The Development of Political Disparity and Economic Security between China and Southeast Asian

Coun-tries under the OBOR Policy

The development on political disparity and economic security in China-ASEAN political relations can be discussed in two levels of attributed analysis. One is at the international level and the other is at the China-ASEAN level of political consideration. The former will be more concerned with political disparity and core interests be-tween mainland China and the U.S. in regards to ASEAN, while the latter will be more concerned with economic security and autonomy between mainland China and the ASEAN countries. Political dis-crepancy here will be the impact of political disparity and economic security. Political disparity denotes the conflict of national sovereignty and political interests. Economic security is defined as economic ad-vantage plus interdependence and integration, less economic depen-dency.

First of all, at the level of International confrontation between China and the U.S. in regards to ASEAN, it can be understood that mainland China intends to resume its historical regional core power against American hegemonic power in the Asia-Pacific region. The grand scheme of OBOR development could be considered a great strategy of mainland China approaching the level of a regional core power, resuming its historical glorious status. Even though the OBOR development brings economic advantages and enhances mutual econo-mic integration, the ASEAN countries still are insecure about too much economic dependence on mainland China decreasing their econo-mic autonomy from mainland China. Especially, since the OBOR strategy is inspired by China’s rise to great power status, the so-called Chinese form of the Marshall Plan is full of political considera-tions.²⁷

Of China’s neighbors, only Southeast Asia has had close historical and diplomatic relations with China. Also, ASEAN is growing its centrality in a rising Asia that China expects to embrace for deve-lopment and security.²⁸Without holding and stabilizing its southern backyard, mainland China likely would be constrained in further out-ward development. So, the meaning of Southeast Asia to mainland China is not only economic interests, but also political purposes, in terms of security, diplomacy, and even military deployment.²⁹Naturally, Southeast Asia has become a geographic fortress for great powers.

It also has become an economic and political arena for mainland China, the U.S., and even Japan to compete and cooperate. Of course, politically and diplomatically, the ASEAN countries will not totally lean towards and depend much on mainland China, but they will make effort to approach the U.S. and Japan for some interests of ex-change. Only by applying equal distance and a balance of diplomacy toward m ainland China and the U.S. can the ASEAN countries gain not only a balance of the two powers but also acquire extra economic and political advantages from both sides.

In some sense, under globalization, the ASEAN region has become the security foundation of mainland China to stretch its in-fluence in Asia. To stabilize and ally with the ASEAN region would give mainland China considerable opportunity of reaching the first step of regional hegemony. The OBOR initiative could provide a

Michele Penna, “China’s Marshall Plan: All Silk Roads Lead to Beijing?”

Benjamin Ho, “ASEAN’s Centrality in a Rising Asia,” RSIS Working Paper (Singapore), No. 249, September 13, 2012, pp. 1-39, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/

wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP249.pdf>.

Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Understanding ASEAN’s Centrality: Bases and Pros-pects in an Evolving Regional Architecture,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 27, No.

4, June 13, 2014, pp. 563-584.

sound foundation for the ASEAN countries to be tied closely with mainland China on economic security as well as enhancing economic interdependence in exchange for the suspicious anxiety of political threat. Under the OBOR initiative, mainland China will move on more infrastructure investment and donate foreign aid to the ASEAN countries to compete with the American rebalancing policy in Asia and containment strategy.

From the view of geo-politics, mainland China’s eastward de-velopment to the Pacific has been blocked by an American alliance with the first and second military defense-line of island chains along the China coast line. This policy was marked as “containment” during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, the entity of mainland China is still treated as an enemy in the Asia-Pacific region, psycho-logically and politically.³⁰Faced with these maritime challenges from the U.S. rebalancing policy and treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the U.S. and Japan, if mainland China would like to escape the eastward obstacles of U.S. force, southward development to Southeast Asia and westward expansion become crucial. At a result, it is understandable that mainland China has brought up geo-political regional strategy on OBOR and especially concentration on Southeast Asia as a milestone for achieving OBOR economic empire.

