Personal-vote or Party-vote Orientation across Different Electoral Systems

Legislators, as single-minded reelection seekers, would behave in the ways centering on electoral connection and maximizing the probabilities to be reelected (Mayhew, 1974). Legislators concerning reelection, as the consequence of rational choice, behave in some ways toward electoral calculations and attempt to enhance their personal and party reputation (Mayhew, 1974; Carey & Shugart, 1995). Personal

Determinants for Reelection ─ A Comparative Study between Taiwanese Old and New Electoral Systems

5

vote, by definition, is the vote obtained based on candidates’ personal attributes, qualification, activities and connections to constituencies. Party vote, by definition, is the vote counted on party affiliation, party-ideology labels and party reputation (Cain, et. al., 1984; 1987; Sheng, 2006). On one hand, if legislators have to rely on personal vote to obtain a renew term, they have strong incentives to promote their personal reputation and construct dense personal connections with the constituencies. On the other hand, if legislators attract electoral support based on party support, they have strong incentives to promote their party interests and party reputation, and

demonstrate their strong connections to party decision-making structures.

An ―efficient secret‖ model (Cox, 1987) describes a party-centric representative style in Britain’s legislature. Because of the party-oriented interaction between party and members of parliament, Britain’ parliament elections became party-centered instead of candidate-centered. Britain has single-member-district (SMD) plurality system with party endorsement. Their party leaders present a fixed ballot, their voters cast a single vote for one party, and the votes pool across whole party. Legislators rely largely on their party support to obtain a renew term, and, consequently, act

collectively to promote their party reputation. The representative styles became more partisan, party-oriented and policy-oriented (Shugart & Carey, 1992: 168-169; Carey

& Shugart, 1995). In order to secure reelection, British members of parliament demonstrate their party loyalty and behave in the ways to increase their party votes.

On the contrary to the British style, legislators in the United States rely more on personal vote rather than party vote to win the reelections. American congressional election adopts primary systems. Their party leaders do not control access to ballots or rank (Carey & Shugart, 1995). As the results, the representative style is more

constituency-oriented because they should rely on personal vote to compete with other candidates in the primary elections (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1984; Carey &

Shugart, 1995). Personal resource and individual support from constituencies are determinants for the reelection results. Providing casework services, promoting pork barrel projects to the constituencies, introducing particularistic and localized bills became popular strategies to please district constituencies and specific interest groups (Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1980; 1989; Jacobson, 1992).

Legislators’ personal-vote or party-vote seeking behavior may emerge because of the consequence of electoral designs. Carey and Shugart (1995) indicate that

Determinants for Reelection ─ A Comparative Study between Taiwanese Old and New Electoral Systems

6

candidates in congressional elections under multi-member district single

non-transferable vote (SNTV) system, open-list proportional representation (PR) system, and single-member-district system with open-endorsement designs (i.e.

primary system) would be more likely to rely on personal vote to win the elections.

On the contrary, candidates under single-member-district (SMD) plurality system with a party leader endorsement and closed-list PR system would be more likely to count on party vote to achieve electoral success (Carey & Shugart, 1995:425).

Electoral-system designs matter the determinants for congressional elections.

Brazil has an open-list PR system in the congressional elections. Their legislators face fierce intra-party competition, thus have strong incentives to promote personal vote built upon individual behavior, personal qualities and connections to constituencies.

Bringing ―pork‖ to the constituencies—such as specific grants, infrastructure projects and subsides, would provide special favor to the constituencies, strengthen legislators’

personal vote bases, and build positive relationships with voters. Particularistic bills to further parochial benefits would be helpful toward reelection (Ames, 1995; 2002).

Personal performance becomes determinant and drive vote-obtained motivation and legislators’ representative styles.

Before 1994 Japan had a SNTV electoral system with a parliamentary cabinet government structure. Although the parliamentary structure inherently favors the determination of party vote (i.e. Britain), the effects from SNTV electoral system provide strong incentives to promote parochial benefits. The dominance of personal vote could be reflected by the uneven and financially inefficient allocation of public funding due to the campaign promises of candidates. In fact, around 30 percent of the budget is allocated particularly and parochially (Shugart and Carey, 1992: 169).

Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993: 16-37) indicate that party leaders in Japan even help assign legislators to particular committees so they could promote the pork and claim credits easily. It is party decision that fosters legislators’ personal-vote-seeking effort and encourages the promotion of parochial and localized interests.

The importance of electoral system regarding determinants for reelection has been discussed extensively; Carey & Shugart (1995:426) argue that the

Germany-style mixed electoral system (with a closed-list formula and votes pooling across whole party) has the smallest increase in personal-vote values. The electoral designs imply higher importance of party vote rather than personal vote. However,

Determinants for Reelection ─ A Comparative Study between Taiwanese Old and New Electoral Systems

7

according to Lancaster & Patterson’s (1990) and Stratmann & Baur’s (2002) observations, Germany’s plurality-SMD legislators provide relatively stronger incentives to promote the pork if compared to the PR legislators.

A further discussion of determinants for reelection under the SMD system is needed. Since Taiwan has experienced the electoral reform from SNTV system to SMD system in the district representative elections, a comparative study of

determinants for reelection under the old and new systems would be meaningful. It provides an unusual opportunity of natural experiment which may promote our understandings about the change or continuity of legislators’ electoral calculations across electoral systems.