Language ideology is predominantly understood as the bridge between linguistic forms
and their meanings in macro social contexts. Language ideology as theoretical frameworks diverse in researchers‘ distinct remarks of what language ideology is, how it can be
approached as an inquiry and at what levels of discursive explicitness it is manifested. The variations contribute to an abundance of discussion on its definitions, its relation to power and dominance, and its ‗siting‘ in language use (Woolard 1998).
Language ideology does not have a unified definition. Even terminologies vary, depending on dimensions that different academic strands choose to attend to. One of the most frequently-cited definitions by Silverstein (1979) describes language ideology as ―sets of
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beliefs about language articulated by the users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use‖ (193). Silverstein does not distinguish between
‗ideology about language‘ and ‗linguistic ideologies.‘ He further states that the moment
speakers put their social experiences in real world in language, they also ―presuppose (or
reflect) and create (or fashion) a good deal of social reality by the very activity of using language‖ (Silverstein 1979: 194). That is, putting social experiences into words both reflects
and further accentuates social experiences. The similar concept is termed ‗linguistic ideology‘
by Irvine (1989), who defines linguistic ideology as ―the cultural (or subcultural) system of
ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests‖ (255). Rather than characterizing language ideologies as ‗beliefs‘
(Silverstein 1979), Irvine refers language ideologies to ‗ideas‘ and rejects a causal and predictable relation between linguistic phenomena and social differentiation. Linguistic ideology is taken as the mediating factor between linguistic phenomena and social differentiation (Irvine 1989). Woolard explains that language ideologies are ―[r]epresentations, whether explicit or implicit, that construe the intersection of language and human beings in
the social world‖ (1998: 3), and states that ‗linguistic ideology,‘ ‗language ideology,‘ and
‗ideologies of language‘ are used interchangeably by her regardless of differences these terms may denote in their own separate fields. Woolard‘s definition (1998) addresses agentivity.
Cameron (2003), who aligns with Irvine (1989) and Woolard (1998), summarizes definitions
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in the past literature and defines language ideologies as ―sets of representations through
which language is imbued with cultural meaning for a certain community‖ (447). Similarly,
Eagleton (2007) states that ideology defines uniqueness but manifests itself as what
―[e]verybody knows that, a kind of anonymous universal truth‖ (20). The definition also
suggests that language ideologies reside in social actors of shared cultural practices.
Ideologies, in other words, ―are social constructs‖ (Cameron 2003: 448) which reveal ―what
people think, or take for granted about, language and communication‖ (Woolard &
Schieffelin 1994: 56). These definition all point to a regulating, evaluative function which (language) ideologies serve.
Despite the use of different terminologies and the lack of a unified definition, according to Woolard (1998), the majority of scholarly attention of language ideology addresses 4 salient themes. First, with the use of ‗beliefs‘ and ‗ideas‘ to describe language ideology, ideologies are ideational and therefore ―internally contradictory‖ (Woolard 1998: 6).
The second strand addresses that ideologies are ―derived from, rooted in, reflective of, or responsive to the experience or interests of a particular social position‖ (Woolard 1998: 6).
The third property, which is also the most recognized one, notes the role of language ideology as a medium between linguistic practice and social distinction. Ideologies are power-laden and can be exercised for power sustaining or contestation. Last, ideology is considered to be deviant from objective truth. It portrays our rationalizations of language. According to
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Woolard (1998), the third strand that language ideology could be deployed for power sustention is commonly seen as an extension from the second strand but diverges from it. The second property about reflexivity of language ideologies addresses a neutral view on language ideology while the third property about power contestation and social distinction emphasizes a critical view of it (Woolard & Schieffelin 1994). The neutral view sees
language ideology as constituted by and constitutive of social experiences (Woolard 1998) while the critical view is ―reserved for only aspects of representation and social cognition,
with particular social origins or functional or formal characteristics‖ (Woolard & Schieffelin
1994: 57). John B. Thompson (1990), who defines ideology as ―meaning in the service of power‖ (7), also emphasizes this third property. The study will examine the data with the four
properties to pinpoint the ideologizing process.
Though ‗language ideology,‘ ‗linguistic ideology,‘ ‗ideologies of language,‘ or simply
‗ideology,‘ are considered interchangeable in works such as Woolard‘s (1998) and Silverstein‘s (1979), the adaptation of definitions themselves are open to further debate.
