Chapter 4. Higher Education Across the Taiwan Strait
4.4 Developments in Student Exchanges between China and Taiwan
國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
Kong, Macau, and Taiwan to replace political and military course credits with “other national curriculum credits.”45
For graduate school applicants, the process of entering a university in mainland China involves specialized subject and language testing as well as interviews with each institution to which Taiwanese students apply. The examinations and required depend on the applicant’s desired field of study and target institution. Students from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau have the option of taking the Hong Kong-Macau-Taiwan joint entrance exam (港澳臺聯合招生考試) for admission to mainland graduate programs or the
mainland’s standard entrance exam. Taiwanese students may also apply their advanced subject test (學科能力測試) scores in Taiwan toward entrance to mainland universities.46
In addition to the available legal documents on Taiwanese students in Mainland China, news and media reports have claimed over the past few years that Chinese universities are adopting more preferential policies to attract Taiwanese students. These policies include lowering entrance exam score requirements for admission, expanding quotas for the number of students that universities can recruit from Taiwan, and extending scholarships to admitted students from Taiwan.47 Articles 13 and 26 of the PRC’s “31 Measures” document released in 2018 specifically target Taiwanese students and young professionals, including the ability for Taiwanese people to take mainland professional qualification exams and clinical certifications and transfer certifications obtained in Taiwan to mainland China.48
4.4 Developments in Student Exchanges between China and Taiwan
Since 2011, Mainland Chinese students have flowed to Taiwan for higher education. While well-established today, flows of mainland Chinese students to Taiwan
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 See: Ben Halder, “China’s New Weapon Against Taiwan? Educating its Best and Brightest,” OZY, May 6, 2019, accessed May 8, 2019, https://www.ozy.com/acumen/chinas-new-weapon-against-taiwan-educating-its-best-and-brightest/94039; Brenda Goh and Jess Macy Yu, “China tries to charm tech-savvy Taiwanese youth as political ties fray,” Reuters, February 7, 2018, accessed May 8, 2019,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-taiwan-youth/china-tries-to-charm-tech-savvy-taiwanese-youth-as-political-ties-fray-idUSKBN1FR0LB; and Chen-ju Lin, “Why are Taiwanese Students Choosing China for University?,” Taiwan Gazette, November 19, 2018, accessed May 8, 2019,
https://www.taiwangazette.org/news/2018/11/18/why-are-taiwanese-students-choosing-china-for-university.
48 Judith Norton and Edward J. Barss, “China’s 31 Measures,” East Asia Peace and Security Initiative, March 22, 2018, accessed May 17, 2019, https://www.eapasi.com/blogs1/china-31-measures.
‧
have not risen consistently over the past seven years. The number of Mainland students in Taiwan increased from 928 in 2011 to 3,019 by 2015 for degree-seeking students, and from 11,227 to 34,114 students for short-term programs in that same time period. The number of new admissions of short-term and degree program students from mainland China has decreased each year after 2015, with 20,597 students in short-term programs and 2,140 students in degree programs entering Taiwan in 2018. Combining short-term and degree program enrollments, a total of 29,603 students from mainland China were in Taiwan in 2018.49 News sources in Taiwan attribute the decrease in Mainland Chinese enrollments to the tense cross-strait relationship since the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen of the Taiwan-centric DPP, which has resulted in China restricting the number of students allowed to apply for higher education programs in Taiwan.50
While Taiwan has only recently opened its universities to Mainland Chinese students, China’s policies toward Taiwanese students have long been open but difficult to quantify. Chinese statistics estimate that 12,000 Taiwanese students were in China in 2017, about twice as many as 2011 levels.51 PRC policy allowing Taiwanese students to study in Mainland universities mirrors other incentives China offers to Taiwan’s people to improve cross-strait relations at the economic level. More recently, the 2018 unveiling of
“31 incentives” for Taiwanese professionals, students, and residents in China includes easier access to institutions of higher education for Taiwanese people, among other incentives that make life more convenient for Taiwanese professionals and
businesspeople in China.52 News reports show that Taiwan officials are weary of losing
49 Mainland Affairs Council, “Mainland Chinese Students in Taiwan, Statistics on Mainland Students Researching and studying for Degrees in Taiwan,” accessed May 6, 2019,
https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=CA7B5FA9C0EC7005&sms=D645444CA321A4FA
&s=54D121541C911FB1.
50 Keoni Everington, “China Halves Students Allotted for Taiwan, tries to lure Taiwanese,” Taiwan News, July 6, 2017, accessed May 6, 2019, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3204297.
51 Rachel Lin et al., “China Targeting Students using Stipends: source,” Taipei Times, April 3, 2018, accessed November 22, 2018,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/04/03/2003690576/1.
52 See “Chinese Mainland promotes cross-Strait exchanges, cooperation,” Xinhua, February 28, 2018, accessed November 22, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-02/28/c_137005735.htm; and Zhonggong Zhongyang Tai Ban, Guowu Yuan Tai Ban 中共中央臺辦, 國務院臺辦 [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Taiwan Office], “Guanyu Yinfa ‘Guanyu Cujin Liang’an Jingji Wenhua Jiaoliu Hezuo de Ruogan Cuoshi’ de Tongzhi” 關於印發《關於促進兩岸經濟文化交流合作 的若干措施》的通知 [Notice on the ‘Several Measures on Promoting Cross-Strait Economic and Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation’],” Zhongguo Taiwan Wang 中國臺灣網, February 28, 2018, accessed February 21, 2018, http://big5.taiwan.cn/xwzx/la/201802/t20180228_11928235.htm.
‧
advanced talent and students to outside economies and especially to China.53 These reports fuel concern in Taiwan that the island faces a “brain drain” of talent to the
mainland as students and young graduates and professionals find preferential employment opportunities in mainland China.54 These concerns are linked to other arguments in Taiwanese political circles that heavy reliance on the mainland’s economy may eventually harm Taiwan’.
