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Chapter II: Cold-War Middle East-China Relations 1949-1990
Long before the establishment of the PRC, during World War II, the Communists in Yan’an watched the developments in the Middle East carefully. The Middle East had a strategic importance in Mao’s view of global affairs. The Communists' greatest fear was that the Germans will take over the Middle East and use its great oil fields and strategic crossroads to take over Great Britain's colonies and then diverse powers into the Pacific.
What worried China the most was that Germany and their ally Japan will control the Pacific.
World War II had weakened British and French power. New forces, the Soviet-Union and the United-States, came out stronger from the war and started to get greater influence on world affairs. In the International Relations framework, the power of decision making transferred from the League of Nations, to the United Nations. As a result of the British and French decline, all countries in the Middle East achieved independence. Although British interests and presence still existed in important strategic places like the Suez Canal and the Oil fields in Iraq, Britain was slowly losing its hold in the region to the two emerging great powers.
In the aftermath of World War II, Mao Zedong started to consolidate his foreign policy. According to Mao’s view; the old colonial powers of Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France, were replaced by two new Superpowers the Soviet Union and the United States. To his perception these two Superpowers wanted to overcome each other, but that could only be achieved by gaining control over the vast area, or in Mao’s words the ‘intermediate zone’ that separated them. The Chinese Communists were afraid of an American ‘Imperialist’ attack against the ‘Socialist’ camp. According to their doctrine
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such an attack can only be possible after the Americans take over the colonial and semi-colonial states in the ‘intermediate zone’. Thus, Mao gave great importance to the Middle East in his understanding of the world order.
From a Chinese perspective, a common ‘Imperialist’ enemy threatened both China and the Middle East. Guided by this thinking, during the 1950’s China called the Middle Eastern Countries not to take part in American military pacts16. Until the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, China's foreign policy was according to the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance’ signed by the sides in 1950, which meant following the Soviet policy. China adopted the Soviet side in order to keep on unity of the ‘Socialist camp’ in fighting Imperialism.
PRC is Looking for Diplomatic Support in the Middle East
After establishing the PRC in 1949, the new Communist leadership was confronted with the need to establish its legitimacy in the world and looked for international support. In its early years, the PRC’s main goal was to establish international relations with other countries, not to mention, to gain recognition by other countries. Furthermore, the PRC hoped for a UN membership in order to take over the China seat from the ROC. However, most of the countries in the world decided to stay loyal to the old regime of China and recognized Taipei instead of Beijing. The Middle Eastern countries were no exception .None of them recognized the PRC, mainly due to heavy American pressure.
16 For example, the Baghdad pact, defense pact signed in 1955 between Turkey, Iran, Great Britain, and later Pakistan and Iraq, was encouraged by the United States and won some hostility in Beijing.
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There was only one exception, Israel. On January 9, 1950 Israel became the first Middle Eastern government to recognize the PRC. As the two governments were fighting for legitimacy in the world, it was important for the new Israeli state to have as much as supporters as it can in the world sphere. However, in order to keep an open door for the Arab world, the Chinese did not welcome the Israeli support. In the contrary, the Arab world response did not show any intention to support the PRC aspirations. For example, Egypt voted on January 13, 1950, against the Soviet proposal to expel the ROC delegate from the Security Council, and on August 1950, the Arab League voted to recognize the ROC as the legitimate representative of China. In response, Beijing accused the Arab League of being an Imperialist puppet. The only connections between the PRC and the Middle East during the early 1950’s were non-governmental. For example, in 1951 unofficial Egyptian delegates attended a World Peace Council meeting in Beijing17.
The Bandung Conference: The PRC getting closer to the Arab world
The big change came in 1955 after the Asian-African summit conference in Bandung, Indonesia. As just mentioned, until Bandung conference, official relations between the PRC and Middle Eastern countries barely existed. Eighteen out of the twenty nine countries that participated in the summit did not recognize the PRC. Bandung was a golden opportunity for the Chinese leaders to interact with leaders of the third world.
