Forallthat,thisisnottooveremphasizethefar-reachingbio-powerand
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puttheconcomitantthanato-powerintheshade.Afterall,themarksthatthe powerofdeathleavesontheislandareindelibleandthehavocMoreaucreates can’tpossibly escapeournotice.IfPrendick’s“about-face”speaksvolumes about his tacit appreciation of Moreau’s biopolitical project, then his concomitantapprehensionaboutthecrueltyisallthemoresymptomaticofthe unseverableumbilicalcordthatlashestogetherthepoweroflifeandpower overlife.Prendick’sabout-turnonthevivisectionissue,inshort,pointstothe originarydissymmetryofbio-power.Constitutivelycutacrossbythanato-power, bio-powerisnotonlythewellspringfundingMoreau’s“humanizingprocess,” butalsotheseedbedforalltheinflictionsimposedonlife.Asaninstanceof the dramatic reversal in his stance, Prendick’s “about-face” comes to synchronize these two conflictualmomentsofbio-powerand disclose the oppositefrontsofitsJanusfaceatthesametime.
HencetheWells’insightintothedynamicofbio-power,whichvirtually coincideswithFoucault’sblindnessasitwere.Thedualityofbio-poweris centralto Prendick’s“about-face,”buttoaconsiderableextentrelegated to marginalityinFoucaultgenealogicaldescriptionofbio-power.AsFoucaultis nevertiredofaverring,thetechnologiesofbio-powerisinthemaingearedto bringacapablebodyintoexistence:
Already in the controlauthoritiesthatappeared from the nineteenth centuryonward,thebodyacquiredacompletelydifferentsignification;
itwasnolongersomethingtobetorturedbutsomethingtobemolded, reformed,corrected,something thatmustacquire aptitudes,receive a certain numberofqualities,become qualified asa body capable of working.(Foucault2000:82)
Foucault’sgenealogicaldescription ofthe biopoliticalproduction ofthe
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humanbodybearsastrikingresemblancetoMoreau’s“humanizingprocess.” Moreau’santhropo-geneticlaboratoryisabiopoliticalapparatusparexcellence, inasmuch asthereconstructive surgery performed therein isalso aimed to
“mold”animalsinto“moreintelligent”species:“Alltheweek,nightandday,I mouldedhim.Withhim itwaschieflythebrainthatneededmoulding;much hadtobeadded,muchchanged”(Moreau,76).Nevertheless,asissuggestedin Prendick’s“about-face,”somethingmoreisinvolvedinMoreau’s“humanizing process”apartfrom thebiopoliticaloptimizationoflife.Foucault’sdescription ofbiopoliticalmoldingistooschematicandone-sidedtoshedsufficientlight onthesubtlerelationshipbetweenbio-powerandthanato-power.
With regard to this problem,Aristotle’s discussion of the Athenian democracy comesasa usefulcomplementto Foucault’ssomewhatlimited horizon.Thecoincidenceoftheontologicalandthepoliticalisnotsomucha noveltypeculiartothebiopoliticalepoch,asitisthefoundationalproblem the answerstowhich,asitwere,determinethevicissitudesoftheWesternpolitics. Tothatextent,AristotleisthefounderoftheWesternpoliticssotospeak.Of particular concern to him is a politico-ontological question which the biopoliticalregimehasneverceasedtoaddressandoccupiestheforefrontof Moreau’s experimental physiology－i.e. the question concerning how to transform andupgradealifeimmersingitselfinthesatisfactionofbasicneeds (zoē)intoagoodlifewhichismoreworthyofliving(bios).Comparedwith Foucault’spartialperspective,thecomprehensivenessofAristotle’sdiscussion deservesfurtherscrutiny.
