Purpose of the Agreement for Japanese and S. Korean Governments

difficult under the South Korean President Park Geun Hye and rightist Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Japan has long been expressing its frustration over South Korea’s criticism against their handling of past wrongdoings (M. Kim, 2016). President Park have refused to meet with Prime Minister Abe for nearly three years (Minegishi, 2015). Kim Tae Hyo, a former adviser to president Lee Myung-Bak argued that:

…the chance of a meeting between Ms Park and Mr Abe was relatively low as long as South Korea’s government and people perceived a lack of remorse from Tokyo over the wartime sexual slavery. It’s a matter of the personal relationship between Park Geun-hye and Shinzo Abe […] Both sides don’t want to lose face (Sevastopulo & Mundy, 2014).

However, in defiance of those expectations, a sudden announcement was made in 2015 by the two governments that the comfort women issue has been resolved. If domestic politics were prioritized, Abe would not have stepped away from “his firm conviction that no further apology is necessary […] he is likely to place more priority on domestic politics and comfort to his right-wing support groups” (C. Park, 2015). Also, Park,

“who takes a principled position on history-related issues, would not step back from her insistence that Abe show a sincere attitude toward issues stemming from the unhappy historical experience between Korea and Japan including the comfort women issue” (C. Park, 2015). What then has convinced Japan to make gesture of apology?

What made the two governments to arrive at the agreement? In order to understand the two governments’ purpose of the 2015 agreement, we need to look back at the very basis of what led to the establishment of their bilateral ties:

Korea would not have allowed itself to make an easy compromise in the process of decolonization from Japan, but for the restrictions caused by the Cold War. The Korean government needed economic cooperation with Japan under the restrictions of the Cold War, i.e. due to the pressure applied by the US for friendly relations with Japan and the confrontation with the North. These experts say that Korea could not have secured a satisfactory outcome (Tadashi, 2008).

In the midst of Cold War strategic confrontation between the southern triangle (the United States, Japan, and the ROK) and the northern triangle (Russia, China, and North Korea), and in urgent need of economic support, South Korea had no other choice but to pursue a virtual alliance with a former enemy and colonizer (Sohn, 2016). South Korea had to put aside colonial issues for strategic and economic cooperation. U.S.

strategic interest was the tie that bound those two former enemies together as strong alliance partners. “The North Korean nuclear crisis improved the tainted image of trilateralism” (Sohn, 2016). The same phenomenon can be seen from the case of 2015 agreement. Due to the ever-arising power of China over the region and unceasing threats from North Korea, the two countries had to put aside historical issues for strategic cooperation. “After all, troubled ties between the two countries would only work to the benefit of China and North Korea, while deeply undermining U.S. strategic interests and shaking its trust in what have been strong alliance partners” (C. Park, 2015). North Korea was a constant threat to U.S., South Korea and Japan ever since the Cold War. There were times when situations were better but when President Park took

the office, North Korea was posing serious threats to the region. Thus, it was time when security alliance had to remain stronger than ever.

After a dispute with U.S. in 2012 over the launch of rocket, North Korea voided the agreement made with U.S. to suspend nuclear tests, uranium enrichment, and long-range missile tests in exchange for food aid (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2017). Around the time President Park took the office in 2013, North Korea conducted a nuclear test and the North Korean state media announced that the country would restart all nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, including its 5MW graphite-moderated reactor, and uranium enrichment plant (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2017). In August 2013, satellite imagery confirmed steam venting from the 5MW reactor's turbine and generator building (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2017). By September of 2015, North Korea confirmed restarting its nuclear reactor, seen as its main source of weapons-grade plutonium (Stanton, 2015). In the end of 2015, North Korea claimed that it added the hydrogen bomb to its arsenal (Hanna, Hume & Griffiths, 2015). Tensions further escalated as President Park took a tough stance against North Korea’s provocations. South Korea resumed propaganda broadcasts across the border for the first time since 2004. It was an act of retribution for a landmine attack that Seoul blames on Pyongyang — firing of two rockets over the border towards the speakers (Fifield, 2015b). Until today, North Korea conducted five nuclear weapons tests in total: 2006, 2009, 2013, and twice after the year of 2015 (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2017). The one conducted immediately after the end of 2015 was claimed to be a thermonuclear device (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2017).

Due to escalating threats of North Korea, U.S. continued to pressure South Korea that it was time to put aside historical issues and improve relations with Japan for stronger trilateral alliance. The South Korean President Park was under a great pressure to put aside the comfort women issue, which remained as the biggest obstacle in the bilateral relations with Japan, for security cooperation. “Diplomatic pressure as a result of the United States believing that tension between its two allies over history problems was damaging its national interests […] forced Park to call for a resolution by the year’s end, marking the 50th anniversary of diplomatic normalization” (Sohn, 2016).

North Korea was one of the major threats in the region, but the rising power of China, North Korea’s longtime ally, was another factor that have pushed the Japanese government to reach the agreement. Soeya argues: “China-centered Asia, which is not

a reassuring sign for neighboring countries. Given this dynamic, Japan and South Korea need close relations with the United States in order to promote a liberal international order in East Asia and to socialize China into this order” (Soeya, 2016). China’s rising power is more of a threat to Japan than to South Korea. South Korea holds more positive relations with China as it shares more historical common ground and since China is also a necessary power for South Korea when negotiating with North Korea. South Korea often take a stance to balance itself between U.S. and China:

Whereas Japan is firmly aligned with the United States, South Korea has attempted to take a different approach by increasing its connectedness with both great powers. It maintains a long-standing alliance with the United States (and partially with Japan), while recently crafting an amicable relationship with China (Sneider, 2016).

