Japan and China’s Trade Volume
6.2 Competitive Relationship
had fought for neighboring territories. Nowadays, East Sea maritime and island dispute still remain unsettled.129 In spite of having such a close relationship as economic partners, the sovereignty problem between China and Japan cannot be ignored. With the constrained military capability, Japan is sensitive to China’s actual military power. Some of the Japanese elites even questioned the lack of transparency in China’s military spending.130 It is obvious that Japan is deeply suspicious of China’s military movements. On the other hand, scholar inferred that China’s military is becoming a more effective tool in term of its combat and security.131 From Japan’s point of view, having such an aggressive and strong neighbor might threaten its own security, this might provoke Japan’s desire to enhance its military capability. Then, there is no surprising that Japanese government is eager to revise the constitution. As for China, Ryu believed that, China would perceive Japan’s constitutional amendment as a mean to suppress China’s rise. In response to Japan’s action, China might strengthen the level of its military power to secure this region.132 Whether the speculations of each other are correct or not, the military build-up of two countries is predictable.
The dispute and conflicts between Japan and China have let the two countries share abnormal diplomatic relationship. Political-diplomatic matters create trade friction for Japan and China, and pose an uncertainty to the economic cooperation. Early in 2002 to 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi insisted on visiting Yasukuni Shrine, ignored
129. Hook, Glenn D., Ra Mason, and Paul OShea. Regional Risk and Security in Japan Whither the Everyday.
130. Xinbo, Wu. “The Security Dimension of Sino-Japanese Relations: Warily Watching One Another.” Asian Survey 40, no. 2 (2000): 296-310.
131. Shambaugh, David L. “The United States in Asia: Durable Leadership.” In International Relations of Asia, 93-114.
132. Ryu, Yongwook. “To Revise or Not to Revise: The ‘peace Constitution’, Pro-revision Movement, and Japan’s National Identity.” The Pacific Review, (2018), 1-18.
‧
relationship. The confrontational feelings between Japanese and Chinese rose due to the visit. China took Prime Minister Koizumi’s action as sabotage, triggered the anger of Chinese people. The relationship back to normal in the end of 2005, Japan announced that they were going to provide economic aid to China. Prime Minister Abe and China’s leader Wen Jiabao paid their official visit to each country in order to fix their relationship.133 Through the joint agreement, Japan and China declared the two countries would form a strategically and mutually beneficial relationship to achieve their common interests. China-Japan Joint Statement has broken the diplomatic deadlock. Traced back to figure 1.4134, the decrease of the approval rate in this era might be influence by the stable relationship between Japan and China.However, the situation has changed ever since China’s leader Xi Jinping took the reins. In recent years, China holds a strong attitude toward the South China Sea conflict. Xi claimed that China will unswervingly safeguard its sovereignty and national interests in South China Sea in early 2016.135 China’s non-stopping intensive action in the South China Sea has provoked Japan’s anxiety. To insure the sovereignty right in South China Sea, China’s leader Xi Jinping built islands, consolidated the reefs and set up a city in South China Sea.136 These decisions have brought the South China Sea conflict to another level. Scholar believed that Japan could play a vital role in containing China’s expanding submarine capabilities.137 Scholar stated that Japanese involvement in the security of the SCS has been related to new bilateral defense policy agreements made by the U.S. 138 On the other hand, having strategic and economic partnerships with the Asia-Pacific countries made Japan play a vital role in the SCS conflict. In quest for regional peace, Japan needs to
133. McCurry, Justin. “Wen Jiabao’s Visit to Japan Could Signal a Genuine Thaw in Sino-Japanese Relations.” The Guardian. (April 11, 2007). (Accessed June 2018).
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/apr/11/japan.china.
134. Figure 1.4 in page 12.
135. Pti. “Play Constructive Role in South China Sea Dispute, Xi Jinping Tells Barack Obama” The Times of India. (September 03, 2016). (Accessed July 2018.)
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/Play-constructive-role-in-South-China-Sea-dispute-Xi-Jinping-tells-Barack-Obama/articleshow/53997722.cms.
136. “Xi Personally Behind Tough Stance on South China Sea Dispute.” South China Morning Post.
(July 28, 2017). (Accessed June 2018). https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2104547/xi-personally-behind-island-building-south-china-sea.
137. Sheldon, Simon W. “Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea.” Asian Survey 52, no. 6 (2012): 995-1018.
138. Drifte, Reinhard. “Japan’s Policy towards the South China Sea - Applying Proactive Peace Diplomacy?” PRIF Report 140 (2016): 1-31.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
conduct hardline policy in SCS conflict. Other than that China’s attitude toward the South China Sea has become one of the factors to alert the Japanese public to the necessity of revising Article 9.