In order to prevent U.S. and Western powers from dominating Southeast Asia, mainland China has claimed that Asian affairs should not be intervened in by non-Asian countries and that Asian security should be protected by Asian countries, accompanied by the Chinese version of the “Monroe Doctrine”（門羅主義）, which seems to be

Biwu Zhang, “Chinese Perceptions of US Return to Southeast Asia and the Prospect of China’s Peaceful Rise,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 24, No. 91, June 25, 2014, pp. 176-195.

kind of Chinese “New Asian Security Strategy”（亞洲新安全觀）.³¹ The Chinese mode of Monroe Doctrine is paralleled by its “Major Power Relation Strategy” as well as “Walk-out Policy.” The ASEAN region has become the target for mainland China’s Monroe Doctrine against the American rebalancing policy and psychological containment policy in Asia. Under the doctrine, the ASEAN region is treated as a determined object by mainland China rather than a deciding subject.

Deep inside of its strategic thought, mainland China would like to adopt its own “Monroe Doctrine” in Southeast Asia to kick the U.S.

out of Asia, especially the ASEAN region. On the other hand, mainland China h as included the ASEAN region under her protection against American power so that China’s defense line would move from the southern border territory into the Indo-China Peninsula.³²Furthermore, using the 21^stCentury Maritime Silk Road from the South China Sea to the Strait of Malacca and onward to the Indian Ocean would firmly protect mainland China’s core interests on the peninsula and would create a defense security frontline into the sea area. Clearly, the Monroe Doctrine under the OBOR strategy would fulfill mainland China’s economic and political purposes in the ASEAN region against the U.S. and Japan’s influence. This can be seen as the first level political discrepancy on economic security and political confrontation among regional great powers in the ASEAN region.

Last but not least, there is a seeming confrontation and competition between mainland China and Japan investment in the ASEAN region.

The Monroe Doctrine, published in 1823, reveals the attitudes of the U.S. back then, such as those against Europe’s great powers colonizing America or Europe’s right to set foot in America or Mexico.

Roger Cohen, “China’s Monroe Doctrine,” The New York Times, May 8, 2014,

<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/09/opinion/cohen-chinas-monroe-doctrine.

html?_r=0>.

In the past, the whole ASEAN economy was dominated by Japan in terms of trade, investment, financial support, and even foreign aid (ODA). Yet, since the new century was born, primarily after 2010 with the start of the China-ASEAN FTA, the influence of mainland China’s power in the regional economy gradually has surpassed Japan’s. Under the development scheme of the OBOR, the AIIB has been taken as a financial instrument by mainland China to compete with the role of the ADB, dominated by Japan, in the ASEAN region, chiefly in the GMS development.

In addition, at the China-ASEAN level of bilateral relations, the ASEAN countries also have faced several severe challenges from mainland China beyond economic security, such as the high speed rail (HSR) expansion policy, a forming perception of a tribute system (or tutelage system) between suzerain and vassal states, and sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. Especially, the good transportation infrastructure linkages can be thought of as a crucial and pragmatic tactic for mainland China to embrace the ASEAN region.

China has approached the ASEAN region with a new diplomatic strategy of high speed rail expansion in order to reach this area quickly, as well as form ties with this area for economic integration.

The Pan-Asia HSR has been planned to cover the ASEAN region, via Yunnan to Vietnam, Kampuchea, Thailand, Malaysia, and Sin-gapore. Since 2009, mainland China has emphasized its HSR con-struction stretching out to neighbors. The HSR diplomacy is used to construct and serve the grand scheme of the OBOR development.

Additionally, the highway construction from Kunming, Yunnan, to Bangkok, Thailand, was completed at the end of 2013. Aside from this, the highway also connects from Nanning, China, to Hanoi and then to Ho Chi Minh city, Vietnam. This highway line is also accom-panied by rail construction that will expand to Phnom Penh and

Bang-kok or Vientiane, Laos. More superhighways are under construction between mainland China and the Indochina Peninsula. These trans-portation improvements will contribute to mainland China’s economic integration with the ASEAN region and will decrease the perception of ASEAN’s economic autonomy.

