether the two are meant to be ‘historically rivals’ to inevitably lead to a coming conflict against each other or that the two are capable enough to cooperate. Kentaro Sakuwa (2009, p. 498) had asked, “How can we understand and explain [this] dyadic relationship?” Even, according to Alastair Iain Johnston, the East Asian scholars have already acknowledged that their notations of East Asia do not purely unravel the queries of East Asia, in particularly of the relationship between China and Japan, for which it is. 12 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(20) not essentially “fit with the empirical expectations of transatlantic IR theory.” Another scholar, David Kang, has even criticized “the structural realist theories for ‘getting Asia wrong’” and requesting a ‘new analytical framework’ to understand East Asia better (Buzan & Yongjin, 2014, p. 14). Without a constructive IR theory for East Asia, it thwarts the complexity nature of IR from gauging the states of Asia in a “systematic and theoretically” approach (Sakuwa, 2009, p. 498). However, the realist theory, currently, seems to be considered the “most influential, theoretical perspective in the study of East Asian international relations” (Buzan & Yongjin, 2014, p. 14). Yet, there are still gaps of the IR theory in East Asia from a standpoint of realism. 政治大. which neglects that the balance of power “is not just an unintended natural process”. 立. (Zhang, 2011, p. 650). For that, the realist scholars also ought to glance at a liberal. ‧ 國. 學. understanding, especially as the rise of China have become a popular subject of IR.. ‧. Presently, as China seems to develop more of a great power with both military and economic power, people are quick to question whether the BRI is a threat to the. y. Nat. er. io. sit. world security and economy as China’s influence expands immensely and quickly. Some scholars assumed that China would trigger a disaster in East Asia as China. al. n. iv n C expands its strategic influence. Inhcontrast, other scholars e n g c h i U have said that China aims to stabilize the area. Again of Kang (2007, p. 4), he claimed that the East Asian states. would decidedly ‘accommodate China’ and not ‘balancing with China.’ Kang argues that China plans to ruminate its once rule of power over the surrounding states of the area in the past, during the time of the tributary system. However, in contrast, Mingjiang Li differs from Kang’s argument and perceives that Kang “provides a provocative view on Asia’s future by saying that East Asia’s future will resemble its past: Sino-centric, hierarchical, and reasonably stable.” Li reflects that Kang is depicting China of “using the liberal institutionalist approach… [on the] effort in. 13 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(21) improving bilateral relations with its neighbors and intensifying economic interdependence… [to] approach [the] security and territorial dispute in the region” with the regional institutions (Li, 2009, p. 122). Therefore, Li asserted that “China has essentially learned to employ liberal institutional and social constructivist means for realist purpose.” Thus, he implies that China aims to maintain the competition with its neighboring actors and to assure its security but operate it more cooperatively and nonthreateningly (Li, 2009, p. 123). However, both scholars, Kang and Li, and even other researchers, have strained to endure from a realist perception with the presence of the liberal foundations, but it has restricted their analytical framework of the realist. 政治大. theory with a glimpse of liberal outlook, which hampers their comprehension of East. 立. Asia.. ‧ 國. 學. Nevertheless, according to Evelyn Goh, the states in East Asia are already in a. ‧. transition of drifting “away from the US-led, unipolar post-Cold War security order.” Still, they do not want the United States to completely withdraw from the region and. y. Nat. er. io. sit. have China dominate the region. For the states, to avoid both of these possible glimpses in the future, these East Asian states, particularly of the Southeast Asian. n. al. i n countries, see ‘three-pronged C strategy’: hengchi U. v. (1) maintain US preponderance by facilitating its continued forward military presence in East Asia and its strategic dominance globally; (2) socialize and integrate China peacefully into the East Asian security order as a responsible regional Great Power; and (3) cultivate regionalism as the basis for a putative security community that can ensure peace in the long run.” (Goh, 2011a, pp. 887-888). Similar to that, several scholars of IR have been using the concept of ‘hedging,’ particularly on the topic of Southeast Asian states’ relationship with a rising China. According to John D. Ciorciari and Jürgen Haacke (2019, p. 368), ‘hedging’ is considerably referring when one state plans and initiates its ‘national security or 14 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(22) alignment strategy,’ which could mix the performance of cooperation and confrontation, to another state. With the use of ‘hedging,’ these scholars argue that states hedge “when they pursue limited or ambiguous alignment vis-à-vis one or more major powers.” These states aimed not to take a clear side, but rather to minimize the potential risk with a stronger state. Cheng-Chwee Kuik and Gilbert Rozman (2015, p. 3) had even detailed the spectrum between balancing and bandwagoning as they know states do not fully balance nor fully bandwagon another state. They see that there are various kinds of hedging behaviors between the spectrum of balancingbandwagoning, such as ‘military hedge,’ ‘political hedge,’ and ‘economic hedge.’