The U.S. pragmatic diplomacy

Based on the U.S. Congressional Research Service report (September 30^th, 1996):

U.S. administration of the islands began in 1953 as a result of the 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan. The Treaty did not mention the Senkakus (Diaoyus), but it referred to other islands that had reverted to Chinese control or which China claimed. These included Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Spratlys, and the Paracels. Article 3 gave the United States sole powers of administration of “Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude.” In 1953, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus issued U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus Proclamation 27 (USCAR 27), which defined the boundaries of “Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude” to include the Senkakus. At the time of the signing of the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, several State Department officials asserted that following the signing of the Japan Peace Treaty, “Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude” was understood by the United States and Japan to include the Senkaku Islands [32, p. 2].

Clearly, the Pinnacle Islands fall south of 29 degrees of north latitude (see Appendix, Figure 22). Although the PRC and ROC governments do not accept the Okinawa Reversion Treaty as a lawful sovereignty transfer over the Pinnacles, the U.S. implication concerning the geographic delineation of the Ryukyu Islands notably supports Japanese administration of the Pinnacles through Okinawa Prefecture.

Nonetheless, despite the United States’ legal association and commitments, since 1972 the U.S. Department of State has opted for an impartial position towards China, Japan, and Taiwan claims over the Pinnacles [28, 29, 32, 4, 16, 23]. Pragmatically, even though the United States maintains neutrality in the dispute, the U.S.

government has agreed that the Okinawa Reversion Treaty is related to the Japan-U.S.

Security Treaty. As described above, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty obligates the United States to protect the territory under “Japanese administration,” which technically includes the Pinnacle Islands. Since 1971, neither the United States nor Japan has appealed to modify any clause of the Japan-U.S Security Treaty, or its implications towards the disputed islands [32].

4.2. The U.S. pragmatic diplomacy

After the 9/11 incident, in the several other incidents such as the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the following trade deficit, the Wall Street crisis in 2008, and the China’s rise, the United States’ declination is quite evident.

Additionally, East Asia transformation is aiming at competition with the United States.

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States’ leadership in the region is still important.

In 1952, the United States and Japan signed a security accord that later was succeeded by the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan in 1960 (Japan-U.S. Security Treaty) [57]. This agreement has remained as the core of the strategic alliance between the two States, and this treaty has also placed Japan as a promoter of the Washington policy in East Asia. Another important point is that the solid relationship between Tokyo and Washington has fostered the pacifist profile of Japan in the region. This aspect somehow has improved the image of Japan’s foreign policy since the 1970’s. At the same time, from Washington’s perspective, the Japanese alliance contributes to the American strategic interests in East Asia by facilitating the deployment and maintenance of the U.S.

Forces in Japan (USFJ) [29, 20].

Certainly, Washington performed a crucial role in the stimulation and manipulation of the Pinnacles issue in 1951 and then again in 1972. The United States provoked the causes of multiple territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors within the 1951 San Francisco framework: 1) the Pinnacle Islands among Japan, PRC, and ROC; 2) the Northern Territories between Japan and USSR (Russia); and 3) the Liancourt Rocks among Japan and the two Koreas. Under the Cold War umbrella, these disputes acted as walls to encase Japan in the Western bloc, protecting it from the communist influence. Whereas, in 1972 the United States washed its hands to Japan by letting the Pinnacles issue unsolved, when it returned the Nansei Islands to Japan’s sovereignty under the Okinawa Reversion Treaty, which included the Pinnacle Islands. Nevertheless, after the Pinnacles controversy erupted, Washington reaffirmed its position announcing that U.S. Military Government only relinquished administrative rights over the Pinnacle Islands in specific. Probably, the American strategists calculated that the Pinnacles dispute would serve as a shield to contend the PRC. They also probably know that letting the territorial dispute nearby the Okinawas would justify the presence of the U.S. Forces in Japan [11]. Indeed, these estimations were still demonstrated during the 2010 incident.

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intervene directly into the regional affairs. Although the U.S. has tried to improve its alliances and reinforce its military presence in order to retain its strategy with its Asian partners, the United States has noted that its interactions with its Asian allies are turning more complex and uncertain. For instance, the American government cannot stimulate its Asian allies to formulate policies against China directly because the U.S. allies do not want to be in such a position. Therefore, the United States has adopted a pragmatic policy in the dispute. Washington has limited itself to deterring China if it forcibly takes the Pinnacles, while at the same time Washington is discouraging any determination to support the Japan’s or Taiwan’s claims. By strategic means, the U.S. supports its allies (Japan and Taiwan) by maintaining a certain power to contend China’s force, and opposing any attempt to fully restore their military power in a way to solve their disputes. Gradually, Japan and the United States will strengthen their ties to work together and to promote progressive and beneficial relations in order to avoid conflictive scenario in East Asia. The United States has to reformulate how to track its interests in the region with the help of Japan and Taiwan [92, 29]. Otherwise, China will try to vacuum the U.S. power in East Asia by influencing the U.S. allies.