InThePolitics,Aristotletracesaquasi-evolutionarytrajectoryfrom bare life(zoē)toagood,politicallyqualifiedform oflife(bios),inordertobetter explain themaking ofman asthepoliticalanimaland ofastateasthe aggregation ofgood lives:“When severalvillagesare united in a single completecommunity,largeenoughtobenearlyorquiteself-sufficing,thestate
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comesintoexistence,originatinginthebareneedsoflife,andcontinuingin existenceforthesakeofagoodlife”(1252b,27-30).Thelineofdemarcation Aristotledrawsbetweenzoē andbiosissofineandwafer-thinthatwecan hardlyascertainwhethertheirrelationshipisdiscontinuousornot.Ontheone hand,he differentiatesbetween “bareneedsoflife” and “a good life” to establishthesuperiorityofbios,whichemerges,toputitsimply,asaresultof thesubtractionofzoē.Ontheotherhand,zoē servesasafertilegroundforthe germinationofbios,whichmeansthecultivationof“agoodlife”entailsa processofaddition,ofsupplementingzoē withsomethingmore,ratherthan subtracting.
Thereareno otherphilosopherswho aremorecapableofappreciating Aristotle’sambivalencemorethanGiorgioAgamben.Inhisunderstanding,the transformationofzoē intobiosisneithersimplyamatterofsubtraction,of sheddingtheundesirableburdenofzoē,normerelyamatterofaddition,of enhancingzoē byinvestingitwithextraqualities.Involvedinthemakingof politicalqualifiedlife,todojusticetoAristotle,isaprocessof“aninclusive exclusion,”ofaninclusion“bymeansofanexclusion”(1998:7).Tounpack Agamben’sdenseargument,wemay rephraseitin thisway:man can be includedinthepolisandtakeonbiosonlyonconditionthatheiscutin himselftoexcludezoē from nowhereelsethanfrom himself.Theoriginary exclusionisthecuttingofbiositself,insofaraszoē,asAristotlestates,isthere insideeverybiosandhencepoliticized,orasAgambenargues,insofarasthere isalwaysalreadyan“implication”ofzoē inbios(1998:7).Asthemainsite ofpoliticalinterventionofbio-power,zoē isalwaysalreadypoliticizedfrom theoutsetandcomestoemergeasbios.Topresentitselfasbios,however,zoē hastobeexcludedfrom biosquapoliticizedzoē,ortosaytheotherway round,from politicizedzoē quabios;hencetheself-mutilationofbiosina mannerofspeaking.From Aristotleonward tilltoday’sbiopoliticalregime,
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Westernpoliticshasnevergroundedthemakingofbiossimplyoninvesting barelifewith awidearray ofcivilrights(addition).Norisitastandard practicetoexpelzoē from bios(subtraction).Asever,theconstitutionofbios instead getsunderwayataninterstitialmomentwhentheupwardtracesof additionanddownwardtrajectoryofsubtractionenterintoindistinction.Atthe coreofWesternpoliticsisastrikingparadoxthatthepolitically“goodlife”is constitutedbyanoriginaryself-cutting,aradicalexclusionofzoē from the alwaysalreadypoliticizedzoē quabios.Evenmoreparadoxicalisthefactthat thebringingintoexistenceofthepoliticallyqualified lifecoincidesexactly with theproduction ofuncannyremainders,orexplicitly stated,ofthezoē which persistently remains after itis banished from the always already politicized zoē quabios.Hencetheimportanceofthequestion asto why
“Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneouslyaninclusion)ofbarelife”(Agamben1998:7).
Giventheoriginarycut,wemayunderstandwhybio-powerisintertwined with thanato-powerab initio.Ifbio-powerisexercised mainly to produce qualifiedform oflife,toincludeandtransform barelifeinto“agoodlife,” then,asAgambenclearlystated,itisproducedandincludedbyexclusionof thealwaysalreadypoliticizedzoē quabios.Suchistherepeatedpracticeof bio-powerthattheoperationof“inclusiveexclusion,”asitturnsout,makesfor theintertwiningofbio-powerwiththanato-power.A blindspotpertainingto Foucault’sgenealogicaldescriptionofbio-powerusuallyliesinitspartialgrasp ofthisoperation.Focusingsolelyontheprocessofaddition,Foucaultislike alwaystoo engrossed in describing how bio-powerinveststhe body with desirablequalitiesand“molds”itintoshapeasproperanddocileasintended.
