Observations of Tokugawa Nariaki on Coastal Defense, August 1853:

It is my belief that the first and most urgent task is for the bakufu to make its choice between peace and war . . . When we consider the respective advantages and disadvantages of war and peace, we find that if we put our trust in war, the whole country's morale will be increased and even if we sustain an initial defeat we will in the end expel the foreigner. . . . However, I propose to give here in outline the . . reasons why we must never choose the policy of peace.

[a]. . . the Americans who arrived recently, though fully aware of [the policy of exclusion], entered Uraga [in Edo Bay] displaying a white flag as a symbol of peace and insisted on presenting their written requests. Moreover, they . . fired heavy guns in salute and even went so far as to conduct surveys without permission. They were arrogant and discourteous, their actions an outrage. Indeed, this was the greatest disgrace we have suffered since the dawn of history. . . . The foreigners, having thus ignored our prohibition and penetrated our waters, . . threatening us and making demands upon us, should it happen not only that the bakufu fails to expel them but also that it concludes an agreement in accordance with their requests, then I fear it would be impossible to maintain our national [integrity as a state]. . . .

[b] The prohibition of Christianity is the first rule of the Tokugawa [the ruling shogunate] house. Public notices concerning it are posted everywhere, even to the remotest corner of every province. . . . The bakufu can never ignore or overlook the evils of Christianity. Yet if the Americans are allowed to come again this religion will inevitably raise its head once more, however strict the prohibition; and this, I fear, is something we could never justify to the spirits of our ancestors. . . .

[c] To exchange our valuable articles like gold, silver, copper, and iron for useless foreign goods like woolens and satin is to incur great loss while acquiring not the smallest benefit. The best course of all would be for the bakufu to put a stop to the trade with Holland. . . .

[d] For some years Russia, England, and others have sought trade with us, but the bakufu has not permitted it. Should permission be granted to the Americans, on what ground would it be possible [then] to refuse if Russia and the others . . request it . . .

[e] It is widely stated that the foreigners have no other [i.e., apart from trade] evil designs and that if only the bakufu will permit trade there will be no further difficulty.

However, it is their practice first to seek a foothold by means of trade and then to go on to propagate Christianity and make other unreasonable demands . . .

[f] . . . If the people of Japan stand firmly united, if we complete our military preparations and return to the state of society that existed [in earlier times], then we will even be able to go out against foreign countries and spread abroad our fame and prestige. But if we open trade at the demand of the foreigners, for no better reason gun-emplacements. . . . Since even ignorant commoners are talking in this way, I fear that if the bakufu does not decide to carry out expulsion, if its handling of the matter shows nothing but excess of leniency and appeasement of the foreigners, then the lower orders may fail to understand its ideas and hence opposition might arise from evil men who have lost their respect for bakufu authority. It might even be that bakufu control of the great lords would itself be endangered. . . .

[h] There are those who say that . . . one must recognize that peace has now lasted so long that our armaments are inadequate . . [and that] thebakufu would be forced to conclude a peace settlement and so its prestige would suffer still further damage.

Hence [it is argued], the bakufu should . . placate the foreigners, meanwhile exerting all its efforts in military preparations, so that when these preparations have been completed it can more strictly enforce the ancient [exclusionary] laws. . . . However, to my mind the people here [in Edo] are temporizing and half-hearted. . . there is not the slightest chance that the feudal lords will complete military preparations, however many years may pass, unless they are set an example in military matters by the bakufu. . . . Again, relaxation of the expulsion laws was ordered in 1842 [after China's defeat by Britain in the Opium War], with the apparent object of first placating the foreigners and then using the respite to complete military preparations, but here, too, I do not think the various lords have made any particular progress in rearming in the twelve years that have since elapsed. On the arrival of [the U.S. ships under Commodore Perry], all fell into a panic . . . it shows a shameful spirit. I therefore believe that if there be any sign of the bakufu pursuing the policy of peace, morale

will never rise . . . and the gun-batteries and other preparations made will accordingly be so much ornament, never put to effective use. But if the bakufu, now and henceforward, shows itself resolute for expulsion, the immediate effect will be to increase ten-fold the morale of the country and to bring about the completion of military preparations . . . Hesitant as I am to say so, only by so doing will the shogun be able to fulfill his 'barbarian-expelling' duty and unite the men of every province in carrying out their military functions. . . .

