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中國的一帶一路戰略,要去哪裡 - 政大學術集成

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(1)國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程 International Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies College of Social Sciences National Chengchi University. 碩士論文 Master’s Thesis. 立. 政 治 大. ‧ 國. 學 ‧. 中國的一帶一路戰略,要去哪裡. y. sit. Nat. A Smooth Road Ahead?. n. al. er. io. China’s Eurasian pivot, its initiatives and what it hopes to gain. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Student: Jonathan Solan 江德生 Advisor: Dr. Chung-min Tsai 蔡中民. 中華民國 105 年 7 月. July 2016. 1.

(2) 中國的一帶一路戰略,要去哪裡 A Smooth Road Ahead? China’s Eurasian pivot, its initiatives and what it hopes to gain 研究生: 江德生 指導教授:. 蔡中民. Student: Jonathan Solan Advisor: Dr. Chung-min Tsai. 治. 立. 政 國立政治大學. 大. ‧ 國. 學. 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程. A Thesis. er. io. sit. Nat. y. ‧. 碩士論文. Submitted to International a Master’s Program in Asia-Pacific Studies. n. iv l C n h e n g cUniversity National Chengchi hi U. In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement For the Degree of Master in China Studies. 中華民國 105 年 7 月 July 2016. 2.

(3) Acknowledgements Foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my advisor Professor Chung-min Tsai for his support, patience, encouragement, direction and determination, which have been essential in the completion of my studies with IMAS.. Along with Professor Tsai, I would like to convey my great appreciation to Professor Nien-chung Chang Liao and Professor Wen-yang Chang for their insightful comments and their time and patience in agreeing to sit on my thesis committee.. My sincere thanks also go to my partner Madeline Mills for her unwavering support and also my precious new daughter Ada for keeping my spirits up when so much was to be done!. 立. 政 治 大. Finally, I would like to thank Taiwan for providing me with such extraordinary. ‧ 國. 學. opportunities and experiences during my time here. It has been amazing.. ‧. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 3.

(4) Abstract The One Belt, One Road (OBOR, 一帶一路, yidaiyilu) initiative announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 represents China’s most forthright articulation of its status as a world power yet. It is symbolically, and potentially in practice, the country’s most important foreign policy initiative of modern times. The intention of this thesis is to investigate why China is investing in the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB, 丝绸之路经济带, sichouzhilu jingjidai) portion of OBOR, explain what some of the likely geopolitical consequences will be and. 政 治 大. comment on how the existing international order should respond.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. I will explore why China is investing in the project and apply the theories of offensive realism and complex interdependence to analyze its. ‧. motivations. I will synthesize these realist and liberal perspectives and. y. Nat. conclude that although China does likely seek to use the SREB as part of. io. sit. attempts to significantly expand its power, which would probably lead to. a. er. conflict with the United States, domestic and international constraints. n. v l will prevent it from succeeding; at the same time, n i the stability-creating Ch. U. e nadvantages g c h i that are achievable through interlinkages and developmental the project are something that the international order can benefit from while supporting the legitimate national development strategies of China and avoiding the potential for conflict that would come from attempting to constrain China’s ambitions.. Keywords: One Belt, One Road; Silk Road Economic Belt; Eurasian pivot; Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; Silk Road Fund; Shanghai Cooperation Organization; offensive realism; complex interdependence; China Dream; Thucydides Trap; security dilemma; Central Asia; Eurasia. 4.

(5) Table of Contents Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 3 Abstract .................................................................................................................................. 4 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 7 1.1. Research Questions .......................................................................................................... 8 1.2. Need for Research ............................................................................................................. 8 1.3. Why the SREB? .................................................................................................................... 8 1.4. Literature Review.............................................................................................................. 8. 1.4.1. Realism ...................................................................................................... 9 1.4.2. Realism and China ................................................................................... 10. 政 治 大. 1.4.3. Liberalism ................................................................................................ 11. 立. 1.4.4. Liberalism and China ............................................................................... 12. ‧ 國. 學. 1.4.5. Offensive realism and the SREB ............................................................. 13 1.4.6. Complex interdependence and the SREB ................................................ 14. ‧. 1.5. Theoretical Perspective ...............................................................................................15. y. Nat. 2. A New China and a New Silk Road ......................................................................... 16. al. er. National Development ..................................................................................................22. io. 2.2. sit. 2.1. A “Peaceful Rise”? ...........................................................................................................18. v i n Ch Investment ........................................................................................................................ 26 engchi U Strategic Aspects .............................................................................................................28 n. 2.3. Import and Export Lines ..............................................................................................25 2.4. 2.5.. 2.5. Overseas Suspicion ........................................................................................................32. 3. Discussion ................................................................................................................... 36 4. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 43 4. Limitations and Future Directions for Research ........................................... 44 5. Appendix ...................................................................................................................... 45 5.1. Nominal Definitions........................................................................................................45 5.2. Maps .....................................................................................................................................49. 6.. References..................................................................................................................... 50. 5.

(6) 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 6.

(7) 1. Introduction China’s wealth and power are facts. What China does with its wealth and power and how the existing international order accommodates it, I would argue, are the most important geopolitical questions of the coming decades. China’s plans for the SREB confront a wide range of the country’s pressing and longterm concerns simultaneously. China makes up close to one-fifth of the world’s population, and the economic betterment of such a huge portion of humanity, many of who still live in real poverty, has to be a global priority. The SREB strategies also offer potentially huge benefits to regions and populations outside of the country that are much in need of development. Development of these regions, as well as of China,. 政 治 大 at a very difficult stage of economic transition and the new Silk Road developments 立. would offer benefits to the wider world and act as engines of global growth. China is offer important strategies for shoring up the world’s second-largest economy, in. ‧ 國. 學. which a crisis would trigger huge economic problems globally. However, that is not to say that the new Silk Road initiatives do not bring with them cause for caution.. ‧. y. Nat. China’s behavior in the South and East China Seas and in land border disputes, its. sit. resultant poor relationships with many of its neighbors, it resorting to nationalism as. al. er. io. an organizing principle with an apparent lack of awareness of the dangers of such a. n. v i n minority groups and certain C worrisome of its long-term ambitions give h e n gindicators i U h c cause for alarm. However, the best course of action for those international actors with strategy, the authoritarian nature of its governance, its marginalization of particular. concerns over China’s increased power is to accommodate, assist China in pursuing its legitimate national interests and, where necessary, balance as appropriate. China is big and it is powerful, however, concerns over its more bellicose and nationalistic overtures can be offset by a number of factors that are very likely to put substantial checks on any perceived tendencies towards aggressive expansionism. Internally, China is faced with seemingly insurmountable demographic and economic challenges that will limit its ability to grow into the superpower that has become so familiar in more hyperbolic assessments of its future potential. It is also in a very challenging area geographically, both in terms of the resources it has access to nationally and in. 7.