Judith Butler has suspected Foucault is inordinately alert to the
“materialization”ofthebody,tooinquisitiveaboutthebiopolitical“principleof intelligibility”whichservestogovernthewholeprocessofmaterializationand
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makethebodyintelligible.SuchistheweaknessoftheFoucault’sgenealogical description.Hisdescription,Butlercontends,almostpaysnoattentiontothe
“dematerialized,” thus unintelligible matter which atonce undergirds the symbolicinscriptionofbio-poweronthebody,and“hastobeexcluded”from theprocessofbody’smaterialization (33-35,emphasisoriginal).Along the similarlineofAgamben,Butlerurgesforwardthesimultaneousinterplayof additionandsubtractioninvolvedintheprocessofmaterializationofthebody.
Moreimportantly,sheneverceasestoremindusofthepersistencepresenceof the“dematerialized”matter,ofanuncannysubstancewhich,astheleftoversof materialization, is testimony to the biopolitical operation of “inclusive exclusion.”
Itisnotoffthemark to underlinethebiopoliticalimportofButler’s
“dematerialized” matter, for this biopolitically unintelligible substance is ontologicallyverysimilartotheuncannyzoē whichisproducedinthemidst ofitsbeingexpelledfrom thealwaysalready zoē quabios.IfinWestern politicstheproductionof“goodlife”comestopresentitselfasaprocessof
“inclusive exclusion,” then itremainsto be scrutinized whatwillbe the morphology ofitsend product−i.e.the zoē which isexcluded and thus dematerialized.
Agamben haspressed into hisservice the Christian idea ofnudity to illustratethisfuzzyandwell-nighungraspablezoē.Agambenisstruckbythe complexity ofthisidea when he findsthatin Christianity nudity isnot conceivedofasanatural,materialstatewearebornwithin,butratherasa dematerializedcorporealitywhichisatoncepresupposedandcreatedbysin.It iscommonplacetosayAdam andEvefeelashamedoftheirnudityaftertheir immaculatenakedbodiesaretaintedbysin.Presupposedinsuchanopinionis the assumption thatthere are two naked bodies in Christianity−i.e.the paradisiacal body that Adam and Eve were born with, and then the
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post-lapsarian body thatmakes the firsthumans feelashamed.However, AgambensuspectsthatinChristianitythereisnosuchthingasparadisiacal nudityintherigoroussenseoftheword.Theso-calledparadisiacalbodyisnot nakedatallprimarilybecausethebodiesofthefirstcoupleareclothedwith graceabinitio.Nuditycannotcomeintoviewandbecomeastigma,untilthe paradisiacalbodyisundressedbecauseofsin(Agamben2011:55-60).Then, wecomeupagainstastandardCatch-22situation.Ifsincreatesnudityby undressingtheparadisiacalbody,theremustbepresupposedabodywhichis nakedthroughandthough,sinfulinitself,andonwhichGodputshisgracein ordertocoverupitsshamefulmonstrosity.Hereatimeloopisverymuchin evidence:theshamefulnudity,thenudityparexcellence,istheproductof denudationandapresuppositionatthesametime.Itisatonceaposteriorithe creation ofsin,and a prioriapresupposition,withoutwhich notonly the vestmentofdivinegraceisunnecessary,butthefirstcouplewillhavenothing tobeashamedofwhentheyareundressed.Hencenudityasapresupposed
“event”:
...nudityisnotactuallyastatebutratheranevent.Inasmuchasit istheobscurepresuppositionoftheadditionofapieceofclothingor thesuddenresultofitsremoval—anunexpectedgiftoranunexpected loss—nuditybelongstotimeandhistory,nottobeingandform.We can therefore only experience nudity asa denudation and a baring, neverasaform andastablepossession.Atanyrate,itisdifficultto graspandimpossibletoholdonto.(Agamben2011:65)
IfwereadAgamben’sdiscussionhereintohisinterpretationofAristotle, firstwewillfindaclearparallelbetweentheparadisiacalbodyandthealways alreadypoliticizedzoē.Justasthepre-lapsarianbodyisalwaysalreadyvested withGod’sgrace,sothezoē isrightfrom thebeginningimplicatedinbio,
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alwaysalreadypoliticizedbybio-powerandinvestedwithallthe“qualities” requisite fora qualified life.The worker’s docile body which has been effectively“molded,reformed,corrected”isparadisiacalinthissense.
