C ONCLUSION

What insight into the design of the governance structure of financial mechanisms for climate change might be gleaned from this examination of IMF reforms, and in particular from the four guiding principles identified in Part II.3?

First, the distribution of power between donor members, as a group, and recipient members, as a group, must be maintained. This seems to be a slightly modified principle of “balanced representation of all parties,” but will be particularly useful to those climate change financial mechanisms operating at the international scale with very large membership.

Second, any discussion of and decisions relating to governance issues need to be transparent, such that major donors remain confident in how the institution reaches its decisions by maintaining a decisive voice. This echoes the principles of transparency and effectiveness. Discussion about designing the governance structure of any climate change financial mechanism must involve all the stakeholders, in particular the donors and recipients. In addition, any set of decision-making rules and/or organisational arrangement must allow room for donors to exercise their power so that they will be willing to continue to support the operations of the mechanism they believe to be effective.

Third, first and foremost, potential recipient countries need to transform themselves, and be well-prepared so as to possess enough bargaining chips in the process of negotiation. This certainly falls outside of the four guiding principles! Nevertheless, when it comes to climate change mitigation and adaptation policies, no country should expect others to support such activities without undertaking and demonstrating its own efforts to contribute equally to such a daunting task. When a country demonstrates its

93. The four members, China, South Korea, Mexico and Turkey that received the first round of ad hoc quota increase in 2006 also receive extra allocation of quota in 2008. In fact, after the 2006 reform programme came out, commentators have already expressed some reservation. It has been criticized that “the end result of the reform could allow for the increase of the quotas of a handful of successful emerging economies at the expense of middle-income developing countries.” Torres, supra note 33, at 455.

own matching determination to design and implement climate change mitigation and adaptation policies, it is more likely that it will be invited to participate in climate change financial mechanisms and, as a result have opportunities to take part in and influence the operations of these mechanisms. This might be particularly important for those financial mechanisms that operate on a smaller scale, for example at the bilateral or regional level. It also might apply to those financial mechanisms that generate their resources from the private sector where investors are more willing to invest in those activities that have a demonstratively positive effect on climate change mitigation or adaptation and which can only take place in a country that provides a supportive environment for such activities.

REFERENCES

Amazon Fund.(2005). Retrieved from http://www.amazonfund.org/

Asian Development Bank. (2011). Climate change. Retrieved from http://beta.adb.org/themes/climate-change/main

Ballesteros, A., Nakhooda, S., Werksman, J. & Hurlburt, K. (2010). Power, responsibility, and accountability: Re-thinking the legitimacy of institutions for climate finance [Adobe Digital Editions version].

Retrieved from http://pdf.wri.org/power_responsibility_accountability.pdf Beltran G. S. (2005, March). Governance in Bretton Woods Institutions.

Paper presented at XX G24 Technical Group Meeting, Manila, Phillipine. Retrieved from

http://www.g24.org/ResearchPaps/GBeltran.pdf

Bird, N. & Brown, J. (2010). International climate finance: Principles for European support to developing countries (European Development Co-operation to 2020 (EDC 2020), Working Paper No.6). Retrieved from

http://www.edc2020.eu/fileadmin/publications/EDC_2020_Working_Pa per_No_6.pdf

Bredenkamp, H. & Pattillo, C. (2010). Financing the response to climate change. [Adobe Digital Editions version]. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1006.pdf

Chelsky, J. (2008). Summarizing the views of the imf executive board.

(BP/08/05). Retrieved from The Independent Evaluation Office website:

http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/052108CG_back ground6.pdf

Copper, R. N. & Truman, E. M. (2007). The IMF quota formula: Linchpin of fund reform. Policy Briefs in International Economics, PB07-1, 1-19.

Financial mechanism. Retrieved from

http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/financial-mechanism.html Germany’s climate initiative. (2011) Retrieved from

http://www.bmu-klimaschutzinitiative.de/en/home_i

Gianviti, F. (1999). Decision-making in the International Monetary Fund. In International Monetary Fund (Ed.), Current developments in monetary and financial Law (Vol. 1, pp. 31-67). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Global Environment Facility. (2004). Instrument for the establishment of the restructure global environment facility. Washington, DC: Author.

