the males of their families at Rabaul or some other port nearer Sydney selected by Australian officials and arranged for the Japanese hospital ship Hikawa Maru, a former 11,000 tons NYK liner, to carry them the rest of their journey”.
In response, Prime Minister Ben Chifley personally made a statement, insisting that the Yoizuki and what happened on the ship should not be regarded as Australia’s
responsibilities:136
Information from departments, supported by documentary evidence, appears to indicate clearly that the control of shipping was a subject under die control of the U.S. authorities.
At this point, the repatriation of Taiwanese internees via the Yoizuki had clearly turned from a piece of Australian local news into an international controversy, and possibly a diplomatic crisis with SCAP. However, Australia could not resolve the matter without SCAP’s support. Thereby, Prime Minister Chifley (re-)defined the incident as
131 “Yoizuki to be examined at Rabaul”, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 March, 1946.
132 “Yoizuki Overcrowded by 205”, Sydney Morning Herald, 21 March 1946.
133 “Jap Destroyer Unlikely to be Recalled”, The Mercury, 8 March, 1946.
134 “MacArthur Disclaims Onus for Jap Ship Scandal”, The Mercury, 9 March, 1946.
135 “MacArthur Disclaims Onus for Jap Ship Scandal”, The Mercury, 9 March, 1946.
136 “Yoizuki to be Examined at Rabaul”, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 March, 1946.
"an unfortunate misunderstanding”, and tried to find a common ground for cooperation and extend an olive branch to SCAP with the following statement: 137
I do not propose to enter into any recriminations with the U.S. Authorities as to how the present misunderstanding arose, because the Supreme Allied Commander, General Douglas MacArthur, has been a, good friend to Australia, and indeed generous in giving help in regard to shipping and many other ways.
4) Conclusion
In its sheer number, especially compared to the number of Japanese hikiagesha (overseas returnees),138 the internment and repatriation of the Taiwanese was hardly a major event of the Second World War, or for that matter, of the collapse of the Japanese Empire.
However, the very unique status of the Taiwanese and their experiences of internment and repatriation helped to shed new light on the postwar reconstruction of East Asia.
The first issue was the conspicuous absence of Japanese authorities in the process.
Whether it was in Hong Kong or Australia, when the Taiwanese were interned and subsequently repatriated, the Japanese nationals underwent the same process. While the Taiwanese were interned, whether it was during or after the war, they were detained for the reason of being “Japanese”. But, as soon as internment was underway, both the British and Australian authorities took very conscious decision and action to separate the Taiwanese from the Japanese. While the repatriation of the Japanese nationals is beyond the scope of this study, it would be hard to verify and define the role played by the Japanese authorities in that process. But based on the analysis above, in the handling of the Taiwanese internees and the eventual repatriation, there was no trace of any Japanese involvement. Further studies would be needed to confirm this, but preliminary studies show that as former imperial/colonized subject, the Taiwanese were left unnoticed and unattended by any Japanese authorities when the Empire disintegrated.
In contrast, the postwar government in Taiwan, the newly established Republic of China (ROC) authorities, did play a role in the Australian case. Soon after the Yoizuki incident, it was reported that the Chinese Legation in Australia held meetings with Prime Minister Chifley and Minister for External Affairs (Herbert Vere) Evatt, then issued a statement confirming that it had “confidence that the Australian Government would induce Gen (General) MacArthur to take action necessary to protect the safety and health of Formosans on the Japanese destroyer Yoizuki”.139 Furthermore, a representative from the Chinese Legation, was tasked to fly to Rabaul to “be present as a representative of the Chinese Government”; this person was regarded as “the sole member of the party from Australia able to speak the Formosan dialect” and the only person able to carry out actual
137 “Yoizuki to be Examined at Rabaul”, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 March, 1946.
138 Statistics showed that more than 3 million Japanese civilians were repatriated from abroad back to Japan after the War, see Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home：Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan (Cambridge：Harvard University Press, 2009).
139 “Jap Destroyer Unlikely to Be Recalled”, The Mercury, 8 March, 1946
first-hand interviews” with those Taiwanese on the Yoizuki. 140 This conspicuous absence of Japanese authorities and presence of Chinese authorities in the repatriation of the Taiwanese in Australia showed that, in the postwar reconstruction of East Asia, the Chinese (ROC) government was rather active and eager to take opportunities to assert its sovereignty (over the Taiwanese as its newly claimed subjects) and establish itself on the international stage as a lawful and responsible player. This re-positioning of ROC, and simultaneously the recriminations between Australia and SCAP in dealing with the
Yoizuki incident, should be understood in the larger context of negotiation and
(re-)balancing of power in postwar East Asia. What was at stake in the repatriation of the Taiwanese and the Yoizuki incident was not the fate of the Taiwanese alone; instead, it was the international legitimacy of several of the Allied Forces,141 and the denial of Japan’s postwar legitimacy in dealing with former subjects of its Empire.The second issue was related to the definition and re-definition of Taiwanese identity.
