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5.1 Survey Comments: Lay beliefs

5.1.1. The evaluated and the evaluating

The survey comments reveal thirteen ideological stances. These stances are found not to directly evaluate the proposal text, but to reflect on ideological understanding of officializing English shaped by four established language ideologies. As one comment can

manifest multiple language ideologies and as established language ideologies bridge between speakers‘ evaluations and the text, the 13 ideological stances do not neatly fall into these four

categories. Instead, the four subsections below illustrate how each established language ideology leads to varied and dynamic ideologizing process where 13 stances prevail. Table 5 presents the four established language ideologies and the 13 ideological stances.

Table 5. The established language ideologies and ideological stances in the online survey comments

Established language ideologies Ideological stances English represents global

competitiveness.

English ability means global competitiveness.

English being important and necessarily doesn‘t make it an official language.

English threatens national identity.

English has nothing to do with competitiveness.

Taiwanese are bad English

Nation-wide language proficiency is difficult.

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The complex relationship between the four established language ideologies and 13 ideological stances will be discussed with comments in the following section. A summarizing ideologization web will be presented in Section 5.5.

5.1.1.1 “English represents global competitiveness.”

Among the 13 ideological stances, four evaluate the connection between English and global competitiveness. These four divergent stances also explicate that one language ideology could meet distinctive evaluations.

The most prominent ideological stance ―English is a globally competitive language,‖

found in 484 comments, sanctions the perceived instrumental connection between English

and global competitiveness, as shown in (12) and (13).

(12) 想要跟國際競爭難道不需要學嗎?

(‗Shouldn‘t we learn [English] if we want to join global competition?‘) (13) 看看英文水帄高的國家比台灣競爭力強多少吧!

(‗Just look at countries that have better English proficiency! How far more competitive they are than Taiwan!‘)

The use of the final particle 嗎 ma and the adverb 難道 nandao ‗surely it doesn‘t‘ turns the

interrogative in (12) into a rhetorical question (Shao 2013). The negative rhetorical question which prefers the positive reading (Shao 2013) strengthens the perceived association between English and global competitiveness. Comment (13) connects 英文水帄高 yingwen shuiping gao ‗better English proficiency‘ with being 競爭力強 jingzhengli qiang ‗more competitive‘

and favors English officialization. English officialization is popularly understood as an

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attempt to enhance competitiveness. This ideological stance corresponds to the long-held belief that English plays a critical role in competiveness and social mobility (Y.F. Chang 2008;

S.-C. Chen 2010; Tsai 2010).

A contesting ideological stance ―English being necessary and important doesn‘t make it an official language,‖ with 33 occurrences, is observed in the viewers‘ doubts regarding the

legitimacy to officialize English. Despite its disapproval to English officialization, the ideological stance affirms that English represents competitiveness, as presented in (14) and

(15).

(14) 國際語言有學習必要,沒有列為官方第二語必要

(‗It is necessary to learn an international language, but unnecessary to make it a second official language.‘)

(15) 英文重要但不用刻意列為官方語言

(‗English is important, but there is no need to deliberately implement [it] as an official language.‘)

Viewer (14) explains that the need to acquire a 國際語言 guoji yuyan ‗international language‘

does not support the need to officialize it. Viewer (15) also disagrees to officialize English simply out of its recognized importance. This ideological stance sanctions that however important English does not meet certain criteria which an official language is conceptualized to possess. This conceptual gap will be further discussed.

The ideological stance ―English threatens Taiwan‘s national identity,‖ seen in 31 comments, addresses the dominant role of English and its undesired impact on local languages and identities (Phillipson 1992). Although whether English brings negative

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influence to local languages and identities still remain debated (House 2003; Smolicz &

Secombe 2003; Byram 2008; Jenkins 2009), the ideological stance also presupposes that

English is globally dominant. Two examples are shown in (16) and (17).

(16) 而由功能性需求訂定第二官方語言, 這樣國語又情何以堪呢?

(‗If we recognize English as an official language simply because of its instrumental functions, how do we see our Guoyu?‘)

(17) 鼓勵語言學習有必要列為官方語言?自貶國格還是民族自賤?