Regarding the characteristics, motivations, and professional futures of students in cross-strait educational movement, several studies have viewed mainland China as a source of cross-border students, focused on student mobility from China to Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau. Chuing Prudence Chou and Gregory S. Ching’s aforementioned 2015 study of Mainland Chinese students in Taiwan used the push-pull framework to analyze student characteristics and motivations for choosing Taiwan as a destination for study.
They found that Chinese students ranked “understanding Taiwan” as a main advantage (positive pull factor) of an educational experience in Taiwan, while disadvantages (negative push factors) of studying in Taiwan included the strict regulations, few scholarship opportunities, and overcoming Taiwanese misconceptions of Mainland Chinese students.55 This illustrates the limited nature of student flows between Taiwan and China and how Taiwan’s cross-strait educational policies remain informed by the ROC’s security imperatives, placing mainland Chinese students in a separate category from typical international students in Taiwan.
While few studies so far have examined Taiwanese students in their choice to study in mainland China, one has shone light on the subject through the linkage
community lens. Regarding the outlook and attitudes of Taiwanese students in mainland China, Davidson’s 2015 study of Taiwanese university students in mainland China
53 See “CHINA’S 31 INCENTIVES: China’s incentives to have limited effect: NDC chief,” Taipei Times, March 13, 2018, accessed November 22, 2018,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2018/03/13/2003689184; and Mimi Leung and Yojana Sharma, “China’s Equal Status Policy causes Taiwan Brain Drain,” University World News, March 1, 2018, accessed November 22, 2018,
http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20180301165622684.
54 Simon Denyer, “Taiwan Battles Brain Drain as China Aims to Woo Young Talent,” The Washington Post, April 15, 2018, accessed September 19, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/taiwan-battles-a-brain-drain-as-china-aims-to-woo-
young-talent-away/2018/04/13/338d096e-3940-11e8-af3c-2123715f78df_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.55ec35431ab1.
55 Chuing Prudence Chou and Gregory Ching, “Cross-Straitization of Higher Education: Voices of the Mainland Chinese Students Studying in Taiwan,” International Journal of Information and Education Technology, vol. 5, no. 2, 2015, pp. 89-94.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
utilized interviews to describe the ways in which Taiwanese students are linked to the Mainland through their academic and social lives.56 The results of the study found that Taiwanese students in China do not necessarily integrate easily into Mainland society;
Taiwanese participants in the study emphasized differences in economic background, upbringing, and education between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese students that makes building social connections between the two groups difficult.57 As a result, the Taiwanese students surveyed formed more cohesive social groups with other Taiwanese students on their campuses and through the Taiwanese Student Associations (TSAs or Taishenghui, 臺生會) at their campuses in mainland China. The study applies the linkage community model to conceptualize Taiwanese students in mainland China as a linkage community between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. However, Davidson concluded that
Taiwanese students, while linked to their Chinese counterparts at mainland higher
education institutions and technically forming a community that has experience living and working in the mainland, do not necessarily constitute an influential group that would advocate for cross-strait policy in Taiwan.58 This study shows that while Taiwanese students can easily enter a Mainland university, the social process of connecting with Mainland Chinese peers is not always successful.
Outside of academia, policy professionals also engage in the discussion of cross-strait mobility among students. A 2018 editorial by Lu Chen-wei of the KMT-backed National Policy Foundation analyzes studies published in Chinese on Taiwanese students in China to argue that their political identities do not change to favor mainland China.
While Taiwanese students may change their perceptions of stereotypes of mainland China, over the course of their studies, their political identities do not necessarily change to support Taiwan’s belonging or unification with China. Lu argues that this occurs because of the “native consciousness” that has developed among the younger generations of Taiwan by which they now view Taiwan and China as separate entities, prefer to separate economic relations from political relations, and identify as Taiwanese only. 59 Lu’s editorial advances the point of view that Taiwanese students separate the political
56 Lincoln Edward Davidson, “Linked without Linking: The Role of mainland China’s Taiwanese Students in Cross-Strait Unification,” Asia Network Exchange, vol. 22, no. 2, 2015, pp. 2-19.
57 Lincoln Edward Davidson, op. cit., p. 10.
58 Lincoln Edward Davidson, op. cit., p. 16.
59 Lu Chen-wei, “For Taiwanese Youth, Does Studying in China Lead to Changes in Political Identity?”
The Taiwan Gazette, September 11, 2018, accessed May 6, 2019,
https://www.taiwangazette.org/news/2018/10/5/for-taiwanese-students-does-studying-in-china-lead-to-changes-in-political-identity.
‧ 國
立 政 治 大 學
‧
N a tio na
l C h engchi U ni ve rs it y
relationship with China from the economic opportunities available in the Mainland and therefore do not constitute a threat to Taiwanese political identity.
This chapter has provided an overview of Taiwan and China’s higher education systems from post-World War II through today. Both China and Taiwan have
experienced periods of rapid economic change that are reflected in the massification, marketization, and internationalization of their higher education systems. While these education systems now display similar features, the different social and political contexts between Taiwan and China complicate the legal aspects of cross-strait exchanges.
Political relations between China and Taiwan also complicate and at times restrict the movement of students across the Taiwan strait for higher education. Current evidence of cross-strait mobility shows that while students take advantage of educational
opportunities on either side of the Taiwan strait, this interaction and integration in the education sector has also not yet led to political spillover in the cross-strait relationship, as Taiwanese students in mainland China tend to retain their Taiwanese political identity while pursuing higher education opportunities. The following chapter examines primary and secondary data that further explores Taiwanese students’ rationales and decision-making processes in choosing mainland China for graduate studies.