Since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in May 2008, generally speaking, Taiwan has been successful in turning potential conflicts with mainland China into a state of less violence and more communication. The underpinning of such a success lies largely in Ma’s insistence on the “1992 Consensus” and the “no unification, no (Taiwan) independence, and no use of force” policy toward Beijing. Although the former still has an ambiguous definition, it has become the starting point of the breakthroughs in political and economic relations across the Strait.2 The latter, sometimes criticized of being less active or too conservative, has been of help for the restoration of stability and the maintenance of status quo of the Taiwan Strait to a certain degree. Furthermore, cross-Strait relations have been less volatile as Ma calls for “Diplomatic Truce” with mainland China in order to reduce the uncertainty or unconstructive factors in his attempt to transform Taipei-Beijing relations into a positive circle.
It is worth noting that Ma’s policies would not have worked had Hu responded to them negatively or uncooperatively. Regardless of the real intention behind the scene, mainland China under Hu’s leadership has either proclaimed its willingness to work with
2 The “1992 Consensus” was put by Chi Su (then Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council of the ROC) in April 2000 to describe the agreement and disagreement in exchanges of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait since the early 1990s. Put it simply, Taiwan prefers to construe this consensus as “One China, respective interpretations,” whereas mainland China prefers to look at the “One China” part.
Draft only. Quote w/ permission.
3
-Taiwan to benefit the people on the two sides of the -Taiwan Strait, or selectively acted in concert with Taiwan’s advocacy on cross-Strait and foreign affairs. This demonstrates the fact that no unilateral action of Taipei or Beijing can alter relations across the Taiwan Strait in a peaceful and constructive way – in other words, it takes two to tangle.
Arguably, there are several salient positive influences on the Asia-Pacific resulting from the gradual recovery of cross-Strait relations after May 2008, but some changes in association with the development of cross-Strait relations seem to remain negative or indeterminate in terms of their influences on the region of the Asia-Pacific. The following paragraphs aim at introducing in brief the positive, negative, and uncertain internal forces leading the dynamic changes in relations across the Strait to the next stage, in the hope that they can serve as a foundation of better understanding of cross-Strait relations in the Asia-Pacific context.
Positive Forces
The most important force that is bringing cross-Strait relations forward is the gradual institutionalization of cross-Strait talks and consultations. For Taiwan, this institutionalization is stated clearly in Article 4 of the Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, which provides:
The Executive Yuan may set up or designate an institution to handle the affairs relating to any dealings between the peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.
The Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan may entrust the institution referred to in the preceding paragraph or any private organization meeting the following criteria to handle the affairs relating to any dealings between the peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area…
The Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan or each competent authorities approved by the Executive Yuan…, based on the need and the nature of the affairs to be handled, entrust any accountable, professional, and experienced non-profit juristic person other than those referred to in the preceding two paragraphs on a case-by-case basis to assist the handling of the affairs relating to any dealings between the peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area; if necessary, it may also be entrusted to execute agreements.
Draft only. Quote w/ permission.
4
-The institution or private organization referred to in the preceding two paragraphs may upon the approval of the entrusting authorities, entrust any other non-profit juristic person as referred to in the preceding paragraph to assist the handling of the affairs relating to any dealings between the peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.
Therefore, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) was established by Taiwan in November 1990 as an authorized private institution handling part of cross-Strait affairs.
For mainland China, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) was set up correspondingly in December 1991 as SEF’s counterpart. Beginning from June 2008, there have been six rounds of the Chiang-Chen Talk, meetings of the heads of both SEF and ARATS, held in mainland China and Taiwan in turn. In addition, with the delicate evolution of cross-Strait engagements, for technical and functional discussions senior officials and their staff from the two sides of the Taiwan Strait now can meet frequently to “communicate” (yewu goutong) as to whether certain matters may be listed as topics of negotiation by the following round of the Chiang-Chen Talk.
The second positive force that needs to be mentioned here is both sides’
self-consciousness of undertaking cautious measures to prevent “surprises” from slowing down various exchanges between Taiwan and mainland China. It is evident that both Ma and Hu have exerted great self-restraint to deal carefully with sensitive cross-Strait interactions. Their strategy of gradual reduction in tension (GRIT) not only stabilizes the Taiwan Strait but also creates an environment for which both sides can find ways to foster stronger mutual confidence incrementally.
The last, but not least, positive force resulting in the advance of cross-Strait relations is the continued technical and functional exchanges and people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The effect of these exchanges has not loomed large in the political realm, but these exchanges have prompted both governments in Taipei and Beijing to consult with each other to minimize possible problems and obstacles and contributed to further cooperation and integration in the non-political realms. Moreover, these exchanges being unfolded are beyond the scope of those in the Korean Peninsula and are probably on the largest scale between two competing regimes in the region of the Asia-Pacific.
Negative Forces
Draft only. Quote w/ permission.