. 政治大. Needless to say, of Southeast Asian states’ relationship with China, though each of. 立. these states has different approaches for China, most of these states are surrounding. ‧ 國. 學. the hedging approach. According to Denny Roy, Thailand and Myanmar are merely. ‧. demonstrating the practice of the hedging strategy while the rest of states are under either an overt low-level balancing (such as Singapore and the Philippines) and a very. y. Nat. er. io. Indonesia) (Roy, 2005).. sit. ‘subtle or highly restrained forms of balancing (such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and. al. n. iv n C However, how about Japan’s to the rise of China? Would the state be h eresponse ngchi U. approaching China similar to the Southeast Asian state with a hedging strategy or. leaning more on either side between balancing and bandwagoning? Ll. López i Vidal and Àngels Pelegrín (2018, p. 193) had stated that Japan’s behavior “vis-à-vis China does not match” with realist and liberal explanations of either the balancing or bandwagoning strategy. They see that Japan is both not strong enough to balance against China and not that weak to go on the bandwagoning strategy. For that, they see that Japan, being a middle power, is on the hedging strategy for China, similar to “with how [other] middle-power states deal with rising power.” Understandably,. 15 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(23) Japan is still a close ally for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region for decades and is also a beneficial mutual partnership with China of its trade and investment for recent years. Japan could not easily abandon on either side of the spectrum. For that, Vidal and Pelegrín see that there are three approaches that Japan initiated on its apparent hedging strategy towards China. The first one is economic pragmatism or “business first” approach, where Japan would maintain its economic partnership with China. Second is the binding-engagement strategy to continue its bilateral and multilateral connections between each other, such as with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the. 政治大. Japan-China Security Dialogue. While the latter approach of hedging is of indirect. 立. balancing against China, this is to expand its military capabilities and enhance its. ‧ 國. 學. security alliance with the U.S., and not directly aim to China (Vidal & Pelegrín, 2018,. ‧. pp. 205-206).. However, though these indications are true, another scholar, Koga Kei (2018,. y. Nat. er. io. sit. p. 633), see Japan’s behavior on China’s rise has been “consistently associated with ‘balancing’…[and] not involved ‘hedging’ vis-à-vis China.” Again, Japan is not. al. n. iv n C strong enough facing China by itself even would not be possible to create an h eand ngchi U. international order by itself. However, though the three scholars, Koga (2018, p. 644), Vidal, and Pelegrín (2018), all agree Jeffery Hornung’s statement that Japan is not a weak state and could not use Kuik’s balancing-bandwagoning spectrum to understand Japan’s behavior clearly, Koga argues that Japan has been consistently on the balancing behavior by its three capabilities: politico-military relations, economic relations, and diplomatic relations. First, on the mention of politico-military capabilities, Japan has enhanced its internal and external balancing, even with the gradual potential risk of the U.S. commitment reduction, by its ongoing alliances with. 16 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(24) not only the U.S. but with Australia, India, and the Philippines and its military technology capabilities. With the ability to reach and maintain these chances working, it shows “Japan’s desire to maintain its balancing posture vis-à-vis China” (Koga, 2018, p. 648). Second, Japan’s economic capabilities, in short, Japan is competent to be ‘risk-free’ and not be economic bandwagoning to China as Japan can lessen its dependency on China in its trade, particularly of the decrease of China’s rare earth minerals to Japan in 2010 (Koga, 2018, p. 652). Lastly, on diplomatic interaction, it is similar to Vidal’s and Pelegrín’s indirect balancing, as Japan is not conducting “diplomatic bandwagoning with China [but rather] engaged in diplomatic balancing. 政治大. through ASEAN-led frameworks” (Koga, 2018, p. 654). Of these three indications,. 立. Koga sees that Japan’s behavior is actually on the balancing strategy rather than. ‧ 國. 