Global Environment Facility. (2009). Adding value and promoting higher

impact through the GEF’s programmatic approach. [Adobe Digital Editions version]. Retrieved from

http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/publication/Programmat ic_Approach.pdf

Global Environment Facility. (2010). Adaptation. Retrieved from http://www.thegef.org/gef/adaptation

Gold, J. (1972). Voting and decisions in the International Monetary Fund.

Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Gold, J. (1984). Public international law in the international monetary system. Southwestern Law Journal, 38, 799-852.

Independent Evaluation Office. (2008). Governance of the IMF: An evaluation. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund. (2010). Retrieved from http://www.icctf.or.id/

International Monetary Fund. (2006, September 1). IMF Executive Board recommends quota and related governance reforms [Press Release No.

06/189]. Retrieved from

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2006/pr06189.htm

International Monetary Fund. (2006, Septermber 18). IMF Board of Governors approves quota and related governance reforms [Press Release No. 06/205]. Retrieved from

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/new110510b.htm International Monetary Fund. (2008). Reform of quota and voice in the

International Monetary Fund-Report of the executive board to the board of governors. Retrieved from

http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/032108.pdf

International Monetary Fund. (2008, March 28). IMF Executive Board recommends reforms to overhaul quota and voice [Press Release No.

08/64]. Retrieved from

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr0864.htm

International Monetary Fund. (2008, April). Reform of IMF quotas and voice:

Responding to changes in the global economy. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2008/040108.htm

International Monetary Fund. (2008, April 29). IMF Board of Governors adopts quota and voice reforms by large margin [Press Release No.

08/93]. Retrieved from

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2008/pr0893.htm

International Monetary Fund. (2009, October 4). Communique of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of

Governors of the International Monetary Fund [Press Release No.

09/347]. Retrieved from

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09347.htm

International Monetary Fund. (2010). Executive Board progress report to the IMFC: The reform of fund governance. Retrieved from

http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/042110a.pdf

International Monetary Fund. (2010, November). IMF Board approves far-reaching governance reforms. IMF Survey Magazine. Retrieved from

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/new110510b.htm International Monetary Fund. (2010, November 5). IMF Executive Board

approves major overhaul of quotas and governance [Press Release No.

10/418]. Retrieved from

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10418.htm

International Monetary Fund. (2010, December 16). IMF Board of Governors approves major quota and governance reforms [Press Release No. 10/477]. Retrieved from

http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10477.htm

International Monetary Fund. (2011, March). Important milestone reached to reinforce IMF legitimacy. IMF Survey Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/new110510b.htm International Monetary Fund. (2011, September 30). IMF quota and

governance publications: June 2006-March 2011. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/quotas/pubs/index.htm

Kelkar, V. L., Chaudhry, P. K., Vanduzer-Snow, M ＆ Bhaskar, V. (2005).

Reforming the International Monetary Fund: Towards enhanced accountability and legitimacy. In A. Buira (Ed.), Reforming the governance of the IMF and the World Bank, pp. 45-74. London, UK:

Anthem Press.

Legal Department and the Quota and Voice Working Group, International Monetary Fund. (2006). Proposed amendment of the articles of agreement regarding basic votes-Preliminary considerations. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/122206a.pdf

Martinez-Diaz, L. (2008). Executive Boards in international organizations:

Lessons for strengthening IMF governance 1-41 (IEO, BP/08/08).

Retrieved from

http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP08_

08.pdf

Mikesell, R. F. (1994). The Bretton Woods debates: A memoir. Essay in

International Finance, 192, 1-68.

Mirakhor, A. & Zaidi, I. (2006). Rethinking the governance of the International Monetary Fund 1-46 (WP/06/273). Retrieved from International Monetary Fund website:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=956736

Mountford, A. (2008). The formal governance structure of the International Monetary Fund 1-30 (BP/08/01). Retrieved from Independent Evaluation Office website:

http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP08_

01.pdf

Parker, C., Brown, J., Pickering, J., Roynestad, E., Mardas, N. & Mitchell, A.