“China is often perceived as a challenger and even as a potential enemy. How to cope with rising China is the fundamental concern of Abe’s external strategy” (C.

Park, 2015). China’s rising power is perceived as more of a threat for Japan due to range of geographical and maritime tension Japan hold with China. For instance, China is currently claiming its sovereignty over the offshore islands, such as the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, and the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (Yee, 2011). The control over these areas is key to securing the rights of resource exploitation, the safety of sea channels of communication and regional naval power projection (Yee, 2011). Japan also carries territorial disputes with China over Diaoyu Island in the East China Sea (Graham-Harrison, 2017). With various historical, territorial and maritime controversies between the two countries, China has increasingly become the major reason for Japanese military enhancement:

There is no longer any ambiguity about the underlying rationales for Japan’s long-term military development: it is China-directed. Japan’s latest Defense White Paper makes these arguments explicit. Though North Korea’s fourth nuclear test reaffirms Tokyo’s strong opposition to Pyongyang’s actions and its decided preference for enhanced U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation (including on ballistic missile defense), its eyes are increasingly cast on Beijing, seeking wherever possible to consolidate relationships across the region to counterbalance Chinese power. (Pollack, 2016).

As China expand its power over the region, Japan take stronger stance against China.

Japan sees China's increasing assertiveness over the waters as a threat to its own country and over the region. Regarding the dispute over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, U.S. defence secretary James Mattis confirmed its commitment to defend the islands was at top of the foreign minister’s agenda (Graham-Harrison, 2017). U.S. has always been highly supportive of Japan’s move to make proactive contributions to international as well as

regional security (C. Park, 2015). Japan’s interest over the region to counterbalance China is backed by U.S. interest over the region. “The United States has begun to recognize this strategic requirement by talking about the need to ‘pivot to Asia’ or

‘rebalance toward Asia’” (Bower, Hiebert, Nguyen & Poling, 2015).

In need to regain its influence over the region, U.S. needed the two allies to refrain from disputes and to hold stronger relations. U.S. not only pressured South Korea but also encouraged Japan to make more positive moves on historical issues with South Korea, especially on the comfort women issue. Ever since the end of WWII, as seen from the case of IMTFE, U.S. have generally held softer stance against Japan.

However, U.S. still drew a clear line on some moves made by Japan that intentionally worsened its relations with its neighboring countries, especially South Korea. U.S.

warned Japan to avoid provoking its other ally on historical and territorial controversies (C. Park, 2015). Prime Minister Abe made several irritating actions and statements that made South Korea and other neighboring countries furious. Abe made remarks such as

“In the U.S., they had a Civil War between the South and the North […] How can two countries like Korea and Japan share similar historical perceptions when even people living in the same country hold different perspectives?” (C. Park, 2015). Abe even suggested that Japan could learn from the Nazi approach to constitutional revisions when it tries to revise its peace constitution (C. Park, 2015). Abe also visited the Yasukuni Shrine with three other cabinet members; and in 2013, Hashimoto Toru, a mayor of Osaka, stated that comfort women were available everywhere and Japan should not be blamed (C. Park, 2015). In response, U.S. began to pressurize Japan to refrain from such provocative actions:

“…thinking that Abe was blocking progress between Japan and Korea, on the one hand, and Japan and China, on the other hand, it began putting pressure on the Abe cabinet to show restraint. Abe toned down his political rhetoric, eventually. He did not visit the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, although he sent gifts to the shrine” (C. Park, 2015).

Thus, in the case of 2015 agreement, in order to secure regional balance and counter North Korea and China’s threat over the region, Japanese government had to follow the persuasion of U.S. in making apologies and to reach a deal with South Korea. U.S.

plays a crucial role in tying South Korea and Japan together.

While the two governments’ decision to hastily reach an agreement was largely due to the regional security purpose based on U.S. strategic interests, internal pressure certainly cannot be omitted. The comfort women issue has been a frustration for both

countries for a long time. The two countries’ tension over the issue was heading for its worst since the former comfort women and their advocates installed the first comfort woman statues in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul on 2011 (Choe & Motoko, 2017). There are now dozens of the statues in Korea and six in other countries including U.S., Canada and Australia (Han & Griffiths, 2017). The statue is seen as an international humiliation for Japan and wishes to remove them, while South Korea views Japan’s anger as another attempt to hide its past. Japan not only attempts to remove the statue within South Korea but also ones that are abroad. Japanese government filed a lawsuit in 2014 seeking to remove the statue in California. “The lawsuit was filed against the city of Glendale […] The plaintiffs claimed the city unconstitutionally disrupted the US government's foreign policy and relationship with Japan” (Zhu, 2017). The supporters argued that “The Japanese government's recent involvement in a lawsuit demanding the removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Southern California is nothing but intimidation and an intentional downplay of the historical facts” (Zhu, 2017). Kim Eun-Sung, the artist of the statue also argued that Japan is overreacting. Kim argued: “Which part of a statue of a girl is harming Japan?

It's a statue with a message of peace and for the rights of women” (Han & Griffiths, 2017). Kim argued that he never expected the statue, which was commissioned by a local civic group and paid for with donations, to cause diplomatic incident (Han &

Griffiths, 2017). The Japanese government’s frustration over the issue is clearly reflected from the following two terms of the 2015 agreement: 1. the removal of the statue and 2. to refrain from further criticisms in the international community.