(8) terms of the strong neighbors that surround it, with whom China has excelled in quarreling.. 1.1. Research Questions This thesis explores why China plans to build the SREB, what some of the project’s likely consequences will be and how other international actors should respond. Is China motivated by a desire to increase its power and assist it in achieving regional hegemony (as stated by John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism), or is it a benevolent initiative intended to increase regional cooperation and development (as suggested by Keohane and Nye’s theory of complex interdependence)?. 1.2. Need for Research. 政 治 大 contemporary topic for study. One Belt, One Road has been called “the most 立 significant and far-reaching initiative that China has ever put forward,” (Wu, 2015); China’s new Silk Road initiatives provide an enormously exciting and important. ‧ 國. 學. however, the plan is still in its early stages and a relatively small amount of research has been carried out so far. It is a project with potentially massive consequences for. ‧. China, the 64 other countries along its routes and regional as well as global balances. y. Nat. of power. Through this thesis I hope to be able to provide some much-needed insight. n. al. er. io. 1.3. Why the SREB?. sit. into this enormously important topic.. Ch. i n U. v. The One Belt, One Road initiative comprises two main parts: the Silk Road Economic st. engchi. Belt and the 21 -Century Maritime Silk Road. This thesis will only consider the SREB, which provides more than enough content for the kind of analysis that can be carried out here. The inland route also seems more viable and the SREB is far and away the more developed of the two OBOR branches, having built on previous initiatives and already having substantial infrastructure in place and operational.. 1.4. Literature Review Offensive realism is a hugely influential theory put forward by US scholar John Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer posits that states vie for power in an anarchic system where there is no higher authority to exert control over them. According to this theory, great powers strive for ever-increasing power with the aims of becoming a regional hegemon and working to ensure that no other state can achieve a similar. 8.

(9) status. State decisions are based on the military capabilities of competitor states and the survival of the state is considered the primary aim. In offensive realist theory, China will use the SREB as part of its efforts to establish regional hegemony and to prevent other states from achieving the same.. Whereas offensive realism sees institutions and initiatives such as the SREB as tools states use to help them accumulate power, liberal perspectives such as complex interdependence theory consider them a part of efforts to foster mutual betterment. In this theory put forward by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, state decisions are influenced by a huge range of factors stemming from a wide array of transnational governmental and nongovernmental interlinkages and state priorities differ from time. 治 政 大 and nongovernmental be a tool for regional integration via an array of governmental 立 connections. Although military considerations remain a factor in complex. to time. According to complex interdependence theory, China intends for the SREB to. ‧ 國. 學. interdependence theory, their importance is downgraded.. ‧. Political realists trace their roots back to the writings of Thomas Hobbes, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thucydides and Sun Tzu, whereas classical liberals include John Locke,. y. Nat. sit. Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill. An essential difference between. al. er. io. the two traditions is that realists can be described as having a predominantly negative. n. view of humanity through a focus on power struggles, while liberals hold a more. Ch. i n U. v. positive view through a belief that cooperation and mutual betterment take precedence.. engchi. 1.4.1. Realism In his seminal work “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” (2001), John Mearsheimer lays out his neorealist theory of offensive realism. The theory states that great powers pursue continual power expansion with the final aims of achieving regional hegemony and preventing other states from achieving hegemony in their respective regions. Mearsheimer’s explanation for why great powers vie with each other for power and strive for hegemony is derived from five assumptions that he states, if taken together, give states reason to think and behave aggressively:. 9.

(10) 1 The international system is anarchic 2 Great powers possess offensive military capabilities 3 There is uncertainty over the intentions of other states 4 Survival is the primary aim of great powers 5 States are rational actors. For Mearsheimer, a state’s power is based on the size of its population and its wealth level, which are the primary building blocks of military capability. Great powers are founded on large populations and massive wealth that are transformed into military strength. This strength allows great powers to exert control over less powerful states. In the anarchic international system, states must rely on themselves for their survival and, Mearsheimer explains, the best way to be able to ensure survival is to be as powerful as possible.. 立. 政 治 大. Owing to the problematic logistics of power projection, offensive realism states that. ‧ 國. 學. global hegemony is a near impossibility for any state. The most that can be hoped for is that a state achieves hegemony in its own region, which then allows it freedom to. ‧. roam the world asserting power and interfering in competitors’ efforts to become more powerful. The United States is the only regional hegemon in the world today. In. y. Nat. sit. the past, France, Germany and Japan have all waged war in attempts to attain regional. n. al. er. io. hegemony, but Russia is the only other country to have achieved such a status.. Ch. i n U. v. For Mearsheimer, regardless of what states say their intentions are, the structural. engchi. forces at work lead to them acting in the ways predicted by the theory. He also makes the point that, even if it happened that a particular administration was sincere in asserting that particular development projects were benign in intention, the intentions of future leaderships can never be known, and they will almost certainly utilize such projects for power accumulation. 1.4.2. Realism and China Mearsheimer and numerous other scholars have applied realist theories to assess China’s increasing power over the last few decades. Mearsheimer, among others, sees the PRC as the No. 1 challenger to American power and the current unipolar system, and postulates on whether China’s ascendency could lead to the formation of a bipolar system as existed during the Cold War.. 10.

(11) Many realists see China’s combination of decades of stellar economic growth, huge population and vastly increased military spending as making it well placed to dislodge the US from its preeminent position in Asia.. Mearsheimer considers the multifarious interlinkages between China and the US as unlikely to prevent conflict between the two, as, according to his theory, politics and national security interests trump all else. According to offensive realism, China will do all it can to become a regional hegemon and ensure that competitor states are unable to challenge it.. 治 政 大 theory interprets it as a and mutual betterment for all involved, offensive realist 立 strategy that will be used to assist China in its efforts to become a regional hegemon.. While the SREB is held up by China as an initiative through which to promote peace. ‧ 國. 學. 1.4.3. Liberalism. Three broad forms of interconnectedness are touted in liberalism as leading states. ‧. away from conflict and into relationships of mutual betterment.. sit. y. Nat. Firstly, economic or commercial liberalism states that economic interdependence. io. al. er. makes conflict costly and so nations will seek out other ways to resolve their. n. v i n C h of reasons, suchUas ideological similarities. Thirdly, war with one another for a variety engchi differences. Secondly, democratic liberalism states that democracies will not go to. institutional or regulatory liberalism states that international institutions and systems of rules are able to resolve international tensions and prevent war.. The neoliberal theory of complex interdependence proposed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in their book “Power and Interdependence” (1977) sees nation states as interlinked and reliant upon each other in multifarious ways that promote peace and mutual betterment. The theory has three main characteristics: 1 State policy goals are not arranged in stable hierarchies (whereas state security is always paramount in realist theories). The lack of a stable hierarchy of policy goals means that, according to this theory, states are guided by a variety of considerations, such as economic betterment and environmental protection,. 11.