學. Vidal’s and Pelegrín’s assumption of the hedging strategy.. ‧. Nevertheless, since the end of the Second World War, the relationship between China and Japan has been gradually peaceful even with its rivalry between. y. Nat. er. io. sit. each other. To some degree, both countries seek to have a ‘peaceful coexistence’ to step forward of normalization. Still, usually, with the competition of regional. al. n. iv n C leadership, such as of the Regional Economic Partnership (RCEP), it h eComprehensive ngchi U has been continuingly exacerbated of the rivalry, with the addition of territorial and. historical issues (Goh, 2011b). However, Goh (2011b) has considered that China and Japan are actually ‘negotiating’ with each other by a ‘power-sharing’ rather than the existence of power competition. The Sino-Japanese relations are complicated, with the apparent assumption of Hot Economics, Cold Politics. For example, though China and Japan have been on ongoing tensions on territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, China and Japan have been reliable economic partners since during the Cold War. Between 1986 and 2015, Japan’s export to China has shifted. 17 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(25) from 8 percent to 23 percent while its exports to the United States have decreased from 39 percent to only 20 percent (Lincoln, 2017, p. 239). With that, Goh sees that there are at least four possible outcomes if there is a transition of a new great power dynamics in East Asia: (1) a revitalization and continuation of the status quo ante with the U.S. as ring-holder between China and Japan; (2) balance of power competition between China on the one hand, and Japan and the U.S. on the other; (3) a new, China-led regional order with Japanese acquiescence and U.S. withdrawal; or (4) a Sino-Japanese condominium. (Goh, 2011b, p. 5). 政治大 power bargain directly for the first time in 400 years” (Goh, 2011b, p. 5). Here, great 立. For all of the possibilities, except (2), it requires China and Japan “to negotiate a great. ‧ 國. 學. power bargain has two levels. The first level is that as great powers build up their commitment and assurance to weaker states, they might be able to exchange for. ‧. ‘adherence and deference’ to ‘leadership and dominance.’ For the second level, it is. sit. y. Nat. between great powers to have a ‘mutual assurance and agreement’ to negotiate power-. al. er. io. sharing (Goh, 2011b, p. 3). Again, the relationships between China and Japan. v. n. weakens with conflicts “over history, territory, trade and production, development. Ch. engchi. i n U. paradigms, energy and military security,” However, Goh (2011b, p. 5) sees these are not considered as a “laundry lists of conflicting interests.” She understands that there are more to focus on, particularly of the reciprocal manner between the powers for their ‘agreements on mutual rights and duties.’ Koga (2018, p. 656) had even initiated an opening for us with a ‘new conceptualization’ on the balance of power theory, instead of a hedging strategy, and extend our insight of state behavior and regional security dynamics. However, as there is a growing demand for infrastructure investment, it could dramatically affect a country’s behavior to respond to another state, especially as China and Japan continue to invest in various regions. Therefore, 18 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(26) there is a necessary investigation on focusing on development assistance, especially in Southeast Asia, in the IR theory.. 2.1.1. Development Assistance between China and Japan As before, there seems to be the negligence of the study of development assistance within the IR theory. Yoshimatsu Hidetaka (2018, p. 721) even stated that most scholars have studied “security affairs, trade, and finance” that would easily link to national interests/wealth and regional order. But argued, there is a need to focus on economic dynamics and regional connectivity as the awareness of infrastructure. 政治大. investment has been growing. In other words, though there are major factors (related. 立. to security and economy) that could affect the country’s interest and the order, the. ‧ 國. 學. current matter that is now critical these years has been the development investment. Within the economic relationship, from between the IR spectrum, two of the. ‧. mainstream IR theories are quite controversial, especially of analyzing the. y. Nat. sit. relationship between China and Japan. As from the spectrum of realism, these. n. al. er. io. scholars see that the relationship between the two countries would eventually. Ch. i n U. v. deteriorate by their economic status as one is rising while the other is declining. They. engchi. assumed that as China’s economic power expands, it would also inevitably destroy the political relationship. While on the opposite range of the spectrum, liberalists claim that the two countries have economic interdependence with each other, which would lead to the de-escalation of the tensions (Chiang, 