6. Difficulties in Normalizing Sino-Vatican Relations
6.4. Prospects on Negotiations: Gains, Risks and Losses
6.4.2. Religious Freedom and Appointments of Bishops
permanent Papal representative in Beijing, who would be required under Canon Law
364316 to send information to the Vatican about the status of the Chinese Church, authorities may struggle to find ways to check the flow of information.317 It is unclear as to whether or not Beijing will be willing to sacrifice this element of sovereignty for other political gain. Similarly, the size (and potential authority) of a united Church in China could prove to be a challenging force to the CCP’s authority.
Not only would potential exist for clashes between the CCP and the Catholic Church but also for the Church to act as a mechanism through which voices of dissent could be aired - the destabilizing potential is evident.318
6.4.2. Religious Freedom and Appointments of Bishops
Due to cultural and political encroachment by imperialists in the past, China, on grounds of nationalism and patriotism, has reiterated that the Catholic Church should be independent of any foreign control, a Chinese Church self-governing and self-administratin; and it has not allowed the Supreme Head of the Catholic Church, the Pope, and the administrative body of the Church, the Vatican, to have any relations whatsoever with the Chinese Catholics. In other words if the Chinese
316 Code of Canon Law (1983), Can. 364 The principal task of a Papal Legate is continually to make more firm and effective the bonds of unity which exist between the Holy See and the particular Churches. Within the territory assigned to him, it is therefore the responsibility of a Legate: 1° to inform the Apostolic See about the conditions in which the particular Churches find themselves, as well as about all matters which affect the life of the Church and the good of souls; 2° to assist the Bishops by action and advice, while leaving intact the exercise of their lawful power; 3° to foster close relations with the Episcopal Conference, offering it every assistance; 4° in connection with the appointment of Bishops, to send or propose names of candidates to the Apostolic See, as well as to prepare the informative process about those who may be promoted, in accordance with the norms issued by the Apostolic See; 5° to take pains to promote whatever may contribute to peace, progress and the united efforts of peoples; 6° to work with the Bishops to foster appropriate exchanges between the Catholic Church and other Churches or ecclesial communities, and indeed with non-christian religions; 7° to work with the Bishops to safeguard, so far as the rulers of the State are concerned, those things which relate to the mission of the Church and of the Apostolic See; 8° to exercise the faculties and carry out the other instructions which are given to him by the Apostolic See.
317 Luehrmann, L. Ibid. p. 501
318Smith, H. (2011). The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Vatican: Prospects for Rapprochement, p. 24-25
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137 Catholic Church, with the backing of the Chinese government, has full autonomy,
only the Chinese government can exercise authority over the Church. By arranging this, Beijing intends to negate completely the very special feature of the Catholic Church of having communion with its highest spiritual leader.319
China strongly requests to have the authority over the appointments of bishops.
But as previously mentioned, the first paragraph of the Can. 377 stipulates that it is the privilege of the Holy Father to select and appoint a bishop. In addition, paragraph 5 of the same canon stipulates:
Can. 377, §5. No rights and privileges of election, nomination, presentation, or designation of bishops are granted to civil authorities.
It is therefore clear that the appointment of bishops’ issue is non-negotiable and that this power of the Pope cannot be relegated to another authority. The appointment of bishops, who are pastors of the ecclesial community, belongs to the Holy Father. The Holy See can certainly express its hope that the bishops elected would receive the consensus of the local Churches, and even of the local civil authorities. But this must absolutely not come to the point of limiting the Pope’s prerogatives, or of granting negotiation or veto rights over candidates. It seems very difficult that the Vatican will concede to China this authority on appointing bishops. However, if a possible negotiation on these nominations is found, other problems will appear. Indeed, in case of diplomatic recognition, both China and the Church will have to face the position of the Catholic leaders within the CCPA. Where will they stand with Rome?
This will also include the reconciliation of excommunications and clarification as to
319Leung, B. (1992). op. cit., p. 265.