(12) rather than security concerns constantly dominating the agenda. State aims are complex and varied and change from time to time. 2 Multiple channels of contact exist among societies and this limits the ability of foreign offices to control foreign relations. A wide variety of both governmental and nongovernmental interlinkages exists that influences state actions and priorities. An array of institutions is seen as able to affect state behavior, rather than them being relegated to the position of relatively insignificant tools for increasing state power as is the case in realist theories. 3 Military force is mostly irrelevant. The military has a diminished position in complex interdependence and states are seen as utilizing other interlinkages to exert influence.. Keohane and Nye argue that this model is closer to the reality of interstate relations, as security matters are not always dominant and other factors exert huge influence. 1.4.4. Liberalism and China. 政 治 大 deepening enmeshment in international systems of trade, finance and institutions, and 立 outline how much the country has gained through its participation in the current. Liberal theorists such as John Ikenberry (2014) draw attention to China’s ever-. ‧ 國. 學. global order. Attention is also drawn to China’s own tentative steps to improve freedoms at home (through initiatives such as village-level elections), develop. ‧. multilateral institutions (the AIIB) and use such institutions to resolve tensions (as has. y. Nat. happened with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization). China today is hugely. sit. dependent on the rules-based, liberal internationalist order in terms of trade and in. al. er. io. maintaining access to an array of commodities from across the world for its industrial. v i n C hin international systems Asia. China is heavily invested e n g c h i U of cooperation and would n. and energy needs, and this is seen as contributing to the maintenance of peace in East. have more to lose than most were these systems to be disrupted. Rather than being incentivized to challenge the current order, China shares common interests with other trading nations in continuing to improve international bonds that are proving to be hugely beneficial in providing wealth accumulation and stability to itself and others.. In complex interdependence theory, the SREB is an initiative that improves integration and interdependence and that will serve to promote peace and win-win cooperation.. 12.

(13) 1.4.5. Offensive realism and the SREB Liberal theories of international relations make much of economic interconnectedness as making conflict so costly to nations that they will find other ways of resolving differences. Nations that are heavily enmeshed in international trade are strongly incentivized to avoid confrontation, as its benefits are insubstantial when compared to the advantages of participation in international systems of trade and investment. In his theory of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer responds to this argument with the examples of pre-WWI Germany and pre-WW2 Japan, which were well integrated into the international economies of their day but still engaged in aggression. Mearsheimer asserts that:. 政 治 大. A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony … because the best way for any state to maximize its prospects for survival is to be the hegemon in its region of the world (2001, p. 103).. 立. ‧ 國. 學. While liberals regard multilateral initiatives such as the SREB as positive measures to increase regional integration, from an offensive realist perspective, the SREB is a. ‧. mechanism intended to enable China to gain more power in the regions to its west and. y. Nat. south. According to Mearsheimer’s model, the SREB and its related institutions of the. io. sit. AIIB and SCO will have little impact on state decision making, but will be used as. al. er. tools for relative gains by allowing China to gradually increase its power in a. n. v i n C h allows political and Japan as examples of how China e n g c h i U concerns to interfere in. relatively nonthreatening way. Mearsheimer uses China’s relationships with Taiwan. relationships where there is a high level of economic interaction. Mearsheimer shows how trade between Germany and Britain and Germany and Russia continued even after conflict erupted in 1914, and says that China does not feel economic gains are significantly damaged by rising tensions between it and its neighbors and that any economic impact that may ensue will be worth it to a China seeking to become a regional hegemon. According to this model, China’s peripheral diplomacy is motivated by its desire for a stable environment in which to increase its power and security and allow it greater access to resources. That China is directing its efforts westward is seen as an effort to balance against the US presence and difficult neighborly relations to the east.. 13.

(14) A central theme of “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” is the assertion that the US does not tolerate peer competitors (states that threaten to become regional hegemons), and that throughout the twentieth century it consigned such contenders to the scrapbook of history. Mearsheimer outlines how this happened with Wilhelmine Germany, imperial Japan, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. China presents the SREB as an attempt to develop mutually beneficial infrastructure in a space that will not cause direct conflict with the US, and indeed may open up the potential for cooperation with the US in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East (Wang, 2014). However, Mearsheimer states that according to his theory, the best course of action for the United States is to use economic, diplomatic and military means to block. 治 政 大the SREB is only benign in Xi’s administration was sincere in its statements that 立 intention, it should still be assumed that future administrations would use the SREB. initiatives that may lead to increased Chinese power. According to this theory, even if. ‧ 國. 學. as a means through which to make advances toward regional hegemony. 1.4.6. Complex interdependence and the SREB. ‧. While realism sees security and power as the primary focus of states and this as. sit. y. Nat. leading to conflict, liberals such as Keohane and Nye highlight interlinkages that encourage cooperation and peace. From the perspective of complex interdependence,. io. al. n. cooperation.. er. the SREB is perceived as a path to preventing conflict and building win-win. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The primary characteristics of complex interdependence are 1) state policy goals are not arranged in stable hierarchies (whereas state security is always paramount in realist theories); 2) multiple channels of contact exist among societies and this limits the ability of foreign offices to control foreign relations; 3) military force is mostly irrelevant; and these characteristics can be observed in China’s approach to the SREB. The project is promoted as a means through which to achieve peaceful development, regional prosperity and national rejuvenation for China. And while the initiative is primarily promoted by government actors, it is also promoted by nongovernmental agencies and businesses. Economic benefits are held up by China as the main motivator of the project, and cultural exchanges are also touted.. 14.

(15) It certainly appears on the surface that China’s approach to the SREB contradicts the expectations of offensive realism. Although this peace-stressing, economically focused Chinese rhetoric is regarded with suspicion by many outside China, liberal theorists such as John Ikenberry see China as embracing the liberal internationalist order that has served it so well. Ikenberry sees China as having to engage more with multilateral institutions and initiatives in the model of liberal internationalism if it is to convince others that its rise truly is to be peaceful and concerned to create win-win benefits for all, and the SREB serves this purpose well.. 1.5. Theoretical Perspective From the perspective of offensive realism, the SREB is a strategy through which. 政 治 大. China intends to carve out a sphere of influence for itself as it strives to become a regional hegemon. From the perspective of complex interdependence, it is an. 立. initiative directed towards regional integration, stability and mutual economic. ‧ 國. 學. betterment.. The investigation into China’s SREB initiatives laid out in the later chapters leads me. ‧. to conclude that a better representation of the truth and a better prediction of the. sit. y. Nat. probable consequences of the SREB can be found through a synthesis of these two positions. Offensive realism places too much emphasis on power accumulation, while. io. al. n. prosperity.. er. complex interdependence places too much emphasis on peace creation and mutual. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. Despite China’s statements to the contrary, if the SREB were to be as comprehensive and successful as it hopes, it would create a significant sphere of influence for the country and this could well result in China becoming a peer competitor of the United States, which would likely result in security competition and the dangers of escalation that go with it. At the same time, the project can also create opportunities for regional integration, cooperation and growth that can benefit China, the countries along the SREB routes and the international order as a whole. The following chapters will discuss the likely real-world outcomes of the SREB and cut a path between the positions of offensive realism and complex interdependence theory.. 15.

