2.1 The Emergence of the Taiwanese Muslim Identity
2.1.2 The Identity of Taiwanese Muslims…
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journeys (朝覲) or to obtain Islamic knowledge from the Middle East. These interactions sparked the Islam revival movement that brought the Islamic culture from Arab-Islamic lands and Osman Turkey Empire back into China and led to waves of uprisings in Muslim communities and conflicts against the Ch’ing government.
Following harsh crackdowns by the government, Han-speaking Muslims turned to seek cooperation with the Revolutionists. When Sun Yet-Sen and the Kuomingtang (KMT) government outlined the idea of “Five Peoples of China” (五族共和) under the flag of Great Chinese Nationalism, Muslims who embraced the ideology were clearly designated as the Hui ethnic group (回族). The distinct boundary of “Hui”
made these people ethnically different from the Han; the difference in religion was also apparent, although less significantly so (Pelletier, 2014). Hence, the revival movement of Islam in China was interrupted again by Chinese Civil War.
After the KMT government lost the civil war and the Chinese Communist Party took over China, large numbers of Muslims fled to Southeast Asia and Taiwan. This was known as the second wave of Muslim immigration to Taiwan. By the end of the Chinese Civil War, around 50,000 Muslims had fled to Taiwan with the KMT government. Many of them were soldiers and government employees who came from different provinces of China where Islam influence is strong, such as Yunnan, Xinjiang, Ningxia, and Gansu (Su, 2002).
2.1.2 The Identity of Taiwanese Muslims
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After their arrival in Taiwan, Han-speaking Muslims settled across a number of different cities. Because of their diasporic background, they did not establish communities around mosques as other Muslim migrants do in other countries (Su, 2002). At that time patriotism throughout Taiwan suppressed all other kinds of divergent identities. In terms of ethnicity, despite their different backgrounds, all immigrants from China were viewed as Mainlanders or waishengren (外省人) as a whole in contrast with benshengren (本省人) and indigenous peoples. This decreased the ethnic identity of the Hui and enforced the ethnic identity of mainlanders within the group. Due to the long period of authoritarian rule and the China-/Han-centered education policy, first generation Han-speaking Muslims did not have the chance and motivation to develop an identity strongly connected to Taiwan. Su (2002) and Lin (2013a, 2013b) pointed out that Muslim associations in Taiwan, at that time, functioned more as NGOs and institutions for establishing government diplomatic relations with Middle East countries than as religious organizations. As a consequence, the power of these organizations declined when the government changed its foreign policies.
Since the 1970s, highly accelerated economic developments have enabled Taiwan to become a more modernized and westernized society. People drifted away from religion and began leading more secular lives. Although Muslim associations had previously tried to establish connections with Chinese Muslims to trace the root of
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their identities when cross-strait interactions increased in frequency and intensity after the lift of martial law in 1987, the young generations of Taiwanese Muslims continue to feel detached from “Mother China” (Lin, 2013a, 2013b). As local Taiwanese consciousness continued to gain momentum, the young generations began attempting to establish a new image of Taiwanese Muslims and forge the new concept of Han-speaking Muslims Ummah (新華人穆斯林社群觀) on many occasions of international visibility.
It is worth highlighting the existence of another group of Han-speaking Muslims in Taiwan. They are the Muslims who moved from China to Myanmar and Thailand during the civil war and began moving back to Taiwan after the 1980s. This constitutes the third phase of Muslim immigration to Taiwan. Many of them settled in Zhonghe District of New Taipei City, Zhongli of Taoyuan City and some other towns (Yu, 2009). The second and the third waves of Muslim immigration mainly constitute the vast majority of the born Muslim community in Taiwan. While they lived in Myanmar and Thailand, their Muslim identity separated them from other Chinese migrants, and they maintained strong Islamic lifestyles as a both religious and ethnic minority that prompted them to build concentrated communities after coming to Taiwan. Yu (2009), Hu& Ma (2011) and Chen (2012) pointed out that these Muslims exhibit the special diasporic identity of the Islamic community rather than ethnic identities like Chinese and Taiwanese. For these Muslims, the nationalism of Myanmar/Thailand or even Taiwan does not constitute their core identity as people.
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The gradual consolidation of the Taiwanese identity that has taken shape over the last few decades has exerted significant influence upon the young people on this island.
The younger generation pays little attention to the backgrounds of their parents or grandparents nowadays; their identity as Taiwanese is a national identity and is highly related to their birth places rather than ethnic group. Pelletier (2014) found that young Muslims in Taiwan mostly identify themselves as Taiwanese, while the identity of being Muslims is no longer tied with ethnic groups but with a global religion: Islam.
That is to say, among this group, the Muslim identity primarily serves as a religious identity rather than ethnic one.
Lin (2014) has observed that 2nd and 3rd generation Han-speaking Muslims in Taiwan feel more connected to Arab-Islam than to Chinese-Islam. This has led to a shift in identity from being an ethnic minority (Hui) to being a religious minority. He believes that this change occurred after the lift of martial law. The Muslim community in Taiwan, which was led by the pro-KMT Chinese Muslim Association, became more open to international foreign influences. Han-speaking Muslims in Taiwan today no longer speak about themselves in terms of the Hui people. Instead, they consider themselves as Muslims and a part of a global religion (Pelletier, 2014). Lin (2013a) and others believe that the phenomenon is in part a reaction of Muslims who face obstacles abroad on account of the awkward international circumstances of Taiwan.
By studying in Arab-Islamic states or interacting with foreign Muslims, Han-speaking
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Muslims in Taiwan have begun developing the localized identity of Taiwanese Muslim. Pelletier then made further research and provided cases evidencing an attempt to express a Taiwanese Muslim identity. By amalgamating the Muslim identity as part of the global Islamic community with the Taiwanese identity as a sense of national belonging, the identity of Taiwanese Muslim is gaining gradual visibility.
Taiwanese Muslims, however, still face the obstacle of forming an increasingly distinctive religious identity that clearly differentiates from other members of society.
A religious faith that is marginalized makes it harder for Taiwanese Muslims to occupy a prominent position in Taiwan’s society. In addition to being the minority, Taiwanese Muslims face another obstacle—the disintegration of the Islam heritage in Taiwan. The overly small size of the community that leads to the lack of religious cohesion is the crucial reason (Chen, 2012). Marcia (1989) explained that the presence of identity only exists when healthy cultural identities have developed. That is to say, individuals are only trying to represent themselves as resistance to mainstream society even when they embrace the cultural marks of their community (Grasmuck et al, 2009). In the face of the rapidly changing social and political environment, the question of maintaining cohesion within religious communities has become a significant issue (Su, 2002) on top of the rising need of dialogue between Taiwan’s mainstream society and its Muslim community.
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Therefore, the question that needs to be asked is how the younger generations of Taiwanese Muslims regard their identity that has gradually formulated over the past few decades. If they embrace the new identity of Taiwanese Muslim, how would they present it to the non-Muslim Taiwan society? It is therefore the aim of this study to look into the self-presentation of their identity as Taiwanese Muslims or under any other forms of identities.