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138 whether past policies toward formal Church separation remain in force.320 There are
precedents which both the Vatican and the Chinese government can draw on to break the present deadlock and improve Sino –Vatican relations.In fact, in an interview with Catholic News in 2007, Archbishop Migliore pointed out the situation in Vietnam where, several years ago, a similar disagreement was resolved, with the Vatican agreeing to consult with the government over the appointment of bishops but still having the final say. Other examples can be found: some regions in Switzerland, Germany, and Austria each have the ability to nominate hopeful candidates, who then receive the approval of the Holy See. In Paraguay, Peru, Haiti, Monaco, and the French diocese of Alsace and Lorraine321, the governments each similarly nominate bishops for Papal approval as well. In the case of France and the Alsace-Lorraine region, the government nominates the Bishop. This privilege has been granted to France since Napoleon by the so-called “Concordat of 1801”. This Concordat was an agreement between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII, signed on July 15, 1801. It solidified the Roman Catholic Church as the majority Church of France and brought back most of its civil status. While the Concordat restored some ties to the papacy, it was largely in favor of the state; the balance of Church-State relations had tilted firmly in Napoleon's favor. The main terms of the Concordat of 1801 between France and Pope Pius VII included:
1/ A declaration that “Catholicism was the religion of the great majority of the French” but not the official state religion, thus maintaining religious freedom, in particular with respect to Protestants.
2/ The Papacy had the right to depose bishops, but this made little difference,
320Luehrman,, L. (2009, July/ September), op. cit., p. 498.
321The Concordat of 1801 was an agreement between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII, signed on 15 July 1801. It solidified the Roman Catholic Church as the majority Church of France and brought back most of its civil status.While the Concordat restored some ties to the papacy, it was largely in favor of the state; the balance of Church-state relations had tilted firmly in Napoleon's favour.
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139 because the French government still nominated them.
3/ The State would pay clerical salaries and the clergy swore an oath of allegiance to the State.
4/ The Roman Catholic Church gave up all its claims to Church lands that were confiscated after 1790.
5/ The Sabbath was reestablished as a "festival", effective Easter Sunday, 18 April 1802. The rest of the French Republican Calendar, which had been abolished, was not replaced by the traditional Gregorian calendar until 1 January 1806.
By the law of 1905 on the separation of Church and State, the Concordat was abrogated in France. However, some terms of the Concordat are still in effect in the Alsace-Lorraine region under the local law of Alsace-Moselle, as the region was controlled by the Holy Roman Empire at the time of the law's passage. Therefore, under this Concordat, the French government still has the right to nominate Bishops and the clergy is still paid by the State.
In Vietnam, where in recent years there has been great progress in promoting bilateral relations with the Vatican, the recent arrangement has been that Hanoi nominates three candidates from which the Pope chooses one.What will happen to the unregistered Church if diplomatic relations indeed develops? Is it possible to bring together the government-sanctioned Churches with unregistered ones? Will participants in the formerly registered Churches be welcomed with Christian charity by those who used to condemn them in the so-called underground movement? While there has been more crossover than conflict within these communities, some divisions and outspoken groups have also soured relations within some Churchcommunities. For many of these questions, the move toward reconciliation
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140 and recognition are not without detractors. Some may see the Vatican’s overtures
toward Beijing as acceptance of a schismatic Church and may consider this path as an insult to those who have suffered persecution because of their committed loyalty to the Holy See.322 Some Catholics believe the worsening persecution is due to signals of dialogue between the Chinese government and the Vatican, which are being increasingly hindered by the Patriotic Association. Even others caution that diplomatic relations will provide few solutions to the dilemmas faced by Catholic Christians in China. As Maryknoll Sister Betty Ann Maheu observed, “Diplomatic relations would be helpful, but they constitute only one element in the overall well-being of the Church in China”.323
6.5. Conclusion
The Church exists for the sake of evangelization, and the only thing it asks is freedom. Diplomatic relations take their meaning in the context of the evangelizing mission of the Church, which is not a political entity among others, and does not seek diplomatic affirmation. Diplomacy does not of itself bring to the Church the freedom to carry out fully its mission. Excessive faith in diplomatic results risks not only being a real illusion, but also bringing undue manipulation of the Church’s priorities. For the good of evangelization, it must remain clear that the Church’s mission is spiritual. The Holy See established its Nunciature in Taipei in 1951. The Vatican has been present in Taiwan for 61 years. During this long period of time, many ties of trust, cooperation and friendship were created. Indeed, the Internunciodid not plan to come to Taipei but tried to stay at his post in Mainland
322Luehrman,, L. (2009, July/ September), op. cit., p. 503.