(16) 2. A New China and a New Silk Road Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, slogans such as the “China Dream,” the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road” have risen to prominence in China. The China Dream encapsulates the idea of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and the Belt and Road initiatives form an integral part of the plan (Swaine, 2015). The OBOR proposals are intended to revive ancient routes of trade and cultural exchange that flourished west from China beginning in the Han Dynasty more than 2,000 years ago up until the 15th century (NDRC, 2015). Xi’s ambitious plan is to build networks of connectivity all the way to Europe, which China now considers part of its Greater Neighborhood Policy (Fallon, 2015).. 政 治 大 silk routes of the past when presenting the projects to both domestic and international 立 It is significant that China is linking its present day OBOR initiatives to the ancient. audiences. The ancient land routes stretched more than 11,000 kilometers linking. ‧ 國. 學. opposite ends of the Eurasian landmass, from Xi’an to Rome and beyond. They connected China to India, Persia, Arabia, Egypt and Europe. In the Chinese. ‧. imagination, the period signifies an era when China was powerful and glorious. At a. y. Nat. time when the Chinese leadership has invested a lot into rejuvenating the nation and. sit. returning China to its “rightful” position atop the global hierarchy, reviving the Silk. n. al. er. io. Road is about much more than opening up trade routes; it’s seen as a road to reclaimed national glory.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The terms “Silk Road” and “Silk Route” are of relatively recent origin, being coined by German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in the late 19th century to describe the historic network of trade routes within and across Asia to Europe (Bhoothalingam, 2016). The new SREB routes closely resemble the ancient routes (see Maps). They are planned to connect China, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Europe through trade and transportation, energy markets and expedited customs procedures. If built according to current proposals, the SREB is likely to hugely increase China’s influence along its routes. It will link the developed economies of Europe with the booming eastern Chinese regions. This will provide much-needed growth to China’s western regions and to the economically underdeveloped Central Asian states through which the routes expand.. 16.

(17) China’s rapid development following the opening of its economy in 1978 and its concurrent increasing influence in international politics have created worry as to what that rise could mean for the current international order (Ikenberry, 2014). Despite China’s efforts to highlight slogans such as the “China Dream,” “Peaceful Development,” “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” “Harmonious World” and “Mutual Development,” the country has not been successful in convincing many of its neighbors and the wider world of its benign intentions (Mearsheimer, 2012). So it has been thus far with the “One Belt, One Road” project. Much debate outside China sees the initiative as part of the country’s plans to become a regional and maritime hegemon, while China itself promotes it as part of a long-term plan for peaceful development.. 立. 政 治 大. The plans for the new Silk Road Economic Belt were announced by President Xi. ‧ 國. 學. Jinping during a speech titled “Promote People-to-People Friendship and Create a Better Future” at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan in September, 2013. ‧. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2013).. y. Nat. sit. The Chinese plan for a new Silk Road is noted by many as being inspired by, and a. al. er. io. response to, a similar yet much smaller project launched by the US in 2011 called the. n. New Silk Road Initiative (Kucera, 2011). The US plan aimed to integrate Afghanistan. Ch. i n U. v. into a north-south trading relationship running from India into Central Asia (ibid.).. engchi. Theresa Fallon of the European Institute for Asian Studies reports that Chinese officials were confounded by the US appropriation of a term so strongly linked to China, and quotes a Chinese diplomat as saying, “When [the] US initiated this, we were devastated. We had long, sleepless nights. And after two years, President Xi proposed [a] strategic vision of our new concept of [the] Silk Road,” (Fallon, 2015, p. 141). Xi’s vision was much bigger and more comprehensive.. In promoting the initiative, XI said:. 17.

(18) The 2,000-plus-year history of exchanges had proved that countries with differences in race, belief and cultural background can absolutely share peace and development as long as they persist in unity and mutual trust, equality and mutual benefit, mutual tolerance and learning from each other, as well as cooperation and win-win outcomes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2013).. Xi continued to say China hoped to: Unceasingly enhance mutual trust, to consolidate friendship, to strengthen cooperation, so as to push forward the common development and prosperity, and work for the happiness and well-being of the people in the regional countries.. Xi reiterated the proposal when attending the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan during the same trip (Nidhi, 2014).. 政 治 大 While China emphasizes harmonious relations, mutual benefits and shared 立 development along the SREB, many outside China are skeptical. They see the. ‧ 國. 學. country’s difficulties with Japan and the Philippines, and ambiguity over Chinese views of the US role in Asia as giving cause for concern (Mearsheimer, 2012). For. ‧. one of the first times, this famously inward-looking country is vulnerable to how it is seen abroad, and there it has a problem. As Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates. y. Nat. sit. Joshua Cooper Ramo has said, “China’s greatest strategic threat today is its national. al. er. io. image,” (Ramo, 2007, p. 12); the international community views China with great. n. suspicion, and this is something it is working hard to change.. 2.1. A “Peaceful Rise”?. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were originally conceived by India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and China’s first premier, Zhou Enlai, in 1954 (Panda, 2014). The Five Principles form a major part of Chinese foreign policy today and are the basis for the China-India relationship. They are: 1 Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty 2 Mutual non-aggression 3 Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs 4 Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit 5 Peaceful coexistence (ibid.). According to the foreign ministry of the PRC (2014), the Principles have become China’s basis for conducting international relations. The Principles are held up by. 18.

(19) China as its contribution to heterodox international relations and as a model for regional relations that differs from that of the US (Panda, 2014). The term “Peaceful Rise” was developed by Zheng Bijian, a former vice principle to the Central Party School (Volodzko, 2015); it was then taken up by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. It was used frequently as a counter to the “China threat theory,” which sees danger coming from China’s increasing power (Lucia, 2012). The term “Peaceful Development” came largely to replace “Peaceful Rise” in official PRC literature, as it was considered less threatening and more reflective of China’s status as a still-developing country (Deepak, 2012).. 治 政 大have abandoned revolutionary peaceful environment for national development, and 立 positions that characterized earlier periods in favor of a focus on economic China’s leaders of recent decades have been in agreement over the necessity of a. ‧ 國. 學. development through cooperation within the international system. However, China has also always made no secret of its desire to increase its standing and become a. ‧. great power (Xi, 2014). At Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits and elsewhere, China has made no secret of its opposition to US unipolarity and has. y. Nat. er. io. sit. repeatedly stated its desire to create a multipolar world (Allison, 2015). A 2011 white paper entitled “China’s Peaceful Development” lays out the country’s. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. official position in detail. In a section entitled “What China’s Peaceful Development. engchi. Means to the Rest of the World,” it states:. China's peaceful development has broken away from the traditional pattern where a rising power was bound to seek hegemony. In modern history, some rising powers established colonies, fought for spheres of influence, and conducted military expansion against other countries. This reached climax in the 20th century, when rivalry for hegemony and military confrontation plunged mankind into the abyss of two devastating world wars. With a keen appreciation of its historical and cultural tradition of several thousand years, the nature of economic globalization, changes in international relations and the international security landscape in the 21st century as well as the common interests and values of humanity, China has decided upon peaceful development and mutually beneficial cooperation as a fundamental way to realize its modernization, participate in international affairs and handle international relations. The experiences of the past several decades have proved that China is correct in embarking upon the path of peaceful development, and there is no reason. 19.