After all, with the rapid development, China has been viewed as both partner and a threat to neighboring countries. Japan is no exception to hold the same point of view.
In spite of offering an olive branch to China during Koizumi’s administration, Japan still pays highly attention to China’s every movement. The abnormal relationship also affects Japanese public’s impression on China. Fear of the power of China, the public is more likely to approve the constitutional amendment than before.
‧
The change of the international environment during the past decades resulted in some of the countries attempted to change their strategy on dealing with international (security) affairs, Japan is one of the countries. The special regulation restricted by Japanese constitution made Japan be unable to possess a regular military force.
Japan’s constitutional amendment has been a heated topic in both domestic and oversea resulted from it has never changed ever since it promulgated in 1946.
According to Japanese constitution, the constitution amendment requires both politicians’ legislation and the public’s agreement. Article 9 is the most controversial law in the Japanese constitution. Article 9 contained the core concept of Pacifism and Japan’s determination of not embroiled in any conflicts or dispute. The change of the international environment forces Japanese to rethink the necessity of revising the constitution. Prime Minister Abe and his cabinet/party have insisted on amending the constitution for years, they believed that with the revision of constitution, it would be more reasonable and convenience for Japan to launch a war or actively secure its own territory. Even with the huge ambition, Prime Minister Abe has encountered obstacle from the public. Most of the Japanese people were reluctant to get rid of the tag of
“Pacifist country”. Fear of being target or getting embroiled in war has decreased people’s desire to change the constitution. Disagreement between the Japanese government and people made the constitutional amendment become more complicated. Despite the fact that Prime Minister Abe determined to revise the constitution, Japanese people mostly refused to amend the constitution. Thus, the constitutional amendment had been unsettled for years. However, the survey in the past two years had dramatically changed. The public realized that there might be necessity to revise the constitution. This study tried to find out the reasons of Japanese people’s shifting attitude toward Article 9.
Literature nowadays discussing the Japanese constitution amendment mostly focuses on the Japanese politics elites’ attitude and the reactions of countries affected by the constitutional amendment (such as the United States and China). These discussions mainly circulate in the consequence of conducting the constitutional amendment, seldom consider about the public’s perspective. However, the constitutional
‧
amendment not only requires agreement and consensus from the government, also demands the public’s referendums. This regulation gives Japanese people right to examine the necessity of revising constitution. Even though the public’s opinion plays a vital role on the issue of constitutional amendment, literature rarely put the emphasis on the public. Basically, this paper illustrates the possible reasons that might influence the change of the public’s attitude toward Article 9. Reasons attributed to mostly external threats. Neighboring countries like China and North Korea have threatened Japan’s security in different ways; these conditions successfully raised the public’s fear. Although Japan has long been suffered from territorial dispute and tensions with neighboring countries, the change of international security environment nowadays is more challenging and dangerous. The increase of fear makes the public gradually agree with the constitutional amendment.
Chapter 1 tried to illustrate the history of the constitution and attempt to shed light on the importance of Article 9. Article 9 is one of the controversial article in Japanese constitution, not only does it shape the basic image of Japan as a Pacifism country but also make the people have the ideology of staying peace. In spite of insisting not to revise the constitution, some of the Japanese people gradually change their mind; this is what this study aims to look beyond.
Chapter 2 reviewed partial literatures which covered the constitutional amendment, found out that most of them put the emphasis on the elites’ and experts’ viewpoint, and seldom mentioned the public’s thought. On the other hand, some of the literature gave us the possible reasons that might affect the public’s attitude. The external threats might likely trigger the public’s feeling of insecurity, and bring about the increase of the approval rate.
Chapter 3 is an additional chapter for this article. In order to maintain the objectiveness of the study, chapter 3 distinguished the difference between the three mainstream media: Asahi, NHK and Yomiuri Shimbun. Three media share different perspectives on the constitutional amendment, the surveys conducted by each indicated consistent results, proved that there is feasibility for this study.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Chapter 4 elucidated the relationship between the United States and Japan. Two countries possess trustable alliance for decades. Even though there was up and down in their bilateral relationship, they still share close relationship. Japan tends to rely on United States for dealing with Asia-Pacific affairs. In the U.S’ point of view, the constitutional amendment would be effortless way to enhance Japan’s military capability.
Chapter 5 illustrated how the North Korean ongoing missile tests triggered Japanese people fear. After Kim Jong-En became the leader of North Korea, he has launched several times of missiles tests to threaten the US-Japan-South Korea alliance. Worst of all, some of the missile directly fell into Japan’s exclusive economic zone. This has let some of the Japanese people believe that there is necessity for Japan to defense itself by increasing its own military capability. Also, due to the security triangle with Japan and the United States, South Korea is likely to support Japan’s constitutional amendment. Overall, North Korea is one of the main reasons that Japanese people shifted their attitude toward Article 9.