323Maheu, B. A. (2005, November 7). The Catholic Church in China.America Press News, 193(14), p.
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141 China. However, after such a long time among the Taiwanese, it isn’t fair to abandon
Taiwan. It is right that the Holy See has this sublime mission of proclaiming the Gospel in all the corners of the World and especially in China where many Catholics are not yet free to believe and practice their faith. Why treat Taiwan as a “historical remnant,” as a sort of traffic accident to be shaken off? Of course, Taiwan is small, and China is big: but is this argument really valid? In Taiwan, the Church is free and at peace. There is an air of freedom and pluralism on this island.
The second pre-condition of China on the appointment of Bishops cannot be acceptable for the Vatican according to its Canon law. A constructive dialogue has to be established in order to find a possible solution that respects the authority of the Holy Father but also won’t irritate China. Pope Benedict XVI does really care about China and his great desire is to find a solution to this stalemate. Despite the difficulties and because of his love for the Chinese, the Holy Father hasn’t given up and continues to think of possible ways to reach China. Since he became Pope Benedict XVI in 2005, the Pontiff has always shown that he cares for China. He elevated to the Cardinalate, Bishop Zen in 2006, he wrote a letter addressing Chinese Catholics in 2007, and he established the Commission on the Church in China in late 2007. Even though illicit ordinations took place recently in China, the Pope was not discouraged because of his concern for the freedom of Catholics on the Mainland. In order to have a better understanding of China, Pope Benedict XVI has ordained Archbishop Savio Hon, a native of Hong Kong, and appointed him as secretary of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples. In addition, the Holy Father appointed Archbishop Fernando Filoni, an expert in Chinese affairs and on the Middle East, as prefect of the Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples, on 10 May 2011; he was made cardinal at the consistory of February 18, 2012.
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142 Numerous are the difficulties but great is the desire of the Holy See normalize the
relations with China. However, this has to be done in a proper way and according to the principle, the moral and beliefs of the Church.
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143 7. Scenarios on Sino-Vatican Relations
7.1. Introduction
The issue of Sino-Vatican diplomatic relations is far from easy to solve. Time and constructive dialogue will certainly help for a better mutual understanding. The Soviet Union / Russia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam had, in the past, difficulties in their ties with the Holy See. However, Russia has recently created full diplomatic relations with the Vatican and Vietnam has accepted a Papal non-resident envoy. These two cases may serve as models to think about a possible way to normalize the relations between the Vatican and China. In his address on January 11, 2010 to the members of the diplomatic Corps, Pope Benedict XVI said:
I formulate the hope that the Successor of Peter keeps his door open to everyone in the hope of maintaining relations which can contribute to the progress of the human family. It is a reason for deep satisfaction that, just a few weeks ago, full diplomatic relations were established between the Holy See and the Russian Federation. The recent visit of the President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was likewise very significant; Vietnam is a country close to my heart, where the Church is celebrating her centuries-long presence with a Jubilee Year. In this spirit of openness, throughout 2009 I met many political leaders from all over the world; I also visited some of them and would like to continue to do so, insofar as is possible.324
7.2. The Model of Russia-Vatican Relations 7.2.1. Perestroika and Glasnost
During the Cold War, the Holy See and the Kremlin went through decades of spiritual and philosophical conflict. The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who
324BenedictXVI. (2010, January 11). Address of His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI to the Members of the Diplomatic Corps for the Traditional Exchange of New Year Greetings. Retrieved March 14, 2012, from www.vatican.va:
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2010/january/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_2 0100111_diplomatic-corps_en.html