(20) whatsoever for China to deviate from this path (Information Office of the State Council, 2011).. The paper states that China is in a position to contribute to world peace on its road to increased prosperity and emphasizes the importance of China being open to the outside world and creating win-win developments with other countries that seek mutual betterment. It states that “the Chinese nation loves peace,” as it has suffered bitterly from war and poverty in recent history and recognizes that peace is necessary if prosperity is to be achieved.. 政 治 大 a means through which to manage competition by increasing the areas where 立 countries can work together; the paper states that, “China uses cooperation as a way. It devotes a section to what it calls “cooperative development,” which it describes as. ‧ 國. 學. to pursue peace, promote development and settle disputes.”. ‧. The paper also discusses “common development,” through which it emphasizes how. sit. y. Nat. increasingly interdependent countries are and states:. n. al. er. io. Only when common development of all countries is realized and more people share the fruit of development, can world peace and stability have a solid foundation and be effectively guaranteed. … Therefore, China unswervingly follows a strategy of opening-up and mutual benefit.. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. The paper asserts that on the road of peaceful development, China must implement the opening-up strategy of mutual benefit by making full use of the conditions of economic globalization and the potential for regional cooperation.. It goes on to state that China should create a peaceful international environment and favorable external conditions for development by promoting friendly relations with other countries according to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and planning for the long term.. With the China Dream and One Belt, One Road, Xi Jinping can be seen to have followed in the footsteps of his predecessors and introduced ideas that are in line with. 20.

(21) the positions of Peaceful Development. Chinese government literature on OBOR is heavy with the language of the policy. A 2015 white paper entitled “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” gives perhaps the most thorough outline of Beijing’s position on OBOR to date. It speaks of the “Silk Road Spirit,” which is defined as “peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit [and] a historic and cultural heritage shared by all countries around the world.” This bears more than a passing resemblance to Jiang Zemin’s “Shanghai Spirit,” which the former president defined as “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect to different civilizations and common. 政 治 大. prosperity,” and which is held up as the guiding ethos for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Zemin, 2001).. 立. ‧ 國. 學. The 2015 white paper speaks of the 21st century being an era of peace, development, cooperation and mutual benefit, when it is important to “carry on the Silk Road. ‧. Spirit.” It says that a way to promote the prosperity of countries along the OBOR route and “promote world peace and development” is to accelerate the building of the. y. Nat. sit. project. It speaks of consultation being important to ensure that the interests of all are. al. er. io. met and stresses the importance of integrating development strategies. It says the. n. project is an effort to find new models of international cooperation and governance. Ch. i n U. v. that will “inject new positive energy into world peace and development.”. engchi. The paper states that China is committed to taking on greater responsibilities now that it has increased capabilities and to “making greater contributions to the peace and development of mankind.” It outlines the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and how they provide the guiding ethos of the initiative, and explains that the “Belt and Road Initiative is a way for win-win cooperation that promotes common development and prosperity and a road towards peace and friendship.”. It is informative to compare the two white papers to see how the official line on OBOR fits the mold of China’s Peaceful Development policy. Indeed, the way OBOR is presented in government literature almost makes China sound entirely altruistic in the project. 21.

(22) When outlining the plan for the SREB at the SCO summit in Bishkek in 2013, XI presented a five-point proposal for jointly constructing the SREB and strengthening relations between China, Central Asia and Europe: 1 Strengthen policy communication, which may help “switch on a green light” for joint economic cooperation 2 Focus on road connections, with the idea to establish a great transport corridor from the Pacific to the Baltic Sea, and from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, then gradually build a network of transport connections between eastern, western and southern Asia 3 Improve trade facilitation, with a focus on eliminating trade barriers and taking steps to reduce trade and investment expenses 4 Intensify monetary cooperation, with special attention to currency settlements that could decrease transaction costs and lessen financial risk while increasing economic competitiveness 5 Strengthen people-to-people relations (Nidhi, 2014, p. 92). 立. 政 治 大. ‧ 國. 學. The project certainly appears to be designed with trade and economic objectives paramount, and the special leading group to oversee the implementation of OBOR was placed under the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s top. io. al. y. sit. National Development. er. Nat. 2.2. ‧. economic planner (Swaine, 2015).. China is currently the world’s second-largest economy in nominal terms behind the. n. v i n United States, and it has overtaken C h the US in termsUof GDP based on purchasing e g c h ithe US to become the largest trading power parity (IMF, 2016). It has alsonovertaken nation (The World Factbook, 2016). There is no doubt that China has made enormous advances. Between 1978 and 2014, it increased its per capita GDP almost 49-fold (World Economic Forum, 2016). However, China still lags far behind much of the world in GDP per capita terms, ranking 113th globally with US$14,100 compared to the US’ 19th position with US$55,800 (The World Factbook, 2016). It is the job of China’s leaders to be concerned about the prosperity of the Chinese population and recognize that it is necessary to look outward for increased sources of prosperity and security. With a population of over 1.3 billion people, almost 20 percent of the global total, but just 7.9 percent of the world’s farmland and severely limited energy and industrial resources (Information Office of the State Council, 2011), China is heavily. 22.

(23) dependent on the world outside its borders in order to sustain itself and if it is to have any hope of increasing its prosperity. This is especially the case as significantly lower growth rates are expected in the coming years. Since reform and opening, the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) legitimacy has rested on its ability to provide record-breaking economic growth. OBOR serves as a demonstration that the government is taking far-reaching action to ensure the continued rise of the nation.. Much of the debate outside China to do with the new Silk Road plan is heavy with suspicions as to China’s real intentions (see below). While there are very reasonable. 政 治 大. causes for concern associated with the project, it is important to remember that such a development strategy can also be seen less as a matter of choice and more one of. 立. necessity foisted on China by the stage of development at which it finds itself.. ‧ 國. 學. As China attempts to push through a process of switching its economy from export-. ‧. driven to domestic consumption-driven, government literature on OBOR makes no secret of the fact that the initiative is intended to create space and time for the. sit. y. Nat. transition to take place. China has tried to increase domestic consumption, but it is a process that takes time. Income levels and social safety networks first need to. io. n. al. er. improve. OBOR is a recognition that investment is the way to boost growth both. i n U. v. domestically and internationally. China is not well placed to sign typical growth-. Ch. engchi. promoting free trade agreements with its neighbors, as many are not at a high enough level of development. It needs to stimulate regional economies by constructing infrastructure that over time will provide opportunities for trade and further investment. Economic growth and interconnectedness along the new Silk Road could also help boost peace and stability.. China faces a huge crisis of overcapacity in steel production, iron, cement, aluminum, glass, coal, shipbuilding, solar panels and more, and Chinese analysts have held up OBOR as a significant solution to the problem. This is seen especially to be the case when combined with the country’s phenomenal capacity for providing infrastructure – an enormous industry that is operating at far below capacity as China has overproduced on so many of its own infrastructure needs (Dibb and Lee, 2014).. 23.

