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C HAPTER 4—R ESPONDING TO N EW
C HALLENGES IN THE 21 ST C ENTURY
Confronted with major social, economic, and ecological problems the CCP decided on a new development strategy after it had entered the 21st century. At the 16th Party Congress and its 5th Plenary Session in the following year, two new leading political guidelines were adopted:
Harmonious Society and Scientific Development View.
In this chapter, I first explain the ideological foundation on which China builds its reforms in the CMS, and the economic, social and environmental background against which the new development theory was formulated and adopted. By doing so, I introduce the main contents of Scientific Development and the concept of Ecological Civilization that describe China’s idea how to come to terms with environmental degradation, the role of government and cadres in carrying forward the transformation of development.
P
OLITICAL,
ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL BACKGROUNDThe adoption of the Scientific Development View has to be analyzed from the international and domestic vantage point, as both are crucial variables that have been influencing China’s path of development, they contributed to the development of the theory of Scientific Development, and the strategies applied for implementation.
At the beginning of the new century, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). The further integration into the international system posed many challenges to the country in adjusting economic structures and the financial system. The membership also came at a point in history at which various countries (including China itself) had committed to a development of sustainability. At the beginning of the 1990s, led by the United Nations, more and more countries started to pay more attention to sustainable development. The new development
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model called for a fortified consideration of social and environmental justice, more participation of societies, preservation of nature and resources. In other words, governments had devoted themselves consider more social and environmental factors in their development.
However, the cleavage of weak and strong sustainability—i.e. those countries which performed better in terms of natural capital and ecological preservation and those that continued to give priority to economic development—was drawn between rich, developed countries and poorly developed, and emerging countries. Superior production modes and production technology allowed rich countries to produce more environmentally sound. This was also supported by the shift of highly polluting industries into less developed countries where labor costs were low and environmental regulations lax. When transboundary environmental problems became more pronounced and the global climate change debate emerged, China again was faced with sharp criticism as its rapid growth caused a major part of the world wide CO2 emissions.
Within China, development had achieved a high degree of unevenness. During the 1980s, development policies in China favored the development of coastal areas over the development of the inner-provinces. When it became clear that the expected trickle-down effect from East to West was not likely to occur, China launched a massive development program to promote economic development of its poorly developed western and less developed middle provinces (The Great Western Opening up and Development 西部大开发). Nevertheless, in spite of the central government’s efforts, the costal-interior/western divide continued to grow.
Even within regions, the discrepancies of development became more pronounced, in particular between rural and urban areas. Rapid urbanization accompanied by inappropriate migration policies widened the gap between the haves and the have-nots, and between those with and without access to welfare.
In the environmental realm, China was confronted with severe degradation that had started to affect its economy. The hybrid economic system that emerged and gradually developed after China had opened up to the entire world in 1978 combined elements of socialist command economy and advanced capitalism. The highly speculative character of this system not only regularly triggered preoccupations of overheating; it also exerted high pressures on China’s natural environment (Muldavin 1997). Weak environmental legislation combined with the implementation problem at local level aggravated China’s environmental and ecological situation.
Still, switching from continued economic growth to environmental preservation was and is
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still no option for China, as many parts of the country are still poorly developed.25 In order to solve the issues of uneven development, economic growth and environmental degradation China started—on academic level much earlier than on political level26
On societal level, China’s leaders were confronted with visibly growing contentious actions within the society. The number of protests has grown exorbitantly, especially after the turn of the new century. Social scientists have demonstrated the fragmentation of social unrest in China; protests and protesters are divided by various factors: location, generation, and concerns. The reasons are structural as well as strategic (Solinger 1992; Pearson 1997;
Dickson 2003; Lee 2000; Perry 2007). In a briefing document of the Europe China Research and Academic Network (ECRAN) on social unrest in China and the role of information and communication technology Göbel et al. (2012) find that the reasons for social unrest are mostly immediate and involve interest groups who receive unfair treatment or those whose interests are harmed. Even though these protests do not question the legitimacy of the CCP, they are still regarded as a considerable threat as they can “easily spiral out of control” (10).
The pollution of the environment and its resulting impact on agriculture and health is a leading cause of social unrest. According to Wang (2008), China saw an increase of 29% in environmental protests between 1996 and 2005. Protests occur in villages where governments allow factories to pollute the environment in order to boost tax revenues. The polluted water not only destroys agricultural production but causes severe harm to the health of villagers (Göbel et al. 2012: 38); Liu Lee (2010) found out that there are 450 villages in China in which the number of cancer patients is extraordinarily high. In contrast to villagers who protest against immediate impacts, urban contentious actions are usually rooted in the fears of eventual adverse effects in the future. Also, the social origins of the participants are different from those in the villages; they usually involve members of the middle class with higher incomes. The targets of protests are often decisions of the government to host chemical plants (Göbel et al. 2012: 38).
—to search for solutions that allow economic growth with less adverse impacts on the environment. High-tech High-technology, innovation capacity, and knowledge diffusion have become necessary assets for China to gain.
25 According to the World Bank, China had an average Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of 3,180 US Dollars in 2003 and 9,060 US Dollars in 200(World Bank Data: “World Development Indicators.” Retrieved from: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx (last checked, August 2013)
26 For a discussion on the relationship between the economic and academic discourse, and the research efforts on Green GDP accounting see Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne, and Ritirc, Julia (forthcoming): “Green or Black Growth for China: The Development of the Green GDP Accounting System in the PRC.”
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Social unrest catches the attention of media that help to spread the concerns of the protesters to other parts of the country. Yet, in China a “combination of power and freedom” (partly due to the lack of public participation) ensures that responsibility rests in the hand of local governments (Ma 2008: B10). So far, environmentally motivated social unrest, media coverage and NGOs are rather weak and do not seem to push local cadres into rethinking their industrialization strategies, as their short term ability to suppress these riots is rewarded while a change of strategy only implies high risks. Still, the leadership is well aware of the destabilizing force and threat of these protests. This awareness is also reflected in the increased spending on public security budgets and the efforts in technological upgrading (information and surveillance systems) (Göbel et al. 2012: 57).