2019). Though there is a sense of a potential rivalry among the two directly by their economic relations, what about beyond their region? Is there a continuing rivalry between China and Japan in the other regions? Needless to say, according to Yoshimatsu (2018, p. 719), though there are ongoing and well-known arenas between China and Japan, such as the maritime 19 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(27) territorial dispute and several political disputes, there is now emerging a new popular arena of rivalry, and that’s the infrastructure development. The infrastructure development in Asia has been expanding faster than ever, and there is a growing need for investors from other countries, particularly from China and Japan. Here, Yoshimatsu argues that this is “a new lever for rivalry and competition…because they might seek to employ infrastructure investment as a means to sustain domestic economic vigor…and maintain political influence by expanding bilateral and multilateral links with Asian countries" (Yoshimatsu, 2018, p. 720). Another scholar, Laurids Lauridsen (2019, p. 220), sees the infrastructure investment competition. 政治大. could be “just [a] commercial between Chinese and Japanese firms…for new. 立. markets.” Still, it could also be related to ‘political involvement’ of being unavoidable. ‧ 國. 學. with the use of big deals and railway projects that might ‘extend strategic influence.’. ‧. However, again, with the statement of Hirono (2019, p. 2), many scholars “tend to focus on the rivalry within East Asia, and pays scant attention to how China and. y. Nat. er. io. sit. Japan have dealt with their bilateral rivalry outside East Asia.” Some scholars, such as Tony Tai-Ting Liu (2016, p. 157), have emphasized that there is a ‘hint’ of a. al. n. iv n C “potential…friction in the region” Asia between China and Japan because h ofe Central ngchi U of their “incongruent interests” of the region. In consideration of the Central Asian. region, China and Japan have similar interests in the area and with the use of the same rhetoric of being “non-Western” and “Asian,” but, according to Timur Dadabaev (2016, p. 141), each of their plan of approaches are considerably different from each other. For China, they highlighted themselves as being similar to the Central Asian states of being a developing country and having the “Shanghai spirit” of cooperation with them (considering being part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). While for Japan, the Japanese aimed to utilize a duality of identity, of having ‘non–Western’. 20 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(28) tradition to resemble the connectivity from the ancient Silk Road and a “Western” standard that they want to initiate the modernization into the Central Asian states. Dadabaev continues to argue that as both China and Japan try to employ their development in the region and though they may overlap, they do not “aim to exclude” each other, particularly in the field of mineral extraction. Thus, there seems to be none or little rivalry in the region (Dadabaev, 2018). Similar to Central Asia, Africa is viewed as a continent for competition between China and Japan. Africa has been a region of being colonized and exploited of its raw materials and land. There seems to be a longing question on whether China. 政治大. is using Africa for its own interest, especially with its BRI. However, according to. 立. Cannon (2018, p. 207), China has been upgrading Africa in many different ways than. ‧ 國. 學. the colonial periods. China has been able to fill in the “gap in infrastructure, to. ‧. include airports, ports roads and railways,” but of course, there are gaps within the Chinese projects, with “little concerned with human rights, promoting transparency. y. Nat. er. io. sit. and good governance.” Therefore, Japan actually “exploit[s] the weaknesses inherent in certain Chinese sectors.” Similar to other regions, such as Central Asia, where. al. n. iv n C China and Japan are assisting thehcountries’ developments, according to Pedro engchi U. Carvalho (2015), both, China and Japan, have different ways of approaching their aids to the states in Africa. One has a more high priority on economic infrastructure and is diverse on aid, while the other focuses on the local development of the country to build up their economic growth on its own and a push on the local communities with grassroots and human-security projects. Even according to Sakamoto (2018, p. 107), as he focuses on China’s and Japan’s aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, he considers that “China may not think Japan as a rival into developing countries.”. 21 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(29) Same as the previously mentioned scholars, Jiang Yang (2019, p. 1) does not see a rivalry between China and Japan but sees that China and Japan have an opportunity to play as essential roles with their expansion of overseas infrastructure investments. He understands that with the expansion of infrastructure development from the assistance from both China and Japan, there seems to be a “search for new economic engines” with the loss of the neoliberal economic model. He argues that both countries had “adopted each other’s practices of tied commercial financing, heavy government involvement, focusing on physical infrastructure and industrialization, and showing respect for host-country forms of governance” (Jiang,. 