(24) There is a huge disparity of wealth in China, and income is strongly divided across geographical lines, with the central and western provinces fairing poorly compared to the richer regions of the east (Ferdinand, 2016). In 2013, per capita income in western areas such as Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang was just over a third of that in eastern areas such as Guangdong and Fujian, and only a quarter of that in Shanghai and Beijing (ibid.). The SREB is a huge part of China’s plans to reform and improve the economy of the inland areas. The central government has been somewhat successful in opening up China’s west through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but the pace of change has remained slow. The most westerly province, Xinjiang, was a major part of the ancient Silk Road. 政 治 大. and the central government intends to revive this status. The geography of the region, which is landlocked, mainly made up of desert and surrounded by mountains, has. 立. made it difficult to develop using methods that have been successful elsewhere in. ‧ 國. 學. China. However, Xinjiang certainly has a great deal of potential from the viewpoint of the central authorities. It marks the way to Central Asia as well as South Asia and the. ‧. Middle East via Pakistan. In the past, the region made enormous contributions to China through it being a conduit on the Silk Road, which brought so much in terms of. io. al. er. intend to make this the case again.. sit. y. Nat. ideas, technologies and trade to China. Through the SREB, the central authorities. v i n production capacity in recentCdecades. countryUhas had to source an increasing h e n The hi c g amount of what it needs from overseas, drastically increasing the country’s exposure n. China’s demand for energy and raw materials has far outstripped its domestic. to economic and political forces beyond its own control. This has made China increasingly vulnerable to international supply disruptions. Xinjiang contains and borders areas with enormous reserves of coal, natural gas and oil (Chang, 2014). However, Xinjiang poses concerns for the mandarins in Beijing as the region has a long history of discord between the indigenous Uyghur population and Han Chinese immigrants and China’s authorities that has intensified since 2008 (Clarke, 2015). According to internal government statistics, there were 248 instances of “violence and terror” in the province in 2013, with the majority of these cases pitting the nowminority Uyghurs against the ever-encroaching state (Leibold, 2014). The SREB program to build rail and road infrastructure to connect the region with China’s 24.

(25) dynamic eastern areas is part of an ongoing plan to tie the region more closely to the rest of the country. Beijing firmly believes that the political and ethnic tensions in Xinjiang can be lessened by economic development that can be brought through investment. Rolland (2015) argues that this strategy is also being applied to China’s close neighbors through the SREB in the belief that it will enhance political stability in those areas. Jiang Zemin decided in 1999 that Xinjiang needed to be more closely connected to the rest of the country (Clarke, 2015). China’s “Go West” strategy, launched shortly before the country’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, was set up to combat the issues in the western provinces, and has shown some successes: total GDP. 政 治 大. for the western regions reportedly grew from 1.66 trillion yuan in 2000, to 3.33 trillion in 2005 (Xinhua, 2006). However, many raise questions over who such. 立. investments really reward as there is seen to be little benefit for the indigenous. ‧ 國. 學. Uyghur population (Chang, 2014).. Investments are continuing apace in Xinjiang, with plans to spend 160 billion yuan on. ‧. infrastructure construction, 80 billion on industrial projects and 66.5 billion on social. y. Nat. causes in the province in 2016 alone (China Daily, 2016). A high-speed rail link was. n. al. Ch. er. io. (China International Travel Service, 2016).. sit. also recently opened between Urumqi in Xinjiang and Lanzhou in Gansu province. i n U. v. Given the amount of promotion that has gone into the new Silk Road initiative, how. engchi. omnipresent that promotion has been throughout China and that it is so very strongly associated with Xi Jinping personally, it is apparent that China is very confident in its ability to make it work, or else such a potential loss of face and public confidence would never be risked. However, a wide variety of very challenging obstacles lie in its path. From the tough terrain of mountainous Central Asia, to terrorism, to a lack of support for increasing China’s strength from numerous big players, a testing road certainly lies ahead.. 2.3. Import and Export Lines China has been working to diversify its energy supply routes for some time. In 2001 it led the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, through which it has. 25.

(26) secured numerous energy deals and built several pipelines through Siberia and Central Asia to secure its oil supply (Zhang, 2010). It has also built a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan, and Chinese companies have funded and constructed roads, bridges and tunnels across the region (Financial Times, 2016). Even prior to Xi’s announcement of the new Silk Road project, the China-Europe railway began operations between Henan province and Hamburg, Germany (Stratfor Part I, 2013). The route takes less than half the time of sea-routes, and although rail transportation costs around twice as much as by sea, high-tech companies and food manufacturers have considered the extra expense worthwhile (Financial Times, 2016). The volume of overland trade from China to Europe by train has increased 40-fold. 政 治 大 between 2013 and the end of the decade (Stratfor, Part 1, 2013). 立. since 2011 (ibid.), and the Chinese government predicted it would increase 3,000-fold. ‧ 國. 學. Such land routes offer China important security for the transportation of essential goods and resources if a crisis situation were to arise in which sea supply lanes were. ‧. blocked (Fallon, 2015). As well as the Russian and Central Asian supply lines, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor to which China has pledged US$46 billion. y. Nat. sit. includes railways, roads and pipelines, and provides China with close access to. er. al. n. (Shah, 2015).. io. Middle East ports without having to go via the Malacca Strait (see discussion below). Ch. engchi. i n U. v. China heavily promotes the idea of the peaceful regions it sees as being created by these economic interlinkages and increased prosperity.. 2.4. Investment China is sitting on the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, estimated to exceed US$3.3 trillion (World Bank, 2016), and the SREB provides it with the opportunity to do something with this incredible potential. China has strived to do more through the existing institutions of the World Bank (WB) and IMF, but progress has been held back and it has not been given the extra influence it deserves in these organizations as the world’s second-biggest economic power (Shafer, 2015). OBOR and its related initiatives allow China to make use of its accumulated reserves and amazing capacity for providing infrastructure, and can show the world that it has leadership abilities.. 26.

(27) There is no doubt that the regions OBOR is aiming at are in huge need of investment. An Asian Development Bank (ADB) study from 2010 stated that between 2010 and 2020 there would be demand in Asia for infrastructure investment worth US$8.3 trillion, or US$750 billion per year (Kawai, 2015). It is estimated that the WB currently provides US$13 billion, the ADB US$13 billion and other bilaterals around US$15 billion between them per year, so the need is huge (ibid.). China has said that it would have preferred to act through existing institutions, but when the opportunities were not forthcoming it was left with little choice but to create the AIIB (Dollar, 2015). However, that is not to say China was satisfied with the operating procedures of the pre-existing institutions. It has criticized the WB and ADB for being too slow. 治 政 大 (Shafer, 2015). The speed alleviation and not providing wealth-creating infrastructure 立 at which developing countries, many of which have quarrels with China, signed up to to make decisions, for being too risk averse and for focusing too much on poverty. ‧ 國. 學. the AIIB suggests they feel the same way. And the willingness of richer economies to sign up, including key US allies despite US objections, indicates that the wider world. ‧. is recognizing China’s status as a world power.. sit. y. Nat. The AIIB marks an initiative through which China is trying to build trust and reassure the international community that it intends for the SREB to be a joint project that is. io. n. al. er. open to all (Shafer, 2015). However, the vast majority of the funding it intends to. i n U. v. devote to the SREB will be directed through state-owned funds such as the Silk Road. Ch. engchi. Fund, which currently has capitalization of US$40 billion, and, especially, through the China Development Bank, one of China’s policy banks, which reportedly is set to devote US$890 billion to more than 900 projects in countries along OBOR’s routes (China Daily, 2015). The 2007-2008 global financial crisis made China realize that if it is over-reliant on US dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves, it can be hit very hard through no fault of its own (Overholt, 2015). The SREB marks a bold move by China to use its wealth more productively through the building of infrastructure. This will not only provide China with returns on its investments, but, as seen above, will increase the country’s regional and global influence. The SREB also offers China the opportunity. 27.

