III. Media and Journalists within and beyond the Communist Media System
III.4 Chinese and Czech Journalists: A Comparison
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first said nothing to our activities and then they issued an order that they must see everything that will go to print. And then we realized that only a fraction of the eye-witnesses' accounts on the crackdown had been published. The chief editor was postponing them for about a week. They were published only when everyone was publishing that."267
Aftermath
In the end, the chief editor Masek was replaced in March 1990. After that, the paper changed its editors many times while its circulation steadily declined. In 1996, the Socialist Party sold its Melantrich publishing house that published Svododne Slovo to Chemapol Group (headed by a former Communist secret police agent Vaclav Junek) which changed the daily's title to Slovo [Word]. In 1998, half of the daily was sold to a German publisher N-Tisk/MittelRhein Verlag that already owned another daily, Zemske Noviny (formerly Zemedelske Noviny [Agricultural Daily], the daily with the third largest circulation during the Communist era), while Chemapol Group went bankrupt. The new owner fired 90 percent of the staff and merged the editorial rooms of its two dailies. Finally in 2001, the Slovo ceased its publication.268
III.4 Chinese and Czech Journalists: A Comparison
As we have seen, the Chinese journalists – and especially the younger generation – felt that they needed the freedom of the press in order to report "the truth" to the people although they were sometimes not aware that the professionalism they wanted actually went against the party-state control mechanism imposed on them from above. In many cases, they were
267 Hvizdala 1990, 56
268 J. Schrabal. (2002). "That Was House Melantrich and Its Daily Svobodne Slovo." [Online] Available:
http://www.columbia.edu/~js322/nyl/melantrich/melantrich-engl.html [2013-1-20]
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already able not to write what they did not want to, but not yet able to publish everything they wanted to. In many cases, they were able to set up the agenda that went against the conservative Maoism of the hardliners. In early 1989, some media organizations and their journalists were thus de facto free from the Party control, protected by the Party reformers.
Still, they were only tiny elite.
In Czechoslovakia, the journalists felt similar resentments against the media control mechanisms as their Chinese counterparts, but unlike them, they were controlled more tightly.
The wishes of the party-state had always priority over professionalism. Some media organizations were not so close to the center of power and enjoyed some support from their publishing organization which served as a kind of protecting buffer, but this proved to be decisive only after the protests started and the journalists decided to join them. On the other hand, the pro-regime journalists felt that it is possible to achieve both professional standards and good service to the Party at the same time, effectively harmonizing imperatives that were in fact contradictory.
Looking back at the transitologist explanations of the regime change, the journalists as a social group could fit best into the intellectual strata, but their position and their role in the protests was quite specific and in fact diverse. The framework of media control forced them to comply with official Party line while the imperatives of their profession would forced them to serve the people.
During the protests, these two main imperatives came into a clear conflict and the journalist had to choose if they prefer the Party or the people while the paralysis of both Communist regimes provided them with opportunities to break away from the control mechanisms that were controlling their work before.
In the end, journalists of all four analyzed media organizations broke up with the Party-state, but they have done it in different ways, depending on their proximity to the core of Communist regime's power. Basically, some were closer to hardliners, some to reformers,
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and some to protesting students. Their understanding of journalistic professionalism somewhat mirrored their sympathies for the Party or for the people, and also intensity of these sympathies.
In People's Daily, the journalists exercised a "higher kind of loyalty" to the Party by trying to be professional, report the truth and present all the relevant voices, despite the fact that the protesting students had their sympathies and that they themselves often participated in the protests. This would work only had the Party really represented the interests of the people. But on Tiananmen and elsewhere, the people and party were engaged in a conflict and their voices were antagonistic. Moreover, the hardliners and the reformers within the Pary issues contradictory signals, leaving the decision about how to cover the events on the journalists themselves. Under these conditions, the journalistic professionalism of People's Daily journalists proved to be somewhat schizophrenic: as Chinese citizens, they supported the protests, but as journalists, they avoided changing sides and becoming a voice of the protests. Structurally, they were still too close to the core of the power and, unlike in Czechoslovakia, this core did not collapse due to Deng's decisive handling of the situatio.
After June 4, the hardliners made sure that the only voice that would be heard will be theirs, but this required a "lower kind of loyalty", e.g. following the official line. The journalists who during the protests demonstrated their different understanding of media professionalism had to go.
In World Economic Herald, the journalists skillfully expanded the boundaries of what had been permitted and opened new spaces for the public debate. The magazine was characteristic by a certain degree of elitism and clear reformist agenda, as it was closely tied to the alternative, reformist core of power. It was closed down after Shanghai hardliners decided that it went too far while the embattled reformers did not manage to shield them as they themselves were struggling for their survival. This can serve as a supporting evidence for a hypothesis that where there is a significant intra-party split, the media control
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mechanisms might be easily bypassed, but once this split ends, the mechanisms can start working quite effectively even in the middle of the protests events.
In Rude Pravo, the journalists followed the Party line even after the Party collapsed and the line disappeared from sight, as there was no alternative core of power within the regime.
They got rid of the hardliners only after the Communist regime had been defeated, but despite their new de facto independence, they still spoke more for the Party then for the people, and their role regarding the protests was first antagonistic and then passive.
Nevertheless, after there was no core of power to which they might serve, the remaining journalists privatized the daily for themselves.
In Svobodne Slovo, the journalists joined the protests in person and also as a media organization, breaking free from the regime's control. They were to a certain extent shielded by their publisher, the Socialist Party. Even if this shield was rather weak, the collapse of the regime was quick and the control mechanism never took action against them. It is true that changing the sides and becoming a voice of regime's opposition was not in line with the ideals of journalistic professionalisms. It was rather a clear demonstration of media activism, and the daily in its way significantly contributed to the success of the protests. However, as democracy is a regime more favorable to exercising media professionalism, this might had been the most effective choice.
In general, the 1989 events in China and Czechoslovakia are remarkable for the victory of the actors, the journalists, over the structures, the media control mechanisms, that were supposed to secure their conformity with the official line. As we will see in the following part, it was only the hardliners in Rude Pravo who remained with the collapsing regime to the bitter end. The journalists of Svobodne Slovo, People's Daily and World Economic Herald all struggled against the control mechanisms and used their opportunities when these mechanisms became paralyzed. But there was probably something wrong with the Chinese and Czechoslovakia's regime in the first place, as in the stricter times, the hardliners would
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probably make sure that only loyal propagandists work in the media, which would make the external control redundant. Instead, most of the journalists clearly waited for an opportunity to stray away from the official line and get closer to what they considered as more important aspects of the truth.
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