statistically significantly different from zero at 90% and 95% levels, respectively. This implies that when the female CEO share increases, a female chairperson has a lower tendency to cooperate with female CEOs, than male chairpersons.
Next, the results of estimations of Equation (11) are shown in Table 4. The layout of Table 4 is the same as that of Table 3, since explanatory variables of single team estimations are the same as those of female teams estimations. All observed companies are used for single team estimation in Table 4; there are 4,485 companies.
From the first row of Table 4, coefficients of female chairpersons are negative and statistically significantly different from zero at 95% level in seven out of nine columns, which means female chairpersons have lower possibilities of working alone than male chairpersons. Coefficients of the explanatory variable, female CEO share, are negative and statistically significant in columns (3), (6) and (9), which means that as the share of female CEOs increases, the number of companies that opt for a single team decreases.
However, the interaction term of the female chairperson and the female CEO share is insignificant in all estimations. Thus, there is no conclusive information about how the female CEOs share can influence the different genders of chairpersons who opt for a single team.
Combining the estimation results and the two propositions derived in the model section, the gender irrelevant hypothesis is first examined. It is found that coefficients of the interaction term
β
3FC<0, which implies β <FCfβ
mFC. Thus, the gender irrelevant hypothesis is failed. Second, coefficients of single team are examined with coefficients of female chairpersonsβ
1S< 0, which shows that female chairpersons have a lower tendency to form a single team than male chairpersons. However, coefficient of the interaction term of female chairpersons and female CEOs share,β
3S, is insignificant.Since the gender neutral hypothesis is sustained only when
β
1S>0 andβ
3S<0 aresatisfied, the gender neutral hypothesis is also failed.
. Conclusions
Ⅴ
Wage differential and occupation segregation are often considered as the main issues of gender discrimination in labor markets. Since women now receive higher education and have more choices, i.e. other than being housewives only, seriousness of wage gap and occupation segregation is decreasing. However, the promotion process and standards are still not the same and fair for female and male workers.
In this paper, data from the 2006 edition of “Top5000: The Largest Corporations in Taiwan”, published by China Credit Information Service, Ltd. is used to investigate whether there are gender preferences when a chairperson names a CEO. The total number of companies is 4,485. The team formation process is assumed as random matching, which is similar to Boschini and Sjögren (2007).
First, based on the descriptive statistics in the data section, there are only a few female chairpersons and CEOs in these top companies, i.e. about 6%. We also found that chairpersons have a higher tendency to work with same sex CEOs. This means there is gender gap in teamship choices between male and female chairpersons. Second, based on the results of the estimations, both the gender irrelevant hypothesis and gender neutral hypothesis in the random matching model are not sustained by the estimated coefficients of equations (10) and (11).
Notice that the empirical test suggests that a female chairperson has a lower tendency to cooperate with a female CEO than a male chairperson, when the female
CEO share increases in some industry segments. Promoting a candidate as CEO may be
a complex decision, especially in a big company. A chairperson needs to consider many aspects, such as opinions of company’s senior managers and the relationship between the competitors and future CEOs. Therefore, female chairpersons may face more pressure to name a same sex CEO in male dominated working environments. On the
different perspectives, especially in female dominated industries.
For further study, there are a few issues that could be considered. First, more characteristics of companies could be taken into account, such as family-controlled firms, i.e. whether the standard of promotion is based on employees’ performance or blood relationship. Second, board of directors’ characteristics might also help explain the choice of CEOs. For example, the gender ratio and the age structure of the boards might affect the CEO choice.
Appendix (1)
Proof of Propositions
(1) Proposition 1--Gender Irrelevance
.
Using the assumption of proposition 1, the relevant coefficients are derived:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
(2) Proposition 2—Gender Neutral
.
Using the assumption of proposition 2, the relevant coefficients are derived:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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