Premier Zhou Enlai presented the in the summit his ‘Five Principles of Coexistence’:
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful
17 Lillian Craig Harris, China Considers the Middle East. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 81-82.
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coexistence18. The ‘Five principles’ have been in the center of the Chinese agenda for anti-imperialism, and unity of the third world. The most important breakthrough during the Bandung summit was Zhou Enlai's first meeting with the Egyptian leader Nasser19. It was mostly important as Egypt had a great importance back then, as the leader of the Arab world. Later on Zhou visited Egypt three times in 1963-196520
As a result of the Bandung conference the PRC started to consolidate its ties with the Arab world. Egypt, Syria and Yemen established diplomatic ties with China in 1956.
Within a year after the conference, PRC’s trade and cultural delegations traveled to the Middle East and ten trade agreements were signed with Arab states. The PRC trade with the Arab world was politically motivated. Henceforth, the PRC sold Egypt 60,000 tons of steel, desperately needed for its Five Year Plan at prices 20 percent lower than those on the world market. Another economic development following the conference was the Chinese economic aid program to the Middle East. Egypt was the first one to receive aid from the PRC, in the shape of 5 million USD loan. Yemeni Crown Prince Mohamed Al Bader was the first Arab leader to visit the PRC in 1958. In response, the PRC gave Yemen a loan of 16.4 million USD. Both sides also signed a formal Treaty of Friendship.
The PRC sent technicians to build textile plants in Sanaa, and began to build the first modern highway in Yemen
, understanding its importance in the Middle East and in African diplomacy.
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18 Vang Pobzheb, Five Principles of Chinese Foreign Policies (Bloomington, Ind. : AuthorHouse, 2008), 1-2.
. However, it is important to notice that the Chinese capital and aid programs could not replace the Soviet nor the American programs. It was
19 Ibid., 2.
20 ‘Basic Facts’ – Website of People’s Republic of China Embassy in the Arab Republic of Egypt, March 17, 2004, http://eg.china-embassy.org/eng/zaigx/zzgx/js/t76099.htm (accessed May 5, 2011)
21 Lillian Craig Harris, China Considers the Middle East. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 80-91
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impossible for the PRC to establish ties with American proxies in the Middle East, and not all the other states were willing to give in to Beijing’s demands. Lebanon's insistence on keeping its ties with the ROC, which resulted in the break of relations with the PRC, can point out the lack of ability by thePRC to combine the commercial relations with the diplomatic relations.
Ideologic Support: Looking for Communist movements in the Middle East
The PRC foreign policy during the 1950’s was heavily influenced by its Marxist, revolutionary, anti-Imperialist ideology. Therefore, developments such as the military coup that overthrew King Farouk I in Egypt, followed by Nasser anti-western approach, the Iraqi anti-monarchy revolution lead by General Abd-al-Karin Kassem in 1958 or the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, and the Yemeni claims in the port of Aden, all won sympathy from Beijing. From a Middle East point of view, in several cases the PRC intervention was too invasive and has been interpreted as interference in other's internal affairs, as oppose to the ‘five principles’. For example, in 1957 the Jordanian parliament recommended the recognition of the PRC, however King Hussein decided not to do so, and Jordan eventually established diplomatic relations with the ROC22. As a result, the PRC encouraged Jordanian people ‘resistance to Imperialism’. In the years to follow, the Chinese supported the Palestinians in their confrontation with Jordan. Between 1965 and 1970, and especially in 1970, China supported the Palestinians with weapons and ideology support23
22 Apparently, heavy American pressure made King Hussein make such a decision, as King Hussein received massive support and assistance from Washington.
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23 Lillian Craig Harris, “China’s Relations with the PLO”. Journal of Palestinian Studies 7 (1, 1977): 136.
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From a Chinese perspective the Chinese fear of attack against the ‘intermediate zone’ became real during the Suez crisis in 1956. The Crisis started after Egypt decided to nationalize the Suez Canal in order to decrease the dependence in Great Britain. In addition Egypt denied American-British loan offer to build the Aswan Dam or any other compromise. One of the Egyptian anti-Western moves was the recognition of the PRC.
