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call upon the talents of seven billion people and what’s more it can recombine them in a diversity which leads to much more creativity than you can get under ethnic Han nationalism (p. 8).
4. Conclusion
It is difficult at present to come to strong conclusions about what China hopes to gain from the SREB as the project is in such early stages of development and there is such scant information currently available relating to it.
From the perspective of offensive realism, the SREB does represent an increasingly assertive and powerful China working to increase its international stature, carve out a significant sphere of influence and make good on its rhetoric to make China the No.1 world power. But the evidence available suggests that financial and logistical
constraints will pose serious impediments to the success of the project and that it is unlikely to be nearly as effective as China hopes.
According to Keohane and Nye’s theory of complex interdependence, the international community should support the SREB as a legitimate and important development strategy that not only benefits the globally vital Chinese economy at a time of economic worries, but is also a strategy that brings increased connectivity, interdependence, opportunities for cooperation and economic betterment to Central Asia and beyond. On the available evidence, it seems that this line of thinking is more appropriate to the context of the SREB. If managed sensibly, the new Silk Road initiatives represent not a new Great Game, but an opportunity for great gain.
The current international system is far more resilient, dynamic and open, and with a much greater capacity for change, than anything that has come before it. It is certainly able to accommodate China’s legitimate development strategies and indeed benefit from them if it acts wisely. The US and its allies are also able to remain confident of their ability to stay ahead of China economically and militarily if they act sensibly. If the international community refuses to understand and support China’s legitimate national development aspirations to improve the lot of its people, it will create a dangerous situation in which China is much more likely to challenge the current order.
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5. Limitations and Future Directions for Research
OBOR and the SREB are at such early stages of development that it is currently difficult to carry out research into their meaning and implications. Both government and academic literature on the topic is limited and this poses significant problems.
However, OBOR is a huge topic with excellent opportunities for future research as it develops. Most obviously, it would be of great value to ask some of the questions raised in this thesis and apply them to the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, which has potentially huge consequences for trade, security and balances of power. In relation to the SREB, an analysis of how Russia’s influence in Central Asia is likely to affect the project would be important, as would an investigation into how the project is likely to impact the Middle East as well as China-India relations.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Nominal Definitions
One Belt, One Road: A development strategy of the People’s Republic of China announced by President Xi Jinping ( 习近平) in September (One Belt) and October (One Road) 2013 that aims to promote connectivity, infrastructure, resource
development, industrial cooperation and financial integration west to Europe through Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, East Africa and West Asia via the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road (National Development and Reform Commission of the PRC, 2015). Official Chinese government literature lists five main goals to be promoted through the initiative: policy coordination, facilities
connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds (ibid.). It has been estimated that the total cost of OBOR could be as much as US$8 trillion and that it could take 35 years to complete (State Council of the PRC, 2015).
When finished, OBOR could encompass a population of 4.4 billion with an economic aggregate of US$21 trillion, which is equivalent to one-third of the world’s wealth (Rolland, 2015).
Silk Road Economic Belt: The “Belt” comprises the land-based portion of OBOR. It includes a route linking China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia, a route through Central Asia and West Asia to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, and a route through Southeast Asia and South Asia to the Indian Ocean (State Council of the PRC, 2015).
Eurasian pivot: With the announcement of OBOR, Eurasia has been placed “front and center” in China’s contemporary foreign policy (Clarke, 2015). China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced at the National People’s Congress in 2015 that “making all-round progress in the Belt and Road initiative” constituted the “key focus” for Chinese diplomacy in 2015 (Swaine, 2015, p. 4) and that it would lead to the
“rejuvenation of the Eurasian continent,” (Fallon, 2015, p. 141). Matthew Burrows and Robert Manning of the US’ Atlantic Council recently argued that China’s “pivot west to Eurasia seeks to turn its vulnerability – a border with fourteen nations – into
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a strategic asset,” and that it seeks “to realize Mackinder’s vision of a Eurasian heartland unopposed,” (Burrows and Manning, 2015).