(‗Do we need to officialize a language to promote language learning? Is that nation deprecation or ethnicity denigration?‘)

Viewer (16) believes that English officialization places 國語 guoyu ‗the national language‘

inferior to English. The 功能性 gongneng xing ‗instrumental values‘ reveals the viewer‘s

awareness that English officialization is aimed for competitiveness lift. The comment also implies that official languages mean more than instrumental values. Comment (17) sees English officialization as 自貶國格 zi bian guoge ‗nationality self-deprecation‘ and 民族自 賤 minzu zi jian ‗ethnicity denigration‘ and thus as an act of submission to English

dominance. This stance reveals that the conceptualization of official languages associates with national identity and that English could not fulfill such a requirement for identity recognition. The ideological stance explains that language ideologies concerning English and those concerning official languages are interacting but competing.

The ideological stance ―English has nothing to do with global competitiveness,‖ with 13 occurrences, explicitly dissociates English from competitiveness, as presented in (18) and (19).

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(18) 「 國 際 競 爭 力 」 從 來 不 是 因 為 語 言 而 來 。 產 品 的 好 壞 , 價 格 的 高 低 , 才 是。…(23words)….。「國際競爭力」一說,只是個話術。

(‗―Global competitiveness‖ never comes from language, but from the quality of products and the price. ... ―Global competitiveness‖ is just a sales pitch.‘)

(19) 國家競爭力不是靠英文來提升的。真的有產力與能力才是真的。

(‗We can‘t boost our competitiveness with English. Only productivity and capability count.‘)

Comment (18) protests that competitiveness out of language competence presents a 話術

hua shu ‗a sales pitch‘ and both comments (18) and (19) value productivity over language.

However, from the dialogic perspective which Martin and White (2005) discuss, denial itself also presents the negative with the assumption that the positive exists. Put simply, the negation responds to the positive claim that global competitiveness comes from English (Martin & White 2005, 118). Explicitly denying the link between English and boosting competitiveness simultaneously suggests that the viewers are disapprovingly aware of such a positive connection. The dialogic function of negation also justifies the argument in this study that specific rationalizations are assumed. These rationalizations, i.e. established language ideologies, are not necessarily popularly supported. They serve the function of being there for language users to pick up and to re-evaluate in a current context (Gal & Irvine 2019).

These four distinctive ideological stances are not responding directly to the proposal text alone, but reflecting on the conceptualization that English officialization is predominantly perceived to be an attempt to boost Taiwan‘s competitiveness. The meaning-making process shows that the ideologization process rationalizes language management and decision (Woolard 1998; Shohamy 2006).

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5.1.1.2 “Taiwanese are bad English speakers.”

Metadiscourse on English officialization inevitably involves speculations about how this policy proposal could influence individuals, leading to two conflicting ideological stances. Some affirm that officializing English potentially boosts English proficiency. The opposing stance argues that English officialization may not contribute much to improving the

current situation. Noteworthily, the conflicting stance does not defend with the contrary understanding that ―Taiwanese speak good English.‖ The two opposing ideological stances

both reflect on an established language ideology that Taiwanese are bad English speakers.

The ideological stance ―We could/should improve our English,‖ found in 56 comments, celebrates the potential boost in English proficiency as an anticipated result of English officialization. It is expected to see that the appropriation of English is also connected to the established language ideology that English represents global competitiveness, as seen in (20)

and (21).

(20) 台灣人語文程度太差,難以與國際接軌,有個國際通用的語言當第二語言是好事 (‗Taiwanese suffer from low language proficiency. This makes it difficult to go

international. Things might change to have an international language as Taiwan‘s second [official] language.‘)

(21) 有助於提升國民英語能力對促進台灣的國際化有幫助。

(‗[English officialization] helps improve Taiwanese‘s English and internationalization.‘)

Comment (20) reflects that Taiwanese suffer from low English proficiency and attributes low global visibility to self-deprecated English proficiency. The viewer uses two negative evaluation 差 cha ‗bad‘ and 難 nan ‗difficult‘ to accentuate the established link between

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language proficiency and international connectedness. English officialization is expected to

ameliorate the problem. Viewer (21) also argues that officializing English boosts English competence and in return facilitates Taiwan‘s internationalization. The comments manifest

the belief that English is a tool for global connection and that there is a need for competence improvement for global connection.