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144 came to power in 1985, inaugurated a new era by promoting perestroika325 for the
restructure of his country’s political and economic system and by leading his major policy reform: the so-called glasnost326, meaning “openness”. With Gorbachev, hostility with the Vatican came to an end when he came to Rome for a historic meeting327 with Pope John Paul II in December 1989. The Soviet leader wanted to offer to the Soviet Union another orientation for a bright future by adopting new policies both on the domestic level as well as on the international level. This became reality when in March 1990, the Soviet Union and the Vatican established official diplomatic relations at the level of permanent missions; this was a year before the collapse of the Communist regime. The Holy See wanted Gorbachev to restore religious freedom to the Soviet Catholics. The Ukrainian Catholic Church was driven underground by Stalin in 1946. It was forcibly dissolved, and its parishes were closed or merged into the Russian Orthodox Church. Centered in the western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Catholics follow the Eastern liturgy but profess allegiance to the Pope. Gorbachev promises the Pope new law on religious freedom. The Pope has insisted repeatedly that the Ukrainian Catholic Church be made legal again; and he got an important start toward that goal when Gorbachev promised him that a new law guaranteeing freedom of conscience would soon be enacted. In turn, the Soviet leader won something he had come for: legitimacy from the leader of the world's 900 million Roman Catholics. It came in the form of a Papal blessing for his plans to restructure Soviet political and economic life. John Paul said the Holy See ''wishes you success and declares itself ready to support every initiative that will better
325 “Perestroika” (meaning restructuring or reconstruction) refers to the series of political, economic, and social reforms and foreign policy changes undertaken by the Soviet Communist Party in the years 1985 to 1991.
326Glasnost (meaning openness) was a policy which called for increased openness and transparency in government institutions and activities in the Soviet Union.
327 This was only the second time a leader of Russia had met with a Pope, the first being the meeting between Tsar Nicholas I and Pope Gregory XVI in 1845.
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145 protect and integrate the rights and duties of individuals and peoples”.328 During his
second meeting with the pontiff in November 1990, Gorbachev told him about new Soviet religious freedom legislation, which was followed by the reestablishment of Roman Catholic structures in Russia. Boris Yeltsin accepted the tradition to intensify contacts with the Vatican in the midst of political changes and met John Paul II twice in the pontiff’s personal Apostolic Library,; the first time was on December 19, 1991, only a few days after the Belavezha Accords329 were signed. The leader of the new Russia proclaimed his post-Soviet reforming strategy before the spiritual leader of countless Christians.330 Then, in January 1992 the Vatican recognized Russia as the U.S.S.R.'s legal successor and also established relations at the level of mission.
7.2.2. The Vatican and the Russian Orthodox Church
The new detente follows decades of mistrust between the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches under the officially atheist USSR. With an agreement to begin official relations and a pledge of expanded religious freedom for Soviet citizens, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev joined hands today with Pope John Paul II.
Indeed, since the early 1990s, the Catholic Church was able to normally function in Russia. But the lifting of restrictions on religion led to new tensions with the Orthodox Church, which accused the Vatican of poaching for souls in traditional Orthodox territory. The Vatican denied this charge. The standoff prevented John Paul II from fulfilling his wish to make a pilgrimage to Russia. Indeed, the step forward
328Haberman, C. (1989, December 2). The Kremlin and the Vatican; Gorbachev Visits Pope at Vatican; Ties Are Forged. The New York times. Retrieved April 17, 2012, from
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/02/world/the-kremlin-and-the-vatican-gorbachev-visits-Pope-at-vat ican-ties-are-forged.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
329The Belavezha Accords is the agreement which declared the Soviet Union effectively dissolved
329The Belavezha Accords is the agreement which declared the Soviet Union effectively dissolved