政治大. 2019, p. 3). Jiang also claims that China and Japan, as their overseas infrastructural. 立. projects differ from the Western aid donors, have “successfully introduced the theme. ‧ 國. 學. of infrastructure as a mainstream global initiative” (Jiang, 2019, p. 23). In other. ‧. words, with the infrastructure assistance from China and Japan, it has started to recognize a transition of the international order. However, again, there is a need to. y. Nat. er. io. sit. understand how ‘development assistance’ is playing a crucial matter to the transitional international order, and realism and liberalism both lack this understanding.. al. n. iv n C According to Dennis Trinidad (2019), realism sees the security of foreign aid h e nthough gchi U as crucial, realist scholars do also somewhat neglect aid’s development function. Of liberalism, its perspective is opposite to the other approach. Nevertheless, both are actually “disinterested in the role of normative and ideational factors in its explanations” of foreign aid. Therefore, Trinidad (2019, p. 93) calls a need for a “framework of analysis of foreign aid.” In his view, he sees that the roles and rivalry of foreign aid do not distinguish the quality of the aid, but rather the acceptance of lending practices and normative values (Trinidad, Strategic Foreign Aid Competition: Japanese and Chinese Assistance in the Philippine Infrastructure Sector,. 22 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(30) 2019, pp. 107-108). Thus, the English School has the potential to understand the norms and values of infrastructure investment and foreign aid that play a crucial factor in this transitional international order. For that, as several mainstream IR theories have been unmatchable to analyze this situation, the English School seems to be capable enough as it offers a middle perspective between realism and liberalism.. 2.1.2. English School of International Relations Theory With the complexity of IR in Asia, especially between China and Japan in infrastructure investment in various countries, Richard Little (1998, p. 61) and several. 政治大. other scholars from the English School have mentioned that “it is not possible to. 立. understand international relations from a single perspective.” Even of the relationship. ‧ 國. 學. between China and Japan, it also “cannot be adequately explained in terms of realist or liberal traditions alone” (Vidal & Pelegrín, 2018, p. 206). Therefore, Goh stated. ‧. that with the use of the English School approach, it focuses on social and normative. y. Nat. sit. points of international relations, which would exhibit “social norms significant. n. al. er. io. enough to constitute an ‘order’ rather than a ‘system.’” Here, international order could. Ch. i n U. v. be simply as a ‘ruled-based interaction among states,’ but there must be more. engchi. concepts involved in the order. Those concepts are the limits of behavior, management of conflict, and the perpetuation of the general social goals (Goh, 2011b, p. 2). International society is a social institution. It does not only focus on the ‘structural logic of material superiority,’ but crucially by ‘a social compact’ among great powers and weaker states (Goh, 2011b, p. 3). According to several scholars, including the English School scholars, there is an evolution of international society as there is a continuity structure of the IR (Ferguson & Hast, 2018; Zala, 2020). History of great powers’ rights and responsibilities is the function of the liquidity of international society. It is not a solid 23 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(31) or a permanent structure and not wholly an international system filled with material power but rather more as a sociality with the possibilities of transformation of the social norms and institutions over time. For that, from various scholars of the English School, they see the society of states as a ‘social’ institution (Zala, 2019). As each East Asian scholar challenges to structure its analytical framework from either realism, liberalism, or constructivism, it is nonetheless tricky to wholly justify the space of East Asia with one theoretical standpoint. Even, there are further to take into consideration of the “institutions/interdependence-induced narrative and norms-/identity-formulated explanations of conflict and cooperation” and not only of. 政治大. the “power/interest-based account.” Barry Buzan and Yongjin Zhang understand that. 立. it is “clear that no single theoretical perspective can capture adequately multiple,. ‧ 國. 