Following Silverstein‘s definition of treating language ideology as sets of ‗beliefs,‘ the noun
‗belief‘ has used as an alternative in defining language ideologies (see the discussion in
Cameron (2003)). Cameron (2003) states that some academic commentators are reluctant to view ‗language ideologies‘ as synonymous to ‗beliefs.‘ Verschueren (2012) states that
‗beliefs,‘ ‗ideas‘ and ‗opinions‘ ―are merely ‗contents of thinking,‘ whereas ideology is
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associated with underlying patterns of meaning, frames of interpretation, world views, or forms of everyday thinking and explanation‖ (2012: 7). Whereas a belief connotes falsified,
individual, mental construct, ideology places greater emphasis on shared, socially-fostered constructs (Cameron 2003). On the other hand, the word ‗representation‘ adopted by Woolard (1998) and later by Cameron (2003) brings forth the property of language ideology being
both a product and a process of reshaping linguistic perceptions. Having said so, the use of
‗belief‘ as an explanatory term for ideology still prevails. This study uses the term ‗lay beliefs‘
interchangeably to mean a cluster of language ideologies. It must be noted that the study does not see representations and beliefs as theoretically contradictory. The study adopts a broad definition of language ideology and locks the discussion on ideologization with metalinguistic evaluation. Instead of anchoring the study with a definition whether language ideologies are beliefs, representations, or others to begin with, the study is more eager to start with evaluation and appraisal to see how the act reflects the social knowledge of English in the Taiwanese context.
Theoretical orientations to language ideologies also concern the sites where language ideologies are at work and thus observable. The ‗siting‘ (Woolard 1998) of language ideologies is discussion-worthy because language ideologies get by unnoticed most of the time. Eagleton (2007) states that normalcy empowers language ideologies. According to Eagleton, ideology ―is always most effective when invisible‖ (2007: xvii). Woolard (1998)
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summarizes in the introductory chapter of Language Ideology: Practice and Theory that three major focal areas are of importance for investigation on language ideology. Two of the three focal areas directly pertain to everyday communicative practice and therefore they are in direct reference to the present study. One focal area to look into language ideologies is metapragmatics, which refers to either explicit or implicit evaluation-laden discourse of language use (Silverstein 1979; 1985; 1993). The second focal area lies in the perceived contrasts among language varieties. Take Coupland and Bishop‘s (2007) study on British accent as an example. Language ideologies help build up a speaker‘s understanding of language practice in specific socio-cultural contexts. As such, speakers of a standardized language acquire and structure their social experience in a culture where the existence of a standard language and using the standardized language are collectively perceived to be normal and normative (Coupland and Bishop 2007). Milroy (2001) also offers a similar account that language ideologies impact on our perception of what is defined as language and in what way it is considered the standard. The study draws from everyday (meta)discourse of English to investigate how discourse and the ideologizing process of English interacts.
Ideology is understood not as truth but as rationalizations manifested in discursive practice (Silverstein 1979; Woolard 1998; Irvine & Gal 2000; Verschueren 2012).
Representations of linguistic differences are suggested to involve three semiotic processes (Irvine & Gal 2000). ‗Iconization,‘ which is later termed ‗rhemetization‘ by Gal and Irvine
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(2019), describes the conventional and inherent relations between linguistic features and social images. According Gal and Irvine (2019), rhemetization relies on essentialized links between a linguistic feature and an identity for its manifestation. ‗Fractal recursivity‘
addresses linguistic differences which language users detect, pick up and further reproduce for socially emblematic opposition against outgroups. ‗Erasure‘ refers to simplification of recognizing only socially meaningful linguistic distinctions and overlooking those conflicting with ideological norms. Intragroup heterogeneity, and intergroup homogeneity, for example,
are not addressed in the process of othering. The three semiotic processes explicate that language ideologies contribute to speakers‘ understanding of objective linguistic facts in a
non-objective, socioculturally specific way.
A main focus of this study addresses the ideologizing process of English by analyzing
how English as a language and English use in localized Taiwanese contexts are talked about, namely, speakers‘ out-performed attitudes and evaluations of English. The study therefore
draws upon research on language evaluation. As will be argued throughout, the present study attends to discursive levels of language ideologization. Some rationalizations are treated as simply out there and some take on a more critical view to evaluate rationalizations that are taken for granted. The dimension the present study approaches builds on stance, but develops it further to ideological stance. Theoretical frameworks of stance orient to multi-facet nature of speakers‘ reflexivity on language. Stance, according to Berman (2005), ―reflects a key
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facet of human discourse in general: the fact that any state of affairs in the worlds of fact or
fantasy can be described in multiple ways‖ (2005: 109). Berman‘s definition of stance identifies the ‗discursive‘ aspect of evaluation. Biber and Finegan (1989) perceive stance to be ―the lexical and grammatical expression of attitudes, feelings, judgments, or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message‖ (1989: 92). The definition notes the
evaluative nature of stance (Englebretson 2007). A well-cited definition by Du Bois (2007) regards stance as ―a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt
communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects, and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field‖
(Du Bois 2007: 163). In addition to the evaluative nature, the definition by Du Bois (2007) also explicates the public, accessible aspect of stance. The evaluation nature of stance is attended to by Englebretson (2007), who states that the term ‗stance‘ has been defined differently or referred to as other labels such as ‗evaluation‘ (Hunston & Thompson 2000) and ‗subjectivity‘ (Lyons 1981; Athanasiadou, Canakis & Cornillie 2006). These known studies suggest that stance, evaluation, metapragmatics and language ideologies are close-knit.
