Past and Present Stance of South Korean Government

One of the common arguments held by the Japanese right extremists is considering the long-term silence held by the South Korean comfort women. They argue that the entire issue is a lie for the issue first began in Japan, not in Korea.

Hiromichi argues: “How did this whole controversy begin? Not in Korea, but in Japan!

The first assertions that Korean women were coerced into serving as military prostitutes

were made not by Koreans, but by Japanese. The anti-Japanese movement in Korea owes its existence to Koreans who were fooled by the lies of a Japan-hating Japanese”

(Hiromichi, 2012).

As mentioned in Chapter 2, the distinctive cultural and social factors of South Korea was what led those women to hold their long-term silence but another significant domestic factor which further pushed those women in silence was the position held by the South Korean government at the time. South Korea at the time was a weak and poor country with a dictatorial political system filled with pro-Japanese collaborators that had no power nor much of an incentive to confront Japan over colonial issue (B.S.

Yoon, 2010). The military dictatorship in South Korea did not provide the environment for those women to come forward. Japan was also an essential allies for the U.S. Cold War strategy, which pressured South Korean government to be silent over Japan’s war time atrocities (B.S. Yoon, 2010).

During the postwar period, communist expansion as well as political factionalism were threatening South Korea’s political stability (B.S. Yoon, 2010). The anti-communist nation building through institutionalization of political, social, and economic infrastructure was the immediate concern (B.S. Yoon, 2010). The first Korean president, Seung Man Rhee, was both anti-communist and anti-Japanese, who had interest in overcoming historical animosity but also well-aware of the necessity of building a strategic partnership with Japan (T.R. Yoon, 2011). There were some negotiations made few times over the compensation measures, but his strong anti-Japanese posture and the somewhat emotional demand for compensation -$3.6 billion representing 100 million dollars a year for 36 years of colonial suffering- ended the negotiations in failure (B.S. Yoon, 2010). Soon after, the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950 and the first priority of the government was to stop the expansion of the communists, which required South Korea to cooperate with Japan. It obviously was not the appropriate time for compensation demands to be made, especially regarding the comfort women, who have not yet even identified themselves in the public. B.S. Yon argues: “Even if the Rhee government had settled with Japan on compensation money, it is unlikely that it would ever have reached the KCW victims whose very identity was as yet surfaced in South Korean society” (B.S. Yoon, 2010).

After the Korean War, South Korea was suffering from extreme poverty and was in urgent need of economic support. South Korea had no ability to raise unsettled

historical issues against Japan. The country’s first priority was economic development, not reconciliation:

South Korea’s national issues should not be dismissed. An unsettling colonial history and legacy, the U.S. military occupation, national division, the Korean War, and continued national poverty caused the Korean government’s inability to raise the issue of “comfort women.” Moreover, humiliating negotiations with its former enemy seemed inevitable to achieve the nation’s prior goal of economic growth and security at the expense of its people (N. Lee, 2014).

Park Chung Hee over his time of presidency during the 60s and 70s, constantly propagated the rhetoric of prosperity for the minjok, “nationalism” (Chang, 2006). Park Chung Hee government solely focused on rapid economic development by excluding the popular sector (K. Park, 2007). For instance, on December 6, 1971, the government declared a national emergency because of a perceived North Korean threat, and banned all activities opposing or slandering the government (K. Park, 2007). For economic purpose, Park Chung Hee also promoted the influx of foreign currency, encouraged sex tourism catering to foreign military personnel and businessmen, and encouraged Koreans to work abroad (T.R. Yoon, 2011). Many Korean women were especially encouraged to work in the sex industry in Japan (T.R. Yoon, 2011). Even if the comfort women issue was publicized at the time, Park Chung Hee could not have cared less.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Park settled on the 1965 Treaty with Japan, which was solely purposed for economic development:

During Park Jeong-Hee’s military dictatorship, the regime tried to rebuild the country’s relationship with Japan and signed the 1965 Korea-Japan Accord. Essentially, “Korea gave up the right of its citizens to sue the Japanese government for civil damages,” which came in the form of reconstruction funding, which means “economic development grants and loans” from the U.S (N. Lee, 2014).