W. (2009). The little climate finance book: A guide to financing options for forests and climate change. [Adobe Digital Editions version].

Retrieved from

http://www.theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/resources/pdf/2009/lcfb_

en.pdf

Portugal, M. (2005). Improving IMF governance and increasing the influence of developing countries in IMF decision-making. In A. Buira (Ed.), Reforming the governance of the IMF and the World Bank (pp.

75-106). London, UK: Anthem Press.

Silard, S. A. (1995). The global environment facility: A new development in international law and organization. George Washington Journal of International Law and Economics, 28, 607-654.

Stewart, R. B., Kingsbury, B. & Rudyk, B. (2009a). Climate finance: Key concepts and ways forward. [Adobe Digital Editions version].

Retrieved from

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Stewart%20Final.pdf

Stewart, R. B., Kingsbury, B. & Rudyk, B. (Eds.). (2009b). Climate finance:

regulatory and funding strategies for climate change and global development. New York, NY: New York University Press.

The World Bank. (2011). Carbon finance at the World Bank. Retrieved from http://go.worldbank.org/9IGUMTMED0

Torres, H.R. (2007). Reforming the International Monetary Fund-Why its legitimacy is at stake. Journal of International Economic Law, 10, 443-460.

United Nations. (2003). Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development (U.N. Doc.

A/CONF.198/11). New York, NY: Author.

United Nations. (2009). Report of the Commission of Experts of the

President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of International Monetary and Financial System. New York, NY: Author.

United Nations the Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2011, June 21) Financial mechanisms. Retrieved from

http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/2 807.php

United Nations the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), art. 21.3 (May 9, 1992).

United Nations the Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 3-15, 2007, Bali, Decision, at 3, FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1, 1/CMP.3 (May 14, 2008).

Van Houtven, L. (2002). Governance of the IMF: Decision-making, institutional oversight, transparency, and accountability. In (n.d.), Pamphlet Series: No.53. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.

Waste & Resources Action Programme. (2011). Environmental Transformation Fund. Retrieved from

http://www.wrap.org.uk/recycling_industry/information_by_material/or ganics/etf.html

Werksman, J. (1995). Consolidating governance of the global commons:

Insights from the global environment facility. Yearbook of International Environmental Law, 6, 27-63.

Woods, N. & Lombardi, D. (2006). Uneven patterns of governance: How developing countries are represented in the IMF. Review of International Political Economy, 13, 480-515.

Zamora, S. (1980). Voting in international economic organizations.

American Journal of International Law, 74, 566-608.

國際貨幣基金會之治理改革經驗對 氣候變遷財務機制之啟示

施 文 真

摘 要

氣候變化綱要公約2009年第15次締約國大會所發表的「哥本哈根 協議」，因締約國無法達成共識而未獲締約國大會通過。但在僅有12 段內容之「哥本哈根協議」中，即有高達7段提及財務資源的重要性。

而於2010年11月結束之第16次締約國大會所通過之「坎昆協定」，則 係由締約國大會所正式通過之大會決議，該協定亦針對公約之財務機 制訂定相當具體且重要之規範，其中包括「綠色氣候基金」（Green Climate Fund）之設置，此亦顯示財務機制於氣候變遷之減緩與調適 措施的設計以及執行上的重要性。

在氣候變遷財務機制設計中，透過民主程序確保公正與衡平的資 源取得與分配至關重要，治理架構之設計將影響各種類型之財務機制 是否得以有效達成協助開發中國家執行氣候變遷之減緩與調適措施。

以國際貨幣基金會（International Monetary Fund，以下簡稱IMF）

與世界銀行為首之國際發展援助財務機制，自1947年成立以來已運作 超過五十年。IMF之治理機制多年來遭受各界的批評，IMF面對各界 要求改革的呼籲，終於在2008年開始進行一連串的治理改革方案，以 期增加組織正當性與有效性。IMF之治理改革經驗是否為氣候變遷財 務機制的治理架構設計帶來一些啟示？此為本文主要之研究議題。

關鍵詞：財務機制、治理改革、國際貨幣基金會、氣候變遷