Moreover, from a political view, anxious feelings about the for-mation of a tribute or tutelage system are raising, which is the political relationship of suzerain and vassal states. Deepening economic in-terdependence between ASEAN and mainland China also has amplified the economic cost for the ASEAN countries to use traditional military means to deal with China’s rise.³³It is clear, as the degree of economic interdependence between mainland China and ASEAN increases, there will be a higher degree of anxiety in the ASEAN countries with high economic dependence on Chinese economy that will easily bring back the historical relationship of a tribute system with mainland China that is kind of vertical tutelage relation, even though there is still economic and political autonomy.³⁴ As China is rising and in-fluential in military power, the ASEAN countries feel nervous about their economic and national security with mainland China, which en-larges political discrepancy. As a result, the ASEAN countries h ave increased their strategic willingness to invite other regional powers to become more involved in regional security matters, such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN, and accelerate their economic integration via ASEAN plus one or plus three, and even implementing RCEP (ASEAN Plus Six), ASEAN-EU, and ASEAN-USA FTA.³⁵

Kai He, “Facing the Challenges: ASEAN’s Institutional Responses to China’s Rise,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 50, No. 3, September 2014, pp. 137-168.

For example, Vietnamese creation story is one of a 1,000-year struggle to free itself from China’s rule.

Simultaneously, mainland China is asserting sovereignty of some reef islands in the South China Sea, which has always angered the Philippines and Vietnam. The high profile of China’s sovereignty persistence on South China Sea has threatened the regional security stability, which will hinder economic integration as well as increase political distrust with mainland China.³⁶

In Vietnam, owing to the sovereignty dispute on the Spratly and Parcel Islands and the oil rig issue from mainland China, anti-Chinese social riots have begun.³⁷ Vietnam would hedge against mainland China by strengthening ties with the U.S., especially with a signed comprehensive partnership across trade, investment, education, and defense, even with a joint U.S. exercise with the Vietnamese navy.

Therefore, Vietnam will look to the U.S. as its offshore balancer. Vi-etnam has emerged as a front-line state in ASEAN with a stake in maintaining maritime security and freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific region. Vietnam welcomes the benefits heading its way from renewed U.S. attention. Nevertheless, Vietnam wants to avoid being caught between the two powers and very cautiously is trying to prevent falling into the situation of Ukraine as a consequence of an unbalanced foreign policy.³⁸

Kai He, “Facing the Challenges: ASEAN’s Institutional Responses to China’s Rise”; Ralf Emmers & See Seng Tan, “The ASEAN Regional Forum and Pre-ventive Diplomacy: Built to Fail?” Asian Security, Vol.7, No.1, February 25, 2011, pp. 44-60.

Robert Sutter & Chi-hao Huang, “China-Southeast Asia Relations: China Gains and Advances in South China Sea,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 14, No. 3, January 2013, pp. 69-77.

Zachary Keck, “China ‘Internationalizes’ South China Sea Dispute: By raising the oil rig dispute with Vietnam at the UN, China risks setting a dangerous pre-cedent for itself,” The Diplomat, June 10, 2014, <http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/

china-internationalizes-south-china-sea-dispute/>.

In the Philippines, by support of American power, the Philippine government has sent an appeal of rights on island sovereignty issue into the international maritime court in The Hague. Also, there is new strategic cooperation agreement of military partnership and alliance between the Philippines and the U.S. that may welcome U.S.

forces back into the Philippines.³⁹

Mainland China has advocated putting sovereignty disputes aside and engaging in cooperation and development in the South China Sea since 1992. Nowadays, faced with maritime disputes, all the parties involved should find a way to defuse the ongoing tensions, to narrow the differences, and to resolve the issues by amicable and peaceful means. Nevertheless, mainland China still plays a key role in the South China Sea and will determine this region’s stability and security. As shown, mainland China supports and advocates the “dual-track approach” for dealing with the South China Sea issue, namely, relevant disputes being addressed by countries directly concerned through consultations and negotiations in a peaceful way, while strongly objecting to involvement by outside great powers.

The concrete development strategy towards ASEAN can be mark-ed by the six-point proposal Li Keqiang made to achieve three goals for improving the ASEAN economy in the 17^thASEAN-China Summit in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar on November 13, 2014.⁴⁰ This gives a

Phuong Nguyen, “Vietnam’s Careful Dance With the Super Powers,” East Asia Forum, January 21, 2015, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/01/21/vietnams-careful-dance-with-the-superpowers/>.

Veeramalla Anjaiah, “South China Sea in 2015: Fears of War,” Jakarta Post, January 22, 2015, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/01/22/south-china-sea-2015-fears-war.html #sthash.1Yo8KaXW.dpuf>.