Nonetheless,thisisnotthecreationstoryinitsentirety－beitthecreation ofhumanbodyingeneral,ortheworker’sbodyinparticular.Togoonestep further,wefindtheparallelbetweentheparadisiacalbodyandthelaborer’s body not only illustrates the always-already-politicized zoē, but also deconstructsthecreationmythofChristianity.Itsuggeststotheeffectthatthe immaculatebodyofthefirstcoupleisfarfrom primordial,inasmuchasitis artificially enhanced and prosthetically empowered. The creation myth reconstructedbyAgambenvergesontravestywhenhegoesfurthertostate thattheprimordial(or“presupposed”inhiswording)nakedbodyisactually created,orexposed,by “denudation and baring.” The creation,thussaid, amountstoacounter-productiveproduction,aproductionquadestruction.The primordialnakedbody,asAgambenargues,“comesbacktolightwheneverthe caesuraofsinonceagaindividesnatureandgrace,nudityandclothing”(2011:
64).Creationisnothingmorethanstrippingbareandcutting.Itdividesthe always-already-politicizedzoē quabios,inordertoexcludezoē from theentity inwhichzoē andbiosisasmutuallyindifferentas“natureandgrace,nudity andclothing”intheparadisiacalbody.
Moreworthyofnoteatthispointistheresultofcreationquacutting.
Whatiscreatedbymeansofcutting?Whatdoesremainsafterthe“caesuraof sin”andwhatisthemorphologyofthisremainder?Thedividinginquestion hasnothingtodowiththebreakingupofatwinintotwo.Itisanunlikely scenariothatthecuttingcouldreadilybreakdowntheworker’sbodyintozoē andbios.Norisitlikelytodividetheparadisiacalbodyinhalfandreturn
“natureand grace” to theirown originalplaces.Ifzoē isalwaysalready politicized,andtheparadisiacalbodyisalwaysalreadyvestedwithgracein
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thesamevein,theredoesnotexistothermodalitiesofzoē.Whatremainsafter thedividingofzoē quabiosandthedenudationoftheparadisiacalbody,in otherwords,can’tpossiblybezoē ornatureassuch,thatis,thenakedzoēor barenaturepriortotheinvestmentofGod’sgrace.Iftheprimordialzoēor naturedoesexist,itis,asAgambenavers,nothingbutapresupposition.In reality,theprimordialnakedbodydoesnotexistbeforetheparadisiacalbody isundressed,butisinsteadcreatedby“thecaesuraofsin”afterdenudation.Or tospeakmoreprecisely,theprimordialnudityisonlyapresuppositionafter thefact(ofundressing).Itstepsintotheview ofthefirsthumansalwaystoo lateandtooearly−itcomeslaterthanitselfasapresupposition,andearlier thanitselfasan“event.”Agambenisrighttoapointinstatingthat“nudity
thesamevein,theredoesnotexistothermodalitiesofzoē.Whatremainsafter thedividingofzoē quabiosandthedenudationoftheparadisiacalbody,in otherwords,can’tpossiblybezoē ornatureassuch,thatis,thenakedzoēor barenaturepriortotheinvestmentofGod’sgrace.Iftheprimordialzoēor naturedoesexist,itis,asAgambenavers,nothingbutapresupposition.In reality,theprimordialnakedbodydoesnotexistbeforetheparadisiacalbody isundressed,butisinsteadcreatedby“thecaesuraofsin”afterdenudation.Or tospeakmoreprecisely,theprimordialnudityisonlyapresuppositionafter thefact(ofundressing).Itstepsintotheview ofthefirsthumansalwaystoo lateandtooearly−itcomeslaterthanitselfasapresupposition,andearlier thanitselfasan“event.”Agambenisrighttoapointinstatingthat“nudity