This study investigates the layered ideologizing process of English through analyzing evaluative metapragmatic discourse surrounding linguistic practice of English. When similar evaluations are performed repetitively, the occurrences entrench the relation between certain linguistic practice and evaluative terms. These evaluations can be further evaluated (Du Bois
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2007; Davies 2018), leading to inconsistency and contestation in discourse. Put differently, discourse resides existing, established indexes, which point to both speakers‘ identities and the historical development of a linguistic form, and new newly emergent indexes. Social meanings of linguistic practice tolerate indeterminacy which relies on contextual information for meaning invocation (Ochs 1996). Consequently, indeterminacy, as well as individual interpretations, foster new meanings and gives rise to contesting linguistic indexicalities (Jaffe 2016).
2.2 Indexicality
Speakers make numerous choices in terms of ways of speaking. These choices are
never neutral. The situational adjustment of speech, or style differences (Coupland 2007), carry information including speakers‘ backgrounds and evaluations. By the same token, a
hearer evaluates a speaker by relating his/her style to known categories based on his/her social experiences. Therefore, stylistic differences indirectly point to differences in social sense. As Eckert (2008) states, ―Every stylistic move is the result of an interpretation of the social world and of the meanings of elements within it, as well as a positioning of the stylizer with respect to that world‖ (456). John Gumperz (1968) categorizes variations into dialectal and superposed. Labov (1971) proposes a trichotomy among markers, indicators and stereotypes. The two frameworks explicate that stylistic differences can go from carrying
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information about group identification to indexing social differentiation. They also reveal how discourse simultaneously uncovers and reinforces the link between variables and their social meanings. Nonetheless, stylistic differences can indirectly point to a pool of potential social meanings (Silverstein 1985). Besides, these social meanings which linguistic practice indexes are not static. They shift over time (Eckert 2008). Silverstein (2003) proposes N+1st order of indexicality to account for the dynamics of sense-making in linguistic variations.
Silverstein states,
for any indexical phenomenon at order n, an indexical phenomenon at order n+1 is always immanent, lurking in the potential of an ethno-metapragmatically driven native interpretation of the n-th-order paradigmatic contextual variation that it creates or constitutes as a register phenomenon (2003: 212).
Silverstein‘s model emphasizes the function of metapragmatic indexicalization. A first-order
index, similar to an ‗indicator‘ (Labov 1971), connects a variant to group identification and
involves nearly no metapragmatic judgments. A second-order index, similar to Gumperz‘s
‗superposed variability‘ (1968), involves speakers‘ selection of available variations and
relates these linguistic variations to social evaluations, the relations between the two are reinforced through metapragmatic discourse. Different levels of indexicalities are immanent
(Silverstein 2003). Different levels of indexicals are ideologically associated with one another (Eckert 2008), as Eckert (2008) points out, ―Ideology is at the center of stylistic practice‖
(456).
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Indexical values are not in a linear sequence as the framework N+1st order indexicality
might lead people to bear the assumption of linearity. Eckert (2008) clarifies that linearity is never intended in Silverstein‘s model. Rather, these meanings are immanent and ideologically interconnected (Eckert 2008). An indexical field, ―constellation of meanings that are
ideologically related meanings, any one of which can be activated in the situated use of the variable‖ (Eckert 2008, 454), graphically presents that meanings are on the one hand
immanent and on the other available for reinterpretation. Campbell-Kibler (2007) states that the connection between a variation to meanings in an indexical field relies on a hearer‘s own perception and on both sociocultural and linguistic contents in which the variation occurs.
With shared social experiences, stylistic differences are perceived, evaluated, and interpreted
differently across social groups. Significantly, Campbell-Kibler (2007) also remarks that the indexing of a variation to its interpreted meanings can go in a reverse direction. A hearer‘s
previously obtained information about a speaker acts as a model in helping them decide which variation, among all available variations, they believe to hear. That indexicality works in either direction implicates how essential indexicality is in communication.
This study draws from the theoretical framework of indexicalization to account for the observation how language choices and differences in linguistic practice rely heavily on established indexical links and are further interpreted to carry further social meanings.
Though indexicality addresses mostly on choices on variables, such as the variation analysis
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by Eckert (2000; 2008; 2016) and Q. Zhang (2005), the study adopts the framework to account for language preferences and language choices.