Chapter 6 took China as one of the visible threats that might panic the public. With the apparent increase of economic and military power, there is no denying that China has become one of the major powers in East Asia. Japan, the strongest economy in this region, is facing with the challenge from China. Although both of the countries cooperate in several aspects, Japanese people do not have trust on China. Unsettled sovereign problem of the South China Sea brings more uncertainty to the regional peace. As a result, the constitutional amendment might be the guarantee for two countries’ cooperation.
Eventually, reasons in this paper might be partial explanations for the change of the public’s attitude due to the unpredictable international society, but these could reflect Japanese people’s concern over national security.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
References
“2017 November and December: Japan and United States Poll.” Yomiuri Online.
December 19, 2017. (“2017 年 11-12 月 日米共同世論調査.”) Accessed April 3, 2018.
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/feature/opinion/koumoku/20171219-OYT8T50129.html.
“Act on Procedures for Amendment of the Constitution of Japan.” E-Gov 法令検索.
December 12, 2016. Accessed March 14, 2018.
http://elaws.e-gov.go.jp/search/elawsSearch/elaws_search/lsg0500/detail?lawId=419AC100000005 1&openerCode=1.
“Is Japan Abandoning Its Pacifism?” BBC News. September 23, 2015. Accessed December 14, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34278846.
“Japan Protests against Launch of Missiles by North Korea.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. July 5, 2006. Accessed April 3,
2018.http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2006/7/0705.html
“Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China.” Statistics of FDI in China in January-July 2017 -. November 22, 2017. Accessed May 1, 2018.
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/statistic/lanmubb/ASEAN/201712/20171202691 134.shtml.
“NHK World.” Media Bias/Fact Check. May 24, 2017. Accessed March 14, 2018.
https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/nhk-world/.
“North Korea Fires Second Ballistic Missile over Japan.” BBC News. September 15, 2017. Accessed April 3, 2018. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41275614.
“Top 10 Financial Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Budget (Dec 2015) | Global Peace Operations Review.” Global Peace Operations Review Thematic Essays. December
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
10, 2015. Accessed January 05, 2018.
http://peaceoperationsreview.org/infographic/top-10-financial-contributors-to-un-peacekeeping-budget/.
“U.S.-Japan Alliance Never Stronger, Secretary Says.” U.S. Department Of Defense.
December 5, 2016. Accessed March 27, 2018.
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1020645/us-japan-alliance-never-stronger-secretary-says/.
“Xi Personally Behind Tough Stance on South China Sea Dispute.” South China Morning Post. (July 28, 2017). (Accessed June 2018).
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2104547/xi-personally-behind-island-building-south-china-sea.
Alvstam, Claes G., Patrik Ström, and Naoyuki Yoshino. “On the Economic Interdependence between China and Japan: Challenges and Possibilities.” Asia
Pacific Viewpoint 50, no. 2 (2009): 198-214. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8373.2009.01393. x.
Aminian, Nathalie, and Cuauhtémoc Calderon. “Prospects for Closer Economic
Cooperation in Northeast Asia.” Review of Development Economics 14, no. 3 (2010):
417-32. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9361.2010.00562. x.
Anderson, Nicholas D. “Anarchic Threats and Hegemonic Assurances: Japan’s Security Production in the Postwar Era.” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 17, no. 1 (2016): 101-35. doi:10.1093/irap/lcw005.
Aramaki, Ma, and Miki Masaki. “The Change of Ideology toward the Japanese Constitution.” NHK Broadcasting Research and Survey, 2017. (荒牧, 央, and み き 政木. “憲法をめぐる意識の変化といま.” NHK 放送研究と調查)
Aramaki, Ma, and Miki Masaki. “Pros and Cons for Votes against the Constitutional Amendment.” NHK Broadcasting Research and Survey, 2015. (荒牧, 央, and み き 政木. "賛否が拮抗する憲法改正." NHK 放送研究と調查.)
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Barboza, David. “China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy.” The New York Times. August 16, 2010. Accessed April 13, 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html.
Bearak, Max. “Japan’s First Gun-toting Troops since WWII Have Deployed - to South Sudan.” The Washington Post. November 21, 2016. Accessed January 12, 2018.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/21/japans-first-gun-toting-troops-since-wwii-have-deployed-to-south-sudan/?utm_term=.8d20e06d431e.
Berger, Thomas, and James J. Orr. “The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan.” Journal of Japanese Studies 28, no. 2 (2002):
435. doi:10.2307/4126821.
Bergsmann, Stefan. “The Concept of Military Alliance.” Small States and Alliances, 2001, 25-37. doi:10.1007/978-3-662-13000-1_4.