5
-Despite these positive driving forces behind the improved relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, there are still at least three negative forces that may become hindrances to the development of contemporary cross-Strait relations. The first has to do with the lack of trust between the two regimes across the Strait. More specifically, both because of the poor understanding of each other’s political intention and strategic goals, and because of the uncertainty about the future with further policy accommodation, the degree of mutual trust between Taipei and Beijing is still very low. As Taiwan remains to have a politically divided society and as leaders in mainland China still has a strong irredentist thinking and the fear of losing power if their Taiwan policy turns out unsuccessful, it is extremely difficult, perhaps untimely as well, to untie the knot (i.e., to solve the problem with the lack of mutual trust) quickly for the time being.
The second negative force that has an impact on cross-Strait relations and the Asia-Pacific concerns the possibility of leadership change of Taiwan, ROC, and the Chinese Communist Party, respectively. In Taiwan there will be a possible regime change every four years, which further complicates dynamic relations across the Strait due to the sharp difference of mainland policies of the two major parties. In mainland China the leadership will change roughly once every ten years, and whether its policy toward Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific, including the US, is a function of the replacement of one set of leaders by another remains to be seen, owing to the mysterious political decisionmaking process. Therefore, the two sides across the Strait have the possibility of being inconsistent in their external policies in 2012.
The last negative force emerging in cross-Strait relations is the unsolved dilemma regarding endless struggles for sovereignty between the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China. It is obvious that this issue is at the core of cross-Strait relations. Even though in 1992 Taiwan reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Chinese mainland in accordance with the Constitution, but it also acknowledged that it no longer exercised jurisdiction over the Chinese mainland. According to Ma, although both Taiwan and mainland China can not recognize each other’s sovereignty because their sovereignty claims completely overlap, their mutual non-denial of jurisdiction can become a pragmatic reflection of the status quo. In the foreseeable future, nevertheless, it is not likely that mainland China will abdicate its territorial claim over Taiwan and try to come up with a new framework by which both Taiwan and mainland China can
Draft only. Quote w/ permission.
6
-interact politically on an equal footing. Now the Chinese Communist Party has eyed its relations with the Kuomintang (KMT) on the basis of equality and mutual respect, but in terms of government-to-government relations mainland China always sticks to the traditional concept of sovereignty and has no interest to face the reality that in “China,”
broadly defined, there are two separate governments that rule part of the territory and people. These endless struggles for sovereignty also hinder the constructive dialogue of the two sides of the Strait on how their joint efforts and agreements can be a driving force for the Asia-Pacific development in many critical areas.
Uncertain Forces
In addition to those positive and negative driving forces affecting the course of cross-Strait relations, it appears difficult to discern the consequences of the closer economic bonding between Taiwan and mainland China under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).
In the short run, signing the ECFA is mutually beneficial, not only economically but also politically. For Taiwan, it finally reached a free trade agreement-like deal with one of its major trading partners, and it generally helps expand the share of Taiwan’s products in mainland China. Moreover, the Ma administration is able to claim the achievements followed by signing the ECFA, therefore strengthening the political support for the KMT.
For mainland China, with the ECFA being viewed as a tool for economic unification which may lead to political unification, “Taiwan is on a short leash as far as its economic integration with other East Asian countries is concerned,” despite Taiwan’s economic progress and gains.3 What is also important to note is that in ECFA-related negotiations mainland China releases some goodwill to Taiwan but never gives way to Taiwan’s requests that would dampen mainland China’s core economic interest.
Regionally, with the ECFA’s help, Taiwan can provide know-how about doing business in mainland China, act as a risk buffer to enter mainland China’s market, or serve as a gateway to mainland China. Yet, the ECFA that facilitates economic and trade interflows between Taiwan and mainland China might lead to an outcome placing the
3 “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA): Domestic Opportunities and Challenges,”
FOCUS, No. 4 (March 2011), Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia), p. 9; available at http://www.isis.org.my/files/ISIS_FOCUS_INDEX_2011/ISIS_Focus_4/ISIS_Focus_4-2011.pdf.
Draft only. Quote w/ permission.
7
-Asia-Pacific countries in an inferior position – that is, an outcome that the growth of Taiwan’s market share in mainland China and foreign direct investment from mainland China are at the expense of the neighboring countries.
Some other uncertain forces may include mainland China’s enactment of the Anti-secession Law in 2005 when the internal problems are being intensified, as well as Taiwan’s continued struggle for more international space that comes with the growing
“Taiwan identity,” which may not necessarily lead to Taiwan independence. The former’s effect is uncertain because it is in fact a domestic law of mainland China that provides both pacific and violent means to achieve peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and the ultimate goal of national unification. Given the complex consequence of the Anti-secession Law, the Chinese Communist Party has seldom mentioned it in order to avoid hurting Taiwan people’s feeling. The influence of the latter is indefinite largely because on the one hand the Ma administration’s desire for greater international participation is aimed to become a responsible stakeholder in the region and in the international community, but on the other hand such a desire has been linked to the
“Taiwan identity” by Beijing leaders as a dangerous step which eventually facilitates Taiwan independence.
PART II: Cross-Strait Relations and East Asian Major Power Politics and