I have tried to explain in general terms the relative advantages and disadvantages of the war and peace policies. . . . In these feeble days men tend to cling to peace; they are not fond of defending their country by war. They slander those of us who are determined to fight, calling us lovers of war, men who enjoy conflict. . . . In view of our country's tradition of military courage, however, it is probable that once the bakufu has taken a firm decision we shall find no cowards among us . . . It is therefore my belief that in this question of coastal defense it is of the first importance that the bakufu pay due heed [through purchase of modern ships and guns and constructing coastal batteries]. . and that having once reached a decision it should never waver from it thereafter. . . .

7.2.5 Observations of Ii Naosuke, Lord (daimyo) of Hakone, Oct. 1853:

. . . Careful consideration of conditions as they are today . . leads me to believe that despite the constant differences and debates into which men of patriotism and foresight have been led in recent years by their perception of the danger of foreign aggression, it is impossible in the crisis we now face to ensure the safety and tranquillity of our country merely by an insistence on the seclusion laws as we did in former times. Moreover, time is essential if we are to complete our coast defenses.

Since 1609, when (large) warships . . were forbidden, we have had no warships capable of opposing foreign attack on our coasts with heavy guns. . . . There is a saying that when one is besieged in a castle, to raise the drawbridge is to imprison oneself and make it impossible to hold out indefinitely . . . Even though the shogun's ancestors set up seclusion laws, they left the Dutch and the Chinese to act as a bridge [to the outside world]. Might not this bridge now be of advantage to us in handling foreign affairs, providing us with the means whereby we may for a time avert the outbreak of hostilities and then, after some time has elapsed, gain a complete victory?

I understand that the coal for which the Americans have expressed a desire is to be found in quantity in Kyushu. We should . . tell them . . that should their need of it

arise urgently and unexpectedly during a voyage, they may ask for coal at Nagasaki and if we have any to spare we will provide it. Nor will we grudge them wood and water. As for foodstuffs, the supply varies from province to province, but we can agree to provide food for the shipwrecked and unfortunate. Again, we can tell them, of recent years we have treated kindly those wrecked on our coasts and have sent them all home. There is no need for further discussion of this subject, and all requests concerning it should be made through the Dutch.

Then, too, there is the question of trade. Although there is a national prohibition of it, conditions are not the same as they were. The exchange of goods is a universal practice. This we should explain to the spirits of our ancestors. And we should then tell the foreigners that we mean in the future to send trading vessels to the Dutch company's factory at Batavia [the Dutch East Indies colony of Java; now Indonesia] to engage in trade; that we will allocate some of our trading goods to America, some to Russia, and so on, using the Dutch to trade for us as our agents; but that there will be a delay of one or two years because we must [first] construct new ships for these voyages. By replying in this way we will take the Americans by surprise in offering to treat them generally in the same way as the Dutch.

We must construct new steamships, especially powerful warships, and these we will load with goods not needed in Japan. For a time we will have to employ Dutchmen as masters and mariners, but we will put on board with them Japanese of ability and integrity who must study the use of large guns, the handling of ships, and the rules of navigation. Openly these will be called merchant vessels, but they will in fact have the secret purpose of training a navy. As we increase the number of ships and our mastery of technique, Japanese will be able to sail the oceans freely and gain direct knowledge of conditions abroad without relying on the secret reports of the Dutch. Thus we will eventually complete the organization of a navy.

Moreover, we must shake off the panic and apprehensions that have beset us and abandon our habits of luxury and wasteful spending. Our defenses thus strengthened, and all being arranged at home, we can act so as to make our courage and prestige resound beyond the seas. By so doing, we will not in the future be imprisoning ourselves; indeed, we will be able, I believe, so to accomplish matters at home and abroad as to achieve national security. Forestalling the foreigners in this way, I believe, is the best method of ensuring that the bakufu will at some future time find opportunity to reimpose its ban and forbid foreigners to come to Japan, as was done in [the early 17th c. and before]. Moreover, it would make possible the strictest

prohibition of Christianity. And since I understand that the Americans and Russians themselves have only recently become skilled in navigation, I do not see how the people of our country, who are clever and quick-witted, should prove inferior to Westerners if we begin training at once. . . .

It is now no easy matter, by means of orders concerning the defense of Edo [the shogun's capital city] and the nearby coast, to ensure that all will be fully prepared for any sudden emergency, so not a moment must be wasted. However many firm walls we construct, they will certainly not be as effective as unity of mind if the unforeseen happens. The urgent task of the moment, therefore, is for the bakufu to resolve on relieving the nation's anxieties and issue the appropriate orders.

I am conscious of my temerity in putting forward views that conflict with the existing [seclusion] laws, but I have so reported in accordance with your orders that I was to do so fully and without reserve.

7.2.6 Japanese Reply (1854) to President Fillmore’s Letter of Response from