Berlinger, Joshua. “North Korea's Missile Tests: What You Need to Know.” CNN.
December 04, 2017. Accessed January 10, 2018.
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html.
Cabinet Office. “Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy” October 2017. (內閣大臣官房政 府広報室. “外交に関する世論調査.”) Accessed March 27,
2018.https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h29/h29-gaiko/2-1.html.
Cha, Victor D. Alignment despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000.
Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. “Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific: Theory and Practice.” Contemporary Southeast Asia32, no. 3 (2010): 494. doi:10.1355/cs32-3j.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Chanlett-Avery, Emma, W. H. Cooper, and M. E. Manyin. “Japan-US Relations: Issues for Congress.” Current Politics and Economics of South, Southeastern, and Central Asia 20, no. 2 (2011): 313.
Christensen, T. J. “China, the U.S-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia.” In International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, 25-56. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003.
DiFilippo, Anthony. US-Japan-North Korea Security Relations: Irrepressible Interests.
Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2013.
Dobson, Hugo. Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping: New Pressures, New Responses. London: Routledge, 2003.
Dreyer, June Teufel. “China and Japan: ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’.” Orbis 58, no.
2 (June 23, 2014): 326-41.
Drifte, Reinhard. “Japan’s Policy towards the South China Sea - Applying Proactive Peace Diplomacy?” PRIF Report 140 (2016): 1-31.
East Asia Institute. “Japan’s perceptions toward each other” The Sixth Korea-Japan Citizen Perception Survey June 18, 2018. (동아시아연구원
“한일국민상호인식조사.” 제 6 회 한일 국민 상호인식조사.) Accessed June 2018.http://www.eai.or.kr/main/research_view.asp?intSeq=9659&code=4&keyword_
option=board_content&keyword=일본&gubun=research.
Foot, Rosemary. “Power Transitions and Great Power Management: Three Decades of China–Japan–US Relations.” The Pacific Review 30, no. 6 (2017): 829-42.
doi:10.1080/09512748.2017.1303535.
Green, Michael J. “The US-Japan Alliance a Brief Strategic History.” Education About Asia 12, no. 3 (2007): 25-30.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Hook, Glenn D., Ra Mason, and Paul OShea. Regional Risk and Security in Japan Whither the Everyday. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2015.
Hornung, Jeffrey W. “Japan Chair Platform: Increasing Security Awareness among the Japanese Public.” The New Southbound Policy | Center for Strategic and International Studies. December 13, 2012. Accessed February 14, 2018.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/japan-chair-platform-increasing-security-awareness-among-japanese-public.
Hughes, Christopher W. “Why Japan Could Revise Its Constitution and What It Would Mean for Japanese Security Policy.” Orbis50, no. 4 (2006): 725-44. doi:
10.1016/j.orbis.2006.07.011.
Ikegami, Masako. “NATO and Japan: Strengthening Asian Stability.” NATO. 2007.
Accessed March 14, 2018.
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/art4.html.
Ishizuka, Katsumi. “Japans Policy towards UN Peacekeeping Operations.” International Peacekeeping 12, no. 1 (2005): 67-86. doi:10.1080/1353331042000286568.
Izumikawa, Yasuhiro. “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japans Security Policy.” International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 123-60. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00020.
Japan External Trade of Organization. Analysis of Japan China Trade in 2017. (JETRO, 2017).
Kang, David C. “The Theoretical Roots of Hierarchy in International
Relations.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 3 (2004): 337-52.
doi:10.1080/1035771042000260110.
Katzenstein, Peter J., and Peter J. Katzenstein. Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions. Routledge, 2008. 59-71.
‧
國立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Kim, Byung- Kook. “Between China, America, and North Korea: South Korea’s Hedging.” In China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics, 191-217. Cornell University Press.2008.
Kim, Woosang. “Alliance Transitions and Great Power War.” American Journal of Political Science 35, no. 4 (1991): 833. doi:10.2307/2111496.
Kingston, Jeff. “Does the Nuclear Option Make Sense for Japan?” The Japan Times.
February 25, 2017. Accessed February 14, 2018.
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/02/25/commentary/nuclear-option-make-sense-japan/#.WltV1pP1UWo.
Kliman, Daniel M. Japans Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik. Westport CT: Praeger, 2006.
KYODO. “China is not a Threat: Koizumi.” The Japan Times. April 13, 2002. Accessed May 1, 2018. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2002/04/13/national/china-is-not-a-threat-koizumi/.
KYODO. “Support for Abe’s Cabinet Climbs to 57.7% in Latest Poll.” The Japan Times. August 25, 2013. Accessed January 13, 2018.