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB, 亚洲基础设施投资银行, yazhou jichusheshi touzi yinhang): A China-led multilateral development bank that was proposed in October 2013 and began operations in December 2015 (AIIB, 2016). The bank has 57 founding members from right around the world (37 regional, 20 non-regional), including 16 of the world’s 20 largest economies and a dominant group of developing economies. The bank is intended for infrastructural development,
interconnectivity and economic integration; its stated modus operandi is “lean, clean and green,” (ibid.). The bank began with an initial capitalization of US$100 billion, US$50 billion of which was provided by China (ibid.). Asian and Oceanian countries provide 75 percent of funding (Xinhua, 2015). China currently controls 26.06 percent of the voting share, which gives it veto power (Shafer, 2015).
Silk Road Fund (丝路基金, silu jijin): An investment fund of the Chinese government established in December 2014 to provide financing for infrastructure, trade, cooperation and increased interconnectivity in countries involved in OBOR; the fund presently has total capital of US$40 billion (Silk Road Fund, 2016).
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (上海合作组织, shanghai hezuo zuzhi): A Eurasian intergovernmental political, economic, military and cultural grouping founded in Shanghai in 2001 by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (SCO, 2016). India and Pakistan have been accepted as full members and are expected to become as such next year; Afghanistan, Iran, Mongolia and Belarus are observer states, while Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Turkey are dialogue partners; ASEAN, the Commonwealth of Independent States and Turkmenistan are guest attendees (ibid.). The SCO provides a framework and a range of agreements that can facilitate the smoother implementation of OBOR
initiatives. It provides mechanisms through which extra funding, security and cultural initiatives can be put in place.
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Offensive realism: Offensive realism is a hugely influential theoretical perspective put forward by US scholar John Mearsheimer (2001). Mearsheimer posits that states vie for power in an anarchic system where there is no higher authority to exert control over them. According to this theory, great powers strive for ever-increasing power with the aim of becoming a regional hegemon and working to ensure that no other state can achieve a similar status. State decisions are based on the military capabilities of competitor states and the survival of the state is the primary aim. In offensive realist theory, China will use the SREB as part of its efforts to establish regional hegemony and to prevent other states from achieving the same.
Complex interdependence: Complex interdependence is a theory put forward by US scholars Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977). The theory asserts that state
decisions are influenced by a huge range of factors stemming from a wide array of transnational governmental and nongovernmental interlinkages, and state priorities differ from time to time. According to complex interdependence theory, China intends for the SREB to be a tool for regional integration via an array of governmental and nongovernmental connections.
China Dream: The China Dream has become a hallmark of the Xi Jinping
administration since he announced it at the National Museum of China in 2012. It is thought significant that Xi announced the concept with all members of the Politburo in front of an exhibition about the “century of humiliation” (Callahan, 2013). In its annunciation, the Dream is vague, but Xi spoke of it as targeting the “great
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (ibid.). The OBOR initiatives are widely considered a key part of realizing this dream (Rolland, 2015).
Thucydides Trap: Where a rising power causes fear in an established power that escalates towards war. The term was coined by US political scientist Graham Allison (born 1940), who developed the term from the account of the Peloponnesian War given by the Athenian historian Thucydides. Bloodshed has resulted in 12 out of 16 past cases where a rising power has confronted an established power (Allison, 2015).
Security dilemma: Occurs when what one country does defensively to improve its defensive capabilities, another country or countries perceive as offensive and
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threatening and respond by increasing its/their own military capabilities, often creating a reactive cycle of insecuritization and increased military buildup. The term was coined by German-American scholar John Herz (1908-2005).
Central Asia: The center of the Asian continent comprising the five post-Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and arguably parts of western China, Afghanistan, and parts of Iran and Pakistan. The region comprises the core of what influential British geostrategist Halford Mackinder (1861-1947) referred to as the Earth’s Heartland, control of which he considered to be the key to global domination.
Eurasia: The total combined landmass of the continents of Europe and Asia.
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6.2. Maps
Figure 1
Figure 2
The ancient Silk Routes
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