There is no doubt that from a historic perspective, the decision to recognize the PRC had widened the gap between Egypt and the West during that time. The nationalization of the Canal badly hurt the Western interests in the region, especially those of Great Britain, and led to a blockade on Israel. The result was a British-French-Israeli military operation to liberate the Canal. The PRC backed the Egyptians and the Soviet in the days of the Crisis and supported Nasser’s anti-Imperialist approach. According to some reports, China supplied weapons to the Egyptians in 1955 through Czechoslovakian24
The PRC’s growing diplomatic ties with the Middle East caused ideological disputes. If one examine the Chinese response to the establishment of United Arab Republic, it is easier to understand the ideological disputes between the PRC and the Arab world. From a Chinese perspective, such a union and a pan-Arab state should have been the milestone to fight imperialism, and unite the Arab world. Yet, the Chinese hopes were soon to be smashed by Nasser. His hostility towards the Kassem revolution in Iraq, his anti-Communist campaigns highlighted in an almost complete elimination of the
, this weapons were eventually used by the Egyptians during the Suez crisis. In the following years after the Suez crisis, the Sino-Egyptian trade had doubled, making PRC the second most important market for Egyptian export, after the Soviet Union.
24John Calabrese, China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East. (London ; New York : Pinter Pub, 1991), 11.
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Syrian Communist party, the biggest Communist party in the Arab world, and his willing to accommodate with the West, all led the PRC to the conclusion that despite his anti-Western approach during the Suez crisis, Nasser might not be on their side. China was accused of supporting local Communist parties and undermining Arab independence.
Eventually, the Sino-Egyptian relations started to deteriorate following the Chinese dissatisfaction from Nasser’s moves and attacks on communism.
After the Iraqi revolution in 1958 the center of the PRC support in the Arab world moved towards Iraq. The PRC was one of the first countries to recognize Kassem’s new regime in Iraq. Kassem’s revolution was followed by Iraqi withdrawal from the American sponsored Baghdad pact, to Beijing’s satisfaction. In 1958 the Communist involvement in the Iraqi revolution, led the Chinese to believe that the first Maoist People’s Republic in the Arab world might be on the verge. However, just like the Egyptian case, the Iraqis soon accused the Chinese of manipulating and supporting leftist Communists and supplying weapons for a Communist takeover of Iraq. After Kassem turned against the Communists the Chinese interest in Iraq was gone.
The Sino-Soviet Split: The Arab world turn their back to the PRC
Starting from early 1960’s until the late 1980’s China’s foreign policy in the Middle East was heavily influenced by the Sino-Soviet split. The Arab Soviet allies preferred to cool down their relations with China, in order to keep good relations with the Soviets. The PRC adopted a more radical attitude than the Soviets in support of pan-Arab nationalists, but at the same time, its policies took on an anti-Soviet color, which had the paradoxical result of cooling relations with Soviet allies such as Egypt and Syria. The
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PRC could not provide the same monetary and military support as the Soviets, therefore the Middle Eastern Soviet allies decided to stay loyal to Moscow. The Middle East changed from a region of Sino-Soviet cooperation, to a region of confrontation. During the period of the split, China tried to develop an independent foreign policy, and a socialist economic model. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, China’s foreign policy was anti American-Imperialism and anti Soviet-Revisionism. From a Chinese point of view, both Superpowers had negative influence in the Middle East. It is important to notice that in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, from late 1966 to mid-1967, China recalled all its ambassadors from the Middle East, except Huang Hua, the Chinese ambassador in Cairo25
During the Cold war both Soviets and Chinese competed about the lead of the
‘Socialist camp’. Obviously, just like in any other arena, the Soviet Union had greater influence in the Middle East. Nasser’s trip to Moscow in September 1965 and the Soviet-Egyptian communiqué issued on his departure have made a clear point to the Chinese.
China’s diplomatic efforts to create economic gestures were eventually denied as well.