The case of Taiwanese in Hong Kong shows that before the war, while the Taiwanese were legally Japanese subjects, some Taiwanese were keeping themselves away from (being identified as) the Japanese. This dis-engagement from the Japanese contact
allowed the Taiwanese to maintain good relationships with the local population. However, the outbreak of the war in 1941 and the subsequent Japanese military occupation
gradually made (most) people of Hong Kong resentful, if not antagonistic, against all things Japanese. As a result, in the eyes of Hong Kong’s people and the British, the Taiwanese were equally (responsible for the war carried out by the) Japanese; and as the internment of the Taiwanese had demonstrated, this perception against the Taiwanese continued well into the postwar era in Hong Kong.
The Taiwanese in Australia also experienced a process of having their identity re-defined, but with very different result from their counterparts in Hong Kong. During the war, as Taiwanese internees were transferred from the Dutch East Indies to Australia, they were regarded as “enemy aliens” and confined in internment camps across Australia.
Immediately after the war, the internment of Taiwanese continued and thereby demonstrated that the Taiwanese continued to be seen as “enemy”, like the Japanese, waiting for repatriation. However, the Yoizuki incident in March 1946 re-defined the Taiwanese in the eyes of the Australian public. Before the Taiwanese went on board the vessel on March 6, 1946, they were considered Japanese to be repatriated; but soon after the incident, the Taiwanese were re-defined as subjects worthy of sympathy, Australia’s ally, and simply “Chinese, not Japanese”.
The contrast between Hong Kong and Australia in the postwar handling of Taiwanese internment and repatriation led to the third issue, the effect of wartime experiences, or war memories, in the postwar reconstruction of East Asia. The cases of Hong Kong and Australia showed that wartime experiences of the host society played a fundamental role in shaping the postwar perception of the Taiwanese and determining
140 “Yoizuki to be Examined at Rabaul”, Sydney Morning Herald, 11 March, 1946.
141 For further discussion of ROC government’s postwar pursuit of international legitimacy, see Barak Kushner, Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2015)
the fate of the Taiwanese internees. The British authorities as well as the people of Hong Kong, having lived through the defeat and occupation in the hands of the Japanese, clearly held a much stronger and longer-lasting sense of resentment against anything—
and anyone—“Japanese”, including the Taiwanese. In comparison, the Australian public was more sympathetic than people of Hong Kong toward the interned Taiwanese, and inclined to see the Taiwanese as citizens of ROC, thereby on “their” side (the Allied).
One major factor contributing to the difference in their postwar attitude toward the Taiwanese between the people of Hong Kong and the people of Australia was that while the former had close contact and conflict with the Taiwanese during the wartime, the latter had no direct contact with the Taiwanese during the wartime because most Taiwanese interned in Australia were not from Australia and were confined to the selected internment camps. While it was clear that the Taiwanese interned in Australia were considered “enemy aliens”, but his lack of direct interaction with the Taiwanese—
and thereby lack of conflict or resentment— made it much easier for the people of Australia to overturn and overcome wartime animosity once the war ended.
Another major factor contributing to the different postwar perception of the Taiwanese was the media. In Hong Kong, public opinion as expressed in newspapers endorsed government’s decision to intern the Taiwanese as “enemy nationals”, and further stirred up hostility against the Taiwanese. But in Australia, after the Yoizuki incident, the media unanimously criticized the government and expressed sympathy toward the Taiwanese, especially the women and children; this consequently turned the public opinion friendly toward the Taiwanese and re-shaped public’s perception of the Taiwanese.
Finally, the repatriation of the Taiwanese showed that the role and effect of media in the postwar reconstruction of East Asia is another topic deserves further study. The presence of Taiwanese women and children in the media reports of the Yoizuki incident was particularly telling. As shown in this study, in the Taiwanese internment in Hong Kong and Australia respectively, there were a significant number of women and children.
While media in Hong Kong did recognize the presence of women and children in the internment, the actual faces and experiences of Taiwanese women and children did not draw much attention in Hong Kong. On the contrary, Taiwanese women and children was clearly the focus of Australia’s media reports of the Yoizuki incident; and reported with vivid photographs, Australia’s media brought the actual faces and experiences of Taiwanese women and children directly—and emotionally—to the Australian public, as well as to government authorities. The effect of the media was so strong that the
Australian government was forced to take immediate action in dealing with the incident and, more importantly, to appease mounting public anger. And unexpectedly, Australian government’s appeasement to the public and response to the media criticism, by
stepping aside from responsibilities and placing the blame on SCAP, led to
recriminations with the latter and further escalated the Yoizuki incident into a diplomatic confrontation. Of course, the media alone did not dictate domestic or international affairs; however, the media did play a critical role in shaping and highlighting the volatile and unpredictable condition of East Asia’s postwar reconstruction.