For instance, Taiwan self-determination is still uncertain, and given the possibilities that China’s rise might persuade the Taiwanese leaders to formulate policies with regard to an eventual unification with China, in which there will not be much margin for the American influence in Taiwan. In this sense, Beijing’s strategy would threat the U.S. relations with its Asian allies, if they opt to ally the Chinese opposite force. Hence, the United States will motivate its strategic partners to rebuild their ties in order to keep balancing the power in the region. The relationship between Japan and the United States has been maintained since the end of World War II. As a matter of fact, for the United States, Japan is the most consistent ally in East Asia.

Even though Japan has diversified its ties with many Nation-States, the U.S. is the only nation with special military commitments to Japan. Certainly, the American-Japanese security alliance is the essence of the Washington policy in East Asia.

Therefore, the United States will try to consolidate its relations with Japan, trying to oppose the Chinese influence in the region. After 2001 the American-Japanese

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alliance took a further step. Japan’s support in the U.S. counter-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were important efforts for the Japanese government to satisfy the United States’ policies around the world. Thereby, Washington has proposed some changes regarding to its strategic alliance with Tokyo by emphasizing the security, integration, and exchange of information [29, 104]. In terms of security there have been strong maritime defense assistance and ballistic missile provisions from the United States as it was evidenced during the recent tensions that North Korea brought to Japan and the rest of the region over a suspicious rocket launch on April 2012. The JSDF deployed several American-made Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile interceptors over Tokyo Metropolitan area as well as various Okinawan townships (Ishigaki, Naha, Miyako, and Chinen) where the rocket supposed to soar.

Fortunately, the North Korean artifact exploded a minute after takeoff, so that the Japanese forces did not require taking further actions [105]. Another important security joint case between Japan and the U.S. has been the SM-3 Cooperative Development Program. It is a SM-3 missile variance to neutralize long-range ballistic missiles, which will have been programed by 2018 [104]. Regarding to integration and exchange of information, the U.S. has promoted the Japanese pacifist foreign policy for decades. As a result, Japan has remarkably increased its participation in regional and international forums. Additionally, Japan has been acknowledged as one of the biggest donors for humanitarian operations across the globe [92, 26].

When the DPJ took the power in 2009, initially it tried to redefine a foreign policy towards a more Asian-oriented rather than a pro-American one. The Japan-U.S.

alliance rhetoric was adjusted, strategic and security issues were planted in between the United States and China. As a result, Japanese government strategy was positioned itself in a more Asian stance, trying to move away from the United States.

As a matter of fact, debates were raised in the Japanese Diet over the removal of the U.S. Futenma base in Okinawa [106, 107]. This initiative brought some tension in Washington and questioned the Japanese alliance commitments. Nevertheless, it can be observed that Washington can use its soft and hard power to convince the Japanese government for the importance of the United States military presence in Okinawa. For instance, Tomodachi Operation ‘Operation Friend’ exercised during the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster of 2011 reaffirmed that the United States alone was the only nation that has the capability to provide maritime resources and aid to people of

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Japan on time [108]. Regarding to the U.S.’s hard power, it can be discerned that the American military supremacy is the only actor that is able to deterrence the parties involved in the Pinnacles dispute, so that the controversy will not escalate to a military conflict. On the other hand, the United Sates may also use the Pinnacles controversy in order to preserve its strategic interests and hegemony in East Asia.

From this standpoint, the Japan-U.S. alliance is partly founded on the protection of Japanese sovereignty against a potential military encounter with China and North Korea. Whereas, it may be perceived as limiting the Japan’s possibilities to once again develop its military power and intimate Beijing’s interests in East Asia. At the same time, it is the U.S. protection that has ensured the progress of the commitment of China not to directly threaten Japan and Taiwan.

