Iran:

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deterioration of the internal situation in the country.”⁴⁰ The UNSC considered the

violence to be a “…threat to international peace and security in the region.”⁴¹ By the end of the sanctioning process, the UNSC had restricted the movement of certain individuals, frozen assets, disallowed armaments to be sold to Liberia, and, most importantly, had sanctioned Liberia’s trade in timber and diamonds without the Liberian government’s consent.

During the entirety of the Liberian case from 2003 to 2010 China did not make any official statements in the UNSC. However, China did vote for all resolutions on sanctioning Liberia and China even voted for a resolution that mandated an

“…improvement of existing sanctions….” in 2001.⁴² Although no official statements could be found, the case of Liberia still offers some insight on the limits of Chinese preconditions. Liberia was a civil conflict that threatened regional stability and China was willing to sanction Liberia even though the ruling government did not accept the

sanctions. Thus, it would appear that it is not outside of China’s sanctions parameters to enact sanctions against a failing state even without the consent of the target state’s leadership when such a step is deemed necessary to protect regional peace and stability.

2.2.7 Iran:

The Islamic Republic of Iran began pursuing a nuclear weapons program that violated proliferation norms in 2006. Due to this flagrant disregard of

non-proliferation norms, the UNSC, under the recommendation of the International Atomic

40 United Nations Sanctions Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, Smart Sanctions, The Next Step: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions, 16.

41 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1689 (2006), S/RES/1689 (2006), June 20, 2006, New York: United Nations, 2.

42 United Nations Security Council, 4405^th Meeting, S/PV.4405, November 5, 2001, New York:

United Nations, 15.

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Energy Association (IAEA), passed sanctions against Iran. In sanctioning Iran, China was vocal in supporting non-proliferation norms, as it stated, “China has all along indicated that purpose of the Security Council reviewing this issue [Iran] is to safeguard the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism…”⁴³ As Iran challenged

non-proliferation norms, China and the UNSC reacted with sanctions. Indeed, though China’s economic ties to Iran have been historically strong, China still allowed UNSC

sanctions.⁴⁴ These sanctions included individual travel bans, asset freezes, a territorial arms embargo with some exceptions, restrictions on Iran’s arms exports, and restrictions on the importation of materials that could be used in making nuclear weapons.

During a UNSC meeting in 2006, the Chinese representative stated: “All along, China has supported safeguarding the international nuclear non-proliferation mechanism and opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We do not wish to see new turbulence in the Middle East. We are in favour of a peaceful solution to Iran’s nuclear issue through political and diplomatic efforts and negotiations.” ⁴⁵ Here, China clearly stated its concern for regional stability in the face of nuclear weapons proliferation, and also exhibited its condemnation for Iran’s violation of non-proliferation. Yet China remains as of this writing unwilling to end diplomatic engagement with Iran. The Chinese delegate described China’s view of sanctions as a diplomatic tool:

China wishes to emphasize that sanctions are not the end, but are a means to urge Iran to resume negotiations. The sanction measures adopted by the Security Council this time are limited and reversible, and they target proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of

43 United Nations Security Council, 5500^th Meeting, S/PV.5500, July 31 5, 2006, New York:

United Nations, 5.

44 Erica Downs and Suzanne Maloney, “Getting China to Sanction Iran: The Chinese-Iranian Oil Connection,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (March 2011),

http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_iran_downs_maloney.aspx.

45 United Nations Security Council, 5612^th Meeting, S/PV.5612, December 23, 2006, New York:

United Nations, 7.

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weapon delivery systems... [When Iran] complies with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and meets the requirements of the IAEA, the Security Council would suspend and even terminate the sanction measures.⁴⁶

The strength of China’s statements in this case suggests that respect for the norms of non-proliferation is a decidedly important factor in China’s sanctions parameters, indicating that this factor may in fact be one of the preconditions for Chinese support of sanctions.

Furthermore, some of China’s possible sub-conditions appear to be expanded on in this quotation. First, it states that sanctions are another tool in the diplomatic box, and as such need to be used in conjunction with diplomatic engagement. Second, it shows that

Chinese sanctions policy places emphasis on the importance of the reversibility of sanctions.

In 2007, a year later, the UNSC introduced another round of harsh sanctions.

During these hearings, Mr. Wang Guangya of the Chinese delegation stated:

…the purpose of the new resolution is not to punish Iran but to urge it to return to negotiations and reactivate diplomatic efforts. The relevant sanctions measures should neither harm the Iranian people nor affect normal economic, trade and financial exchanges between Iran and other countries. ⁴⁷

Such a statement reveals China’s stance that sanctions should not be used as an economic weapon to punish target economies. The delegate once again reemphasized the role of diplomacy in sanctions poicy as he stated: “It is impossible to resolve the issue

fundamentally by imposing sanctions and pressure only. Diplomatic talks remain the best option.”⁴⁸

46 Ibid.

47 United Nations Security Council, 5647^th Meeting, S/PV.5647, March 24, 2007, New York:

United Nations, 11-12.

48 Ibid.

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Iranian sanctions came to a head again in 2010. During these Security Council meetings China’s stance remained in line with its past positions. The Chinese

representative said, “…the Security Council’s actions should be conducive to peace and stability in the Middle East, especially the Gulf region… it should help to promote the current momentum towards global economic recovery and not affect the day-to-day lives of the Iranian people or normal international trade and transactions.”⁴⁹ This statement is another example of Chinese unwillingness to sanction the economies of the offender states, and highlights the stress placed on maintaining regional stability. Also, the Iranian case shows that China will only consent to use specific sanctions, rather than sanctions that affect the country as a whole.

The 2010 sanctions also led to a reiteration of the Chinese position on sanctions and the role of diplomacy, saying again that the two are not mutually exclusive, but instead must be used in concert:

We are the view that sanctions can never fundamentally resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. To bring about a comprehensive and appropriate settlement of the issue, it is imperative to return to the track of dialogue and negotiation. The Security Council’s adoption of this new resolution does not mean that the door to diplomatic efforts is closed. The new resolution is aimed at bringing Iran back to the negotiating table and at activating a new round of diplomatic efforts. To that end, the sanctions mentioned in the new resolution are reversible.⁵⁰

China’s stance on Iran can be summed up in one quote: “China will, as always, continue its efforts to help to maintain world and regional peace and stability, safeguard and strengthen the international non-proliferation mechanism and enhance political and

49 United Nations Security Council, 6335^th Meeting, S/PV.6335, June 9, 2010, New York: United Nations, 11.

50 Ibid.

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diplomatic efforts for the solution of the Iran nuclear issue.”⁵¹ In the Iranian case, China continues to take a clear position against sanctioning the entire economy of Iran and restates Iran’s sovereign right to peaceful nuclear energy. Furthermore, China reiterated that the reversibility of the sanctions are paramount and that sanctions are not an end unto themselves. The variable that caused China to enact sanctions in this case was the

proliferation of nuclear weapons and the threat to regional stability. Furthermore, China restated its desired respect for sovereignty, the importance of the involvement of regional and international organizations, and the significance of easily repealed sanctions and limited types of sanctions.