學. complex, and interactive logics driving East Asian international relations.” Thus,. ‧. using an amalgamation of numerous distinctive components of the theoretical methodologies, it would subsequently support to “capture the complex reality” of the. y. Nat. er. io. sit. space in East Asia. The scholars of the English School have already contemplated this concept of using several IR theories. Even Buzan and Zhang (2014, p. 16) see the. al. n. iv n C English School could “[unload] the competing and sometimes contradictory h ecomplex, ngchi U explanatory logics that often have cross-cutting effects on the construction of the regional order… [by centering] the social structure and primary institutions.” Still the English School of IR is measured adept of pending the findings of East Asia, however there are yet several gaps in the English School. One, in specific, is that the English School have been strongly based by the European (Western) view in the past, and not much from the non-Western point of view. Suzuki (2014, p. 77) exclaimed that the “English School scholars [had once] viewed (European) international society as a positive force… [thus] the English School scholars’ view of. 24 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(32) the history of European international relations was highly one-sided.” Another scholar of the English School, Suganami, even also indicated of the English School’s perspective from Hedley Bull’s and Adam Watson’s The Expansion of International Society (1984), that:. What is disturbing here is the conspicuous absence of the storyteller’s aside, reminding the reader of one key feature of the [nineteenth] century – imperialism. Watson’s observation … describes the state of the mind of the complacent and ill-informed [nineteenth]-century European; the transformation could not have seemed so utterly innocuous to others. (Suganami, 2003, p. 263). 政治大 perception to the globe, but there is even slightly a scarcity in East Asian region from 立 The English School have only freshly opened up its views to broaden its. ‧ 國. 學. a non-Western standpoint. Despite the fact that the English School predominantly been narrowed by one-sided perception, this thesis aims to illustrate the international. ‧. society in East Asia with its infrastructure development in Southeast Asia with the. sit. y. Nat. confronts with China and Japan. This thesis aims to encompass the significance of the. n. al. er. io. influences of the norms and mechanisms from outside of the Western-led. i n U. v. international society to an international society in East Asia as the transitional order begins in Asia.. Ch. engchi. Yet, for the English School method for this thesis, several key points must be accrued in the English School to be able to understand East Asia better– the concepts of international society, the great power management, the balance of power, and the sphere of influence. Therefore, the next two chapters aim to share a glimpse of the evolution of the development assistance and the IR perspective from this transitional international order.. 25 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(33) 3. Chapter Three: The Evolution of the English School 3.1.Introduction The English School of IR theory had only been articulated in the midst of the Cold War during the 1970s when it had “been ignored” from the beginning. Only until Hedley Bull’s works of the English School did it become popular. Yet, numerous of his writings had been reflected “unconnected and unsupported” to the IR (Dunne, 2016, p. 107). There were several discrepancies of the English School that required to be more explain, especially during the Post-Cold War era, with a transition of a new. 政治大. international order. Even other English School scholars could not accumulate a strong. 立. construction between the structure of the English School and the empirical analysis of. ‧ 國. 學. IR.. Nonetheless, the English School have only recently been set out to “no longer. ‧. [be] ignored” as its location of the IR spectrum became interesting to others. The. y. Nat. io. sit. English School, unlike the rest, was the one “occupying the middle ground in. n. al. er. [IR]…as this location is preferable to the dominant mainstream theories of neorealism. Ch. i n U. v. and neoliberalism, and the more radical alternatives (e.g. critical theory and. engchi. poststructuralism)” (Dunne, 2016, pp. 107-108). Bull’s notion of ‘international society’ has developed the predominant focal point of the English School. The formation of Bull’s conception of the English School has underway various investigation of an ‘international society’ in different societies of states by copious scholars. However, there are yet numerous notions and areas that are not fairly dissected and explored utterly, particularly to the areas of the non-Western states and the depth of the international order.. 26 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(34) Therefore, Chapter 4 chiefly concentrates on clarifying four footings of the English School, the ‘international society,’ the ‘great power management,’ the ‘balance of power,’ and the ‘sphere of influence.’ With the four footings and the existence of East Asia, a non-Western region, this thesis aim to set the groundwork later by an empirical approach of the English School in East Asia of the foundation of a transitional international order in the concept of the great powers and its approaches on infrastructural development from aid and investment. Nonetheless, there are manifold gaps among the practice of the English School and the insight of East Asia. Thus, Chapter 4 is focusing on three main questions: what is an ‘international. 政治大. society,’ what are the purposes for great powers in international society, and what is. 立. the ‘balance of power’ and ‘sphere of influence’ for a contemporary ‘international. ‧ 國. 學. society’?. Nat. y. ‧. 3.2.The Concept of International Society. sit. Of Bull’s notion from the classic English School, ‘international society’ exists once “a. n. al. er. io. group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, forms a. Ch. i n U. v. society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound a common set of rules. engchi. in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull, 2012, p. 13). To reassure, an international society is not meant to be a utopian society among states. Even, according to Andrew Linklater, an international society remains “not to be equated with a harmonious order.” Instead, the society is considered as a “tolerable order [that] is better than a realist would predict ‘but less than the cosmopolitan desires’” (Dunne, 2016, p. 115) . Thus, a society of states is a path for states to survive mutually to be away from anarchy. For that, several scholars have used the English School approach to understand the international order clearer as it opens up an evaluation of the interaction among states by a socio-normative 27 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(35) perspective. With the social and normative foundation of the society of states, this leads the order “limits on behavior, the management of conflict, and the preservation of wider social goals” (Buzan & Goh, 2020). However, with the basic concepts of ‘international society,’ there must be some notions of differences between ‘international society’ and ‘international system.’ Each term is notably similar to each other with having a group of states, but the significant differences between them are the determinations of the group and the membership requirements to be part of the group. According to Benjamin Miller, of an anarchic nature of the international system, anarchy “encourages conflicts and. 政治大. constrains cooperation,” but this entirely does not indicate that the international. 立. system is ‘totally chaotic and without order.’ Relatively, of an international system, it. ‧ 國. 學. is of an absence of government, an absence of law or rules. For that, of our ongoing. ‧. international system, there is no whole central government that could be able to control all of the states, but instead, to sustain peace and stability, the states have a. y. Nat. er. io. sit. society of states that fundamentally maintains some kind of rules in the state system. Kenneth Waltz has even stated that states are ongoing a “socialization” where states. al. n. iv n C accept the “so-called rules of state 1995; Waltz, 1979, pp. 127h behavior” e n g c (Miller, hi U. 128). Here, ‘international society’ is distinctly different from the term ‘international system’ socially between states. Part of the term, ‘society,’ is the one significant point that differs the international system from international society. ‘Society’ is considered “composed of real, cognizant human beings” where the society of the ‘people,’ or even of states, have patterned interactions with each other in reality (Barry Jones, 1998, p. 232). To vary Bull’s concept of international society and ‘international system,’ Bull grasps that an international system would exist “when two or more states have. 28 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(36) sufficient contact between them and have sufficient impact on one another’s decision to cause them to behave…as parts of a whole” (Bull, 2012, pp. 9-10; Linklater, 2013, p. 94). An additional vital juncture between the two aspects is that in an international system states could be part of an international society, but not all states in the same international system could possibly be part of the same international society as others. For explanation, it hinges on whether the states are recognized of its membership and acknowledgment by the states of that international society. One example, from Bull’s understanding, is of China and Japan during the nineteenth and early twentieth century when the two states were part of the European-controlled. 政治大. international system but were not solely recognized as part of the European-led. 立. international society (Bull, 2012, p. 13). Thus, there is a distinction between. ‧ 國. 