Under these circumstances, it is difficult for the DPJ to totally change Japan’s foreign policy, making constitutional amendments, and thus obstructing the American-Japanese strategic relationship. Additionally, Japan is still suffering from numerous social problems such as an increasing aged population. The Japanese economy is still under recession, and the unemployment rate has been intensified as well as the tsunami and nuclear disaster of 2011, which has provoked health problems and energy shortages across the country. This last issue has somehow questioned if Japan should continue to rely on nuclear energy or not, which is very difficult to determine for the country with limited natural resources. Therefore, there is an increasing pressure on the DPJ to pay more attention to domestic policies rather than foreign ones.

In 2009, the Deputy Prime Minister of Japan, Katsuya Okada declared that the Japan-U.S. alliance should not be enclosed to military purposes, but also serves as a framework to deal with global issues. Okada emphasized the importance of the U.S.

Forces in Japan for defense purposes, but also for conducting joint exercises in East Asia [109, 110]. This suggestion might be a big challenge for Japan to subordinate the limitation for its sovereignty protection in order to diversify the U.S. alliance towards further steps. Probably, Washington is willing to consolidate its strategic alliance with Japan to more cooperative issues. The dilemma is whether or not Tokyo is also willing to go forward with the American-Japanese security alliance or to move towards the new pole of power that Beijing is trying to assert in the region. In the inexistence of an improvement of a more strategic and security issues among China,

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Japan, and Taiwan, it is up to the United States to determine the path of this complex multilateral relationship. For that reason, Washington tries to maintain relatively good ties with Beijing, Taipei, and Tokyo through a pragmatic diplomacy. Thus, the U.S.

will continue to play its balancer role in order to safeguard its interests and stability in East Asia. Whereas, China might perceive the Japan-U.S. alliance beneficial for it in order to constrain Japanese military capabilities, and to determine itself as the main power in Asia. At the same time, China can compete for the global supremacy against the United States [111]. There is no other Asian power that has openly challenged the United States in economic and military terms as China did. In fact, China’s trades with each of the U.S.’s major allies and partners in East Asia (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) have surpassed the value of the trades with the United States. Moreover, the new Chinese military build-up and modernization have confronted the American power in the region. Indeed, China has experienced substantial changes that indicate the new regional power trying to shift the U.S. balance of power away. Thereby, China will continue to be the core of the regional growth and dynamism, attempting to change the status quo. This transformation has also reflected in its assertive foreign policy, which aims the acquisition of economic and strategic interests around its borders and beyond them [92, 22].

In order to maintain the American interests and values against a rising China, which already has tried to diminish the U.S. influence on East Asia, Washington has performed a significant role regarding to the Pinnacle controversy. One important effect on the perception of the U.S. as the security guarantor of Japan is that it has created a broader scope for the Japanese government in order to maintain its position and deal with China and Taiwan in the Pinnacles issue [92]. From this perspective, Tokyo is seen as an important ally for Washington to keep their strategic interests in the region. Therefore, the U.S. does need Japan’s cooperation to continue its long-stand power in East Asia. At the same time, America’s support would guarantee to Japan not to be marginalized in the new world order. Nonetheless, such sense of security has been reduced by Japan’s concern to become more dependent on China.

Whereas, the U.S. implications in the Pinnacles case has also pressured China to make efforts to commit itself with its neighboring States in order to preserve the stability in the region [20, 41].

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As discussed above, although the diplomatic relation between Beijing and Tokyo has improved in many aspects through dialogues since 1970’s when the Sino-Japanese ties resumed, there are still some issues in which China and Japan cannot coincide, and they can drive the two nations to a mutual conflict as planted in this controversy. In this sense, the U.S.’s intermediacy cannot be neglected. The U.S.

military power still retains its global hegemony; however, Washington strategy does not intend to threat or intervene militarily to solve the dispute. Instead, the United States involvement is to maintain the status quo in the region. How much U.S. will be involved will depend on the circumstances.

Basically, the United States is reluctant to get involved more than a military prevention, and it has not done much to solve the controversy. In fact, in the Pinnacles case, the Washington’s official position is impartial regarding to the parties’ claims and it has echoed that the involved parties should solve the controversy as they convene without an armed intervention [56]. Therefore, the U.S. military intervention will be launch only if the Pinnacles dispute would jeopardize the stability in the region. Although the Pinnacle Islands case has not yet escalated to a major conflict, it can incite a more direct U.S. response. Washington has tried to reinforce its strategy and interests in contending China in East Asia through its maritime disputes in the region. Hence, it would be quite difficult for China to take the Pinnacles, and at the same time it is able to protect its strategic and economic interests in other areas such as South East Asia.

在文檔中 Controversy over the Pinnacle Islands Revisited (頁 71-77)