The contrastive ideological stance ―We won‘t become better in English because of officializing English,‖ with 14 occurrences, casts doubt on whether English officialization

can substantially alter the situation, as revealed in (22) and (23).

(22) 台灣人部會因為這個白癡政策英文變好9

(‗Taiwanese won‘t become better English speakers because of this stupid policy.‘)

(23) 台南市將英語訂為第二官方語言台南路上有多少人會講英文啊?10

(‗Tainan recognizes English as a second official language. How many people in Tainan can actually speak English?‘)

Comment (22) denies the possibility of English improvement with the implementation of this 白癡政策 baichi zhengce ‗stupid policy.‘ The ideological stance reflects on that Taiwanese‘s

poor command of English and further questions the validity of legitimizing English.

Comment (23) also suspects the effectiveness of Tainan‘s attempt to make English the second official language city-wide. Similar to the previous ideological stance, this ideological stance reflects on Taiwanese‘ less command of English. Contrary to the previous ideological stance,

this ideological stance further questions the validity of English officialization on

9 部會 bu hui is a typography, which remains as the way the viewer did. It should be 不會 ―not.‖

10 Tainan, a city in Southern Taiwan, has attempted to list English as its second official language citywide. In the current debate about legitimizing English as Taiwan‘s second official language, the instance of Tainan is brought up occasionally.

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improvement.

Self-deprecation of English proficiency implies the anxiety of non-native-English speakers in response to the conceptualization that English competence is a must (J.S.-Y. Park 2009). When individuals self-identify as bad English speakers and debate whether officializing English makes substantial change, the two opposing discursive forces illustrate that identical rationalizations about languages can invite strikingly different evaluations.

Language ideologization is dynamic and multilayered (Kroskrity 2004). A bigger question along the ideologizing process lies in how proponents and opponents are interpreting the language policy proposal with identical, shared, established language ideologies despite their stances.

5.1.1.3 “The number of official languages should be kept to a minimum.”

Language learning is viewed as an investment with an economic perspective of language (De Swaan 2001). Investment in one language is commonly thought to risk or bargain at the expense of other languages. Multilingualism is therefore conceptualized as a site for language competition (Wiley 2000). When viewers argue for the most appropriate

official language, the efforts to allocate official status to one or a few languages reflect viewers‘ ideation to keep the number of official languages to a minimum.

The ideological stance ―English is more useful,‖ with 31 occurrences, prioritizes the

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perceived instrumental values of English (Oladejo 2006; Y.F. Chang 2008; Tsai 2010; S.-C.

Chen in press 2021) and background the established language ideology ―English represents

global competitiveness.‖ Two examples are shown in (24) and (25).

(24) 至少在我們有生之年英文還是比中文有用

(‗At least English stays more important than Mandarin Chinese in our lifetime.‘) (25) 可以跟國際接軌總比把時間花在學啥台語,客家語當個井底之蛙來的強

(‗Learning English to go international is more practical than learning Taiwanese and Hakka which will only allow people to become narrow-minded‘)

Viewers (24) and (25) believe that learning English is more 有用 you yong ‗useful‘ and 強

qiang ‗practical‘ than learning Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese and Hakka. Both comments

reveal a willingness to limit resources for learning other languages to enhance English competence. Learning more languages or legitimizing more languages seem much less prominent. The viewers express a conflict-oriented understanding of language learning because when time and resources should be spent on a more useful language. The debate of a most appropriate official language also shows how official languages are conceptualized

differently. Some value local identities, as revealed previously in ―English threatens Taiwan‘s national identity‖ whereas some prioritize the usefulness of English.

The ideological stance ―Chinese is more important,‖ manifested in 73 comments,

emphasizes Mandarin Chinese learning, as shown in (26) and (27).

(26) 現在國人的中文能力已經很掉漆了,還有母語也很糟沒必要硬規定列第二官方語11

(‗People nowadays suffer from embarrassingly low Chinese proficiency, let alone proficiency in native languages. There is no need to recognize a second official language.‘)

11 The phrase 掉漆 comes from Taiwanese lak-tshat, used to refer to an embarrassing situation.

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(27) 當大家都在說現在人的中文造詣越來越差時,應該先把中文學好再來學英文!!