學. international society and international system, but however- there is also a spectrum. ‧. of the kinds of international societies, that differs much on how the societies could survive and behave amongst one another.. er. io. sit. y. Nat. n. Figure 3.1: The Spectrum of International Societies a Power Political International Society. iv l C n he Coexistence Cooperation i UInternational Internationaln g c h Society. Society. Convergence International Society. Sources: (Little, 2007, p. 145; Little, 2009, p. 83). Though we have slightly indicated the basic concept of an ‘international society,’ it is moreover to consider the four forms of an international society in the spectrum of international societies (see Figure 4.1). Clarifying the different forms of international society must be envision on the society of states of its characteristics of space, time, and substantially the “institutional arrangement [of]… the maintenance of 29 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(37) [international] order” (Dunne, 2016, p. 115). Nonetheless, the two major forms of international society would be a pluralist international society (coexistence international society) from the left of spectrum and a solidarist international society (cooperation international society) from the opposing spectrum. First, from the left spectrum of international society, a pluralist international society is largely manifested as part of the ‘conservative view’ of international society. Pluralism, in the aspect of international society, is classified as the society of states with a “relatively low degree of shared norms, rules and institutions among the states, where the focus of society is on creating a framework for orderly coexistence and competition” (Buzan & Yongjin,. 政治大. 2014, p. 234). At this stage, the pluralist international society pursues to maintain its. 立. rules and norms and carry out a “structure of coexistence built on the mutual. ‧ 國. 學. recognition of states as independent and legally equal members of society…and on. 116).. ‧. freedom to promote their own ends subject to minimal constraints” (Dunne, 2016, p.. y. Nat. er. io. sit. In contrast of a pluralist international society, a solidarist international society is placed not of the intention of coexistence and competition but rather of the. al. n. iv n C “cooperation over a wider range h of issues, whetherU e n g c h i in pursuit of joint gains or. realization of shared values or even structural convergence among a group of states” (Buzan & Yongjin, 2014, pp. 235-236). Simply from Bull’s perspective, there is a fundamental variance between the two main forms of international society, and that is, of which he describes between the two, one is considered a “potential solidarity” while the one have become “solidarity.” In other words, the fundamental transformation from one to another is whether an international society is “sufficient to enable enforcement of the law against the law-breakers” or not capable to do that. Are the states of an international society capable enough to preserve the trust and. 30 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.

(38) responsibility amongst each other? Bull continues to state, an international society among the states that are not demonstrating the behavior of a solidarist international society would be “capable of agreeing only for the certain minimum purpose which fall short of that of the enforcement of the law.” Thus, it hangs on the states’ “respective empirical judgments about the world” (Linklater & Suganami, 2006, p. 60). Here, the English School scholars envisage that an international society that is from the pluralist spectrum could eventually progress to the solidarist spectrum of an international society. Thus, with first key question, what is an ‘international society,’ there must be. 政治大. an analysis to see the appearance of an international society and then able to deem. 立. Stern depicts an existence of an international society by:. 學. ‧ 國. what ‘form’ of international society that the society of states is. So, for that, simply,. ‧. n. al. er. io. sit. y. Nat. (1) separate and autonomous political units such as empires, city-states, principalities, feudal fiefdoms, sovereign states or nations; (2) significant interactions, co-operative and conflicting, between them which to an extent condition their behaviors; and (3) the existence of a dominant culture that shapes the norms, codes of behavior and institutions that exist between the political units.. Ch. i n U. v. (Stern, 1995, pg. 46). engchi. With that, Stern’s perception marginally differs from Bull’s conceptions of an international society. Simply, there are three core foundations of an international society that would nonetheless be similar of the conceptions: the sovereignty of states, the states’ interactions with each other, and the presence of mutual norms and rules. As such, they would be likewise of how the society of states balance amongst one another by the international society’s five central primary institutions: balance of power, diplomacy, great power management, international law, and war. However, for this thesis, two of the primary institutions, great power management and balance of. 31 DOI:10.6814/NCCU202001824.