CHAPTER 2: Literature Review
2.63. China – Taiwan: Cross-strait Relations &
2.62. Japan – Taiwan: Diaoyutai Islands
While I have used my empirical data about Taiwanese people‘s opinions, and an expert interview on the Diaoyutai Islands Dispute, I felt that it was very important to reference an article in The Washington Times that was written last summer by former ROC President Ma Ying-jeou. Why these islands are often seen to be fought over by the PRC and Japan, it would be irrevocably irresponsible of me as an Asia – Pacific Studies scholar to condone the role that Taiwan plays in this triangular conflict over these very valuable islets.
I will directly refer to Ma‘s written statement concerning Taiwan‘s right to the Diaoyutai islands, as well as his rebuttal to other former ROC President Lee Teng-hui‘s statement that they in fact belong to Japan. This article serves as an excellent counter to any misleading popular belief that many observers have that most Taiwanese are content with the Diaoyutai islands belonging to Japan, and it will illustrate how varied the opinions are when the words are shown in combination with my survey results.
2.63. China – Taiwan: Cross-strait Relations& Unification
Since I looked at contemporary political issues and how they affect Koreans‘
negative attitudes towards Japan, I also must then look at the same for how they affect such opinions of the Taiwanese. In relation to politics, the opposite occurs for Formosa. In the chapter titled ―Japan‖ for Susan L. Shirk‘s book titled China:
Fragile Superpower, the cross strait relations issue is viewed as an indirect reason
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for Taiwanese to view Japan so positively. This issue, of course, pits the PRC and ROC against each other. Moreover, because of the negative relationship between Japan and the PRC, it causes Taiwan to cling to her giant neighbor to the East, while increasing her fear of her other to the West. (Shirk, 2007)
While this book chapter focuses more on the rivalry of China and Japan, it builds a very convenient bridge to a shared fear of China that both Japan and Taiwan have. In turn, this leads Taiwan, during increased level of Cross-strait tension, to support Japan even further. As Kirk clearly explains, ―The Taiwan issue and the Japan issues are closely intertwined. Today‘s Chinese can‘t forgive Japan for dismembering China and ruling Taiwan as a colony until the end of World War II.‖ (Shirk, 2007)
While this seems to bring us back to historical issues as being a reason for public opinion poll results, it is ever present in the contemporary political conflicts of China and Japan, and China and Taiwan. Kirk continues to say that
―Many older Taiwanese, including former president Lee Teng-hui, feel a close affinity to Japan and speak better Japanese than Mandarin, a fact that any Mainland Chinese taxi drivers will tell you bitterly.‖ (Shirk, 2007)
This reality not only illustrates that Taiwan and Japan share their negative feelings towards China, but also eliminates the earlier mentioned question about the favorable opinions of Japan only stemming from the younger Taiwanese generations. This connection of political issues, combined with the fact that Taiwan and Japan have geopolitical problems with China in common, combined with the fact that Chinese judged Taiwanese while under Japanese rule and lost trust for them, all seem to fit like puzzle pieces to form a very cohesive argument to why Taiwan is different than Korea in her attitudes towards Japan. For this reason, the section of Contemporary Political Issues will be broken into one about
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Korea, and one about Taiwan. As Shirk‘s book illustrates in the ―Japan‖ chapter, Taiwan‘s political issues with China, in connection with her bad blood and constant threats to Taiwanese sovereignty, in connection with Japan‘s own political issues with China, may very well cause over 65% of Taiwanese to have a liking towards Japan. This article may very well be one of the highest value, and may very well prove that the reason Taiwanese do not despise Japan like Korea does is due to a shared disliking with Japan towards China. Such viewpoints, however, can be dangerous to make in that they do not reflect the feelings of all Taiwanese people.
To make sure that this point is legitimate, I am using an extremely credible, and casually effective article titled ―Say Goodbye Taiwan‖, which references several opinion polls by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, as well as the Taiwan National Security Survey. Published in The National Interest by John Mearsheimer, this article it shows that the ESC conducted a poll in June 2013 which drew 90% respondents who wanted to at the very least maintain the status quo, and were opposed to move towards reunification. (Mearhseimer, 2014)
Secondary sociological data such as this is directly aligned to my argument that Taiwanese people‘s opinions toward Japan are affected by their political attitude toward China. While this may seem indirect at this point in the paper, through my own surveys, interviews, and other secondary surveys, I will show a very convincing, clear connection. Due to a secondary sociological survey about South Koreans and their views on reunification with North Korea that I am going to reference in this next section, the causality becomes more obvious.