(28) to develop the use of the yuan in international markets, which can be seen as a step towards making it an international reserve currency (Ferdinand, 2016). China desires access to new markets and to improve access to existing ones, and this is something the SREB can provide. The country’s main export markets are currently the United States and Europe and have been for many years (IMF, 2016). However, after the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, consumers in these markets began to buy less and this pushed China into seeking new sources of revenue (Ferdinand, 2016).. 2.5. Strategic Aspects Despite the pacifistic, almost altruistic rhetoric of the Chinese government’s official. 政 治 大 geopolitical or geoeconomic theory” from the Chinese ambassador to the UK 立 (Swaine, 2015, p. 10), the fact is that the strategic and geopolitical advantages of the. publications, and statements such as “The Chinese mind is never programmed around. ‧ 國. 學. SREB are undeniable. As Michael D. Swaine of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace observes, “It would be naive to think that China’s leaders do not. ‧. contemplate such strategic issues in assessing the possible benefits and challenges of the One Belt, One Road concept, despite the general absence of such thinking in. y. Nat. er. io. sit. authoritative sources,” (2015, p. 15).. Numerous commentators argue that OBOR was in no small part a response to the. n. al. i n U. v. Obama administration’s 2011/2012 pivot to Asia and the resultant issues it caused. Ch. engchi. China on its eastern flank. Faced with what influential Chinese scholar Wang Jisi (王 缉思) called the threat of being dragged into a “zero-sum game” in East Asia, Wang argues that a “March West” was a “strategic necessity” for China that would increase the potential for US-China cooperation and create a situation in which “there will be almost no risk of military confrontation between the two,” (Wang, 2014). The strategy would also allow China to take advantage of the relative declining power of the US and Russia across its western border (Clarke, 2015).. A westward pivot also allows China to have greater presence in its restive, strategically important peripheral regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, and also Inner Mongolia (Rolland, 2015). Indigenous populations with cross-border cultural and 28.

(29) linguistic ties in these regions are relatively economically deprived and, especially in Xinjiang, have shown strong resistance to being part of the Chinese nation; China, however, has made it very clear that it intends to keep firm control over these regions and the new Silk Road strategies assist it in achieving this goal (Chang, 2014).. China of course is not only concerned about potential unrest in these peripheral zones. Social and political unrest has become much more prevalent right across the country in recent years, and in a country with such a huge population and where unrest has historically been so very destructive, stability is the No. 1 priority. The new OBOR plans potentially offer a stabilizing economic boost to the country overall, but the major focus is the inland provinces that have been at the back end of national development.. 立. 政 治 大. With security in mind, China has made moves to build stronger strategic relations. ‧ 國. 學. with its continental neighbors for decades, especially since the mid-1990s and the creation of the Shanghai Five. In 1996, with the intention of solving the centuries-old. ‧. border disputes between its members, China, along with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan initiated the Shanghai Five and signed the Shanghai. y. Nat. sit. Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area; this was. al. er. io. followed in 1997 by the Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the. n. Border Areas (Global Security, 2013). The China-led grouping evolved into the more. Ch. i n U. v. substantial Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001, which today has significant. engchi. implications for politics, trade, finance and energy resources in Central Asia and beyond, and through which members conduct joint military exercises (ibid.).. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has already secured multiple agreements and energy deals that alleviate considerable pressure on its western and northern edges. The planned SREB initiatives allow China to take advantage of, as well as deepen, these pre-existing agreements in a region with enormous potential and where China has demonstrated it desires greater influence. Areas to the west of China contain a substantial portion of the world’s energy reserves and, significantly, these reserves are accessible via land – something, it is argued, China desperately wishes to secure to allow it greater energy security in a world in which sea lanes are vulnerable to blockades by the US Navy (see below). 29.

(30) Zhang Yunling, a leading expert on China’s regional cooperation from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argues that:. Through proposing new ideas and suggestions, China has attempted to move regional orders toward the direction that favors itself. In recent years, China has used all imaginable occasions, which include economic, political, security, and cultural ones, to advance new ideas and proposals. In fact, China has not only proposed new ideas but also supplied finance to support them (Zhang, 2010, p. 49).. The strategic partnerships China has built through the SCO have deepened and broadened considerably, and India and Pakistan are expected to become full members of the SCO next year (Ibragimova, 2016). The SREB continues and extends much of. 政 治 大 be expected to operate to some degree in unison: PLA Major General Ji Mingkui has 立 the work that has been done through the SCO (Fallon, 2015), and indeed the two can. pointed out that the SREB has created new momentum for the development of the. ‧ 國. 學. SCO, and that the SCO’s 2014 heads of government summit “started the process of Silk Road Economic Belt security building,” (Fallon, 2015, p. 144).. ‧. Baohui Zhang of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University has stated. Nat. sit. y. that, “While China is seeking equality with the United States, it has also been more. er. io. active in using strategic alliances with other major powers to improve its position in the world,” and he cites China’s relationship with Russia as the best example (2010,. n. al. Ch. i n U. v. p. 45). Through the SCO and bilateral initiatives, the two countries have not only. engchi. settled border disputes and held regular military exercises, but have also signed huge energy deals and negotiated cooperation in Central Asia (Paton, 2014). From Central Asia to the South and East China Seas and beyond, China’s approach to foreign policy has moved up a gear since Xi Jinping came to power, and his new approach has been characterized as “nothing less than rewriting the current geopolitical landscape,” (Fallon, 2015, p. 140). Despite the position outlined in “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” and although Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated that OBOR is “not a tool of geopolitics” (Fallon, 2015, p. 142), it is unlikely that economic cooperation will not turn into political influence and. 30.

(31) strategic maneuvering, especially as “the People’s Liberation Army has become an active participant in China’s internal debate over [OBOR’s] future shape and implications,” (Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2015). Major General Ji Mingkui has written that the SREB provides China with significant leverage it can use to address security problems it has with its neighbors; and Colonel Bao Shixui has said that through the SREB, Beijing can offer economic opportunities in exchange for security cooperation (ibid.). In point of fact, there are clear signs that Chinese policymakers think in geopolitical terms. Foreign Minister Wang Yi himself spoke of the “rejuvenation of the Eurasian continent,” as mentioned above. China’s investments in Central Asia and beyond are expected to be effective in. 政 治 大. garnering support for the SREB. The US$46 billion deal with Pakistan is perhaps the best example to other countries of what they may be able to gain if they play their. 立. cards right. At a Beijing meeting in 2014, China signed agreements with Tajikistan,. ‧ 國. 學. guaranteeing Chinese credit for the construction of a railway connecting the north and south of the country as well as a new power plant and several agricultural projects. ‧. (Eurasianet, 2014). Deals like these are likely to whet the appetites of other countries potentially along the SREB route, all of which are in real need of infrastructural. sit. y. Nat. investment.. al. er. io. Several scholars point to China using what might be termed “investment diplomacy”. n. v i n C hwhen territorial disputes continental periphery at a time e n g c h i U have impacted the country’s as a means through which to boost relationships along its strategically important. relations with its neighbors to its east and south, and also the US. The US presence to China’s west is not nearly as strong as it is to the east, where Washington is pursuing a policy of “rebalancing.” Wang Jisi (2014) has argued that the potential opportunities for cooperation between China and the US in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran could also serve to relieve some of the tension between the two in the AsiaPacific. While many have expected that the SREB will create friction between China and Russia in Central Asia, an area Russia considers to be its own backyard, some are optimistic and see it as creating a sphere for increased cooperation between the two, especially at a time when relations between Russia and Europe and Russia and the US are strained and the country is seeking opportunities elsewhere. Prior to a 2014 31.