The claims were mostly on the property rights (i.e., bond holdings, postal money orders, land holdings, stocks, unpaid wages, forced savings, etc) rather than compensation measures for individual victims (B.S. Yoon, 2011). The comfort women issue was not even mentioned during the negotiation. “Even though KCW [Korean comfort women]

was included, it would not make any difference anyway, for the ‘claims’ had to be factually documented to be considered valid, and the ‘claims’ didn’t mean reparations to be paid to victims” (B.S. Yoon, 2011). The government of Park Chung Hee had no interest in handling historical issues. It rather strived to put historical issues behind to prioritize economic cooperation. The fact is, after the treaty was signed between Korea and Japan, one of the comfort women did try to bring her case forward with the

government. The following reference proves that the Park Chung Hee’s administration had absolute no interest in handling the issue:

A Korean victim-survivor, Hwang Kum-ju, told Kim-Gibson that she tried to report their experience after the Treaty on Basic Relations between Korea and Japan was signed in 1965. As delivering a petition to the Presidential office was impossible, Hwang approached Mrs Park, then the First Lady, when Mrs Park was visiting her home town to see her parents and to celebrate the Buddha’s birthday. However, after listening to Hwang’s brief talk about her and other women’s experiences of sexual slavery, Mrs Park turned pale and urged Hwang never to tell this story to anyone. Mrs Park also remarked that what happened during the war and under Japanese colonialism is now something of the past, and it should not be mentioned again as Korea had to move forward now (Kimura, 2016).

After the assassination of President Park Chung Hee, his eighteen years of military dictatorship ended. However, it was followed by another military dictatorship under Chun Doo Hwan. People generally have no voice to raise under the military dictatorship. Also, Chun’s government maintained the same type of economic centralized ruling, thus there was no space to raise any colonial issues. Thus, for nearly half a century after the liberation in 1945, comfort women suffered from further marginalization and extension of victimization by having to keep their silence under their own government.

The comfort women issue first began to be mentioned by the South Korean government only in the 1990s after the democratic reform by Roh Tae Woo on June 29, 1987 (Jonsson, 2015). Prior to the state visit by President Roh to Japan in May 1990, Korean women’s organizations made a timely statement on the comfort women, asking for the Japanese government’s formal apology and appropriate compensation (Youn, 2008). The President Roh, in response, submitted a request for a list of comfort women but the Japanese government responded that there was no such list (Jonsson, 2015). A representative of the government refused to investigate whether the military had been part of forced labor drafts during the war, claiming that it was impossible to investigate the matter since those women had been accompanied by the troops under the supervision of “private operators” (Naoko, 2016). The Japanese government also argued that the investigation was unnecessary for all issues had been resolved under the 1965 Treaty. This led to the public testimony of Kim Hak Sun on 1991, which allowed the issue to rise as one of the central colonial issues in need of proper settlement.

Since then, South Korean government tried to stand on the side of comfort women for compensation and apologies from the Japanese government. However, none of the attempted resolution efforts have been successful. During the 1990s, there were

some initial efforts of reconciliation made, with the statements raised by Prime Minister Murayama. In 1998, Kim Dae Jung took actions by raising the “lifestyle stability subsidies” to comfort women survivors from 5 million won (US$4,100) all the way to 43 million won (US$35,600) (J. Kim, 2016). The government aimed to pressure Japan into acknowledging legal responsibility, serving as a response to the AWF for compensation (J. Kim, 2016). An agreement named Japan- ROK Joint Declaration has been made (Lin, 2016). However, the condition of the deal asserted by Japan raised intense criticisms. Again, Japan aimed to close entire historical issues once and for all (Yoichi, 2015). The condition was not to “resurrect the historical issue with Japan again” (Yoichi, 2015). It carried the same point of criticism as the 1965 treaty and the 2015 agreement. Thus, all initial reconciliation moves made in the 90s ended in a failure.

After the 90s, reconciliation seemed more and more difficult. Especially under the anti-American president Roh Moo Hyun, who was unlikely to budge even under the pressure of U.S (J. Kim, 2016). In fact, President Roh was the first to argue that the comfort women issue has not been resolved under the 1965 treaty; a claim supported with the release of related diplomatic documents from the talks (J. Kim, 2016). For the first time since Liberation, President Lee Myung Bak also raised the comfort women issue as part of the official agenda in a summit meeting with Japan, held after the 2011 Constitutional Court decision (J. Kim, 2016). The resolution efforts constantly failed as the presidents of South Korea held tougher stance against Japan and as the Japanese government fought back under the ever-growing influence of right extremists.

4.1.3. Purpose of the Agreement for Japanese and S. Korean Governments