“China, ASEAN to Upgrade Partnership in ‘Diamond Decade’: Premier Li,”

Xinhua, November 14, 2015, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/chin

strong message that China is willing to expand pragmatic cooperation with ASEAN countries in various fields, continuously deepen inte-gration of interests of both sides, and forge a closer China-ASEAN community with a common destiny. Mainland China will put aside political conflicts and differences with ASEAN to pursue a win-win situation.

First, mainland China is willing to outline the grand strategy for further developing China-ASEAN relations with the third plan of action to implement the joint declaration on the China-ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2016-2020). Mainland China also has negotiated a good-neighbor cooperation treaty between mainland China and ASEAN countries. Second, mainland China is going to work together with ASEAN to upgrade the China-ASEAN free trade zone and complete the related negotiations before the end of 2015. Third, in order to accelerate the building of a basic connectivity network via land and maritime connections, mainland China will pro-vide financial support to strengthen planning and building of tele-communications, electric power, and Internet sectors, as well as improve convenience of customs clearance, market supervision and standardization, and regulation.

Fourth, in order to underline maritime cooperation between ma-inland China and ASEAN, the two sides should take this opportunity to strengthen the dialogue between their maritime law enforcement organs, set up a maritime cooperation center, and implement the pan-Beibu Gulf economic cooperation roadmap and the projects under the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund. Fifth, mainland China will work with ASEAN to ensure both traditional security and

non-a/2014-11/14/c_133788239.htm>.

traditional security, as well as to explore possibilities of building a China-ASEAN defense hotline. Also, both sides will conduct joint exercises and deepen the law enforcement cooperation in the Mekong River Basin with cooperation projects for disaster management. Last, mainland China will actively explore new areas of cooperation in culture, people-to-people exchanges, science and technology, envi-ronment, education, rural poverty reduction, public health, personnel training, scientific research, and environmental protection.⁴¹

Last, two aspects of conflicts can be blamed for expanding the political discrepancy, one is among the ASEAN countries and the other is between mainland China and ASEAN under the OBOR strategy. The former is that some economic and political conflicts and problems still exist among ASEAN countries, so mainland China has to pay considerable attention. One, ASEAN intends to move to-wards a single market by the end of 2015 but the AEC has not yet reached its end-goal since both border and beyond-the-border res-trictions continue to prevail in the region.⁴²Two, some economic dis-parities of development still exist among the ASEAN countries, such as human resources, institutions, poverty, physical infrastructure, fi-nance, and information & community technology. Three, even though the foreign direct investment flowing into the ASEAN region as a

“Remarks by H. E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China At the 17^th ASEAN-China Summit,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People’s Republic of China, November 14, 2014, <http://www.fmprc.

gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/lkqzlcxdyhzldrxlhybdmdjxzsfw/t1212266.shtml>;

“China’s Premier Li Keqiang Calls for Peace, Stability at East Asia Summit,”

Current Affairs, November 13, 2014, <http://www.in.com/news/current-affairs/

chinas-premier-li-keqiang-calls-for-peace-stability-at-east-asia-summit-52999501-in-1.html>.

Mie Oba, “ASEAN and the Creation of a Regional Community,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 June 17, 2014, pp. 63-78.

whole increased from US$ 21.8 billion in 2000 to US$ 110.3 billion in 2012, the investment is too concentrated in Singapore, which, in turn, will accelerate the uneven de velopment among the ASEAN countries and hinder ASEAN as a whole.⁴³

Some economic and political conflicts have been raised under the OBOR development between mainland China and ASEAN. One, the development of the OBOR implies the reality of China’s rise and even brings up the China dream, which is a threat for ASEAN. Two, the OBOR initially indicates not only soft power but also hard power.

It is linked well with overseas Chinese economic power and networks in the ASEAN region. Three, the OBOR grand scheme deeply connects with the culture, history, economy, and diplomacy of the old Silk Road, which easily reflects an impression of a tribute system between mainland China and ASEAN. Four, the OBOR initiative is a unilateral development strategy where mainland China never consulted with the ASEAN countries and possibly has neglected respect for ASEAN.

在文檔中 The Political Economy of Development between China and ASEAN States-- An Emerging New Form of Economic Integration and Political Discrepancy--Jenn-jaw Soong (宋鎮照)Update:2018/05/03 (頁 21-31)