Both loans given to Egypt and Syria were never used, and the trade between China and the Middle East declined in 1967 to only one half of the previous year
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25The great appreciation and importance of Huang Hua in Chinese diplomacy can be seen in his later positions, as the first Chinese ambassador in the UN Security Council, and the Minister of foreign affairs in 1976.
. China’s efforts to press Middle Eastern regimes against both the Americans and the Soviets did not have any economic nor military backup. Since China could not compete with the Soviet Union, during the time its focus was on supporting those who oppose both the United States and the Soviet Union, and condemned those who allied with the new Soviet enemy.
26Yitzhak Schihor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1949-1977. (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1979), 121-124.
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Support for Revolutionary Movements: The PRC deepen their involvement in the Middle East
Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese supported ‘people’s revolutionary movements’
such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and People’s Front of the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) 27. China referred to the ‘people’s liberation movements’ as a force that will resist imperialism in the Middle East and will promote Chinese interests in the region28. China saw the PFLOAG as a potential to promote Mao’s people’s war theory. The movement launched armed struggle in June 1965 against the Sultan of Oman, Said bim Taimur. Later on in June 1967, a delegation visited Beijing and received light armaments, together with Mao’s writings and Marxist literature. In 1968, following a British announcement that its military forces will withdraw from the Gulf within three years, the movement started to spread to Kuwait, and won the PRC sympathy for its fight against Imperialism29
Since 1963, the PRC took an active part in the Arab-Israeli conflict and supported the Palestinians. The Chinese support was motivated by strategic and revolutionary reasons. In 1963 during his visit in Egypt, Zhou Enlai referred to the Palestinian Issue in his press conference by saying “The Chinese people have always stood firmly behind the Arabs in Palestine in their just struggle for their legitimate rights…”
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27 Earlier named Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF)
The Chinese support became more visible in the years to follow.
28 Yitzhak Schihor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1949-1977. (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1979), 12-14.
29 Mohamed. Bin Huwaidin, China's Relations with Arabia and the Gulf, 1949-1999. (London ; New York : Routledge Curzon, 2002), 102-104.
30 Yitzhak Schihor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1949-1977. (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1979), 115.
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In March 1965 the first PLO delegation, headed by Ahmad Shukeiri, arrived in Beijing. PRC’s top leaders including Mao met the delegation for talks. The joint statement can tell more than anything else about the Chinese support for the Palestinian cause: “The two parties agreed that the PLO shall set up a mission in Beijing to strengthen mutual co-operation. The Chinese people will make every effort to support the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle to return to their home land by all means, political and otherwise”31. Following the statement the PRC declared May 15 as Palestine day, the celebration took place during 1965-1971, including mass demonstrations. The Chinese support was not only ideological but material as well. The PRC had some military training programs for the Palestinians, and according to Israeli intelligence supplied 5 million USD worth weapons to the Palestinians in 1965-196932
However, the reason why the PLO strengthened their ties with the PRC was purely opportunistic, even as some might say for lack of any other option. The PLO could not get American nor Soviet support. In its early years the PLO tried to get Soviet support, but got rejected. The fact that the Soviet still had diplomatic relations with Israel did not assist the Palestinians. In a later period the Soviets tried not to supply too much weapons to the PLO, from a concern to the regional stability. The Sino-Palestinian relations were fruitful for both sides. Despite the improvement of the relations with the Arab world after . The most important thing for the Palestinians was the fact, that unlike the Soviets, the Chinese support had no strings attached. The relations with the PLO were strong all along Mao’s era.
31 “Joint Statement of the Chinese People’s Institue of Foreign Affairs and the PLO”, Renmin Ribao, 23 March 1965, in Survey of China Mainland Press, published by US Consulate General, Hong Kong. no.
3425 (26 March 1965), 36.
32 Lillian Craig Harris , “China’s Relations with the PLO”. Journal of Palestinian Studies 7 (1, 1977):
32 Lillian Craig Harris , “China’s Relations with the PLO”. Journal of Palestinian Studies 7 (1, 1977):