(‗When everyone acknowledges receding Mandarin Chinese proficiency, we should put Mandarin before English.‘)

Taiwanese are thought to suffer from receding Mandarin Chinese and local language proficiency in the two comments. In response to receding Mandarin proficiency, learning Mandarin is prioritized to improving English. The viewers hold diverse opinions about the role of Mandarin Chinese. Some consider Mandarin Chinese to be a local language in Taiwan while others disagree. To better accommodate the data, Mandarin Chinese and local languages are labeled differently in this study.

The ideological stance ―Local languages are more important,‖ with 54 occurrences, values local language preservation over English learning. Two comments are presented in (28)

and (29.)

(28) 自己國家的母語都搞不好了還要將外來語言當成官方語言!?

(‗We can‘t even settle our own native languages and now we‘re having a foreign language as our official language!?‘)

(29) 第二官方語言應該是各族群母語,自己的母語都不好好推廣,推甚麼英語。

(‗Native languages are the entitled second official languages. Why are we promoting English when we are neglecting our native languages?‘)

Viewer (28) finds it dissatisfactory to give a 外來語 wailaiyu ‗foreign language‘ the official

status when the native languages still struggle for recognition. Viewer (29) also believes that the native languages should serve as official languages. Valuing local languages more than English, this stance contests the ideological stance ―English is more important.‖

The three ideological stances prioritize respective languages in the discussion of language officialization. The act of weighing importance among languages also indicates that

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having additional official languages is a much less prominent belief.

5.1.1.4 “An official language is a language for all.”

An official language is generally understood as a language that everyone in a social group speaks, or should learn to speak. Officializing English is therefore understood as having the obligation to speak English. Four ideological stances reflect on this mandated English competence.

The ideological stance ―English is for everyone,‖ with 19 occurrences, celebrates the fact that language learning becomes equally available to all. This ideological stance also backgrounds the established language ideology ―English represents global competitiveness,‖

as illustrated in (30) and (31).

(30) 語言學習不應該分貧富, 如果列為第二官語就能讓全民更具國際化,給弱勢家庭更 多的機會

(‗Language learning should be equally available to everyone. If English is recognized as a second official language, [this] makes everyone more international and gives underprivileged families more opportunities.‘)

(31) 許多新技術及生活資訊第一時間都是英文,能多學一種全球常用語言還是很大幫 助的,… (19 words)…,許多學習是需要強制的

(‗A lot of first-hand information is available in English. It helps to acquire a common global language. Learning takes place when it is compulsory.‘)

Comment (30) links English learning to 機會 jihui ‗opportunity‘ of underprivileged families,

inferring the instrumental functions of English in social mobility. The notion that language learning 不應該分貧富 bu yinggai fen pinfu ‗should be equally available to everyone‘ implies

that English learning was originally considered to be socially discriminative, as also

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discussed in Tsai (2010) and Price (2014). The positive attitudes revealed in Comment (30) also indicate that English officialization is reckoned to be likely to lead to successful language learning. Comment (31) states that English allows speakers to stay tuned to new information and that language learning should be mandated. Legitimizing English seems to promise successful English learning. English has already long been a required school subject, just as enhancing English ability has been seen as an issue. Nonetheless, Price (2014) discusses that social division is entrenched in mandatory English-in-education in Taiwan, making English learning available to an exclusive group of people.

Mandated societal language learning is viewed as facilitative in developing an

English-speaking environment. The ideological stance ―Officializing English creates an English-friendly environment,‖ with 29 occurrences, hopes that officializing English could immerse Taiwanese in speaking English. The ideological stance backgrounds the established language ideologies that Taiwanese do not speak good English and that English competence represents competitiveness. Speaking English is treated as normative and advantageous, as

(32) and (33) reveal.

(32) 若英文成為第二官方語言,本人認為可以營造英語的使用環境,並增加國人的外 語能力

(‗If English is made a second official language, I think this can build an environment where English is actually used and boost English proficiency.‘)

(33) 沒有先天的歷史條件,只能倚靠後天創造環境,才有希望趕上星、馬、港等。

(‗Without historical backgrounds, we have to put efforts in creating environments so that we can keep up with Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong.‘)

Comment (32) believe that English officialization helps to develop an English speaking