(32) meeting in Sochi at the Winter Olympics, Russia had been wary of the SREB initiative (Tiezzi, 2014). China Central Television (CCTV) reported that at the meeting: Putin pledged to support China’s proposal of ‘One Belt and One Road,’ and expressed his willingness to link the section of Eurasian Rail inside Russia with the initiatives to create greater benefits. Russia’s attitude toward ‘One Belt and One Road’ has changed dramatically (CCTV, 2014).. Whereas the SREB routes had gone around Russian territory prior to the meeting, after February 2014, a rail corridor from Beijing to Moscow was included (Fallon, 2015). How the SREB will affect the division of labor between China and Russia in Central Asia remains open to question, with some suggesting that Russia will perform. 政 治 大. a security role around China’s economic leadership (ECFR, 2016). It remains to be seen how relations between the two powers will play out as the SREB progresses.. 立. ‧ 國. 學. What is often termed China’s “Malacca dilemma” is also said to be a critical strategic motivation for China wanting to improve transportation infrastructure overland to its west. The country is presently hugely dependent on sea routes for its energy needs,. ‧. and 80 percent of its energy supplies from the Middle East and Africa currently pass. y. Nat. through the Malacca Strait (Kelanic, 2013). By building pipelines, roadways and. io. sit. railways into Central Asia, the Middle East and Russia, China will be able to maintain. al. n. crisis (ibid.).. er. access to precious resources in the event of a maritime blockade by the US or other. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. China has historically been a land-based power rather than a maritime power and the SREB can be seen to as a reaffirmation of that fact.. 2.6. Overseas Suspicion In spite of China’s push to highlight the benefits of its increasingly multilateral approach through initiatives such as the SREB, many observers see underlying aspects to the project that give cause for suspicion. Christina Lin of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues that, “Conceptually, China’s New Silk Road is based on China’s resurging imperial role in the world,” (Anstee, 2013). Others argue that China’s sponsorship of railways and heavy investment could be seen as part of a. 32.

(33) defense strategy and power projection that protects supply lines and enables potential militarization (ibid.). The Financial Times has called OBOR, “the largest program of economic diplomacy since the US-led Marshall Plan for post-war reconstruction in Europe” (FT, 2015), and US scholar William Overholt (2015) sees OBOR as closely resembling the Marshall Plan in terms of its foreign policy and security aspects, as it contains not only huge geographic scope but also integrates economic, political and national security considerations. Chinese multilateralism in Central Asia has been criticized as an attempt to create a “club” of authoritarian regimes hoping to create legitimacy for their particular forms of governance and stand against the spread of liberal democracy (Carnegie Europe, 2011).. 立. 政 治 大. Semi-authoritative Chinese sources have done much to increase distrust as to China’s. ‧ 國. 學. true intentions and the potential of OBOR projects. Wang Yiwei, a professor at Renmin University, has used the words of the father of modern geopolitics and. ‧. geostrategy, Halford Mackinder, and called for a revival of Eurasia as a “world island” through OBOR, which would diminish the power of the United States. sit. y. Nat. (Fallon, 2015, p. 142). Mackinder’s most famous quote is, “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; who. io. n. al. er. rules the World Island commands the World.” Ruan Zongze, a prominent China. i n U. v. commentator and executive vice president of the China Institute of International. Ch. engchi. Studies in August 2013 said, “No one in the world will try to contain China, and no one in this world is capable of containing China,” (Callahan, 2013); which begs the question, what might China like to do that others might wish to contain? Numerous Western scholars express concerns that China might use the SREB to create unwelcome spheres of influence, dominate its neighbors and upset the apple cart of the current international order. Nadege Rolland of the US’ National Bureau of Asian Research argues that the SREB is much more than just an infrastructural network; she sees it as something that opens profoundly transformative strategic opportunities for China: Chinese authorities hope that it will lead eventually to a situation in which Europe becomes a mere peninsula at the end of the Asian continent,. 33.

(34) economically integrated with and dependent on the Chinese locomotive, while the United States is relegated to the position of a distant island, floating between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The birth of a transcontinental economic corridor, as envisioned by the Chinese authorities, could change the global landscape, shifting the focus of strategy and commerce to the Eurasian landmass from the waters surrounding it and reducing the significance of U.S. naval supremacy. This corridor could further intensify intra-European divergences over Asia policy, cause deep differences between the United States and its European allies, and sharpen commercial rivalries (Rolland, 2015).. Tansen Sen, of Baruch College in New York, has written that China’s recent attempts to portray Chinese activity on the ancient Silk Road and Maritime Silk Route as peaceful endeavors in a utopian epoch are misrepresentations (2014). He states that Chinese activity on both the ancient Silk Road and Maritime Silk Route was warlike in intention and activity and part of an attempt to push a Sinocentric world order. Sen. 政 治 大 in China’s image, with major geopolitical implications. 立. sees the current initiatives as a major step in China’s drive to recreate the world order. ‧ 國. 學. Others are not quite so foreboding in their predictions, but still see China as developing alternatives that could come to challenge the US-led current global order.. ‧. UCLA scholar Randall Peerenboom argues that China’s now long-term achievements. y. Nat. in modernization could lead to the establishment of alternative models of. io. sit. development for other countries with similar political and socioeconomic. al. er. arrangements (Zhang, 2010). And Joseph Nye has stated that:. n. v i n In parts of Africa, Asia C and Latin America, the so-called ‘Beijing consensus’ on i Upopular than the previously e nbecome authoritarian government hhas g c hmore dominant ‘Washington consensus’ of market economics with democratic government (Zhang, 2010, p. 59).. In his book “When China Rules the World” (2009), Martin Jacques argues that rising powers transform the structure and interrelationships of international institutions of global governance, and that China will do the same as ascendant powers that have come before it. He forecasts that China will become the dominant world power and states that “the power of each new hegemonic nation or continent is invariably expressed in novel ways,” (Jacques, 2009, p. 270). He states that for Europe, maritime expansion was the key to power and that the United States relied on airborne supremacy and global economic hegemony. He continues that the Chinese tradition is very different from that of the West, and that its power will take innovative forms. In. 34.

(35) the past, he states, China has relied on land-based expansion to build its power. The SREB can, in this understanding, be interpreted as an innovative move on China’s path to becoming a hegemonic power.. 立. 政 治 大. ‧. ‧ 國. 學. n. er. io. sit. y. Nat. al. Ch. engchi. i n U. v. 35.

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