CHAPTER 5: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5.2.2 Sanctions Preventing Democratization
that Myanmar will participate in regional peace and development.”178 In another statement in the UNSC China made a similar statement, declaring that, “We sincerely hope to see a Myanmar with political stability, economic prosperity, social harmony and democratic progress.”179 From an unofficial point of view, China may be willing to encourage, and in fact may be actively encouraging, more democratic progress.
According to a report from a Wikileaks cable:
We [a US Ambassador meeting with a Chinese Ambassador] discussed the lack of political dialogue and the need for all countries to speak with one voice to persuade the generals to start talking and quit dragging their feet.
The Chinese Ambassador no longer tried to defend the regime, and acknowledged that the generals had made a bad situation worse. The Chinese have used their access to the generals to push for change, without much observable result, but remain interested in working with us to promote change. The Ambassador indicated that fear of losing power and economic interests may be the key obstacles keeping the generals away from the negotiating table.180
Clearly, more democratic change to the Burmese regime is a possibility and perhaps even a mutual goal of both China and the US. Indeed, a more liberalized Burma would be a peaceful, positive development for the region and appears to be a point of agreement for both the US and China. But, given China’s involvement in the Burmese economy, the first step in achieving this goal would be modifying the US sanctions regime.
5.2.2 Sanctions Preventing Democratization
Many studies have concluded that US sanctions may be harming Burmese democratic progress, as they have slowed the growth of a trading middle class while not influencing the ruling junta. Some studies have shown that without a middle class
178 United Nations Security Council, S/PV.5526, 3.
179 United Nations Security Council, 5753rd Meeting, S/PV.5753, October 5, 2007, New York:
United Nations, 8.
180 The Guardian, “US embassy cables: China losing patience with Burma”, December 9, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/137835.
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democratic transition from an authoritarian government is difficult and unlikely. As one scholar wrote, “transitions from autocratic rule in countries with established markets and private property are usually seen to stem from endogenous forces in which the ascendant middle class or bourgeoisie plays an important contributory role.”181 Or, simply put: “No bourgeois, no democracy.”182 In this respect, to attain the goal of liberalization the country must first foster a bourgeoisie, or middle class. Under the current sanctions, the middle class in Burma has been adversely affected by US sanctions while China has invested heavily in the upper echelons of the corrupt Burmese regime. In this way, the sanctions have done more to harm democratic transition than to pressure the junta into modifying its behavior.
In an accurate summation of the argument that lifting the sanctions on Burma would spur internal progress, one scholar writes:
While the government and its closely-affiliated private cronies constitute the major employers in the country, lifting of sanctions has the potential to allow for people to advocate for reform without immediately being
concerned about their source of income. However, so long as the United States is basing its stance on political reasons, the likelihood that the country will lift its sanctions is slim. ASEAN and China, however, even prior to the 2010 elections, have demonstrated that they are willing to engage with the Naypyidaw regime regardless.183
Even the Burmese people are hopeful for the possibility of increased business opportunities. “The Burmese middle classes are concerned about economic development—the economy is in a bad state. Their main concern is the new
government’s economic policy, and they are hoping for change to unify exchange rates
181 Ewing-Chow, “First Do No Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanctions and Human Rights,” 177.
182 Ibid.
183 Jane Ferguson, “Burmese sanctions likely to stay, despite ASEAN call,” East Asia Forum, February 18, 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/02/18/burmese-sanctions-likely-to-stay-despite-asean-call/.
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and in the rules governing, for example, the imports of cars and other goods.”184 The US sanctions as they stand will continue to harm the local economy and bourgeoisie. As one scholar wrote, “U.S. dollars are its [Burma’s] lifeblood, at least in urban areas, and the measure of prohibiting dealings between Burmese and American financial institutions caused considerable hardship to traders and business people.”185 Indeed, the sanctions have done a disproportionate amount of damage to the working people of Burma rather than the military junta.186 Furthermore, “sanctions have also helped crush an incipient manufacturing export sector with resulting significant job losses.”187It is concerning that the main victims of the US sanctions have been young, working people and the middle class, particularly because these social actors tend to be the catalysts for democratic change; this fact has been dramatically showcased recently in the on-going Arab Spring, where students and other young people have been major players in movements for democratic change in such countries as Tunisia and Egypt. “In short … sanctions disproportionately impact the people of Burma, not its military,”188 and this stunts the possibility for meaningful change.
The sanctions have also stifled foreign direct investment (FDI) from American Multinational Corporations (MNCs). This lack of new investments in the private sector has caused significant harm to the democratic opposition movement as China has moved its investments into government-owned operations. Without the infusion of funds into the private sector, actors independent from the state have failed to emerge. “Trade sanctions
184 The Diplomat, “Time to Drop Burma Sanctions,” The Diplomat, March 3, 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/2011/03/03/%E2%80%98time-to-drop-burma-sanctions%E2%80%99/.
185 Seekins, “Myanmar in 2009,” 198.
186 Ewing-Chow, “First Do No Harm: Myanmar Trade Sanctions and Human Rights,” 158.
187 Sachs, “Myanmar: Sanctions Won’t Work.”
188 Seekins, “Burma and U.S. Sanctions,” 444.
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imposed by the United States have likely arrested the rise of an independent trading class, further weakening the material bases for sustained opposition to the regime.”189 Without these private actors there is no well-funded opposition to the government from within the country itself. “Concentration of commercial influence in conjunction with Western trade sanctions has curtailed the potential spread of an independent trading class.”190 As such, trade under a China-dominated system has further entrenched the military junta.